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A HISTORY OF GARMENT AND TAILORING WORKERS IN CAPE TOWN, 1900-1939 
ABSTRACT 
The large scale production of clothing started relatively late in 
South Africa because of the inability of local manufacturers to 
compete with cheap imports. The industry's tendency to draw the 
most exploitable workers into a system of "sweated labour" emerged 
clearly during World War I, when military uniforms were produced in 
Cape Town under appalling conditions. But the clothing industry did 
not become firmly established until after 1925 when a protective 
tariff was imposed on clothing imports. Industrial laws then assist­
ed to ensure that South African clothing production was based on 
factories not outwork and that the extremes of sweating were pre­
vented from establishing a hold on the trade. From 1925 to 1939 
the Cape Town clothing industry grew impressively. The foundations 
were laid for the rapid expansion of the industry after 1939 and 
for the emergence of the clothing industry as the leading employer 
of labour in Cape Town and of the Western Cape as the leading 
centre of clothing manufacturing in South Africa. 
Garment workers in Cape Town have a history starkly different 
from that of garment workers in the Transvaal. While the latter 
were strongly organized into a successful, militant union (under 
the leadership of E.S. Sachs) and were a leading force in economic 
and political battles in the Transvaal, the former were press-ganged 
into membership of an employer-sympathetic union created by Robert 
Stuart of the Cape Federation of Labour Unions. While the Garment 
Workers' Union of the Cape Peninsula maintained a strict non-racialism 
at all times, the Transvaal union excluded African workers and orga­
nized coloured workers into a separate branch. While very few 
Cape garment workers were ever involved in strikes and the Cape 
Union never once called a strike, the Transvaal garment workers 
participated in two union-called general strikes and in over one 
hundred more limited strike actions. Cape garment workers' wages 
were between ten and forty per cent below those in the Transvaal. 
The distinctiveness of the Cape garment workers' history 
derives from the peculiarities of the class struggle in Cape Town. 
The slow growth of the city over 250 years; its economic base in 
commerce rather than in the exploitation of natural resources; the 
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relative backwardness of Cape Town capitalism - with a dominant 
merchant class challenging the development of precarious manufactur­
ing enterprises which operated in a highly competitive environment 
and remained almost entirely confined to consumer goods production; 
and the absence of primary racial division in the working class, 
all contributed to a process of class struggle that was more muted 
than that in the North. Cape Town was infertile ground for the 
growth of an organized working class movement. Apart from sporadic 
but intense worker action briefly after World War I, few workers 
were drawn into either trade union or political organization. On 
the other hand, Cape manufacturers, despite their differences, 
were united in the Cape Chamber of Industries (by W.J. Laite) 
to promote protection for their industries and to build a cornmon 
front to resist labour initiatives and government interference. 
The labour legislation of the 1920's had profound effects on 
the forms of organization of workers (and employers) in Cape Town 
and on the class struggle. The legislation provided the basis 
for a close alliance between the clothing manufacturers and the 
bureaucratic leadership of the Garment Workers' Union of the Cape 
Peninsula. The Wage Act could be applied to unorganized workers 
in industry and allowed the "Wage Board" to set minimum wages 
at "civilized" levels. The Industrial Conciliation Act allowed 
well-organized trade union and employers' organizations themselves 
to negotiate wages via a Conciliation Board or an Industrial Council. 
In the Cape clothing industry, employers sponsored the creation 
of a trade union in the hope that they might avoid the attention 
of the Wage Board by forming an Industrial Council. This Union, 
duly registered under the Industrial Conciliation Act, was a major 
weapon of the employers in defeating two campaigns launched by the 
Transvaal garment workers' union in Cape Town to organize Cape 
garment workers and absorb them into a national union to fight· 
for higher wages. The second of these campaigns caused the formation 
of the current Industrial Council for the Clothing Industry (Cape) 
as a defensive move on the part of the Cape manufacturers and 
the Cape Union against both the Transvaal union and a growing mili­
tancy amongst Cape Town workers. 
The labour legislation had different effects on the fortunes 
of tailoring and factory workers. Between 1926 and 1936 the wages 
and conditions of both branches of the clothing industry in Cape 
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Town were governed by the Wage Board. Despite the early opposition 
of clothing factory owners to the Wage Board, their adherence 
to certain key aspects of the Wage Determinations aided the rapid 
expansion of the industry and a slow increase in wages. By con­
trast, the tailoring trades were plunged into confusion by the 
Wage Board's attempts to abolish horne-work. Faced by mounting 
competition from clothing factories, tailoring declined, becoming 
a much less important avenue of employment and making a much re­
duced contribution to local clothing production. 
The thesis is a case study in a virtually unexplored area of South 
African labour history. Its concern is to situate the history 
of the clothing workers within the class struggle in Cape Town. 
An analysis of the long-standing wage disparity between the Wit­
watersrand and Cape Town clothing industries serves to emphasize 
the interlinkages between the struggles of workers in the two 
regions. A detailed examination of the operation of the Wage 
and Industrial Conciliation Acts in the Cape Town clothing trades 
shows up weaknesses in the existing "Transvaal-centric" interpreta­
tions of this important legislation. The story of organization 
in the garment industry illustrates many of the problems confront­
ing trade unionism in Cape Town in the inter-war period. 
The archives of the Cape Clothing Manufacturers' Association, the 
Garment Workers' Union of South Africa and the Secretary for Labour 
are major sources of the thesis. 
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In magnis et voluisse 	sat est 

Propertius II x 6 

[In great undertakings it is enough 
even to have had the will for them] 
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,INTRODUCTION 

Clothing factories employ more women workers than any other branch 
of South African industry. Although more than ninety percent 
of these workers are trade union members, the wages paid by the 
clothing factories are among the lowest in all of manufacturing 
industry. 
It is no co-incidence that the industrial sector with the 
lowest wages should also be 'the best organized' - the trade unions 
play an important role in suppressing and defusing worker discontent. 
The militant history of the Garment Workers' Union of South Africa 
testifies that. this was not always the case in the Transvaal. 
But, 'in the Cape and Natal, garment workers have always been domi­
nated by bureaucratic, conservative unions which exist in a more 
or less happy alliance with the factory owners. 
This thesis studies the origins of the Cape Garment Workers' 
Union by tracing the history of labour and employer organization 
in the clothing trades from the start of this century up to the 
outbreak of World War II. The main intention of the work is to 
explain why this type of employer-dominated unionism was able 
to take root so early and so firmly in the Cape clothing industry. 
Analysis of the forgotten history of the clothing workers is not 
restricted to their trade unions. Account is taken of the condi­
tions of class struggle in Cape Town and of the effects of industrial 
legislation and employer organization. The thesis breaks new 
ground as the first detailed account of labour organization in a 
Cape Town manufacturing industry and also as the first attempt 
1to identify the conditions of economic class struggle specific 
to Cape Town in the inter-War period. 
1. 	 In this context, 'economic class struggle' refers to all 
the efforts of workers and working class organizations to 
secure from the employers or from the state improved wages 
and working conditions. The concept does not exclude politics 
but it signifies the struggles which accept the confines 
of the existing political system and have as their object 
the wresting of economic concessions from the capitalist 
class. Poulantzas (1973, p.130) describes the economic class 
struggle as lithe socio-economic relations of the CMP". 
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Major Sources 

2
Original use is made of three main archival sources those of 
the Garment Workers' Union of South Africa (GWUSA), the Secretary 
for Labour and the Cape Chamber of Industries (CCI). The magni­
ficent collection of GWUSA papers has been well-used since it 
was donated to the University of the Witwatersrand Library in 
1976. However this is the first work3 to draw'on those parts 
of the collection relating to clothing worker unionism in the 
Cape. The files of the Secretary for Labour have never, to my 
knowledge been used, as is done here, to analyse official policy 
on the implementation of the industrial legislation of the 1920's. 
The CCI has itself used its records to prepare short official 
histories of its activities but this is the first time a close 
study has been made of one of its constituent associations - that 
of the clothing manufacturers - and it is the first effort to 
make use of the CCI records for the purposes of reconstructing 
the labour history of Cape Town. 
The CCI archive is not indexed or sorted, and is housed in 
a state of confusion in several separate store-rooms. While exca­
vating for material on the garment industry, I prepared a rough 
inventory of the contents of the store-rooms and persuaded the 
University of Cape Town library to ask the CCI to donate these 
records to the University for safe-keeping. The library has made 
several approaches to the Chamber over the past four years but 
none has been successful. 
The CCI archive dates from 1904 and represents the greatest 
single source of information on the development of manufacturing 
industry in Cape Town. It is rich in material valuable to economic 
2. 	 I was unable to consult the records of the Industrial Council 
for the Clothing Industry (ICCI) (Cape) and those of the 
Garment Workers' Union of the Cape Peninsula (GWU-CP - now 
named the Garment Workers' Union of the Western Province). 
The secretary of the industrial council and the officials 
of the Union turned down flat several requests to make use 
of their records under any circumstances. Mr G. Nel of the 
ICCI (Cape) stated that the secrecy clause in the council's 
constitution prevented even its earliest records being made 
available to anyone. Neither Mr L. Petersen nor Mr C. Petersen 
of the GWU-WP explained the repeated refusal of their Union 
to give me any assistance in my research. 
3. 	 Apart from my B.A.(Honours) dissertation, (Nicol, 1977). 
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and social historians and indeed to any social scientist interested 
in the history of Cape Town. It is distressing that this unique 
archive remains bundled in cardboard boxes in dusty store-rooms 
where it is both inconvenient to use and not properly cared for. 
Aims of the Thesis 
The aims of the thesis are at once limited and broad. The thesis 
has a narrow focus on the garment and tailoring workers of Cape 
Town in a particular period. One of its major aims is to piece 
together fragments of the untold story of Cape Town's tailors 
and clothing machinists. But it also seeks to draw out from the 
experience of the garment workers a broader range of general points 
relating to Cape Town, to South Africa-and to the effects of the 
uneven development of capitalism. 
For example, the study of the records of the clothing manufac~ 
turers' and master tailors' associations, in conjunction with 
those of the Secretary for Labour allows a fascinating case-study 
of the teething problems of the industrial legislation of the 
\ 
1920's and its different effects in the clothing industry and 
the tailoring trade. The legislation had a profound impact on 
wage levels, work processes and attitudes to labour organization 
in Cape Town industry. The battles around the trade union organi­
zation in the garment industry after 1925, which are recorded 
here, throw light on many of the central problems of the Cape 
labour movement. The organization of Cape Town employers by the 
CCI became one of the main determinants of the path taken by labour. 
organization. The close examination of the activities of the Cape 
Wholesale Clothing and Shirt Manufacturers'Association (CWCMA) 
show this process in detail. Differences in the tenor of class 
struggle between the Cape Peninsula and the Witwatersrand are 
stressed and found to be related in part to the backwardness of 
capitalism in Cape Town. The clothing sector is characteristic 
of Cape Town industry - it is labour intensive, small scale and 
challenged by local competition as well as competition from the 
Transvaal and imports from overseas. 
This study thus illuminates a general understanding of Cape 
Town labour history and some of the regional implications of South 
African industrial legislation. 
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The bulk of the thesis consists of a detailed narrative. 
On the one hand this encompasses the working conditions of garment 
and tailoring workers, the struggles of workers in factories and 
sweatshops and the means of ~heir disorganization by the employers, 
the state and their trade union. On the other hand the narrative 
highlights the complex relationship between tailors, factory owners 
and the Wage Board and the conflicts between merchant tailors, 
journeymen tailors and the clothing factories. Yet despite its 
concern with everyday events, its efforts to portray the subtleties 
in the relationships between workers, bosses and trade unionists 
and its use of sources which directly reflect class struggle, 
the 	 thesis is not well described as a 'history from below,.4 
This 	is for two reasons. First, such a study of the Cape 
garment workers, to be properly rounded, would include more than 
is attempted here. In particular, it would include an account 
of the social background of clothing workers over time and an 
investigation of the organizational implications of the majority 
of workers being women. These are not omitted because they are 
regarded as superfluous to the present study (on the contrary) 
but because of a lack of readily available sources. Second, 'his­
tory 	from below' is too limiting a description of the purposes 
of the the thesis as a whole. Unlike many histories from below 
it explicitly tackles theoretical issues - specifically those 
relating to the dynamics of regional class struggle. Both of 
these points merit further explanation. 
With regard to the social background of workers, we are able 
to sketch little more than changes in the racial composition of 
the workforce. None of the sources consulted5 could give specific 
answers to questions about the social origins, family situations, 
housing conditions or education of the clothing workers. The 
social milieu of garment workers was constantly changing. The 
early tailo~s and tailoresses, the War-time sweatshop workers 
4. 	 See, for example, Thompson (1963); Hobsbawm and Rude (1973); 

Stedman Jones (1971); van Onselen (1982). 

5. 	 In addition to the major archival sources, sources included 
newspapers and periodicals, government .publications, court 
records, secondary materials and a limited use of oral testi­
mony. 
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and the waves of "better class" women whose employment after 1925 
secured the success of the clothing industry in Cape Town. all 
had differing social origins. Speculations. about the identity 
of Cape garment workers in these periods could only be safely 
made in a wide study of the origins and development of a working 
class in Cape Town. It should be borne in mind that while about 
half of the women workers in Cape Town industry in 1938 worked 
in clothing factories. even then the number of garment workers 
was small in absolut~ terms. not being above 6 000. Clothing workers 
were never a group clearly identifiable apart from the rest of 
the working class in Cape Town. 
With regard to the peculiarities of the clothing industry 
which derive from its predominantly female labour force, the sources 
consulted give few clues about the dynamics of the sexual division 
of labour in the factory. They merely indicate its extent and 
principal cause - the ability of the manufacturers to pay women 
lower wages than men. 
The interesting studies of Afrikaner women garment workers 
in the Transvaal by Pollak (1933). J. Lewis (1978), O'Meara (1978), 
Touyz (1979) and Berger (1982) all rely on the fact that for a 
long period and .for changing reasons these workers were a distinct 
group within the working class in Johannesburg and Germiston. 
They were recognized as such by their union and within the factories 
as well as by politicians. Studies of the Transvaal clothing 
industry do not deal satisfactorily with the black men who were 
an important proportion of the workforce from the start of the 
industry or with the black women who entered the industry during 
World War II and soon outnumbered white women workers. 
A 'history from below' is not prohibited from explicitly 
discussing theoretical issues6 but it is not one of its charac­
teristics. An important feature of this thesis is its open dis­
cussion of the analytical problems that surround it. It is not 
possibl~ to understand the story of the garment workers of Cape 
Town apart from their context in the class struggle in Cape Town. 
A correct characterisation of the class struggle in Cape Town 
is thus essential for this thesis - while at the same time being 
6. See. for example, Foster (1974). 
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impossible. No other authors have considered the regional sp~­
cificity of class struggle in Cape Town before World War II (or 
after it) and this study, which does not depart. far from its focus 
on garment workers cannot alone allow a reliable analysis of the 
broader local conditions of class struggle. The characterisation 
of class struggle in Cape Town presented in this thesis is there­
fore subject to revision in later work. 
Analytical Influences 
The aims of the thesis which have been noted above are continually 
given explicit expression. But there remains an additional set 
of intentions the realization of which depends on the success 
of the thesis as a whole. To express these intentions and draw 
out their implications is not easy. They may be expressed starkly 
and succinctly as follows: In its presentation this thesis attempts 
to bridge the great divide in recent South African historical 
writing between Marxist historians who adopt a narrative discourse 
and other Marxist social scientists who write within a structural­
ist framework. In particular it seeks to reconcile and synthesize 
the work of scholars such as Charles van Onselen with that of 
scholars such as Rob Davies, Dave Kaplan, Dan O'Meara and Mike 
Morris,7 who have developed interpretations of South African history 
while drawing on-the theories of Poulantzas. 8 
7. 	 Referred to below as 'the Poulantzian writers'. 
8. 	 The thesis did not set out with the set of intentions mentioned 
above in mind. It started in a state of confusion and ignor­
ance, about the facts of Cape Town labour history and theories 
applicable to class struggle in Cape Town, that only lessened 
in the process of writing and interpreting. No process of 
historical investigation can (or ought to) begin from a state 
of analytical clarity. The comments below do not reflect 
the method of writing and interpreting history. They seek 
rather to draw out implications of the thesis that could 
only be seen after its completion. Marx once summarized 
his dialectical method as follows: 
"Of course the method of presentation must differ in form 
from the method of investigation. The aim of investigation 
is to appropriate the matter in detail, to analyze its various 
developmental forms, and to trace the inner connexions be­
tween these forms. Not until this preliminary work has been 
effected, can the movement as it really is be suitably described. 
If the description prove successful, if the life of the subject 
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Charles van Onselen's writings are immediately attractive 
to any writer of South African labour or social history. He writes 
local history, tracing class conflict in everyday existence and 
in periods of crisis in order to reveal the interaction of cultural, 
political and economic conditions. His description is at the 
same time an explanation for the events, the conditions, the period 
he is dealing with. Above all, van Onselen is a magnificent story­
teller. He brings the past to life. His writings have an intrinsic 
value besides their importance as the vehicle for new research. 
Van Onselen is not simply possessed of a talent for story­
telling. His work puts people back into the class struggle. 
History is not made simply by classes or organizations or fractions 
of capital. People make history. Their actions may be understood 
by locating their class position but this rarely provides a suffi­
cient explanation. It is also misleading uncritically to see 
organizations as the real actors in history (this may be done 
by identifying an organization with a class or a fraction of 
capital). People are behind these organizations - often a very 
few people. To expose their role is not to deny that class in~ . 
terests and positions are expressed through organizations, but 
to allow that private interests and ambitions can direct an organi­
zation as much as elemental class forces. 
9The success of van Onselen's narrative style, however, draws 
attention away from the theories of history, of capitalism, of social. 
development, which underlie it. Van Onselen has no theoretical 
introductions to his work. Nowhere does he articulate the theory 
behind his writings. This is not a failure in itself - his analysis 
speaks through his interpretation of the facts and events he 
interrogates. But it makes him a secretive craftsman. One is 
able to admire the finished product he provides while not really 
understanding how it is made. 
matter is now reflected back in the ideas, then it may appear 
as if we have before us an a priori construction." (Marx, 
1974, p.lix and 1976, p.102). 
The qualifying phrase "If the description prove successful" 
is crucial. The success of an historical narrative depends 
on many factors. The comments below focus on just one of 
these factors - the adequacy of the analysis which underlies 
the narrative. 
9. See van Onselen (1976 and 1982). 
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The Poulantzian writers have a quite different method. It 
is always open-day in their historical workshop. The specialist 
concepts of their trade are laid out, like tools, for inspection 
and questioning. Their finished product comes with plans of its 
internal layout and it bears the indentations from the clamps 
and braces used in construction (several of which may still be 
in place). The Poulantzian writers discuss their theory as much 
as the concrete conditions to which it is applied. 10 They do 
not, by and large, adopt a narrative style of expression. They 
present their work as theory in dialogue with concrete conditions. 
The Poulantzian writers have introduced new dimensions of explana­
tion into South African history. In particular they have inter­
preted theoretically the path of capitalist development, the charac­
ter of racial domination and changes in the class structure in 
South Africa over an extended period. They have attempted to 
explain these by reference to the relationship of South Africa 
to the world capitalist system as well as to the internal dynamics 
of the South African social formation. The Poulantzian writers 
identify broad themes in South African history which other historians 
can investigate. It is important that these themes emerge from 
an explicit and open interaction between theory and inquiry. 
The usefulness of the Poulantzian writers in furthering de­
bate is beyond question. This thesis attests to their value in 
stimulating and directing historical research. It does this while 
fully realizing the disadvantages and weaknesses of aspects of 
the work of Poulantzas and his South African followers. 
Firstly, the most obvious disadvantage of the Poulantzian 
writers is that their theoretical focus often makes their work 
difficult to read and understand. Those inspired by Poulantzas 
have, too often, absorbed not only his theory but his style and 
idiom too. One can imagine an Adam Bede of the next century con­
fiding to George Eliot~ 
van Onselen was like a good meal 0' victual, you were 
the better for him without thinking on it. But Poulantzas 
was like a dose of physic, he gripped you and worreted 
10. 	 See Davies (1977); Davies, Kaplan, Morris and O'Meara (1977); 
Kaplan (1977); Morris (1979). 
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11 you, and after all he left you much the same. 
Secondly, and most seriously for this thesis, the Poulantzian 
framework, as it exists, cannot deal with locality. Its concern 
is with the social formation in toto not with regions within the 
social formation in which class struggle takes particular forms 
which flow from particular local conditions. This is a theoretical 
'gap' which the thesis does not attempt to fill but has had to 
come to terms with. 
Thirdly, as with any theory there is a danger of theoreticism. 
In the work of the Poulantzian writers there are not always ade­
quate checks on theoreticism. Theory can take on a life of its 
own. Theoretical debate is necessary but finally concepts must 
be judged by their usefulness and consistency in historical expla­
nation. Too often a theory is tested in an ad hoc manner. Isolated 
facts are cited, research is undertaken only to confirm the answers 
already determined by theory. If one instance doesn't yield suit­
able confirmation another can be sought out or 'overdetermination' 
is invoked. 
This thesis has two aspects to its presentation: 
1) The adoption of a narrative form of history writing which 
is informed by a particular analysis of South African his­
tory, capitalism and class struggle in Cape Town. 
2) An explicit formulation of crucial aspects of the theory 
that informs the narrative. 
The second aspect makes clear that a simple augmentation of the 
theory underlying van Onselen's work with the insights of the 
Poulantzian writers is not proposed. The analytical constructs 
need to be debated openly and theoretically. Their usefulness 
is determined solely by how they 'perform' in the narrative. 
The ultimate test of an historical theory or analysis is its abi­
lity to sustain and strengthen an historical narrative. 
3a The Usefulness and Limitations of the work of the Poulantzian 
writers 
This section of the introduction summarizes the applicability 
11. See Adam Bede (London: Chatto &Windus), 1952, p.175. 
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and usefulness of the work of the Poulantzian writers in this 
thesis and discusses the limitations of their work in developing 
an analysis of class struggle in Cape Town. 
The Cape clothing industry was put on its feet by the policies 
of the Pact government after 1924. After struggling for twenty 
years against severe foreign competition, the protective tariffs 
introduced by the Pact and renewed by subsequent governments, 
allowed the local manufacture of clothing to be profitable. The 
clothing industry was one of the first successful areas of import 
substitution. The Pact government's concern that industrial protec­
tion should produce jobs for white workers at 'civilized' wages 
greatly affected the clothing industry. It was the first industry 
to be investigated by the Wage Board and Wage Board Determinations 
set minimum wages in the Cape clothing industry from 1926 to 1936. 
All the unions which exist in the clothing industry today have 
their origins in this decade. The Transvaal garment workers' 
union was a party, in 1925, to the first industrial council agree­
ment ever to be gazetted. By 1936 industrial councils were operat­
ing in Cape Town and Durban as well. 
These issues of industrial protection, civilized labour and 
industrial legislation, both before and during the rule of the 
Pact and Fusion governments, are important themes in the work 
of Davies and Kaplan. Their analys~s of the state and the develop­
ment of manufacturing industry before World War II provide a cru­
cial part of the interpretive background of this thesis. Their 
concerns
12
with theorising the forms of class struggle in South 
Africa pose a problem central to this thesis - the identification 
and explanation of the forms taken by the class struggle in Cape 
Town. Their view of the capitalist state as the disorganizer of 
the dominated classes and the organizer of the dominating classes 
(which is derived from Poulantzas, 1973) is reflected in the analy­
sis of the alliance described here between the Cape clothing manu­
facturers, the union officials and the Department of Labour. 
The work of the Poulantzian writers, by focusing on the state, 
follows the principal trends in class formation. It produces 
12. And that of Morris and O'Meara. 
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a periodization of the state13 which reflects the dominant currents 
in capitalist development and class conflict for the whole social 
formation. This periodization, punctuated by mine strikes and 
gun battles, monopoly capital, migrant labour and racially exclu­
sive institutions cannot have an immediate relevance for Cape 
Town, that quiet backwater with sweetheart unions, competitive 
capital and racial integration. Yet the Poulantzian theoretical 
framework provides no guidelines for theorising such 'local' con­
ditions of class struggle. The periodization of the state does 
not require detailed consideration of every single incident of 
class conflict. It is drawn to consider only those incidents 
which have a direct effect on the state - the nexus of class struggle. 
The particular forms and development of .the class struggle in 
Cape Town is not an issue for the Poulantzian writers. However, 
it is clearly a central issue for the historian of Cape Town. 
3b Analysing the Conditions of Class Struggle in Cape Town 1900-1939 
'Conditions of class struggle' is a phrase that occurs throughout 
the thesis. As a concept, 'conditions of class struggle' comes 
specifically from the work of Davies. It refers to the full range 
of conditions - economic, political and ideological - under which 
the class struggle is waged. The concept is given focus by the 
periodization of the state. The conditions of class struggle 
vary between different time periods rather than between different 
geographical regions. The concept serves its limited purpose 
within the work of the Poulantzian writers but it cannot be used 
in the same sense when writing local history where the regional 
characteristics of class struggle are of paramount interest. The 
temptation is to develop a concept of 'local conditions of class 
13. 	 The dominant classes in a social formation dominated by the 
capitalist mode of production are combined in a 'power bloc'. 
Changes in the composition of the power bloc and changes 
in the power relations between the constituents of the power 
bloc indicate changes in the 'form of state'. The capitalist 
state goes through different phases or stages characterised 
by the prevalence of a particular form of state. The specifi­
cation of these phases is what is meant by a 'periodization 
of the state'. (See Kaplan, 1977, pp.iii-iv; Poulantzas, 
1973). 
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struggle' that would allow account to be taken of regional as 
well as temporal variations in conditions of class struggle. 
No such effort is made in this thesis. Neither is there any specu­
lation on whether such a theory is more likely to be a down-scaled 
version of Poulantzas than a sub-atomic physics of local struggle 
that breaks with Poulantzas as decisively as Einstein did with 
Newton. 
In this study, the phrase 'conditions of class struggle' 
is not a concept when used in the context of local struggles. 
It is a 'collective noun' which refers to the full range of eco­
nomic, ideological and political factors that secure a particular 
outcome to struggles in a factory, in an industry or in a city. 
The phrase can thus encompass the regional distinctiveness of 
class struggle as well as changes over time. 
Conditions of class struggle in Cape Town differ markedly 
from those in the rest of the country. 1) The nature of capital­
ism in Cape Town is different. Commercial capital dominated manu­
facturing capital up until the 1920's and thereafter capital re­
mained competitive and small in scale. Before World War II the 
influence of monopoly capital, all pervasive on the Witwatersrand, 
was not directly experienced in Cape Town. 2) Class struggle 
in Cape Town never manifests itself primarily as a conflict between 
races. The skill divisions in the workforce did not coincide 
with racial divisions as they largely did elsewhere in South Africa 
(van Duin, 1983). The isolation effects generated by state policy 
in Cape Town were different from those operating in the rest of 
14South Africa. 3) The labour movement in Cape Town never develop­
ed, as it did on the Witwatersrand, into an organized threat to 
the dominant classes in Cape Town. 
The guiding principle behind our assessment of the class 
struggle in Cape Town is the uneven development of capitalism. 
14. 	 See Kaplan (1977, pp.18-28). Isolation effects conceal from 
the dominated classes the nature of their oppression. They 
are promoted through ideological and juridical institutions. 
Kaplan argues that the basis for the isolation of Africans, 
for example, is found in their partial, non-complete separa­
tion from the land. 
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Thi~ affects our subject at three levels-international, national 
and industrial-technological. 
The uneven development of capitalism on a world scale estab­
lished the Cape as a colony subordinated to Britain. This subordi~ 
nation was economic, political and ideological. One of its effects 
was to hamper the growth of manufacturing industry and to secure 
the dominance of merchant capital in Cape Town. Without protective 
tariffs most South African manufacturing concerns were doomed 
to a precarious existence. The need for tariff protection caused 
a few Cape manufacturers to create the South African Manufacturers' 
Association in 1904. This later developed into the Cape Chamber 
of Industries and the national South African Federated Chamber 
of Industries. Although the actions of these bodies had only 
a marginal effect on the institution of protective tariffs in 
192515 , they ensured a purposeful unity amongst the leading Cape 
Town industrialists by this date. The organization of the CCI, 
built slowly but steadily over a 20 year period, gave a crucial 
advantage to local manufacturers when they needed to unite in 
the mid-1920's to adapt to the changes introduced by the Pact 
government, particularly those changes which related to labour 
organization and minimum wage determination. The subordination 
of the Cape to Britain had a weakening effect on the capacity 
for unity and organization of the working class in Cape Town. 
The backwardness of peripheral capitalism, its small scale and 
intensely competitive nature, put structural limits on the ablity 
of the working class to conduct successful economic struggles. 
In 1925, unions were weak and craft-bound. The majority of workers 
were unorganized. This relative strength of the employers and 
relative weakness of the workers had significant effects on the 
class struggle in Cape Town. 
Capitalism developed unevenly within Southern Africa as well 
as on a world scale. The capitalist penetration of the sub-conti­
nent before the discovery of minerals took place under the auspices 
of merchant capital. Cape Town was the military, administrative 
and commercial centre. It was remote from the cutting edge of 
settler and mercantile expansion and followed its own path of 
15. See Chapter 2, below. 
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development. Wars of conquest and dispossession had been fought 
out by the early eighteenth century. Slavery met labour needs 
until, following the emancipation of slaves in 1838, it gave way 
to forms of wage labour and the growth of a stratum of independent 
craftsmen, tailors, fishermen, etc. 
The Cape colony was jerked out of its bucolic stupor by the 
discovery, first of diamonds and then of gold. Many writers have 
stressed the severity of the rupturing effects on economy and 
society in the interior produced by the new assault on the people 
and land of Southern Africa. Forms of monopoly capital soon came 
to dominate the mining industry. With its imperial links, mining 
capital had the will and ability to force on Southern Africa trans­
formations in politics, economics and ideology which allowed for 
the profitable mining of gold and diamonds. 
Cape Town grew again as a seat of government, a port of entry 
for immigrants and a commercial centre. Yet it was again hundreds 
of miles away from the new foci of capitalist interest. It was 
not directly affected by the social tensions that accompanied 
the forging of a migrant labour system and the development of 
. capitalist agriculture. Dispossessed farm labourers swelled the 
ranks of the city poor and an expanding population put pressure 
on housing but the city was a witness to and not a participant in 
the great conflicts that were changing the character of Southern 
Africa. No new economic resources were developed near Cape Town. 
Commercial capital still held sway in political and economic life. 
The South African War, which opened the way for a new phase of 
capitalist penetration of the interior, .left Cape Town largely 
unscathed. The history of Cape Town and the Western Cape is thus 
cast in a different mould from the rest of Southern Africa. 
Cape Town's subordination to the interior, secured economi­
cally by the mineral discoveries,wasformally acknowledged politi­
cally in the formation of the Union in 1910. 16 This did not have 
16. 	 Just as Poulantzian theory cannot deal with locality it is 
confused by the sudden expansion or contraction of a social 
formation (or the merging of social formations). Before 
1910, the Cape colony had its own state, its own contradic­
tions, its own trajectory of capitalist development. After 
1910, Cape politics became the property of a new social for­
mation and was submerged beneath a flood of contradictions 
and struggles, the intensity of which it could not match. 
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an immediate effect on the economy. Laws applicable in each of 
the four colonies before Union remained in force until specifically 
repealed. The Cape was able to continue its old path of slow 
economic growth based on commerce and struggling industry for 
15 years. It retained its qualified non-racial franchise. The 
most significant legislation - the Native Labour Regulation Act 
and the Native Land Act - did not touch Cape Town. But the in­
dustrial laws and policies of the Pact government after 1924 affec­
ted Cape Town profoundly. 
The Pact carne to power on account of class struggles in the 
interior and its political programme grew out of class struggles 
in the interior. Not surprisingly the industrial legislation 
had a different effect on the class struggle in Cape Town from 
that on the Witwatersrand. The legislation was framed to blend 
in with and resolve class conflicts on the Witwatersrand which 
had been sharpened to a special intensity by racial domination, 
the prevalence of monopoly (mining) capital and the strength of 
the white labour movement. In Cape Town manufacturing capital 
developed in the context of powerful commercial capital and low­
key class and race conflict. The industrial legislation allowed 
trade unions and employers' organizations to be formed but their 
role in Cape Town was artificial - they were the outgrowth of 
developments elsewhere. Both owed their existence, in the 
first place, to the legislation - not to any quickening of class 
struggle. The legislation (as the thesis argues at length) had 
an unusually important effect on the class struggle in Cape Town. 
No one gave special consideration to how the policy of indus­
trial protection, the Industrial Conciliation Act or the Wage 
Act would affect Cape Town. Its subordination to the interests 
of stability on the Witwatersrand is illustrated by this fact 
alone. The dominance of the Witwatersrand was experienced practi­
cally by Cape clothing manufacturers when the Wage Board sought, 
in 1926, to force them to raise their wages to the levels paid 
in the Transvaal. That low wages in the 'peripheral' Cape Town 
clothing industry should have threatened the competitive ability 
of clothing manufacturers in the 'central' Transvaal, is a further 
consequence of the uneven development of capitalism at a national 
level. This wage disparity endured. It was the cause of the 
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two campaigns by the Transvaal garment workers' union to organize 
Cape clothing workers. These are key events in this history. 
The third level at which the uneven development of capitalism 
has a bearing on our study is that of the clothing industry itself. 
Clothing was one of the last major branches of industry to move 
from the home or small workshop into the factory. The invention 
and widespread use of the sewing machine came only in the latter 
half of the nineteenth century and even this crucial technological 
advance did not make factory production necessary or more profitable. 
By reason of the backwardness and discrete nature of the technology 
applied to the production of clothing, the clothing trades retained 
a level of competition between rival manufacturers and a small 
scale of enterprise characteristic of the early phases of capitalism. 
At the same time they were not characterised by the.realdivisions 
of skill which marked early capitalist manufacture. The production 
of elothing has, from the earliest times, been characterised by 
an extreme division of labour. This has sev rely limited the 
proportion of highly skilled workers. These factors; small enter­
prises, the extreme division of labour, low capital intensity, 
the low barriers of entry for new firms, fierce competition between 
firms and between unskilled workers; make for. low wages and a 
difficulty of sustaining union and employer organization. Reasons 
have already been suggested for the organization of Cape clothing 
manufacturers before 1925. But in this context it is not the 
lack of organization among workers before 1925 that is remarkable 
but the presence and persistence after 1925 of a greater degree 
of formal worker organization than in any other sector of South 
African and Cape Town industry. Here again the Industrial Con~ . 
ciliation Act, which provided the framework for clothing worker 
organization,would appear to be a deciding factor. 
The uneven development of capitalism underlies the backward­
ness of Cape Town industry, the weakness of worker organization 
and the strength of employer organization up to 1925. These three 
elements contribute towards the special effects of the industrial 
legislation in Cape Town which are identified as a major determi­
nant of local conditions of class struggle in the period 1925 
to 1939. 
This preliminary analysis of the class struggle in Cape Town 
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is set out fully in Chapter 2. It informs the subsequent narra­

tive chapters. 

3c Why study local history? 

Local history, presented as it is in this thesis,can have both 

a theoretical and a political importance. 

History is constantly invoked in present day efforts_ to 
organize people into trade unions, youth and community organi­
zations and political bodies which oppose Apartheid and capital­
ism. In general, the use made of history is unimaginative and 
uninformed. Resistance to racial oppression and exploitation 
in the past merely justifies ana inspires present resistance. 
The historical incidents cited are most often drawn from the great 
themes of South African history: colonization, conquest and dis­
possession, repression and exploitation. In the face of a real 
need to assert the common history of all South Africans against 
the divisive policies of the South African government, regional 
history is often ignored. Yet the class struggle is conducted 
subject to regional conditions and the legacy of local struggles 
has a direct bearing on its course of development. 
A comparison between the garment workers' unions in Johannes­
burg and Cape Town between 1925 and 1939 shows how different are 
the workers' experiences of trade unions, of industrial councils, 
of employers, of state attitudes. The experience of the South 
African working class is not a single experience. Conditions 
of class struggle differ between cities, between industries, be­
tween factories. When one examines the history of a group ,of 
workers, conditions of class struggle are local conditions. Local 
history is where mistakes are seen and understood as they occur. 
Local history is where trade unionists and political activists 
can learn lessons. Local history shows people that resistance 
is not only in great events, nationally remembered. Resistance 
is found in the "nooks and crannies,,17 of their own past. The 
history of class struggle is their history. The writing of re­
gional history can meet a political need. 
Local historical research has a role in contributing to the 
17. See van Onselen (1976, p.239). 
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analysis of South African history in general and to the theori­
zation of specific aspects of that history. It can be a proving 
ground for hypotheses developed from studies of other regions 
(in South Africa or elsewhere) or developed from a newly noted 
theory. In the context of the work of the Poulantzian writers, 
regional studies reveal the concrete conditions underlying their 
periodization of the state. Such studies may question the vali­
dity of the periodization. This thesis is not led to dispute 
the periodization of the state. It tends to support much of the 
analysis of Davies18 and Kaplan of the effects of industrial pro­
tection and the industrial legislation while stressing that the 
regional impact of these policies was different. 
This section of the Introduction has argued that the thesis, 
in its presentation, may be viewed as a synthesis of the insights 
of van Onselen and the Poulantzian writers into the historical 
process. It does not assert that the two approaches to social 
analysis are reducible to .each other, it stresses the differences 
between them. However their difference is not that of mindless 
empiricism on the one hand and theoreticism on the other. It 
is rather that of the north and south poles of a magnetic field 
which together secure the functioning of an electric motor. 
Cape Town Labour History 
The wave of new interest in South African labour history noted 
by Eddie Webster (1978) six years ago has yet to rise high in 
Cape Town. There remain few published works about the history 
of workers in the city and none have the study of labour history 
or Cape Town as an object. Only the work of Peter Wickins, which 
is largely on the ICU, has appeared in the decade since the Durban 
strikes aroused academic interest in labour studies. 
Both of the two major secondary sources - Roux (1964) and 
Simons and Simons (1969) ~ describe events in Cape Town in an 
anecdotal fashion as part of a wider history of South Africa. 
18. 	 Chapter 4 disputes aspects of Davies' analysis of the impor­
tance of the Wage Act in promoting mechanization in industry 
and the employment of 'civilized' labour. 
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The only published work to summarize the history of trade union 
federations in Cape Town19 is Muriel Horrell's useful book Trade 
Unions in South Africa (1961). Robert Stuart is the only Cape 
trade unionist to have written memoirs. 20 These were never pub­
lished in book form but were serialized in a labour journal (Stuart, 
1950, 1951). The official history of the National Union of Dis­
tributive Workers by Norman Herd (1974) records organization in 
Cape Town after our period as does Luckhart and Wall's official 
history of SACTU (1980). Most recent writings on labour in Cape 
Town (for example in the S.A. Labour Bulletin) have concentrated 
on events since 1973. 
The reasons for this lack of concern with the labour history 
of Cape Town are easy to find. It is a history that lacks the 
drama of the story of the gold and diamond mines, of migrant la­
bourandlarge scale industry. No events in Cape Town had much 
effect on national labour struggles or state policy. With the 
exception of the Food and Canning Workers' Union (which drew mem­
bers mainly from the country towns) none of the unions existing 
in Cape Town today had a militant past likely to attract notice. 
Finally, the lack of primary sources available in Cape Town it­
self may have discouraged local historians from investigating 
the history of labour. The papers of the Cape Federation of La­
bour Unions are part of the TUCSA archives at the University of 
the Witwatersrand where the records of the Cape Town branch of 
the NUDW are also housed. The files of the Secretary for Labour 
are an essential source, but these are held in the Central Archives 
in Pretoria. The only union records available to researchers 
are those of the FCWU which were transferred to the University 
of Cape Town library in 1983. 
In beginning to reconstruct the history of labour in Cape 
Town there are two groups of workers who immediately call for 
19. 	 A more detailed account is given in the unpublished seminar 
paper of Kelvin Williams (1974). 
20. 	 Wilfrid Harrison's Memories of a Socialist in South Africa 
is occasionally useful. 
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attention - the workers on the docks and those in the clothing 
factories. The docks were the largest single employer of labour 
in Cape Town up until 1914. Many Africans worked as stevedores 
and dockworkers were the first African contract workers to arrive 
21in Cape Town. The dockworkers have a history of labour organi­
zation dating at least from the early years of this .century. 
They were the first members of the ICU. Later they were members 
of one of the few African unions to be registered under the Indus­
trial Conciliation Act and to participate in an industrial council. 
Again today the dockworkers, though greatly reduced in number, 
are among the best organized workers in Cape Town. 
Interest in the history of workers in the clothing industry 
derives from the size of the industry in terms of employment and 
output and its importance as the leading sector of manufacturing 
industry in Cape Town. In 1983, over 60 000 worked in the clothing 
factories. 22 The Garment Workers' Union of the Western Province 
is the largest regionally based union in South Africa and is one 
of the wealthiest unions in the country. It is today regularly 
characterised as a bureaucratic, em~loyer-sympathetic union. 23 
This thesis shows that such criticisms are not new and, at least 
up to 1939, were justified. 
As the field on which the action of the thesis is played 
out is so little known, space is devoted to a summary of the ori­
gins of labour and employer organization and to outlining hypo­
theses about the forms assumed by class struggle in Cape Town. 
The thesis firstly suggests that the dominance exercised 
over the Cape Town labour movement after 1925 by the Cape Federa­
tion (CFLU) and its secretary Robert Stuart, was founded on a 
broad-based alliance with the bosses which was mediated through 
the CCI. 
21. 	 Labour History Group (1984). Debbie Budlender has done a 
preliminary study of the history of dockworkers but has 
found few satisfactory written sources. 
22. 	 'ICCI (Cape): Annual Report 1982', late 1983, p.4. In 1981, 
one quarter of all workers in Cape Town manufacturing in­
dustry were garment workers (Business Argus 7 March 1981). 
23. 	 Maree (1976); Bloch (1982); Grassroots May-June 1980, July­
August 1982; Cape Herald 10 November 1983; Unity November 
1983 (the newsletter of a recently formed "Clothing Workers' 
Union" which seeks to challenge the leadership of the GWU­
\vP) • 
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Secondly, it is argued that the industrial legislation of 
the 1920's operated in a different way in Cape Town from the Trans­
vaal. The significance of this legislation in moulding struggles 
in Cape Town cannot be explained by reliance on the Transvaal­
centric analyses by Davies (1976, 1979) and Lever (1977). The 
legislation was the condition for the establishment of a union 
movement in Cape Town rather than a blow struck at its militant 
growth. In the rest of South Africa the Industrial Conciliation 
Act, by excluding African workers, ensured the separation of most 
struggles of skilled and unskilled workers. It is held up as 
a primary cause of the working class remaining divided on racial 
lines. Neither argument is applicable to Cape Town. The vast 
majority of unskilled workers were 'coloured' and had the same 
legal opportunities to organize as skilled workers. Even African 
workers in Cape Town could legally belong to registered unions 
until 1937. 
An analysis of the history of the Cape garment workers illus­
trates and lends support to both of these hypotheses. Stuart's 
domination over the GWU-CP was based in a long-standing alliance 
with the Cape Clothing Manufacturers Association. A comparison 
between the histories of the Cape and Transvaal garment workers' 
unions highlights the different effects of the industrial legis­
lation in the two regions. 
The most controversial aspect of this thesis is its endorse­
ment of most of the criticisms levelled at the Cape Federation 
of Labour Unions and its leader Bob Stuart by labour leaders based 
in the Transvaal. Stuart was the 'father' of trade unionism in 
Cape Town. From 1913 to his death in 1950, he was the dominant 
figure in Cape unionism. He firmly resisted all attempts to unite 
the South African labour movement in a single national co­
ordinating body. He did his utmost to discourage Transvaal union­
ists from building a Cape base for such a body among unorganized 
workers in Cape Town. Stuart was an unrelenting foe of 'politics' 
in trade unions and a consistent opponent of communists. His 
Cape chauvinism and opportunist criticism of the racism within 
24 
many Transvaal unions gave him the attention of Cape workers, 
24. See Williams (1974). 
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but his Transvaal (and local) opponents always accused him of 
being a bossed man who sold out the workers. He was accused of 
creating stumbling blocks to unity between the union movements 
of the North and South in order to retain his leadership of an 
independent Cape labour movememnt. This thesis argues that Stuart 
and the CFLU, while not necessarily the stooges of the CCI, were 
often its willing dupe~ and that, especially after 1925, Stuart 
and the grouF he built around him, retained their dominance over 
the Cape labour movement largely on account of the alliance they 
entered into with the bosses. This alliance has its best example 
in the Cape Garment Workers' Union. 
While the records of the CCI, the GWUSA and the Secretary 
for Labour tend to confirm an unfavourable judgement of Stuart 
and the CFLU, every.effort is made to interpret Stuart's actions 
and those of his faction of the CFLU in the light of the class 
struggle in Cape Town. These actions were never simply the out­
growth of Stuart's personality and the personalities of certain 
corrupt individuals. They have a rationality which none of the 
CFLU's .critics could properly see - even if they could never 
have appreciated it. 
This thesis makes two main contributions to the study of .la­
bour history in South Africa. Firstly, it is the first major 
study of the history of the labour movement in Cape Town. It 
shows that the experience of workers in Cape Town diverges sharply 
from that of workers in the mines and factories of the Witwaters­
rand, the region which has, in the past, attracted most academic 
attention. 
Secondly, the thesis shows that industrial laws have differ­
ent effects in different regions and these are determined by re­
gional conditions of class struggle. Most generalizations about 
the effects of the Industrial Conciliation Act, being based on 
observations in the Transvaal, need regional qualification. Simi­
larly, the effects of these laws do not remain constant through 
time. The importance and function of a particular law in regula­
ting class struggle changes in sympathy with the conditions of 
class struggle. Even if the provisions of a law are not amended 
(and that is not the case with South African industrial legislation) 
it is implemented and acts in different periods in different ways. 
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The industrial law is not static but dynamic; its different aspects 
are not revealed simultaneously but historically. It is absurd 
that industrial sociologists at universities should rely only 
on accounts of the intentions of 1924 legislators and the early 
effects of the Industrial Conciliation Act when introducing stu­
dents to the Labour Relations Act today. This is an abuse of 
history which at the same time Qbscures the real use which can 
be made of history in understanding the current operation of indus­
trial legislation. 
In this context. this history of the garment workers. their 
unions and their employers throws new light on the operation of 
South Africa's labour relations system. It is the first case 
study of class struggle conducted within the structures of the 
Wage and Industrial Conciliation Acts. Recent writers on South 
African labour history implicitly dismiss registered unions as 
unworthy of study as trade unions because they were incorporated 
into state apparatuses and further tamed with economic concessions. 
But although the labour movement of white workers never again 
presented a political challenge to the state itself as it did 
in 1922; although all white worker struggles were contained within 
legal structures; registered unions still had to fight the economic 
class struggle. To say their economic struggles were contained 
is not to confirm their successes for workers. We need to trace 
historically exactly how the industrial legislation affected worker 
struggles. At a time when the government has opened up the old 
labour relations system to participation by African and non-racial 
unions. it is interesting to trace how the garment workers of 
Cape Town had their economic struggles channelled and drained 
by similar legislation over a fifteen year period. 
The structure of the thesis is straightforward: 
Chapter One provides a background to the early growth of the 
clothing industry in South Africa and outlines the working 
conditions in Cape Town tailoring shops and factories be­
tween 1900 and 1925. 
Chapter Two sketches the growth of Cape Town manufacturing indus­
try from 1900 to 1939 and outlines the structures of labour 
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and employer organization over the same period. This pivotal 
chapter sets out hypotheses about the nature of the economic 
class struggle in Cape Town and the specific effects which 
the industrial legislation had on local organization. The 
remainder of the thesis seeks to justify these hypotheses 
by detailed reference to the clothing industry. 
Chapters Three and Four look closely at the effects of the Wage 
and Industrial Conciliation Acts on wage levels and employer 
and worker organization in the Cape tailoring and clothing 
industries. The period covered is 1925 to 1934. 
Chapters Five and Six .record and analyse the failure of two efforts 
by the Transvaal garment workers' union to capture control 
of the Cape Union in 1930-1 and 1935-8. 
Chapter Seven first assesses the effects of the "Cape Campaigns" 
and sketches the history of the GWU-CP since 1939. Secondly 
it concludes the thesis by summarising how the history of 
the garment and tailoring workers of Cape Town supports the 
hypotheses about the economic class struggle in Cape Town 
set out in Chapter 2. 
Appendix A assesses the wage disparity between the garment in­
dustries of the Witwatersrand and Cape Town. The lower 
wages paid in Cape Town were a real or imagined threat to 
Transvaal wage standards for thirty years and were the cause 
of much bitter conflict in the industry. 
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CHAPTER I 
SEWING MACHINES AND SWEATSHOPS 
The development of the industrial production of clothing has been 
subjected to little close scrutiny by economic historians. This 
is surprising in view of the very large numbers of people ~mployed 
in the clothing industry and the early importance of the industry 
in many advanced economies. In Britain, for example, there were 
more than 500 000 clothing workers in 1925 (Dobbs, 1928, p.205). 
In 1929, the American clothing industry employed more than one 
million workers (Hardy, 1936, pp.9; 150). 
In one sense, however, the lack of interest in the history 
of the industry is understandable. Mechanization and factory 
production of ready-made clothing came relatively late, less than 
one hundred and fifty years ago (Thomas, 1955, p.1), and the prin­
cipal technological innovation upon which the industry was based, 
the sewing machine, was of a relatively low level of sophistication 
and in essence has remained unimproved upon until very recently. 
While the advent of the sewing machines led to a drastic reduction 
in the cost of new clothes, it did not have the same disruptive 
effects on the established tailoring tratle as innovations in spin­
ning and weaving, for example, had in the textile industry. Sewing 
machines were cheap, portable and simple to operate. The economic 
forces tending to shift clothing production out of homes and small 
workshops and to concentrate it in large factories were infinitely 
weaker than in those industries whose new technology required 
large capital investment and in which economies of scale substan­
tially reduced costs. The first clothing factories were part 
of a ~ industry supplying cheap ready-made clothing to people 
who previously wore second-hand clothes or clothes made at home. 
The early factories did not threaten the livelihood of tailors. 
Indeed, tailors were able to reduce prices and produce a better 
quality garment by using sewing machines. The sewing machine 
easily fitted into the minute division of tasks long established 
in the trade. 
The lack of analysis of the clothing industry as a whole 
is mitigated by the enormous amount of public attention which 
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has been focussed on the industry because of its long use of 
sweated labour. Since the emergence of the gild system the needle 
trades have been most noted for low wages, intense exploitation 
of labour and bad, often appalling, working conditions. Cut-throat 
competition and the highly seasonal nature of the trades compelled 
tailors and factory owners to force wages down to their lowest 
level and to make extensive use of outworkers. Small, ruthless 
operators with their sweatshops' and slopshops, and exploiting 
hidden armies of miserable home-workers, could compete successfully 
with large, modern factories. 
\ The evils of sweating in the British clothing industry first 
attracted public notice in the middle of the last century when 
Charles Kingsley wrote a pamphlet entitled 'Cheap Clothes and 
Nasty'. This pamphlet and his novel 'Alton Locke' were both in­
spired by a series of articles in the London Morning Chronicle 
which exposed the iniquities of "the sweating systemtl However• 
it was more than fifty years before any effective action was taken. 
In that period, the widespread introduction of the sewing machine 
led to an enormous increase in the number of outworkers and a . 
further deterioration in working conditions (Schmiechen, 1975). 
From time to time public concern was revived - most notably by 
the 1888-90 Select Committee on the Sweating System and by the 
researches of Charles Booth, Beatrice Potter (Webb) and others 
(Booth, 1902; 1903). In 1906 an enquiry by the Board of Trade 
and the famous 'Sweating Exhibition' organized by the London 
Daily News led to the launching of an anti-sweating campaign. 
This culminated in the 1909 Trade Boards Act, the enforcement 
of which removed some of the worst aspects of sweating in Britain 
(Tawney, 1915). 
The massive clothing industry in the United States of America 
fed on successive waves of cheap immigrant labour. It appears 
that the battle against the sweating system in America between 
1910 and the mid-1930's relied to a much greater extent on trade 
union organization than was the case in Britain (Hardy, 1936; 
Zaretz, 1934). 
Although legislation and trade union organization have led 
to greater control over tne excesses of exploitation prevalent 
in any system of production which relies on outwork, outwork still 
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exists in all industrialized countries and particularly still 
in the clothing industry. Where clothing production has been 
largely moved into factories, clothing workers remain amongst 
the lowest paid industrial workers. 1 
This chapter deals with the development of clothing produc­
tion in Cape Town between 1900 and 1925. There is little detailed 
or comprehensive information available on the origins of this 
small and struggling sector of Cape Town industry. However it 
is clear firstly, that clothing production in South Africa showed 
many of the characteristic features of clothing production in 
the industrialized countries, and secondly that clothing produc­
tion in Cape Town shared common features and problems with other 
local manufacturing industries. Chapter one illustrates the first 
point while Chapter two deals generally with the second point 
and also with the growth of worker organization in Cape Town. 
Together, Chapters one and two lay the basis for interpreting 
the path of development followed by the clothing industry and 
clothing worker organization in Cape Town. 
The Political Economy of the Clothing Industry 
Before describing the actual conditions in the Cape Town clothing 
trades in the first quarter of this century, it is necessary to 
make some general points about the clothing industry as it came 
to exist in industrial societies. Four types of clothing manufac­
turing establishment can be identified (see Figure 1.1): 
1) The traditional, centuries old professional producer of 
clothes was the tailor with his helpers. As factory production 
grew and ready-made clothing improved in quality, tailors increas­
ingly produced mainly'higher class' clothing. The retail bespoke 
tailor made garments to fit an ihdividual customer. He might 
work alone, employ assistants in his own workshop or sub-contract 
the work out to a middleman or directly to home-workers. 
2) The wholesale bespoke factory produced garments measured 
to fit an individual customer but by factory methods. Uniforms 
for post-office or railway employees were produced in such a fac­
1. 	 In 1975 clothing workers received the lowest industrial wages 
in all the E.E.C. countries and Switzerland (The Economist 
11 March 1978). 
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Figure 1.1: Divisions in the Clothing Trade 
RETAIL 
BESPOKE 
TAILORING 
Customer deals 
directly with the 
tailor, who 
measures him for 
the garment. 
Tailor buys the 
cloth chosen by 
the customer. 
Garment may be 
fitted on customer 
several times 
during production. 
Unit production Product made to 
customer's 
ins truct Ions. 
Price agreed 
beforehand. 
WHOLESALE 
BESPOKE 
FACTORIES 
Factory receives 
order wi th 
measurements and 
makes pattern. 
Customer chooses 
cloth from 
factory stocks or 
a sample book. 
After completion, . 
ga rment may be 
fitted by a draper 
and possibly 
altered in factory 
Unit production Product made to 
s tanda rd Ized 
order. 
Price set. 
WHOLESALE 
READY-MAKE 
FACTORIES 
Factory designs 
pattern and 
·chooses the 
range of 50 i zes 
Factory chooses 
cloth. 
No fitting. Mass production 
Seeks buyer 
(retailer) after 
production. Price 
negotiable, OR may 
make to order-and 
set the price. 
CUT, HAKE 
AND TRIM 
FACTORIES 
Factory is given 
pattern by the 
retailer (or a 
wholesale factory) 
Cloth supplied by 
the retailer. 
No fitting Mass production 
Makes to retai ler's 
(or wholesaler's) 
Instructions. 
Price agreed 
beforehand 
tory. This type of establishment also made up 'special orders' 
where a customer's measurements were sent to the factory by the 
customer himself or through a retailer. This was not as expensive 
as retail bespoke tailoring but the finished garment fitted better 
than one ready-made. 
3) The wholesale ready-made factory mass produced garments 
from standard patterns in different sizes· which it sold to retail­
ers or wholesale merchants. To begin with, only the cheapest 
clothes were made by this method. As the science of pattern-design 
progressed, a larger proportion of people were able to find a 
ready-made garment that fitted them properly. Better quality 
clothing gradually began to be produced by the methods of mass 
production. 
4) Cut, Make and Trim (CMT) factories were supplied with 
cloth and patterns by a retailer, wholesaler or a ready-make fac­
tory. They were instructed to cut the cloth and make it up accord­
ing to the pattern and to' attach all the trimmings. The price 
for the job was agreed in advance. Such a factory used mass­
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production methods. Its overhead costs were lower than those 
of a ready-make factory as it did not invest in stocks of cloth. 
Depending on conditions of labour supply, all of these types 
of establishment might make more or less use of outworkers. The 
bulk of ready-made clothing produced in London in the 1890's was 
not produced in factories but in the homes of outworkers (Schmie­
chen, 1975, pp.9; 35; 264). 
A concern was not restricted to anyone of these 'divisions' 
in the clothing industry. A factory might usually make uniforms 
for individual bank clerks but turn to producing ready-makes in 
slack periods, or even accept a CMT contract from a retailer. 
A tailor with his own workshop might accept outwork from a factory 
or execute small CMT contracts. 
The four divisions of the clothing industry described above 
have many common features: they all use the same technology and, 
to some extent, have similar labour processes; they all draw on 
the same potential labour force. All are seasonal and are charac­
terized by an extreme division of labour,and intense competition. 
All branches of garment manufacture have the sewing machine 
as their key instrument of labour. The process of joining together 
two or more pieces of material by machinery is the one really 
efficient technique in the making of clothes. To all intents 
and purposes it completely ousted hand-sewing and opened the way 
for the mass production of new clothes for all classes of people. 
Compared with the importance of the sewing machine, the other 
tools of the clothing trade were insignificant (Thomas, 1955, 
p.37-8). There were other labour-saving innovations in common 
2 
use but none were indispensable in the same way as the sewing 
machine. 
A similar labour process could exist in a small clothing . 
workshop of twenty workers and in a large factory with three thou­
2. 	 For example, the bandknife, succeeded by the Eastman Electric 
Cloth Cutting Machine; Reece buttonholing machines (c.1914); 
blind-stitching machines (after 1900), button-sewing machines; 
cloth-laying machines (Hardy, 1936, p.199; Thomas, 1955, 
p.38). Most recently microprocessors have been used to con­
trol sewing machines and computers are programmed to aid 
layout and pattern design (Garment Worker 3/10 October 1980). 
" 
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sand. The small factory would have one production line and the 
larger proportionately more. Important differences in the labour 
process were of course evident between a factory and the smallest 
workshop. Conveyor belts and synchro-flow systems incorporate 
workers in a qualitatively different way from a workshop operating 
on the 'make-through' system where one machinist makes a complete 
garment. But a worker trained in one division of the industry 
could be employed in any other. Many former employees of tailors 
made their way into factories. 
The clothing industry is unusually seasonal. There are peaks 
of demand for workers in autumn and in spring. Fashion branches 
are particularly prone to seasonal fluctuations but most factories 
experience seasonal layoffs and short-time, 'balanced' by overtime 
and speeding-up in the busy periods. The factor of seasonality 
is a contributory cause of the continued existence of outworkers 
and small sub-contractors,. In the slack periods they are the first 
to suffer as factories become able to complete all production 
themselves, but in booms their numbers expand rapidly. The seasonal 
peak provides many sub-contractors with the greater part of their 
annual income. 
The manufacture of clothing was split into many separate 
tasks long before the invention of the sewing machine. (The sewing 
machine did, however, encourage a further subdivision of procedures). 
In a tailors' shop for instance, the master tailor was a skilled 
craftsman, knowing every aspect of the making of a garment from 
measuring/cutting to finishing and fitting. He presided over 
a hierarchy of operatives, the lowest of whom might know how to 
complete only one operation in the making of one garment, such 
as lining a coat sleeve or sewing a button-hole. Depending on 
the size and class of his business, a master might do part of 
the work himself or" have several employees or he might sub-contract 
the work out. The lower level employees and outworkers were often 
women but the most skilled tasks were the preserve of men. 
The structure of the tailoring shop was duplicated in the 
factory, only the scale of operation was larger and the division 
of tasks more minute. Men again had their defined places as cut­
ters and senior operatives and also as pressers, a job requiring 
strength and endurance. The sewing work was divided out between 
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specialized machinists after passing through the hands of fitters­
up and baisters, and before going on to fellers, trimmers, button­
holers, cleaners, pressers and packers. 
The size of clothing manufacturing concerns varied greatly. 
In general retail bespoke tailors were small but might employ 
fifty or more workers in a workshop (as Garlicks did in 1906) 
and draw on the labour of many more outworkers. Some tailors 
had no workshop at all but worked at home and sent work out. 
Factory size had no lower limit. The smallest factories could 
successfully compete with the largest, employing hundreds of workers. 
Competition in the clothing trades was intense between tailors 
and factories, between factories/tailors themselves and between 
workers. In the early days tailors were not subject to competition 
from factories as factory production was confined to the cheap 
clothes market. However, as the quality of ready-makes improved 
and wholesale bespoke tailoring developed, the division of the 
market became blurred and all tailors, except those catering for 
the very wealthy or making speciality garments, found themselves 
increasingly hard-pressed. The making of shirts and underwear 
were the first sectors to be absorbed by factory production in 
both Britain and the United States. The market for suits was 
shared between retail bespoke tailors and the wholesale bespoke 
factories for a period, but by the late 1930's both were losing 
ground to ready-made suits. The effect of this trend towards 
ready-make production was most severe for the handicraft tailors, 
many of whom were driven out of business. Wholesale bespoke fac­
tories were easily able to shift to making ready-makes only ­
often, in any event, a large part of their output. 
The basic reason for the high degree of competition between 
clothing firms (that is, between all the tailors and factories 
producing for the same market) is to be found in the ease with 
which new firms could establish themselves. The ease of entry 
was itself due to the low level of technology3 used in clothing 
manufacture and the wide range of markets for clothing (for differ­
ent sexes, ages, income groups, uses). As a result of the stiff 
3. 	 The instruments of labour were cheap and compact and required 
a low level of skill to operate. 
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competition in the industry master tailors, sub-contractors and 
factory owners were under extreme pressure to reduce costs. The 
labour intensive nature of garment manufacture and the fixed price 
of raw materials meant that the workers bore the brunt of the 
necessity to keep costs down. 
In the period with which this work concerns itself wages 
in factories were kept low by the employment of the most exploit­
able strata of society as workers. At one time these might be 
recent immigrants, at another young women or blacks. These groups 
of workers were prepared to accept pay just at or below the costs 
of the reproduction of their labour power. Costs were still further 
reduced by sweating, which is seen most characteristically in 
the systems of sub~contracting and outwork but includes the prac­
·4tices of speeding-up and lengthening hours. 
The sub-contracting system was to an extent the legacy of 
the tailoring firm. Most tailors did not operate workshops but 
gave their work out to journeymen tailors (middlemen tailors) 
who had a workshop with assistants, did the work themselves at 
home, perhaps with family help, or even contracted it out again. 
Payment to the journeyman was on a piecework basis and contracts 
were awarded to the lowest bidder. The unpaid wives and children 
of journeymen and their employees were often drawn into the work 
to complete contracts. But, as the historians of clothing industry 
trade unionism in Britain have noted, the sweating system "waited 
on the development of the (sewing) machine before it was revealed 
in its total ugliness" (Stewart and Hunter·, 1964, p.47). 
The sewing machine was cheap, compact and relatively light. 
It could be installed in any room or garret. The machine did 
not require an operator to possess the same degree of skill as 
for hand-sewing. To outfit a 'shop', hire a few workers and begin 
production was a simple task. A clothing contractor's success 
depended on the savagery with which he could exploit his workers. 
4. 	 Clementina Black defined sweating as "the effort of an un­
economic system to extract from the misery of the unorga~ 
nized, ill-equipped worker the equivalent of organized, well­
paid, well-equipped industry. It was the competition of 
flesh and blood with machinery" (Black, 1907, p.xi). 
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Sweating was intensified in homes as well, where outworkers op­
5
erated their own machines at still lower rates. Many elderly 
or semi-invalid women were willing to undertake such work at rates 
which did not yield a living wage. Married women with small child­
ren also took outwork as there was very little else that was com­
patible with staying at home and looking after their families. 
Even large clothing manufacturers gave out work because piece­
wages were low and they incurred no additional overhead costs. 
Another effect of the existence of sub-contracting and outwork 
was to drag the wages of 'free', able-bodied workers down to the 
lowest levels. For reasons we shall discuss, outwork and sweat­
ing never appeared in South Africa in as chronic a form as they 
were manifested in Britain and the United States. But they were 
features at several stages in the growth of the South African 
clothing industry, and the economic forces of which they are the 
most extreme expression governed the South African clothing in­
dustry as they did all others. 
2 The Supply of Clothing in South Africa up to 1925 
The South African clothing industry followed the path of develop­
ment marked out by many Cape Town industries. A period of very 
limited local manufacture and a great reliance on imports was 
followed by a spurt of growth during the First World War. This 
was halted by the depression of the early 1920's and renewed com­
petition from cheaper imports. It was only after the state im­
posed protective tariffs in 1925 that the clothing industry was 
able to establish itself as the main supplier of domestic demand. 
In the years before 1925, clothing imports made up a signifi­
cant proportion of total imports into South Africa. From 1897 
to 1906 between ten and nineteen per cent of total imports into 
British South Africa were of clothing. 6 From 1911 to 1925 imports 
of clothing accounted for between twelve and seventeen per cent 
of total imports into the Union. 7 
5. 	 Many workers hired their sewing machines. Singers, the sew­
ing machine manufacturers, were the inventors of the hire­
purchase system (Thomas, 1953, p.37). 
6. 	 Calculated from figures in G37.1898 and G26.1907. 
7. 	 See Table 1.1, below. 
~ 
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The source of the great bulk of these imports was the United 
Kingdom. In 1913, South Africa imported £5 million worth of cloth­
ing, £3,25 million of which came from Britain. This constituted 
8thirty eight percent of Britain's total clothing exports. South 
Africa was the principal foreign market of the British industry.9 
During the South African War the demand for clothing from 
South Africa contracted causing some unemployment amongst British 
workers (Thomas, 1955, p.43). However several firms recouped 
their losses by producing military uniforms. A trade journal 
of 1902 stated: 
Ordersffid money are being sent over from the Cape al­

most as freely as if there had never been any wa~ ••• 

Here in Leeds we possess the honour of having clothed 

the fighting men of both sides. We have made a very 

large number of active service uniforms for Mr. Tommy 

Atkins, and a very large number of our slim brethren 

the Boers wear ready-mades that were produced in Leeds 

.f actorles. 10 
Clothing factories came to South Africa only at the begin­
ning of this century. The first factory began operation in Salt 
River in 1907. 11 The scattered nature of the South African mar­
ket should not in itself have discouraged the development of a 
clothing industry before this date but other factors did. The 
main hindrance was the very low cost of imported clothing of all 
but the best quality. The local manufacturer could not easily 
compete with goods produced by workers who were exploited as in­
tensely as those in Britain. 12 There was no chance of protective 
8. 	 Tawney (1915, p.2). 
9. 	 In 1913 South Africa was followed by Australia (11%) and 
New Zealand (8%) (Tawney, 1915, p.2). 
10. 	 Men's Wear 22 February 1902, p.177, quoted in Thomas (1955, p.43). 
11. 	 A. Fraser &Co. (The Buyer February 1957). 
12. 	 Except for a brief period during the first World War, Cape 
clothing manufacturers consistently claimed that the wages 
of clothing workers in Britain were substantially below those 
paid in South Africa. (See, for example, S.A. Commerce and 
Manufacturers' Record, 8 January 1914, p.13 and Select Committee 
on the Regulation of Wages Bill: Minutes of Evidence S.C. 
4 - 1917, pp.53, 56, 58-9). This claim was again forcefully 
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tariff barriers being erected to encourage local industry as the 
Cape Parliament, and Cape business life in general, were dominated 
by merchant capital which drew its strength from the import trade. 
Dominant in this trade were the large wholesalers such as 
J.W. Jagger &Co., Cleghorn &Harris, Garlicks and Hepworths, 
several of which also owned retail outlets. Garlicks had its 
own tailors' workshop as well. Some of the wholesalers were actual 
branches of a British firm, some were tied to one British firm 
for which they acted as agents, while others were independent 
importers. The wholesalers dealt in ready-made clothes of all 
qualities - coats, shirts, suits, underclothing and childrens' 
garments. In addition, they would measure customers for suits 
and then send the measurements to Britain to be made up in the 
13
'special order' department of a factory. This produced a well-
fitting suit which was cheaper than the tailor-made product. 
A substantial part of the wholesalers' trade in imported special 
orders was with drapery stores in towns throughout South Africa. 
The drapers sent the measurements of their customers through the 
wholesalers in Cape Town and ,then fitted the suit on its arrival. 
Inland stores were also supplied with stock ready-makes and soft 
goods. 14 The owners of the wholesale houses were opposed to the 
success of factories which would absorb part of their market. 
They strenuously opposed high tariffs being placed on manufactured 
goods. 
The first clothing factories in South Africa were set up 
to produce special orders and measured uniforms for bank and post 
office workers and the railways. It was common for these factories 
also to produce ready-made clothing when they were not busy with 
special orders. This differed from the development of the clothing 
industry in Britain. There, the first factories produced the 
made before the 1935 Customs Tariff Commission (see, for 
example, Minutes of Evidence paragraphs 260, 288, 3170 and 
the Return of A. Fraser &Co.) and before the Wage Board 
('Memorandum of Objections to Wage Board's Recommendation, 
[Gazetted December 30th 1927], Cape Town, January 1928'­
CCl Archives). 
13. 	 S.A. Commerce and Manufacturers' Record 1 July 1909, p.198. 
14. 	 Select Committte on the Regulation of Wages Bill: Minutes 
of Evidence; pp.21; 29; 86. (Hereafter S.C. 4 - 1917 Minutes). 
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cheapest ready-makes and for fifty years there was a clear distinc­
tion between the retail bespoke tailor, producing quality tailored 
garments, and the wholesale ready-make factory (Thomas, 1955, p.3). 
As the quality of ready-made clothing improved, in the early twen­
tieth century, some ready-make factories began to take orders 
for clothes to be made to measure. This division of the trade, 
first called 'special orders', became known as 'wholesale bespoke 
tailoring', meaning clothes which were made to order by factory 
methods. 
So, by the early twentieth century, factory-produced clothing 
was posing a double threat to the existence of tailors. Ready­
makes were improving in quality and becoming acceptable to people 
higher up the social scale who would normally buy from a tailor. 
Secondly factories were making clothes to measure. This was as 
true for tailors in South Africa as it was for those in Britain. 
Factories first produced clothing for men - suits, coats, trousers, 
pyjamas and shirts as well as underwear. This was followed by 
some clothing for children. Women's dresses were slower to enter 
factory production - in Cape Town this branch of the industry 
became important only after 1939, although 'ladies underwear' 
was fairly well established by then. 
The sources of supply of new clothing to the South African 
market up to the Second World War are indicated in Table 1.1 and 
Graph 1.1 below. At the turn of this century, most of the new 
clothing consumed in South Africa was imported. There were nu­
merous local tailors and dressmakers, but their contribution to 
the total supply of clothing was minimal. The first clothing 
factories appeared just before the First World War. The disrup­
tion in trade between Britain and South Africa boosted the expan­
sion of existing factories and the sudden, urgent demand for mili­
tary uniforms led to the formation of additional clothing factories. 
The boom ended abruptly in 1920 and the clothing industry remained 
in a depressed state until the Pact government's measures to encour­
age local industry took effect after 1925. 
The extreme fluctuations in the statistics in 1920 are the 
~ 
result of the crisis in the British (and world) economy in 1920-21. 
The renewal of intense foreign competition between 1920 and 1925 
had a drastic effect on the South African clothing industry. 
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Graph 1.1: The Supply of New Clothing in South Africa 1916-1938 
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Table 1.1: The Supply of New Clothing in South Africa 1916-1938 

(current prices) 

Local Local Clothing Clothing
YEAR output - Imports Exports Total output imports & Texti Ie 
of of new as %of as %of imports
clothing clothing clothing total total as %of 
supply supply imports total 
(£OOO's) (£OOO's) (£OOOs) (£OOO's) imports 
1911 

- 5 055 0 14 
 28
- -
-
1912 
 - 5 201 0 - 28
13
-
1913 
 - 4 995 0 12
- 25
-
1914 

- 4 315 0 12
- 25
-
1915 
 - 4 214 2 
 - - 13 
 29 

1916 
 1 003 6 451 6 
 7 448 
 16
13,5 33 

1917 
 1 272 5 875 13 
 7 134 
 17,8 15 
 33 

1918 
 10 318
1 736 8 593 11 
 16,8 17 
 47 

2 220 6 864 17
1919 
 9 067 14
25,5 31 

1920 
 2 800 15 325 23 
 18 102 
 15,5 15 
 30 

1921 
 2 497 7 824 6 
 25,59 775 
 13 
 25 

1922 
 2 078 8 207 1 
 10 284 
 20,2 16 
 34 

1923 
 2 009 8 297 1 
 10 305 
 14
19,5 30 

1924 
 2 093 8 323 0 
 10 416 
 20,1 13 
 27 

2 240 8 294 0
1925 
 10 534 
 21,3 12 
 29 

1926 
 2 667 8 290 1 
 10 956 
 24,3 26
11 

1927 
 2 933 8 027 1 
 26,810 959 
 24
11 

1928 
 3 425 8- 204 3 
 11 626 
 10
29,5 25 

3 800 7 780 2
1929 
 32,8 24
11 579 
 9 

1930 
 3877 6 228 2 
 10 104 
 38,4 10 
 25 

1931 
 - 5 184 ­ - 10 
 26
-
1932 
 - 3 019 ­ 24
- - 9 

1933 
 4 121 4 356 0 
 8477 
 48,6 25
9 

1934 
 4 007 4 920 1 
 8 926 
 44,9 20
7 

4 701 5 476 191
1935 
 9 986 
 54,0 18
7 

1936 
 5 153 6 099 194 
 11 058 46,6 18
7 

1937 
 6 057 6 804 256 
 12 605 
 46,9 17
7 

1938 
 (6 173) (6 242) (297) (12 118) 50,9 19
7 

Notes: 	 The figures for clothing imports were obtained 
by adding together the following categories: 
Apparel & Slops; Cotton, Linen, Silk and Wool 
Manufactures; Uniforms and Appointments and 
Hats & Caps. 
The method of statistical collection changed in 
1938, so 	the 1938 figures are not comparable 
with earlier figures. 
Sources: 	Annual Statements of the Trade and Shipping of 
the Union of South Africa 
Official Year Books of the Union of South Africa 
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Local clothing production declined both in relative and absolute 
terms. At the end of the First World War, local clothing fac­
tories produced about 25 per cent of South Africa's clothing re­
quirements. Through the 1920's this fell to about 20 per cent, 
although the local market expanded steadily. 
The South African clothing industry suffered a relatively 
minor set-back during the Great Depression and from 1932 onwards 
supplied about 50 per cent of all the new clothing consumed 
Graph 1.2: Local Clothing Production as a Percentage of the 
Total Supply of Clothing 1916-1938 
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in the country. Clothing became one of the first major areas 
of import substituting industrialization in the South African 
economy. Its progress up to 1938 is illustrated in Graph 1.2 
above. The percentage of total imports made up by imported cloth­
ing declined from 14 per cent in 1914 to 7 per cent by 1938. 
The two main centres of clothing production were Cape Town 
and the Witwatersrand. At the end of the First World War there 
were about 2 500 workers in all branches of the clothing industry 
15in Cape Town compared with 1 200 on the Witwatersrand. The 
conditions inland were, it appears, more favourable to growth 
than in the Cape during the early 1920's because by 1925 there 
16 
were slightly more clothing workers inland than at the coast. 
By 1939, almost 17 000 workers were employed in clothing factories. 
8 000 worked in the Transvaal, 6 000 in Cape Town and 3 000 in 
the Eastern Province and Natal. Durban, today the second major 
area of clothing employment after Cape Town, became an important 
centre for the industry only after the Second World War. 
Conditions in the Cape Town Clothing Trades before 1925 
From 1900 to 1925 the progress of the clothing industry in Cape 
Town was hesitant and precarious. In this period the industry 
broke out of the confines of bespoke tailoring and workshops and 
included ready-make production in factories. However, the latter 
was extremely vulnerable to foreign competition until it was 
granted sustained protection from imports after 1925. There are 
no adequate statistics with which one might chart the outlines 
of the development of the clothing industry in Cape Town and I 
have discovered no sources which allow a continuous assessment 
of other aspects of the industry's growth. However, a clear in­
dication of the changes in the industry in Cape Town may be gained 
from an examination of conditions in two years, 1906 and 1917. 
15. 	 UG 51-1918, Statistics of Production 1916/17. 
16. 	 The 1924/25 Industrial Census showed 3 079 clothing workers 
in the Western Cape and 3 175 in the Southern Transvaal (UG 
41-1927). Between 1919/20 and 1924/5 the value of tailoring 
and garment production in the Western Cape fell from 
£0,705m to £0,422m while in the Southern Transvaal it fell 
from £0,728m to £0,682m. 
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In both years select committees (appointed by the Cape Legislative 
Assembly in 1906 and by the Union Parliament in 1917) heard evidence 
on conditions in the clothing trades in Cape Town. 1906 is the 
year before the first clothing factory was established in Cape 
Town. 1917 is the date of the first strike of clothing factory 
workers in Cape Town. Although the conditions in 1906 and in 
1917 obviously represent two ~ifferent phases in the development 
of the clothing industry in Cape Town, it is not possible, given 
the lack of information, to date the beginning of this transition 
from tailoring to factory production more precisely than the years 
of the First World War, or to identify its dynamics, beyond point­
ing to wartime conditions. 
3a Conditions in 1906 
Some insight into conditions in the tailoring trade in the early 
years of the century may be gained from evidence presented before 
17two select committees of the Cape Parliament in 1906. The select 
committees investigated conditions in the industries of Cape Town 
to judge whether it was desirable that a Factory Act be introduced 
into the colony. Evidence was submitted for all the small and 
struggling industries of Cape Town. But both committees were 
shocked by the conditions they found to exist in tailoring. The 
trade followed its common pattern of sub-contracting outwork, 
18piecework,long hours and low wages. 
17. 	 The Select Committee of the Legislative Council on the Con­
ducting of Factories and the Fair Wage Clause and the Select 
Committee of the House of Assembly on the Factory Act. The 
report of the former was publishedasCl-1906 and of the latter 
as A6-1906. 
18. 	 Much of the following account is drawn directly from the 
minutes of the oral evidence presented before the two select 
committees. Neither committee issued a comprehensive report 
which resolves contradictions between the evidence of differ­
ent witnesses. Both favoured the introduction of a Factory 
Act. While tailoring was given more time than other indus­
tries and 'representation' from all levels in the hierarchy 
of the trade appeared, there was only one Muslim or coloured 
witness (who was very briefly examined) and no inspection 
was made of the Muslim shops about which the most serious 
allegations were made. (See J. Garlick MLA in 1906 Cape 
Hansard, p.594). 
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Abraham Stone, a journeyman tailor, stated: 
As far as my own trade is concerned, I find that the 
sweating here in this colony is appalling •••The shop­
keepers take their orders and give the work out to a 
sub-contractor, who again employs men to do piece-work, 
which is done in domestic workshops, in most cases a 
room where the people eat and sleep. The hours of work 
are practically unlimited. I know of cases where 100 
hours a week are put in, but generally it is 70 or 80 
hours as a rule. There is piece-work in most cases 
and that accounts for it ••• There is no proper sanita­
tion either ••• Clothes are made frequently in domestic 
workshops, where the people eat and sleep in the same 
room, and the clothing made there is sent out to the 
public. Then there is the question of the girls, who 
work perhaps 50 hours a week: there are very few women. 
I know cases where they work as much as 70 and 75 hours 
a week, and how can you expect these girls to become 
good wives and mothers?19 
Other witnesses confirmed that, with the exception of Garlicks, 
which had a number of workshops, the bulk of tailoring was done 
by outworkers and by sub-contract. Wages varied from £3 to £5 
per week for cutters and more highly skilled men, from £2.10 to 
£2.15 for men workers and from 12 shillings to £1 for women. 
"Unusually long hours were worked, very frequently until midnight 
and at lmes a t roug t e nlg. ne comml ee mem er put ' 11 h h h . ht" 20 0 'tt b t 
the following to a journeyman: 
I judge from your evidence that these people are bound 
to work these long hours and receive this small remuner­
ation because you yourself get from the leading firms 
so small a remuneration from the work you take from 
them; is that the position? 
19. A6-1906, Evidence, pp.140-141. 
20. Cl-1906, Report, p.ix. 
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The reply was that it was exactly the position. 21 The one com­
mittee stated in its report: 
••• it appears that it is not from avarice or greed that 
these long hours are worked, but these unfortunate people 
are compelled to do this owing to the conditions under 
22
which the clothing trade is carried on. 
Great concern was voiced about the dangers to public health which 
existed in clothes being made in small, dirty rooms and even serv-" 
ing as bedding before being returned to the master tailor. It 
was feared that the recent epidemics of smallpox and plague might 
have gained a more rapid hold on Cape Town as a result of the 
23
existing tailoring system. An inspection was made of rooms 
in which white tailors and their helpers worked in District 6. 
The state of the rooms was declared to be "anything but satisfac­
24tory". 
Neither select committee made any attempt to investigate 
the conditions under which Cape Town's community of Malay tailors 
worked. The Muslim tailors had been established for many genera­
tions and some of them became relatively prosperous. An informant 
said that of the Muslim artisans, tailors were amongst the wealth­
iest and most important citizens. As they worked from home they 
were ideal Imams, being always easily available for advice}5 
Muslim tailors made traditional Malay garments as well as taking 
work from white master-tailors on contract. Several white tailors 
gave evidence in 1906 about the situation of the Muslim tailors. 
They described their conditions as more terrible than their own. 
There are about 200 Malay tailors, and they live good­
ness knows how many families in a house. The Malay 
tailor has not a separate room as a workshop. He has 
a room, and there is a bed, his wife and children, and 
goodness knows how many other people in that room, and 
21. 	 A6-1906, Evidence, paragraph 1226. 
22. 	 Cl-1906, Report, p.x. 
23. 	 Ibid., p.xi. 
24. 	 Report of Sub-committee appointed to visit Certain Workshops 
in the City_ Appendix B to Cl-1906. 
25. 	 Interview with Mr Achmat Davids, the son of a tailor, 1978. 
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there he does the work ••• The majority of trousers are 
made by Malays and there I think it more dangerous than 
in the case of a coat. The majority of trousers and 
vests are made by Malays in this town, and they are 
26
made in horrible places. 
At the time, Garlicks was the only tailoring firm to have a work­
. 
shop attached to its premises. About ninety workers were employed 
there. They were both coloured (Malay) and white and the majority 
were pieceworkers. John Garlick MLA, the owner, explained: 
Two or three years ago, there was a fair amount of that 
sub-contracting, but I came to the conclusion not to 
allow it for the reason that we had sufficient room 
in our own shop and decided that rather than somebody 
else should take the cream off the wages from the work­
27people, we would do it in our shop, and pay them better. 
An average pieceworker received about £2.15 a week - a figure 
several other witnesses estimated as the average wage of most 
male workers. (It is not clear whether this 'wage could only be 
earned by a worker if he had family help). Garlicks 'factory' 
opened at 7.30 a.m. and closed at 6 p.m. Day workers came at 
8 a.m. and pieceworkers before 10 a.m. The system did not how­
ever exclude work at home. Most workers took "big bundles of 
work to do at home",28 the reason for their later arrival at the 
workshop. As Garlick said: 
Many of the pieceworkers find the (workshop) hours too 
short and are anxious to work longer ••• If (a man) has 
a wife and family and is anxious to earn as much as 
possible, he will take work home and do an hour or two's 
work in the evening, or before he comes to the workshop 
. th . 29ln e mornlng. 
The organization of the workers in the tailoring trade presents 
special difficulties. Competition for work is intense, specially 
26. A6-1906, Evidence, p.113. 
27. Cl-1906, Evidence, p.79a. 
28. A6-1906, Evidence, p.113. 

29 • Cl-1906, Evidence, p.78a.

• 
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between outworkers; workshops are small and often enmeshed in 
family structures and the sub-contracting system makes the middle­
man journeyman tailors both employers and workers at the same 
time. In Cape Town these difficulties of organization were com­
pounded by divisions which existed between the Malay tailors and 
the other white (mainly Jewish) tailors. Between 1900 and 1925 
a succession of short-lived tailors trade unions made brief appear­
ances. In 1906, Abraham Stone, a journeyman, was secretary of 
the Amalgamated Society of Tailors. 30 The society was campaign­
ing for a fifty hour week and minimum wages of £4.4 for men and 
31£2 for women. However, Abraham Walker, another journeyman, 
stated: 
The (tailors') organization cannot do any good because 
they are not organized properly. We have about 150 
or 170 members, all Europeans, belonging to the organi­
zation, but there are Malay tailors in Cape Town, and 
these Malays are the cause of all the trouble. They 
have insanitary workshops, and they are working for 
any price; they are not particular what they get ••• We 
have been trying to get the Malays to join, but we can­
not get the Malays to come and organize. We have sent 
money and had meeting after meeting trying to get them 
together, but they will not organize because the shops 
they work for say "You must not listen to what they 
tell you", and the Malay workman looks to the shopman 
who employs him as a god; whatever the shopman says 
to him is law, and whatever he pays the Malay takes. 
The shops can do with the Malays what they like and 
the Malays will not organize. The only thing they ex­
plain to the Malays is that we want them to pay so 
much a week, and that we want to rob them of their 
money. That is what they explain to the Malays 
30. 	 The Amalgamated Society of Tailors was formed in the latter half 
of 1905 (S.A. News 28 October 1905). The S.A. News commented 
that "the competition between the Malays and the Jews is well 
known to be the great stumbling block to complete success in 
their organization". It referred to the "ruinous distrust 
which unfortunately prevails". (S.A. News 2 December 1905). 
31. 	 Stone said that Hepworths Ltd. had agreed to their scale of 
prices "on account of the appointment of the Factory Act Select 
Committee". (A6-1906, Evidence, p.144). 
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and the Malays will not organize. 32 
No evidence was presented to either select committee which in­
dicated that women workers were organized in any way. The major­
ity of workers in the tailoring trade were men and men occupied 
all the key positions in the trade. So long as the journeymen 
were organized they could conduct a strike as it was they who 
distributed work to outworkers. 
3b Conditions in 1917 and the Tailors' Strike 
The clothing trades again came under the scrutiny of a parliamentary 
select committee in 1917.33 By then the rudiments of a modern 
clothing industry had developed. Several clothing factories had 
been established and a great volume of military clothing was being 
produced. Factories had been built before the war to produce 
f or t he spec1a1 or er US1ness. 34 e war created'. db' Th a spec1a1 oppor­
tunity for South African manufacturers. Trade with Britain was 
disrupted, reducing the competition from imports and in these 
abnormal conditions it was possible for a larger range of clothing 
to be profitably produced in South Africa. There was an immediate, 
heavy demand for military uniforms from the government out of 
which the established factories first made "huge profits".35 The 
favourable climate enticed many new 'entrepreneurs' into setting 
32. 	 A6-1906, Evidence, p.124. 
In April 1901, all of the two-hundred or so white tailors 
in Cape Town conducted a twenty-day strike demanding higher 
rates from the master tailors. The master tailors conceded 
increases of only one seventh of the demands and the strike 
ended. Malay tailors continued to work throughout the strike, 
ignoring the appeals of the Cape Town branch of the United 
South African Tailors Union for unity (South African News; 
3, 4, 5, 6 and 24 April 1901). 
33. 	 The Select Committee on the Regulation of Wages (Specified 
Trades) Bill. The committee's report and minutes of evidence 
were published as S.C. 4 - 1917. 
34. 	 A. Fraser & Co. was followed by The African Clothing Co. 
and M. Bertish &Co. 
35. 	 S.C. 4 - 1917, Evidence, pp.55; 77. 
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up shop and soon their competition established a new and deeper 
polarization between the 'upper' and 'lower' classes of trade. 
The worst conditions of exploitation came to exist in the pro­
duction of military clothing under contract from the government. 
The Union Defence Force had been disturbed by the high prices 
it first had to pay for uniforms. Its solution was to buy up 
large quantities of material and give it out_on a cut, make and 
trim basis. An industrialist complained: 
Their policy was to get the work done at the cheapest 
price possible. The policy of squeezing was carried 
out to an enormous extent. It was made impossible for 
respectable firms to compete, because of those conditions 
that were established. The squeezing was performed 
in the ordinary way of bartering. A man would come 
round and say, "Can you make 1 000 tunics for us?" 
The reply would be "Yes". He would then say "What price?" 
When he was told the price he would say "Well, I can 
get it done at less than that" and so it came about 
that it was impossible for any of the established firms 
36to compete at all ••• 
The men who got these contracts immediately gathered 
the cheapest possible labour they could get round about 
them and established work rooms. The whole thing was 
merely a question of getting the lowest price possible, 
and it involved very long hours •••The agents of the 
military were continually going round seeing that these 
things were made to time, and the conditions were par­
ticularly bad. Of course, that got organized by and 
37by into what I can call by no other name than sweating. 
A tailor commented: 
The man who can send in the lowest tender is considered 
the man to do the work, and the burden of the low price 
falls on the shoulders of the work-people who have to 
38
make the garments. 
36. S.C. 4 - 1917, Evidence, Mr. W. Marshall MPC (Hepworths), p.32. 
37. Ibid., p.30. 
38. S.C. 4 - 1917, Evidence, Julius Folk, p.80. 
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The labour registration officer for the peninsula said: 
When the large contracts for military clothing were 
called for, these contracts appear to have been sub­
let in some cases to other persons. I am informed that 
military overcoats given out at a price approximating 
ISs. for making, to the first firm that secured the 
contract, were eventually found to have been made for 
approximately 5s. as a result of subletting. 39 
He continued: 
This sweated tailoring trade is carried on by the Jewish 
people to some extent, and coloured people also. The 
Jewish people manage the business. I know of a case 
of a man who was not a tailor at all, but he obtained 
a contract and sublet it, and now he has started tailor­
ing on his own account. This sort of thing is usually 
carried out, not in factories, but at the homes of the 
workers. They have what are called squad tailors, per­
haps seven or eight people who deal in these small con­
tracts; one of the members of these squads takes machin­
ing, another the pressing, another the felling, another 
the button-holing, and so on ••• 40 
Military clothing was also produced in new factories which drew 
in and created a new group of young coloured women to work in 
factories at very low wages. 
The established firms first did a large quantity of mili­
tary work, but reduced the scope of their tenders when competition 
forced prices down to the lowest level. The bulk of their output 
was in special orders and in a limited range of ready-made clothing. 
There were in Cape Town at least five factories which employed 
between 100 and 200 workers. The African Clothing Co. was one 
of the best equipped. Established in 1911 as "the pioneer ready­
made clothing factory of South Africa,,41 it employed one hundred 
39. 	 S.C. 4 - 1917, Mr. H. Beynon, p.16. 
40. 	 Ibid., p.21. 
41. 	 South African Commerce and Manufacturers' Record August 
1916, p.284. 
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and fifty workers in a specialised production system. The factory 
was visited in 1916 by one Thos. H. Lewis, who reported in part 
as follows: 
The whirr of machinery greeted our entry into the machin­
ing department. I had heard so much of the conditions 
which usually occur in the machining-rooms of tailoring 
factories, that I was most agreeably surprised to find 
myself in a spacious, high-roofed, well lighted and 
excellently ventilated room in which blended, not un­
pleasantly, the jingle and hum of hundreds of machines 
of all makes and sizes ••• I threaded my way through lines 
of cheerful-faced machinists, and was specially interested 
in the working of the button-sewing, button-holing, 
felling, patent blind-stitching (the only one in the 
country), tacking and binding machines. For my special 
edification, specimens of the work of each machine were 
shown by nimble-fingered operators, whose deftness in 
42handling them astonished me. 
If physical conditions in the larger factories were good, wages 
were still very low, as low as four shillings a week for beginners. 
The 'better class of trade' was still the preserve of tailors 
and, as in 1906, it drew almost exclusively on the labour of out­
workers and sub-contractors. However there had been a considerable 
erosion of white tailors. One tailor stated: 
About seven years ago we had a union in Cape Town and 
we had about 600 members who were white European tailors. 
Now I do not think there will be more than 75 to one 
hundred of such members. 43 
This decline in the number of white tailors was attributed to com­
44petition from the Malay tailors who undercut their prices.
The First World War provided South African manufacturers 
with the opportunity to produce clothing profitably on a wider 
42. 	 South African Commerce and Manufacturers' Record August 
1916, p.286 
43. 	 S.C. 4 - 1917, Evidence, Mr. J. Folk, p.84. 
44. 	 Ibid., p.82. 
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scale than before. But it was not only the artificial protection 
afforded by the War which made this possible. The War years saw 
a deterioration in working conditions as military uniform produc­
tion "introduced into Cape Town some of the worst elements in 
the trade such as we have always been accustomed to understand 
' . G B" d hI' d . 1 ." 45 
There was a reduction in the real wages of workers. To further 
reduce costs, cheap coloured and young women workers were intro­
duced into factory labour on a large scale. 
obtaln ln reat rltaln an ot er arge ln ustrla countrles. 
W.M. Middlemass, the head of A. Fraser & Co. and later chair­
man of the Cape Wholesale Clothing and Shirt Manufacturers' Asso­
ciation (1925), stated: 
I am sure that if you make inquiries into the conditions 
under which a large quantity of the clothing is made 
in Cape Town you will be surprised. There is no super­
vision, and arrangements for sanitation leave much to 
be desired. From my own knowledge I can say that the 
hours worked in some of these places are terrible. 
There is no limit whatever. They work Saturday after­
noons and Sundays too; if you go through the town you 
can hear the machines working all' over the place, per­
haps more in little workshops than in private houses. 
I do not know anything about private houses. Our busi­
ness was founded in 1907. I do think conditions in 
.l' d h b 	 . h 46t he tal orlng tra eave ecome worse slnce ten. 
Several witnesses even stated that in some areas, conditions in 
. B'Cape 	Town were worse t han ln rltaln.. 47 
The wages of factory workers varied from 4 shillings a week 
for young girls of 14 or 15 who were just starting in the trade 
to 18 to 25 shillings for qualified women machinists. Boys who 
started work at 13 or 14 earned 5 shillings a week to start with 
and then 30 to 70 shillings once they had qualified at the age 
45. 	 S.C. 4 - 1917, Evidence, Mr. W. Marshall MPC, p.24. 
46. 	 S.C. 4 - 1917, Evidence, Mr. W.M. Middlemass (rendered Middle­
man in the Minutes), p.88. 
47. 	 Julius Folk said: "I know a good deal about the tailoring 
trade of this class in England, and I should say that the 
conditions are worse here than in the Old Country." (S.C. 
4 - 1917, Evidence, p.82). 
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of 20 or so. Pieceworkers, who were paid according to a log, 
were said to earn similar wages. However, it is hard to draw 
much meaning from these figures. Wages varied widely between 
seasons. Workers on short-time received much less, as did tailors 
and outworkers who failed to get as much work as they wanted to 
do. Wages, prices and hours of work fluctuated over time and 
between the d~fferent classes of trade and the race of the opera­
tives - coloured workers in general received less than whites. 
In many cases, hours and wages had stayed more or less the same 
since 1900 but the cost of living had risen sharply. Prices rose 
by approximately forty per cent between 1910 and 1917. At this 
time a "European of low type" was said to need 22/6 if she were 
48to support herself. It seems that less than half of the factory 
workers received a wage approaching this level. 49 But undoubtedly 
the most significant factor in the profitable expansion of the 
clothing industry was the use which factory owners were able to 
make of the labour of young girls still living at home. 
The first reason why the level of wages was so low was that 
factories took care to employ girls who were living at home and 
who therefore did not have to bear the full costs of the repro­
duction of their labour power. Beynon explained: 
Most of these girls it must be remebered, live with 
their parents, and reputable firms in town, when they 
engage a girl as apprentice, always ask who she is 
living with and who her parents are, so as to ensure 
50there is sufficient support. 
Middlemass stated: 
A girl of 14 years of age will have somebody to look 
after her, she will not be on her own •••• A girl cannot 
live on 5s. a week, to one who is dependent upon her­
self we would have to pay 25s. a week, but, of course, 
51 
a girl at that age must live with her parents. 
48. S.C. 4 - 1917 , Evidence, Mr. H. Beynon, p.20. 
49. S.C. 4 - 1917, Evidence, Mr. M. Torbin, p.57. 
50. S.C. 4 - 1917 , Evidence, Mr. H. Beynon, p.20. 
5l. S.C. 4 - 1917, Evidence, Mr. W.M. Middlemass, p.91-92. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
52 

Middlemass also stated: 
I certainly do not contend that a girl can live decently 
on lOs. a week. I do not however look upon it as a serious 
thing that a large number are being paid no more than 
that. The majority of these girls live with their families 
52
and have their parents behind them.
The head of a firm of clothing retailers said: 
A girl cannot live respectably on £2.10s. a month, un­
less, of course, she is living with her parents. We 
should n6t engage a hand who had to support herself 
unless we paid what we considered a living wage of from 
£6 to £8 a month ••• lf we could not pay a girl that who 
had to support herself we should not engage her. We 
should engage others at a lower salary they were 
53living with their parents.
The second reason for the low level of wages is found in the use 
manufacturers made of so-called "learners". There is no appren­
ticeship system in the wholesale clothing industry as the processes 
in~olved are divided and sub-divided and workers require little 
instruction. 54 Speed and accuracy, the most valued attributes 
of the machinist, come mainly from practice. However factory 
owners still insist on a period of 'learnership' during which 
productive workers can be paid at lower learners rates. In 1917, 
for example, some factories engaged young learners at 5 shillings 
a week and then edged them up to 17/6 or 20 shillings over three 
55to four years. One factory manager stated: 
52. 	 S.C. 4 - 1917, Evidence, Mr. W.M. Middlemass, p.87. 
53. 	 S.C. 4 - 1917, Evidence, Mr. G. Davidson, p.103. 
54. 	 The Clothing Section of the CCI wrote to the Juvenile Affairs 
Board in 1923: "Many of the processes today are operated 
by automatic machinery, needing little knowledge and little 
guidance, and experience has shown that the idea of fixing 
a term of apprenticeship for such labour is entirely out of 
the question and thoroughly impracticable." (Letter from 
W.J. 	Laite, 15 March 1923, CCI Archives MIll). 
55. 	 S.C. 4 - 1917, Evidence, M. W. Marshall MPC, p.25. 
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••• there are firms today who are employing what are 
called learners, whom they pay 5s. a week. When they 
have been at one place a while, these girls can do a 
fair amount of work for the particular firm by whom 
they are employed. When they ask for an advance they 
are refused in most cases. They are told they are 
learners, and the wages they are being paid is all that 
the firm can do for them. If they do not like it they 
must leave. It is practically impossible for them to 
leave for they are badly in need of the money, and they 
have only learnt a certain thing to do to that garment. 
They are no good to other firms, because the firms do 
not work alike56 •57 
Learners were by no means assured of a steady advance up the 
learners wage scale. Factory owners would protest that girls 
58had not the ability t.o earn a higher wage. A tailor explained: 
If you look at the vacancies advertised in the papers 
you will see that they are for girls leaving school 
to learn the trade. The reason is that after they have 
worked for one of these firms a few months and they 
are beginning to get on and there is the prospect of 
them asking for more wages, more girls are advertised 
for and as those in work cannot get other work to do, 
they think they might as well go on working at these 
low rates offered. That is the game of the manufacturers, 
and they are in a position to do as they like in the 
59
matter. 
There was no trade union or other organization which looked after 
56. 	 Meaning that other firms would only agree to take such a 
worker on at a learners starting rate. 
57. 	 S.C. 4 - 1917, Evidence, M. W. Crathorne, p.61. 
58. 	 The Clothing Section of the CCI wrote in 1923: " •••where 
a girl, through lack of ability or possessed with an incurably 
lazy disposition, or owing to careless conduct and inattentive 
habits, is perforce compelled to confine her activities to 
single processes of a simple nature, it is out of the question 
of any employer to be compelled to pay her a higher wage 
for her labour than its market value." (W.J. Laite to Juvenile 
Affairs Board, 15 March 1923, CCI Archives, Ml). 
59. 	 S.C. 4 - 1917, Evidence, Mr.J. Folk, p.79. 
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the interests of these workers. Along with their counterparts 
in the printing and sweetmaking trades they were described as 
being "often in a hopeless condition, particularly when they get 
into the hands of the lower class of employers in certain dis­
tricts~.60 Several witnesses said that as a result of the low 
wages many girls were "driven to immorality".61 
Coloured women were subjected to the most intense exploita­
tion. The lower the grade of business, the greater the propor­
tion of coloured labour. Some factory owners said that coloured 
workers could be paid a lower wage because they had a lower stan­
dard of living. One said: 
I do not think a decent girl over 18 years of age could 
live on lOs. a week but the minimum is intended to apply 
to the other class; they can live on less, living as 
62they 	do. 
With 	regard to men workers he said: 
••• if I pay a coloured man at the rate of 30s. a week 
he is quite satisfied and lives comfortably on it, it 
is a living for him whereas I must pay a white man £3.10s. 
or £4, and that is only a bare living for him. 63 
Several witnesses who referred to the lower level of coloured 
workers' wages contended that these workers were not able to pro­
64duce as much as their white counterparts. But Middlemass stated 
with confidence: 
I do not think there is much difference between the 
amount of work which our white employees can get through 
as compared with similar workers in England, and I think 
the coloured worker is every bit as good. We do not 
discriminate; the coloured worker is as efficient as 
the white worker. 65 
60. 	 S.C. 4 - 1917, Evidence, Mr. H. Beynon, p.16. 
61. 	 S.C. 4 - 1917, Evidence, Mrs. A. Cooke, p.72; Rev. C. Davies, 
p.74; Mr. I Rosenbloum, p.77. 
62. 	 S.C. 4 - 1917, Evidence, Mr. M. Torbin, p.58. 
63. 	 Ibid., p.52. 
64. 	 S.C. 4 - 1917, Evidence, Mr. M. Tobin, p.52-53; Mr. W. Cra­
thorne, p.62; Mr. J. Folk, p.83. 
65. 	 S.C. 4 - 1917, Evidence, p.89-90. 
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The Select Committee heard evidence in April 1917, just before 
labour organization in Cape Town leapt forward under the influence 
of the conditions surrounding the end of the First World War. 
(See Chapter two). Despite the evidence presented to the committee 
about the helplessness and unorganizability of tailoring workers, 
especially those at the lower end of the trade, these workers 
were the backbone of a new Tailors' and Tailoress' Union (TTU) 
which was formed in mid-1917. 66 The Union was short-lived. It 
was very much the product of wartime conditions. But it was in­
volved in a remarkable strike, possibly the first strike of cloth­
ing factory workers in the country, which provides further in­
67
sights into conditions in the clothing trades in 1917.
The TTU was composed largely of coloured workers from the 
"second class" trade. It appears to have included some journeymen 
and their helpers or employees as well as indoor factory workers. 
From the start the Union was affiliated to the Cape Federation 
of Labour Unions (CFLU) but its affairs were closely managed by 
its chairman/secretary M.A. Gamiet, sometime president of the 
Cape Malay Association68 • The CFLU was a loosely structured co­
ordinating body for trade unions in ape Town. Its secretary 
was Robert Stuart. 
The new Union first secured a substantial membership in two 
factories, those of A.E. Mendelsohn in Burg Street and Hogsett, 
69Stephens & Bishop in Loop Street. It then asked Stuart to write 
a circular letter to all the clothing firms in Cape Town to inform 
them that: 
••• the members of the Tailors' and Tailoress' Union 
respectfully ask all employers in the Tailoring Trade 

70
for an advance in wages of 30 per cent. 
66. 	 Cape Argus 23 October 1917. 
67. 	 The only substantial sources of information on the strike 
are the Cape Times and the Cape Argus. 
68. 	 The Sun 26 August 1932. 
69. 	 Letter from the A.E. Mendelsohn Co. to the Secretary, CFLU, 
8 October 1917 (Ac2, TUCSA Archives); Cape Times 24 October 1917. 
70. 	 Letter from Stuart, Secretary, CFLU to various clothing manufac­
turers in Cape Town, 2 October 1917 (Ac2, TUCSA Archives). 
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The request referred to the 33 percent increase in the cost of 
living whiC;h a recent Parliamentary Select Committee had found 
to have occurred since 1914. The TTU said it would send the names 
of all firms which agreed to increase wages to, 
••• the government and other institutions asking them 

that before accepting tenders to favourably consider 

firms that have agreed to the increase. 71 

Several firms replied to Stuart's letter. None agreed to the 
increase and all indicated they were paying more. than in 	1914 
72
and that they paid the best wages they could at the time. A.E. 
Mendelsohn wrote that: 
••• we are (as far as we know) the only 'Union' shop 
in Cape Town, and have already increased our wages to 
73the extent of about 25% ••• 
Hogsett, Stephens &Bishop replied that they were paying more 
than before the War. Much of their work was sub-contracted out 
and the firm stated: 
••• our prices are mutually agreed upon between the 

workers and ourselves before we tender for anything 

b . 7419. 
On Monday 22nd October 1917, all the indoor workers at Hogsett, 
Stephens &Bishop and Mendelsohn's responded to a Union call to 
come out on strike in support of higher wages. The Cape Argus 
commented that it had been 
••• known for some time that dissatisfaction existed, 
especially among workers in factories on government 

75

contracts. 
71. 	 Letter from Stuart, Secretary, CFLU to various clothing manufac­
turers in Cape Town, 2 October 1917 (Ac2, TUCSA Archives). 
72. 	 Letters to CFLU from Garlick's Store, 11 October 1917; The A.E. 
Mendelsohn Co., 8 October 1917; Hogsett, Stephens &Bishop, 
6 October 1917; Hepworths Ltd., 5 October 1917; M. Bertish 
&Co.(SA) Ltd., 17 October 1917; Phoenix Manufacturing Co.Ltd., 
4 October 1917 (Ac2, TUCSA Archives). 
73. 	 Letter to CFLU, 8 October 1917 (Ac2. TUCSA Archives). 
74. 	 Letter to CFLU. 6 October 1917 (Ac2. TUCSA Archives). 
75. 	 Cape Argus 22 October 1917. 
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Gamiet stated that at the start of the War up to 4 shillings was 
paid for a tunic. Instead of rising to keep pace with the cost 
of living, the price had fallen, 
••• to the terribly low figure of Is.3d. which does not 
allow of the employees obtaining sufficient to live 

76 

upon. 
A mass meeting for workers and the public was held that night on 
the Parade. As it rained, the meeting was moved to the Trades 
77Hall which was "crowded to excess". A resolution was passed 
that, 
This meeting of citizens pledge themselves to support 
the strike in the tailoring trade and will help them 
morally and financially to the best of our ability until 
a living wage for workers is obtained. 78 
The meeting called on the government Itnot to issue contracts to 
79firms not paying a living wage lt • 
Initially the strike involved about 200 workers just from the 
Hogsett, Stephens &Bishop and Mendelsohn factories. The majorrty 
80
of strikers were coloured and a large proportion were Itgirls lt • 
The Cape Argus commented that, 
For the first time in the history of Cape Town, a trade 
union largely composed of Non-Europeans has called its 
members out as a protest against the conditions of labour. 81 
The strike occurred at a time when the industry was extremely busy 
and moreover in the context of a growing militancy amongst Cape 
Town workers. 
Both Hogsett, Stephens &Bishop and Mendelsohn's said they 
saw no reason for the strike and the press printed their refutations 
of every argument raised by the Union. They denied they paid 
76. Cape Argus 22 October 1917. 
77. Cape Argus 23 October 1917. 
78. Cape Times 23 October 1917 • 
79. Ibid. 
80. Cape Times 24 October 1917. 
81. Cape Argus 24 October 1917. 
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wages as low as the Union alleged. They invited the inspection 
of their wage registers and gave examples of wages paid to workers 
in their factories. These appeared to support their denials of 
underpayment. Mendelsohn said that most workers had been 
••• compelled to strike in sympathy with one or two 
malcontents who for their own ends have engineered the 
82
movement. 
He complained that he had negotiated wages with the workers and 
it was "unfair" that they should strike.83 
Hogsett, Stephens &Bishop said they had received a "very 
amateurish" and "unworkable"84 set of rules and prices drawn 
up by the TTU on the Saturday morning. The TTU demanded accept­
ance of this by 4 p.m. on the same day, or a strike would occur. 
Some of the demands were for increases of between 100 and 150 
per cent. The firm protested that most of their work was whole­
sale bespoke tailoring and that they did very little contract 
work. They also regularly gave increases when requested. Their 
feeling was that they and Mendelsohn's were being "victimized"85 • 
••• (We) have been selected as a start off because nearly 
all our employees are union members and therefore readily 
controllable. 86 
The TTU arranged peaceful picketing at both factories to prevent 
"blacklegging". Gamiet rejected the arguments of the employers. 
He said that the wages they had quoted from their register were 
for outworkers who still had to pay their helpers. 87 A letter 
to the Cape Argus accused Hogsett, Stephens &Bishop of lying. 
The production of a wage register proves nothing. Pay­
ment is by piecework and when 6 o'clock comes, jobs 
are put up and taken to the workers' homes, where the 
said workers employ other workers.88 
82. Cape Times 24 October 1917. 
83. Cape Argus 23 October 1917. 
84. Cape Times 24 October 1917. 
85. Ibid. 
86. Ibid. 
87. Cape Times 25 October 1917. 
88. Cape Argus 25 October 1917. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
59 

An editorial in the Argus commented that the statements of the 
workers and employers were "totally and irreconcilably at vari­
ance".89 However, it was clear that over the previous few years, 
••• the sweating system has been creeping into the 
cheap tailoring trade in the Cape Peninsula and for 
this highly undesirable state of affairs the Govern­
ment are chiefly responsible. 90 
The editorial called for new preventive legislation. 
At the end of the first week of the strike, a mass meeting 
was held in a crowded Metropolitan Hall. 91 Gamiet paraded on 
the stage girls and boys aged between 12 and 14 years, who earned 
from 3/6 to 6/- a week. The Dean of Cape Town made an impassioned 
plea for a living wage and an end to cut-throat competition. 
He said that a law should be enacted to end these conditions. 92 
His remarks were endorsed by A.F. Batty from the CFLU and Dr. 
Abdurahman. Mr. Hogsett attended the meeting and was allowed 
to speak from the floor. He said he had received no complaints 
from his workers and paid as well as other firms. He could not 
afford to pay more as 1ong as hlS""rlva1s pal"d 1ess. 93 
Both Hogsett, Stephens &Bishop and Mendelsohn's refused 
to negotiate on the wage issue until all workers returned to work. 
So, at a mass meeting in the Trades Hall, a resolution was passed 
calling on workers in other firms in the "second class trade" 
(who were mainly engaged in contract work) to join the strike. 94 
On Tuesday morning 30th October, another 800 workers came 
out in support of the TTU wage demands. The strike now included 
virtually all clothing workers in Cape Town except for those in 
the higher class trade. At 12.30 p.m. strikers gathered on the 
Parade. 
Headed by a sergeant and two mounted constables, they 
marched, via Darling and Adderley Streets, along the 
89. CaQe Argus 26 October 1917. 
90. Ibid. 
9l. CaQe Times 27 October 1917. 
92. Ibid. 
93. CaQe Argus 27 October 1917. 
94. CaQe Times 30 October 1917. 
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Dock-road and up Buitengracht Street, lustily singing. 95 
"Britons never shall be slaves" was the marching song. A banner 
reading "Down With Sweating" was prominently displayed. 96 The 
Cape Argus reported that: 
There were a good many Europeans in the procession but 
the bulk of the women wore doeks and the fez ruled amongst 
the men. A noticeable feature, •••was the number of 
Malay boys and girls (presumably strikers) who looked 
of school-going age. 
After the march, the Mayor of Cape Town, Harry Hands, called a 
meeting between the TTU leaders and representatives of the "Cloth­
ing Manufacturers' Association" which had just been formed under 
the auspices of the Cape Chamber of Industries. 98 The employers 
insisted that all workers should return to work before they would 
negotiate wages but promised an increase and no victimization. 99 
This offer was accepted by a mass meeting of workers. Work was 
resumed after only two days of 'general strike,.100 The wage 
increases the employers agreed to were not disclosed but, said 
the Cape Ar~, were "understood to be very satisfactory to the 
employees." 101 
The "tailors' strike" was among the first of a continuous 
series of strikes and disputes in Cape Town industry that lasted 
until 1920. During these few years, new unions were formed and 
3 
95. 	 Cape Argus 30 October 1917. 
96. 	 Cape Times 31 October 1917. 
97. 	 Cape Argus 30 October 1917. 
98. 	 See Chapter 2. 
99. 	 Cape Argus 1 November 1917. It is not clear from the press 
reports what the employers' at'titude was to the workers' de­
mand that their union be recognized by the employers. 
100. 	On 5 November, workers at the Phoenix and Union Clothing 
factories came out on strike again as their employers had 
gone back on the agreement. These disputes were resolved 
by negotiation between the "Clothing Manufacturers' Associa-. 
tion" and the TTU. All workers were back at work on 8 No­
vember. (Cape Times 6 November 1917; 7 November 1917; Cape 
Argus 7 November 1917; 9 November 1917). 
101. Cape Argus 9 November 1917. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
61 

old unions grew stronger. But the TTU, despite its early promise, 
faded away during 1918. By January 1919 it "had gone out of exis­
tence".102 Although the Union, through the strike, caused the 
major clothing manufacturers in Cape Town to come together as 
a unit for the first time, it was not well enough organized to 
participate in one of the semi-formal "conciliation boards" which 
were set up in several trades after 1918 to resolve labour dis­
103putes. 
102. 	CFLU Minutes: 21 January 1919 (TUCSA Archives). 
103. See 	Chapter 2. 
In view of the later importance of Robert Stuart in the history 
of the garment workers, it is interesting to record his memo­
ries of the 1917 strike. They were written in 1950. 
'After the establishment of a Trade Union for Garment Workers, 
demands were submitted to the Employers for increased wages, 
shorter hours and improved working conditions generally. 
The Employers claimed that the Industry could not bear the 
additional costs of higher wage rates, and better working 
conditions,:~ma they accordingly rejected demands in toto. 
A strike resulted, and was completely effective throughout 
the entire Industry. But it was obvious that the stoppage 
could not last for long. The newly formed Union was exceed­
ingly weak financially, with the result that no strike pay 
could be paid; appeals to other Unions evoked no assistance 
whatsoever from them. The Clothing Industry, at that time, 
was of such small dimensions, and the Employees engaged there­
in so relatively few in number, that it was impossible to 
stimulate any interest in, or concern for, them among the 
other Trade Unions functioning here. In these circumstances, 
the inexorable pressure of economic circumstance soon began 
to exert its effect and, after the strike had been in progress 
for a very short time, the Employees expressed their wish 
and intention to resume work again. This, of course, would 
have spelt a crushing and ignominious defeat for the striking 
Employees. Fortunately, however, the Mayor or Cape Town 
was approached and was asked to intervene in the strike. He 
agreed to do so, and he summoned representatives of both 
parties to the dispute with the result that, after several 
hours of negotiation, a settlement was reached. I cannot 
recall the precise terms of the settlement which were, later, 
submitted to the Employees at a meeting of the Union which 
was held in the Metropolitan Hall, Burg Street, Cape Town. 
I outlined, and explained the terms of settlement to the 
Members present who declared themselves to be satisfied with 
the settlement. There were, however, several persons present 
at the meeting, who were not employed in the Clothing Industry, 
and who were in no way connected with it. These outsiders, 
however, were very vocal and severe in their condemnation 
of the terms of settlement and, in the course of their ad­
dresses to the meeting, they urged my replacement as Secretary 
by someone who was more conversant with the Clothing Industry 
and who would, therefore, be able to promote the interests 
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A False Start: 1918 to 1925 
Several of the witnesses who appeared before the 1917 select commit­
tee on the Regulation of Wages Bill expressed doubt that the South 
African clothing industry would survive after the War ended if 
tariff protection were not imposed against imports. However, 
the economic boom after 1918, and the demand for peace-time clothing 
allowed the local industry to grow still more. Factories com­
plained continually about the shortage of raw materials and machin­
104 
ery. William Freestone, the "Inspector of White Labour" reported 
in late 1919 that the clothing factories were extremely busy: 
The Trade expresses little fear of foreign competition. 
Opinions are expressed that the trade is fairly launched 
and safely through initial difficulties. With a good 
supply of labour and fair conditions, confidence in the 
of the Employees engaged therein more effectively. The sug­
gestion that I should relinquish the position as Secretary 
came as a great relief to me, and I told the meeting so. 
A new Secretary was accordingly appointed, whose identity 
I already knew prior to the meeting and, after the usual 
vote of thanks had been proposed to the Chairman, the meet­
ing closed. Although I no longer held any official position 
in the Garment Workers' Union, I maintained my interest in 
its,activities and closely followed its progress under the 
new leadership.· It soon became apparent that the activities 
of the newly appointed Secretary were being confined to weekly 
visits to the factories for the purpose of collecting the 
contributions of members. Besides this, nothing whatsoever 
was attempted or achieved, with the result that the members 
lost heart and interest and the Union ultimately went com­
pletely out of existence. Thus ended the first chapter of 
the narrative insofar as trade union organisation amongst 
the garment workers was concerned. I had been charged with 
being insufficiently militant by a group of people who did 
not know the elementary meaning of militarrcy. They had under­
taken to demonstrate the glittering benefits which they would 
be able to secure for the members. In the event they accom­
plished exactly nothing'. (Stuart, 1950i) 
There is no record in the press or in the CFLU Minutes of 
Stuart ever being the Secretary of the TTU. His account 
of the Metropolitan Hall meeting has no echoes in the re­
ports of the Cape Times and Cape Argus. 
104. Cape Chamber 	of Industries Annual Reports, August 1918, p.28; 
August 1919, p.43 (CCI Archive~). 
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future is felt. 105 
The Cape Chamber of Industries reported that the factories had 
"proved themselves capable of supplying all needs of the country 
in the way of ready-made clothing .106 New factories were in 
"the process of completion"as late as August 1920".107 The future 
was anticipated with unbridled optimism. 
The-crisis which hit the world economy in 1920 affected the 
Cape Town clothing factories very severely. The Clothing Section 
of the CCI stated that lIa very dismal change" had come over the 
industry. 
The expansion of our trade came to a sudden stop, and 
a current in the opposite direction began to flow with 
increasing force with the result that many of the smaller 
factories that came into existence during the last year 
or two have closed down. It is doubtful if in Cape 
Town at least there is a larger number in actual opera­
tion than in 1914. 108 
In addition to the effects which price fluctuations and unemploy­
ment had on the demand for clothing, demand was reduced by the 
. 109importation of greatly increased volumes of second-hand clothing. 
Factory owners once more bemoaned the lack of protective tariffs. 
The depressed condition of the trade is in part due 
to the utterly absurd tariff. The finished article 
is admitted to this country at the same rate as a pro­
portion only of the raw materials of our industry. 
For the rest of these an increased duty of 5% is charged. 
Not only is there therefore no protection, but on a 
105. 	Cape Times 16 December 1919. 
106. 	CCI Annual Report: August 1920, p.44. 
107. 	Ibid. 
108. 	CCI Annual Report: December 1921, p.41. 
109. 	CCI Clothing Section Minutes: 26 April 1920 - C1/1. 
The physical volume of second-hand clothing increased from 
,485m units in 1919 to 1,786m in 1920. It remained above 
,7m until 1925 when it began to fall, reaching ,2m by 1931 
and ,1m by 1939. (Annual Statements of the Trade and Ship­
ping of the Union of South Africa). 
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considerable proportion of our raw materials we are 
actually penalised 5%. The 'encouragement' promised 
to South African industries savours too much of an 
'Irishman's rise'. It is hoped that this anomaly at 
least will soon disappear. With assistance in this 
direction, even of the slightest, a large trade could 
be done in South African ready-made garments with in­
creased employment of which the limits are difficult 
. 110t o estlmate. 
But no such initiative came from the South African Party govern­
ment. The factories which survived the depression struggled on, 
fighting one another and overseas contractors for government work 
and selling ready-makes and special orders as best they could. 
Once the state did, in 1925, introduce its policy of encouraging 
local industry by means of protective tariffs, the clothing industry 
expanded rapidly, scarcely being checked even by the depression 
of the 1930's. 
Clothing became one of the first areas of import substitution 
in the South African economy because the industry was based on 
relatively low-level technology. No special or expensive machinery 
had to be imported to establish the industry. Usually, the competi­
tive advantage of the imports from an industrialized country in 
the periphery result from the superior technology of the metropole 
and the ability to take still greater advantage of the economies 
of scale in producing for a mass market. In the case of clothing 
i~ports into South Africa in the first quarter of this century, 
the competitive advantage of Britain did not arise from technology 
but from lower labour costs. A Cape Town manufacturers' journal 
commented in 1907 that much of the shirts, tailoring and cotton 
goods exported from England was made by sweated labour, 
••• employed at pittances which even the meanest and 
most woe-begone Kaffir in this country would turn up 
his nose at, in scorn and contempt. Yet it is this 
iniquitous and hideous system - battened upon the blood 
110. CCI Annual Report: 1922 December, p.25. 
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and tears of the weak and helpless - which is respon­
sible for the cheapness of much of the goods with which 
our industries, unprotected, cannot compete •••• for 
sweated labour, at least in the opening stages of de­
·· vel opment 0 f a count ry, 1S 1mpossl. ble. 111 
To compete with imports,South African clothing manufacturers had 
to push wages down to very low levels. They were unable to find 
sufficient suitable labour at these rates to allow the industry 
a firm base for expansion. The state could not be pressurized 
into using its resources to recruit low wage workers for the cloth­
ing factories in a similar manner to that in which it assisted 
the mines. Quite apart from the influence exercised over state 
policy by merchant capitalists, almost all the clothing needs 
of the country could be easily and cheaply imported. After 1925, 
legislation prevented the large scale emergence of outwork or 
the extremes of sweating to which the industry tended once tariff 
protection opened up a larger share of the market to locally pro­
duced clothing. This is not to downplay the extremely bad condi­
tions under which workers in the new clothing factories lived 
and worked. Their wages were low and their hours were long. 
In Cape Town workers crowded int  houses near to the factories 
112to save spending money on transport to work. But it is note­
worthy that clothing production in South Africa was, from the 
start, predominantly factory based and to this extent its path 
of development differed from that in Britain and New York. Out­
work was "common,,1l3at certain stages in the development of the 
South African clothing industry, but it never became, as it did 
in London, "a substitute for the factory" (Schmiechen, 1975, p.266). 
In 1900 there were between 125 000 and 190 000 clothing workers 
in London. Between one half and three quarters of these were 
outworkers (Schmiechen, 1975, p.264). - Also, while in Britain 
and the United States of America factory production began with 
Ill. S.A. Commerce & Manufacturers' Record September 1907, p.304. 
See also footnote 12, above. 
112. 	Report of the Wage Board for 3 years ended February 1928, 
p.14- Annexure to the Votes and Proceedings of the House 
of Assembly Number 112 of 1929 (Second session) (Hereafter 
abbreviated as Annexure 112 - 1929). 
113. 	Ibid., p.55. 
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the cheapest clothing and slowly moved up-market; in South Africa. 
the first factories could not possibly compete with cheap-clothing 
imports. This was accepted as a fact of life, as may be seen 
from this comment from a Cape Town manufacturers' journal in 1909 
on the problems of the local clothing industry: 
Ready-made and bespoke tailoring which is imported from 
Europe largely affects this trade. It would.~ we think, 
be unwise to further interfere with the importance of 
ready-made clothing which is a necessity to the poorer 
classes, but the practice adopted by the agents of over­
sea tailors in taking measurements and importing the 
f · . 	 h d f b d' . b . . 1141n1S e garment rom a roa 1S open to ser10US 0 Ject1on. 
In South Africa, factory production began with wholesale bespoke 
tailoring, producing better-class garments. Local factories were 
only able to begin producing for the lower end of the market once 
t ar1'ff protect'lon took effect. 11S 
Tariff protection and industrial legislation played a crucial 
role in marking out the path of development for the clothing in­
dustry. The first made possible the production of clothing for 
a wider market, while the second countered (although not always 
immediately or directly) the natural tendency of the industry 
to drift into extremes of sweating and outwork. As in Britain, 
sweated labour and outwork was attacked first by legislation and 
only subsequently rendered less necessary by advances in techno­
logy and changes in the labour process. As industry in Cape Town 
and in South Africa has progressed past "the opening stages of 
development", the clothing industry has not needed, or been per­
mitted, to degenerate into a 'sweated industry' in the old sense 
of the term. But since the Second World War, the real wages of 
clothing workers have shown a long-term tendency to decline. 
At the same time, the local industry has come to produce over 
114. 	S.A. Commerce &Manufacturers' Record July 1909. 
115. 	It is even possible that the relative lack of "low-wage" 
labour compelled South African clothing firms to be more 
keen to adopt the latest technology than those in Britain. 
This impression is gained from the evidence of clothing manu­
facturers before the Customs Tariff Commission in 1934. 
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_-_._­
90 per cent of the country's clothing requirements. 
Though the broad path of the South African clothing industry's 
development was indicated by tariff protection and industrial 
legislation, both of which applied to the whole country, the de­
velopment of the industry in Cape Town was conditioned by factors 
specific to local conditions of class struggle. Having sketched 
the growth of the clothing industry in South Africa and in Cape 
Town, it is now necessary to turn to this aspect of history of 
Cape Town's tailoring and garment workers. 
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CHAPTER II 
SCENES FROM THE SOUTHERN SIDESHOW 
Economic Class Struggle 
in Cape Town, 1900-1939 
One cannot approach an understanding of the struggles of Cape 
Town clothing workers, of their inertia in the face of insupport­
able conditions of exploitation, of their forms of organization, 
without an appreciation of the general conditions of class struggle 
prevailing at the time. It is necessary to place the clothing 
workers in the context of the class struggle in Cape Town. This 
is not a simple task. There is no analytical writing on the class 
struggle in Cape Town in the period dealt with (nor indeed is 
there much after). Existing research on the labour history of 
Cape Town is patchy and insubstantial. The'unearthing of ths 
history of the common people in the Cape (and in much of South 
Africa), the understanding of the factors which conditioned the 
class struggle in Cape Town, is a task fraught with difficulties. 
Although the details of much of what occurred may be unclear, 
there are several obvious and important observations which one 
can make about the conditions of class struggle in Cape Town. 
First, there is the fact that Cape Town never developed a substan­
tial industrial base. Even today, the.industrial profile of the 
Western Cape is composed of labour intensive consumer good indus­
tries and characterised in general more by competitive than monopoly 
capital. Second, most remarkably in South Africa, the class struggle 
in Cape Town was not manifested in a primarily racial form. The 
racial composition of Cape Town was different in an important way 
from all the other major centres. Although 'coloured' people 
were subject to racial oppression, this was accompanied by a limited 
access to the vote and the inclusion of the upper strata of coloured 
workers in the trade unions of the white workers. The class struggle 
in Cape Town never had the overwhelmingly racial form which marked 
struggles in the Transvaal. Third, we must note the failure of 
the working class (either as a whole or in part) to pose a serious 
challenge to the conditions of existence of the dominant class 
in Cape Town. 
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This last observation is thrown into stark relief when one 
compares the nature and intensity of struggles in Cape Town with 
those in the Transvaal, specifically those revolving around the 
mining industry. The Transvaal was the centre of the class struggles 
which shaped South African history before the Second World War and 
it is useful to take the Transvaal as a fbenchmark f for assessing 
the situation in Cape Town. The militancy, closeness of organi­
zation and strength which workers developed in the Transvaal (al­
beit a small fraction of the workforce) stands in sharp contrast 
to the situation in Cape Town. The resistance of black workers 
to selling their labour power to the mines and the efforts by 
the well-organized dominant classes to break this resistance 
also put a stamp on the intensity of class struggle in the Trans­
vaal. If one accepts that the class struggle in Cape Town was 
of a flow level of intensityf before 1939 (with the exception 
of the years 1917 to 1920) then why was this the case? In particu­
lar, why was the class struggle in Cape Town so much more muted 
than in the Transvaal? 
It is not possible, given the present lack of research, to 
answer these questions fully or with certainty; but it is neces­
sary that we at least begin to sketch out the determinants of 
the class struggle in Cape Town. These will be approached by 
brief accounts of firstly, the growth of manufacturing industry 
in Cape Town; secondly, the associations formed by employers to 
advance their interests; and thirdly, the fortunes of organized 
labour. 
A central argument of this chapter is that the subordinate 
position of Cape Town in the South African social formation had 
significant effects on the class struggle in Cape Town. After 
Union in 1910 the effects were crucial. The rhythm of class struggles 
in South Africa after the Boer War was set in the countryside 
and in the mines and workshops of the Witwatersrand. The merchant 
and financial bourgeoisie of the Cape, which had long enjoyed 
dominance in a wide range of matters affecting the Cape Colony 
and the interior, occupied a relatively minor place in the power 
bloc which emerged after the Boer War. (Any apparent strength 
was the result of common interests with mining capital.) Before 
Union, cpntradictions within the colonial social formation found 
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their resolution within the colonial state apparatus which was 
dominated by comprador, trading and banking interests. The enact­
ment of factory legislation, for example, could be considered 
in the light of Cape - Cape Town - conditions only. After Union, 
the resolution of specifically Cape contradictions was subordi­
nated to the resolution of other contradictions which threatened 
the- unity and integrity of the enlarged social formation. While 
the contradictions were manifest elsewhere, attempts at their 
resolution could but profoundly affect the class struggle in Cape 
Town. To acknowledge and illustrate the importance of such 'ex­
ternal factors' in the class struggle is only a first step. It 
is then necessary to account for the manner in which these exter­
nal factors are 'internalized' in the class struggle in Cape Town­
(Poulantzas, 1977, p.22). 
Cape Town's Manufacturing Industries 
Cape Town grew up as a port and as the seat of government. As 
the gateway for imports and immigrants and as a port of supply 
for ships, it was also an important centre of trade. As the old­
est and best established town in South Africa it was a natural 
base for the commercial interests which first supervised imperial­
ist expansion in South Africa. 
It was around this site of trade, commerce and government 
that small manufacturing industries arose. Cape Town was endowed 
with no resources which made it a likely area for the growth of 
any major industry. Its position as a port made imports of manu­
factured goods by sea relatively cheap. Both of these factors 
retarded growth of industry and limited that which did arise to 
the consumer goods sector. At the time of the mineral discoveries 
in the interior, small food-processing enterprises and concerns 
producing furniture, leather work, coaches and wagons etc. were 
well established. However, it was not until the end of the century 
that factory production became common. By the 1890's, a manu­
facturers' association had been formed and was pressing for pro­
tective tariffs to be placed on imports to aid the growth of in~ 
dustries. 
Plotting the industrial growth of Cape Town presents problems 
as adequate statistics do not exist. The 1904 Census indicates 
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that in that year there were 611 'Industrial Institutions' in 
lCape 	Town employing 11 700 people. What these Institutions pro­
duced is only detailed for the Cape Colony as a whole, but from 
this 	list one can conclude that production did not extend much 
beyond printing, tailoring, light engineering and building, in 
addition to the sectors mentioned above. 
la 	 Employment 
The First World War provided the major stimulus to the expansion 
of industry after the 1903 - 1909 depression.disrupted the supply 
of imports and thus gave local industry a measure of artificial 
protection. By 1916/17, the date of the first Industrial Census 
to detail sectoral output and employment in Cape Town industry, 
there were 21 000 workers in industry.2 Their number grew rapidly 
over 	the following three years to reach a total of 31 700 as the 
post-War boom reached its climax. Industrial employment declined 
during the following depression but had recovered to 34 900 by 
1924/5. The policies of the Pact government produced a spurt 
of growth which ended in 1929/30 when 41 800 worked in the Cape 
Peninsula industries. The 1930 - 1932 depression wiped out the 
1. 	 Cape of Good Hope: Census 1904, Part XI. 
2. 	 All the statistics in sections a, b, c, and d come from the 
annual Statistics of Production listed in the bibliography. 
After 1915 an Industrial Census was taken annually, except 
during the period 1930-32. The published results only rarely 
gave details for Cape Town alone so I have used the figures 
given for the 'Cape Peninsula' or 'Cape Western'. This in­
cludes the Cape Peninsula proper, Somerset West, Paarl, Stel­
lenbosch, Wellington and Malmesbury. It is not clear that 
exactly the same area is included each year. The industries 
deemed to constitute the various sectors in the statistics 
were changed on occasion, thus distorting comparisons of 
industrial sectors over time and, in the case of engineering 
and light and power, making such comparisons impossible. 
Strictly speaking it is not admissible to use the statistics 
as I do below. The trends indicated may be true but it would 
require independent information to be sure of this. None 
of the trends I draw out in the text conflict with general 
impressions I have gained while reading material touching 
on Cape Town industry before the Second World War; nor do 
they conflict with van den Bogaerde (1957) - although this 
study of Western Cape Private Industry based entirely 
on these same statistics. 
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employment growth achieved in the previous five years; but it 
was followed by five years of rapid growth which boosted indus­
trial employment to 56 200 by 1937/8. 
From 1916/7 until 1929/30 the annual rate of growth3 in em­
ployment in industry in the Cape Peninsula stayed just ahead of 
the national average, but the region was harder hit by the great 
depression than th~ rest of the country and its recovery after­
wards was slightly slower. So while the Cape Peninsula had accoun­
ted for 17% of employment in South African industry in 1916/17 and 
19% in 1929/30, by 1937/8 its contributions had fallen to 16%. 
Table 2.1: Industrial Employment in the Cape Peninsula by Sector 
Annual1937/81924/51916/7 average %SectQrs 
" 
growth rateNo. 'OOsNo. 'OOs No'OOs" 
(21 years) 
-3,2 
"" 
0 

St6ne & Clay 

1 132 1Raw material 
11,5 

Wood 

53031 123 
2 1.91535 1010 
**** 633 

Food & Drink 

6221736Metal &'Engineering 
16 3 

Clothing & Textiles 

9174 2149 23 
6,3 

Books & Printing 

169130 924 12 
4 

Vehicles 

43 8726919 
12 
3,6 
423283 1 
4 
7 
2155 1810Furniture 
251R 536Chemicals 4
..... 
0 
3,5 
0 33 16Light, & Power 
4 
6,2 
2541412 6Leather 
137128 81020Building 
015 100Other 
4,784 

Govt. 'WOrkshops 

561349 7795210Total 
1.6?89 ?2277?? 
.. 	 0 indicates 0 to 99 employed 

1 indicates 100 to 199 employed etc. 

.... 	 Figure totally distorted as sectoral details exclude government 
workers, who are a significant proportion of the workforce in 
these sectors (see footnote 4 ). 
3. 	 The annual average rate of growth between two dates is calcu­
lated as: r = 1 - (Yn/Y0) l/n where Yo is the figure for the 
earlier date, Yn for the later date, and n the number of years 
separating the two. r is expressed as a percentage. 
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In common with the country as a whole, the sectoral spread 
of industry in the Cape Peninsula did not change significantly 
in the inter-war period, beyond a sharp decline in the importance 
of food processing. This sector showed a relative decline from 
employing 23% of Cape Peninsula industrial workers in 1916/17 
to 16% in 1937/8. In the rest of the country the fall was from 
20% to 13% over the same period. Neither in Cape Town nor else­
where was there a single branch of industry which emerged as a 
'leading sector'. In the Cape Peninsula, clothing, vehicles, 
chemicals, building and quarrying all displayed rates of growth 
of employment greater than the average 4,7% per annum over the 
21 years from 1916/17 to 1937/8. 
In 1916/17 and in 1924/25 the four industrial main sectors 
were food &drink; metal &engineering; clothing; and building. 
Together they accounted for 62% of workers in industry in 1916/17 
and probably slightly fewer in 1924/25.4 By 1937/38 the clothing 
industry (including laundries and textile factories) employed 
as many workers as the food and drink sector. These were followed 
in importance by metal &engineering and building. These four 
sectors accounted for about 55% of industrial employment in the 
Cape Peninsula. 
1b Output 
When one examines the structure of Cape Peninsula industry in 
terms of the relative contributions of the various sectors to 
total output, the picture is different. The food and drink sec­
tor emerges clearly as the most important branch of industry. 
Cape Peninsula industry as a whole displayed a 167% growth 
in employment and a 226% growth in the (money) value of output 
over the 21 years 1916/17 to 1937/38. The increase in produc­
tivity (measured as output per head) varied considerably between 
sectors; from about 37% for clothing and 55% for food, to 121% 
and 194% for printing and chemicals respectively. 
4. 	 The published results of the Industrial Census are not con­
sistent in including or excluding government and railway 
workers in 'industrial workshops' from the statistics. This 
can lead to significant errors. For example, in 1924/5 such 
workers made up 22% of the industrial workforce in the Cape 
Peninsula but details of the sectors in which they worked 
are 	not provided. In later years government workers were 
about 14% of the workforce. 
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In general, over the entire period from 1900 to 1939, Cape 
Town industry expanded greatly, but the expansion was based on 
the same industrial sectors which were dominant in the early years 
of the century. There was little broadening of the industrial 
base beyond consumer goods production, construction and service 
activities for the railways and shipping. 
Table 2.2: 	 Percentage Contribution of Certain Sectors to 
Total Output of Cape Peninsula Industry 
** Annual 
average 'I< 
Sectors 1916/17 1924/25 1937/38 rate of growtll 
of out~ut 
Raw material 2 2 1 2 
stone & Clay 1 2 2 10 
Wood 5 33 33 3 
Metal & Engineering 13 5 6 * 
Food & Drink 39 45 35 5 
Clothing & Textiles 7 6 11 8 
Books & Printing 7 '9 9 7 
Vehicles 1 1 3 10 
Furniture 4 5 4 5 
Chemicals 5 11 10 10 
Light & Power 4 1 3 * 
Leather 5 4 4 4 
Building 7 5 le 7 
Other 0 2 0 -
Total Output (E m) 8,4 14,7 27,4 All 5,7 'I< 
sectors 
* Meaningful figure cannot be calculated 
from the data available (see footnote 4 ) 
** Annual average rate of growth of output 
between 1916/7 and 1937/6, expressed as 
a percentage. 
lc Employment by Race 
On the Transvaal gold mines and in Transvaal industry, the racial 
division of the workforce coincided to a very large extent with 
divisions of labour between skilled and unskilled workers, or 
between supervisors and workers. On the mines there was even 
a further tribal division of labour, with cerLain jobs becoming 
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the preserve of certain tribes. The importance and function of 
any racial divisions of labour in Cape Town industry was never 
as clear cut as in the Transvaal. In Cape Town, there were coloured 
artisans who were skilled workers in most trades and industries. 
White unskilled or less-skilled workers worked alongside coloured 
workers in at least the garment and food and drink sectors. 
It is not possible to use official statistics to make more 
specific comments on racial aspects of the division of labour. 
The figures in Table 2.3 below are given as a matter of form and 
not because the main divisions in the working class in Cape Town 
coincide with the differences in race. The majority of Cape Town 
unions did not exclude workers on the grounds of race. The Gar­
ment Workers' Union of the Cape Peninsula, which was formed in 
1927, was non-racial from the outset. Throughout the period covered 
by the thesis, Cape Town factories, where they employed workers 
of different races, were 'integrated'. This contrasts with the 
position in the Transvaal where African men did the pressing and 
where coloured garment workers were separated from white workers 
both in the factories and in a separate union branch. 
Over the period 1916 to 1938 about 60% of the labour force 
was black and 40% white. Relatively more whites were employed 
in the metal & engineering, printing and vehicle sectors. After 
1924, relatively more blacks came to .be employed in construction. 
Africans made up only 4% of the industrial labour force (i.e. 
this figure excludes dock-workers) in 1916 but after 1924 they 
accounted for about 14%. They worked mainly in the quarrying, 
food & drink, construction and chemical (Somerset West) sectors. 
No African women worked in industry during this period. 
1d Women Workers 
One of the most remarkable facts about Cape Town industry throughout 
the period 1916 to 1938 is the relatively large proportion of 
women workers in the labour force. This proportion varied between 
about 18 and 28 per cent, while in the rest of the country women 
made up less than 10 per cent of the labour force. To an extent 
this is simply a reflection of the dominance of industries which 
employ relatively more women workers - such as food & canning 
and clothing. But it is also an indication of the earlier move 
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Table 2.3: Racial Distribution of Jobs - Certain Industrial Sectors 
1924/51916/7 
SectoralSectoral 
distribtttion % white % black distributior!Is white % black. 
.of . blacks . of blacks 
19.7/38 
Sectoral 
% white % black. ~istribution 
of blacks 
Metal & Engineering 
Food & Drink 
Clothing & Textiles 
Books & Printing 
Vehicles 
Furniture 
Chemicals 
Leather 
Building 
Other 
, 
All Sectors 
Government 
64 
32 
41 
55 
54 
38 
26 
31 
31 
43 
36 
68 
59 
45 
46 
62 
74 
69 
69 
9 
29 
13 
8 
2 
5 
4 
6 
6 
18 
57 100 
52 
27 
35 
52 
55 
33 
29 
32 
29 
38 
49 
48 
73 
65 
48 
45 
67 
71 
68 
71 
4 
24 
9 
6 
2 
5 
6 
4 
9 
14. 
62 83 
51 17 
50 
32 
46 
57 
57 
43 
70 
48 
24 
50 
68 
54 
43 
43 
57 
30 
42 
76 
4 
18 
15 
5 
2 ...... 0'\ 
3 
6 
4 
18 
18 
44 56 93 
68 32 7 
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of women in Cape Town into industrial employment. Even in 1904, 
women made up 8% of the tiny industrial labour force in the Cape 
Colony. There was a great increase in the number of women workers 
in Cape Town (especially black women) during World War I. In 
1916/7, 3 200 of the 4 500 women workers in the Cape Peninsula 
were black. Over the next two decades, the number of women workers 
rose to 13 200. Just under half of these were white. There was 
a rapid growth in the number of white women workers in South Afri­
can industry after 1925. In both Cape Town and the rest of the 
country, the employment of white women grew at an average rate 
of 10% per annum from 1925 to 1938. 
Table 2.4: Percentage of Women Workers in the Industrial Labour Force 
Year Cape Peninsula S. Transvaal Union excluding C.P. 
No. % No. % No. % 
1916/17 4 500 21 1 2'00 4 6 700 7 
1919/20 6 200 20 2 400 4 8 300 6 
1924/25 6 400 18 2 800 4 9 000 6 
1932/33 11 000 28 9 500 10 15 200 10 
1937/38 13 200 24 12 500 '8 25 300 9 
Black women were slow to move into industry in the rest of South 
Africa. In the whole country in 1938, white women in industry 
outnumbered their black counterparts in a ratio of 6:1. In Cape 
Town there was a slow, if uneven, growth in the number of black 
women workers between 1925 and 1938. At the end of the period, 
, 
black women still just outnumbered white. Cape Town was the 
first centre in which black women were employed in industry on 
a significant scale. 
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Table 2.5: Racial Composition of Female Industrial Labour Force 
CAPE PENINSULA 1916/17 1924/25 1937/39 
White women 1 300 1 900 6 300 
Black women 3 200 4 500 6 900 
Total 4500 6400 13 200 
UNION EXCLUDINGC~Y~ 
PENINSULA 1916/17 1924/25 1937/39 
White Women 3 800 6 200 21.600 
Black Women 3 000 2 900 3 600 
Total 6900 9 100 25 200 
Due t.o v-ou",l"'''~l th" toit;!~ ""4j "(·,.tfev f ..c'" ~hE- su.... t:>f 
the fi3w~s Ql.ove -th...... 
Table 2.6 gives an impression of the pattern of women's work in 
Cape Town industry. The actual jobs women did, their places in 
the division of labour, do not emerge from the statistics. Jobs 
included putting heads on matches, cigarette making, bookbinding, 
shoemaking, soap and candle making, in addition to the more ob­
vious tasks of sewing, tailoring, jam and sweet making, and food 
canning. 
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Table 2.6: 'Women's Work in Certain Industrial Sectors of the Cape Peninsula 
Food & Drink 
Clothing & Textiles 
Books & Printing 
Chemicals 
Leather 
Other 
No. 
1916/17 
,w/s SD. %WW/s No. 
1924/25 
'W/s SD 'WW/S No. 
1937/38 
'W/S SD %WW/S 
1 750 
1 290 
560 
1.260 
90 
560 
35 39 
51 29 
28 12 
43 6 
7 2 
7 12 
24 
43 
29 
21 
43 
19 
3 010 
1 640 
870 
. 260 
210 
380 
40 47 
53 26 
32 14 
13 4 
14 3 
2 6 
21 
35 
38 
36 
42 
27 
3 480 
6 320 
1 420 
460 
720 
780 
38 26 
69 47 
33 11 
18 4 
28 5 
1 7 
40 
48 
51 
54 
62 
43 
I 
All Sec:t{):r5 4 500 21 100 30 
.. 
6 370 18 100 29 13 230 24 100 48 I -...J \0 
tw/s Percentage of the l~bour force in e~ch ~ector made up bY women. 
SD Percentage of the ~ema1e labour force in each sector. 
tWW/S Percentage of women workers in each sector who are white. 
totAl empIG~ ...e .. t Ov~v 01.11 sectDv5 Note: ::Due to y-oo"Gh',,:\, "",he f~uves fo\' ~/.ie 
.....ef'~etq.:l ,.. the boHoM vow M4~ cI"f:f~v of..".... -t"'e SVIO'I /If 
1i~ l)Y'es o.l,ove ~WI. 
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2 Mustering the Manufacturers 1900 - 1925 
The greatest obstacle in the way of the pioneers of manufacturing 
industry in Cape Town was competition from imports. There was 
a desperate need for some form of protection. In the Cape Colony, 
commercial interests exercised a greater power in politics and 
in business than manufacturing interests. 5 The weak efforts of 
the latter to secure'protective tariffs against imports, their 
struggles to promote 'colonial manufactures' in the domestic mark­
ket, met only with hostility from the great importers, the 'mer­
chant princes' of the Cape. The attitudes of commerce ruled. 
This was because they were also shared by the powerful Cape repre­
sentati~es of the mining and finance capital operating in the 
north. 
Despite the advances made by manufacturing industry in Cape 
Town during the First World War, the manufacturers as a group 
remained economically weak and politically impotent. This was 
the situation right up to 1925 when the first meaningful protec­
tive tariffs came into force. The importance of the local em­
ployers' organizations, such as the Cape Chamber of Industries, 
did not lie in their marshalling the manufacturers of the Cape 
into an army which finally battered down resistance to industrial 
protection. (It is in this light that their achievements are 
seen by their own historians and propagandists.) The Cape regi­
ment, however well drilled, had no weapons and was surprised by 
those whom it thought allies of the enemy being the initiators 
of a serious protective policy for South African industry.6 The 
real importance of the employers' associations lay in their uniting 
the manufacturers of Cape Town in industrial and regional organi­
zations which helped them to make the most of existing circumstances, 
most of which lay beyond their control or influence~ In this more 
mundane activity the Cape Chamber of Industries, its predecessors 
and affiliates, achieved notable success. This will be seen most 
clearly in their relationship to organized labour, over which 
5. 	 S.A. Commerce &Manufacturers' Record August 1907; S.A. 
Industry &Trade May 1957, pp.129 et seq., 'Industr~Early 
Struggle - The Battle for Protection'. 
6. 	 cf. Bozzoli (1975, p.213). 
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they came to exert a powerful and, in some cases, decisive in­
fluence after 1925. The employers' organizations in Cape Town 
in the first quarter of this century successfully adapted them­
selves to the position of weakness into which they were thrust 
by economic and political conditions. 
The South African Manufacturers' Association (SAMA)7 was 
8formed by a small group of Cape ~own factory owners in 1904. 
The activities of the Association over the next twenty years centred 
on three areas: agitation for protective tariffs; the promotion 
of 'colonial industries'; and the local organization of manufac­
turers. 
2a 	 The Battle for Protection 
Although formed in 1904, the SAMA took several years to establish 
9itself as the voice of Cape Town factory owners. A journal noted 
in 1907 that, 
••• the time, capital and energies (of the manufacturers) 
have been devoted to keeping their concerns from disaster 
and they have had little inclination for public affairs. 
It is little wonder, therefore, that when they did raise 
their voices on behalf of the cause of their industries, 
they were quickly silenced and put down by the advocates 
of free trade. 10 
The SAMA's effective existence dates from 1907 when W.J. Laite 
became interested in the struggle for protection and found in 
the Association a vehicle for his ambitions. 
7. 	 The South African Manufacturers' Association (SAMA) changed 
its name on two occasions. Its membership was at all times 
largely confined to Cape Town. From 1904 to 1914 it went 
under the name of SAMA; in 1914 it became the Cape Province 
Manufacturers' Association (CPMA) and in 1922 it was renamed 
the Cape Chamber of Industries, which it remains today. 
8. 	 SAMA Minutes: 7November 1904 (CCI Archives C1/1). 
9. 	 SAMA had 50 members at its first general meeting in 1904; 
70 in 1907, and claimed between 300 and 400 in 1909 after 
a massive membership drive. Many of the new members failed 
to pay their annual subscription and it appears that membership 
had stabilised at about 85 by 1911. (SAMA Minutes: 28 Novem­
ber 1904; 29 November 1907 (AGM); 6 April 1909; 25 May 1909; 
6 September 1911 - C1/1). 
10. 	 South African Commerce and Manufacturers Record August 1907 
(in future referenced as S.A.Commerce - see bibliography 
for name changes). 
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W.J. Laite arrived in South Africa in 1901 at the age of 
, 
38. He was a key figure in the campaign for protection and a 
pioneer of employer organization in South Africa. He sergeant­
majored the Cape manufacturers into a united front and was a prin­
cipal mover behind the formation of the SA Federated Chambers 
of Industries in 1917 - this being the first nation-wide body. 
After a period as secretary of the SAFCI, he returned to Cape 
Town and served as secretary of the Cape Chamber of Industries, 
the Cape Wholesale Clothing and Shirt Manufacturer~ Association 
and others until his retirement in 1938. As will be seen, he 
occupies an important place also in the labour history of Cape 
Town. 
Laite qualified as a printer in England after a seven year 
apprenticeship and then was the proprietor of several unsuccessful 
, , 11 A '. 11 h l' dprlntlng ventures. S a prlnter s trave er e supp le sta­
tionery to Buffalo Bill when he visited London with his 'Wi1d 
West Show' in 1887. Later he established a 'liberal paper', 
"The Hastings and St Leonards Weekly Mail", and was elected a 
borough councillor. Ill-health forced him to move to a warmer 
climate. In South Africa Laite started out as the agent of a 
London firm selling supplies to printers. This business went 
under in the depression following the Boer.War. In his travels 
around South Africa, Laite came to the realisation that there 
were "powerful overseas interests holding the economic life of 
the country in thra11 11 (Laite, 1943, p.35) and that a "merchant 
prince class" gained by defending free trade. Laite became the 
most passionate and dedicated advocate of protection for industry. 
He decided to 
••• pub1ish my own magazine as a propagandist medium 
for the cause I had come to believe in. (Laite, 1943, p.35) 
In May 1907, South African Commerce and Manufacturers' Record 
made its appearance. Its aim was to promote the idea of "industrial 
development by protection to provide South Africa with a sound 
economic basis" (Laite, 1943, p.36). The journal now began to 
11. 	 These details are drawn from the biography of W.J. Laite 
written by his son, H.J. Laite (Laite, 1943). 
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trumpet a challenge to the powerful mining and trading interests. 
But as yet the motley band of Cape jam, candle and cabinet makers 
could not mount even a show of force. Articles were printed to 
keep up spirits presenting the manufacturers as pioneers and 
stressing that the future prosperity of the country lay in their 
hands. 
Laite had been allowed to describe his journal as the official 
organ of the SAMA and he was elected an honorary member. In 1908 
he became the honorary secretary of the SAMA and in 1909 he was 
appointed the paid secretary at a monthly salary of £20. 12 He 
launched an immediate drive for increased membership and called 
on manufacturers everywhere to organize. Despite its name, the 
SAMA was always a Cape organization. Laite saw that the campaign 
for protection would need the support of the manufacturers in 
the other colonies, especially the Transvaal. 
One strong, well-organized association, supported by 
every manufacturer in the country, would wield a tre­
mendous power and could insist on having their interests 
adequately considered and justice done to them. Indeed 
such an organization would wield a power that no Govern­
13
ment, however strong, could afford to trifle with.
In 1908 Laite set off on a tour of industrial centres "preaching 
the gospel of organization and developmene' (Laite, 1943, pp.37; 
48). Manufacturers' associations were established in the Trans­
vaal and Natal and in the Eastern Cape but conflicts of interest 
over railway rates and the customs union prevented their amalgama­
tion. National co-ordination of demands for protection was partly 
achieved.by the South African National Union, a pressure group 
formed in 1907 which was influenced by wealthy farmers who sought 
agricultural protection and expected to benefit also from protec­
. f . d 14t10n or 1n ustry. 
12. 	 SAMA Minutes: 12 February 1907; 29 November 1907 (AGM); 
1 October 1908; 27 October 1909 - C1/1. 
13. 	 SAMA Minutes: 9 October 1908 - C1/1. The quotation is 
an extract from 'An Open Letter To The Manufacturers Of South 
Africa', dated 19 October 1909, a draft of which was discussed 
at the meeting and accepted after the words "The powerful 
importing and mining interests" had been deleted and replaced 
with "Our free trade friends". 
14. 	 See S.A. Commerce September 1909, p.342; South African Journal 
of Industries 1919, p.147; Bozzoli (1981,pp.111; 149; 313n). 
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In 1910 the Union Government appointed the Cullinan Commis­
sion to report on customs tariffs and industries. Laite accom­
panied the Commission on its tour round the country as the adviser 
of M4 Mossop, the one Cape manufacturer who was appointed a member. 
Laite was appalled by the "bitter opposition of the Chamber of 
Mines" to protection. On his return he called an urgent meeting 
to discuss "combined and rapid action" to combat the propaganda 
.. ~ 15 L'of t he mlnlng communlty. alte, 
••• assured the meeting that the Mining and Mercantile 
communities (so far as the latter were affected) would 
not hesitate to spend very large sums of money in pursuit 
of their object - opposing the recommendations of the 
Manufacturers' Association. 
A self-elected "Consumers) Committee" had been formed and had put 
out a booklet on the tariff problem. This was described as, 
... a tissue of misrepresentations and served to show 
the lengths to which the mining interests were prepared 
to go against the manufacturers whom they recognised 
as an association with strength. 
Laite urged the preparation of a reply which should also be issued 
in Dutch as part of a campaign "to bind the farmers to stand with 
the manufacturers".16 A £2 000 fund was launched to start a 'Gene­
ral Tariff Campaign'. 
The Cullinan Commission produced a report that did not recom­
mend any decisive change in tariff policy. Laite commented that 
the report had been, 
••• framed on the prejudices and personal bias of the 
members rather than on the weight of evidence submitted 
to the Commission ••• (T)he industrial community realised 
the utter futility of expecting a proper appreciation 
of its needs at the hands of men whose position, training 
and interests necessarily influence their ,judgement 
when dealing with economic problems. (Laite, 1913, pp.5-6)" 
15. 	 SAMA Minutes: 30 August 1911; 6 September 1911 - C1/1. 

Only 18 out of 85 manufacturers invited attended the meeting. 

16. 	 SAMA Minutes: 6 September 1911 - C1/1. 
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The 1912 SAMA congress decided to use the tariff campaign fund 
to send Laite overseas to study tariff systems. He visited America 
and Canada and produced a most impressive report - "The Union 
Tariff And its Relation to Industrial and Agricultural Development: 
The Case for Manufacturers" (Laite, 1913). This included a survey 
of the effects of tariff policies in the United States, Australia, 
New Zealand and Canada, a well-argued case for protection in South 
Africa and comprehensive recommendations on tariff levels. It 
"formed the basis for all subsequent agitation and representation" 
for protection. (Laite, 1943, p.49) 
The government still ignored the manufacturers' cries for 
assistance but their position was vastly improved by the First 
World War which restricted imports and led to an improvement in 
their competitive position. Contrary to all expectations, the 
boom continued after the War. It was only in 1920 that depression 
concentrated minds on the tariff question once more. 
Laite had continued his early efforts to unite the regional 
manufacturers' associations. In 1914 the SAMA entered into a 
federation with the Natal association and changed its name to 
the Cape Province Manufacturers Association (CPMA). Conflicts 
of interest between the inland and coastal manufacturers prevented 
wider unity until 1917, when a founding conference was held for 
the SA Federated Chambers of Industries. Laite left Cape Town 
to take up the secretaryship of this new body (leaving his son, 
H.J. 	Laite, as secretary of the CPMA). 
With the formation of the SAFCI, the locus of the manufactu­
rers' struggle for protection shifted north. The CPMA faced the 
most rabid free traders in its base area and stood no chance of 
.. hem rom he 	 f ree d"prlnClp es. 17wlnnlng t away f t most extreme tra e 1 
J.W. 	Jagger, the leading Cape merchant and the most committed 
defender 	of free trade, bought into the furniture and leather 

18
industries in 1921 but still fiercely opposed protection. The 
balance of power between these two fractions of the bourgeoisie 
in Cape Town was the secure possession of commercial and comprador 
17. 	 Commerce in the north was a lot more tolerant of 'compromises' 
on protective tariffs. Differences along these lines between 
the Northern and Southern sections of the Association of 
Chambers of Commerce are referred to by Kaplan (1976, p.80). 
18. 	 Industrial South Africa December 1921, p.534. 
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elements right up to 1925. The Cape manufacturers might have 
formulated the arguments for protection but they relied absolutely 
t he power 0 f . h h" I" " ff 19on 	 ot ers to put t lS po lCY lnto e ect. 
The protective policies launched by the Pact government in 
1925 were a direct result of political battles fought and won 
in the north. It was the victory of national capital over imperial 
120caplta_" t hatIde to protect " lon and not ""agltatlon"dan represent a­
tions" of manufacturers (whether in the Cape or elsewhere). Manu­
facturing capital then was a small and politically confused element 
of national capital. It is ironic (but not remarkable) that the 
SAFCI as a whole stood solidly behind Smuts' South African Party 
in the 1924 elections (as it had in 1921 and despite the SAP hav­
ing a shameful record of reneging on promises to bring in tariff 
protection).21 In party politics the manufacturers' associations 
played for the wrong side, vainly hoping it would score an 'own 
goal' • 
2b The Promotion of South African Industries 
The second area of concern to the Cape Manufacturers' Association 
was the promotion of existing industries. Merchant capital put 
severe constraints on the expansion of industry by its ability 
to sell imported go~ds more cheaply than they could be made in 
South Africa. But not only did merchant capital oppose the re­
moval of these constraints through the application of protective 
tariffs - it opposed all aid to industry22 and operated in ways 
which further undermined local production. 
For example, the small trading stores in the interior relied 
on coastal import wholesaling houses for credit and a 'wide range 
of their supplies. They were effectively tied to the wholesaler, 
who could cut credit and supplies if a store began to buy locally 
produced goods in place of imports. Local industry was unable 
19. 	 Bozzoli (1981, p.157) makes the point that: "In the end 
it was the local [South African - M.N.] bourgeoisie's two 
least amenable allies - agricultural capital, and white la­
bour - who were the instruments of the entrenchment of its 
first requirement: protection." 
20. 	 See Kaplan (1977, Chapters 2 and 4); Davies (1977, Chapters 
4 and 5). cf. Bozzoli (1981, p.172). 
21. 	 S.A. Commerce February 1921, pp.l07-8; December 1922, p.611; 
July 1923, p.329. 
22. 	 S.A. Commerce November 1907, p.452, "The Outlook of Mr. Jagger". 
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to meet all the needs of the stores so by these means the mer­
23
chants exerted control over many markets. In addition "anti­
colonial attitudes" were fostered in the advertising of imported 
goods. This led to what Laite described as "a deep and unreason­
ing prejudice of our own people against the products and manufac­
tures of South Africa" (Laite, 1943, p.38). There is one reference 
to coal from the first_colliery in Natal being turned down by 
the ra1'Iways 1n. pref erence or t h' . 1 f 24f e 1mported art1c e, 
The Cape manufacturers' association saw it as a main object 
25to break down consumer resistance to colonial products. It 
was acknowledged that this resistance was not unreasoning in all 
26 
cases. Many colonial manufactures were of an inferior quality. 
It was obvious that, 
••• the manufacturers would have to put the very best 

article on the market and put it up in the very best 

manner, otherwise they would not be able to fight down 

. .. 27f ore1gn compet1t10n. 
South African Commerce continually gave hints on how factory effici­
ency could be improved and how marketing should be tackled. The 
manufacturers' association organized an exhibition of manufactured 
goods in an effort both to interest buyers and encourage improve­
, I' 28ments 1n qua 1ty. 
In 1907 the SAMA gave its support to the formation of the 
SA National Alliance,29 which encouraged patriotic interest in 
all South African products. It combined the interests of "farmers, 
politicians, ma ufacturers and commercial men" (Bozzoli, 1981, p.lll). 
Its associated wing, the SA National Union, also promoted South 
30African manufactured goods and agricultural produce overseas. 
23. 	 SA Journal of Industries 1921, p.1l8, liThe Industrial Develop­
ment of SA". 
24. 	 Ibid., p.120. 
25. 	 S.A. Commerce September 1907, p.300. 
26. 	 S.A. Commerce June 1907, p.76. 
27. 	 S.A. Commerce August 1907, p.250. 
28. 	 SAMA Minutes: 2 July 1908 - Cl/1; "Official Souvenir of 
the SA Industrial Exhibition" supplement to S.A. Commerce 
February, 1914. 
29. 	 SAMA Minutes: 21 October 1907 - cl/1. 
30. 	 S.A. Commerce June 1909, p.128; see also footnote 14. 
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The Cape manufacturers' association gave practical assis­
tance to manufacturers to help them cope with the realities of 
competition from imports and the marketing networks of wholesalers. 
2c Organization 
The few histories which have commented on the early associations 
of factory-owners in South Africa see their main significance 
in leading or supporting the battle for protective tariffs. My 
contention has been that these associations had little effective 
role in the 'victory' of protection. Their weather-beaten banners 
were flown on every battlefield for twenty years, but they never 
contributed any fighting forces and their bishops often blessed 
the wrong side. Protectionist propaganda was a major pastime 
of the CPMA and their most publicised activity. But the true 
significance of manufacturers' associations before 1925 lies else­
where - in the gradual organization of the struggling, competing, 
bickering owners of small factories into bodies in which they 
could co-operate for their immediate mutual benefit. Such organi­
zation was initially a by-product of the perceived need to unite 
all in the crusade for protection. It came to be their real rea­
. 31 
son f or ex~stence. 
One of the SAMA's original aims was to watch over "legislation 
of importance to industry".32 It regularly made submissions to 
government commissions of enquiry and parliamentary select commit­
tees on all matters from customs tariffs and railway rates to 
factory conditions, hours of work, workmens compensation, appren­
ticeship, sweating and wage and conciliation boards. It sent 
deputations to the government on a wide range of concerns. These 
pleas and recommendations may often have been disregarded, but 
31. 	 Bozzoli (1981, Chapter 3 especially) provides a useful analysis 
of the ideological functions of the manufacturers' associations 
before 1925, but she virtually ignores the practical and paro­
chial aspect of their importance. Bozzoli's concept of "na­
tional capital" (p.171), does not allow scope for stressing 
the regional determinants of class struggle. Like the Poulant­
zian writers, her work appears to seek a single 'aggregated' 
process of class formation in South Af:r:ica. Unlike the Pou­
lantzians, a great deal of her attention is focussed on the 
Cape because it was there that the "ideologists" of manufactur­
ing capital first emerged. However the relationship of these 
ideologists of the "national bourgeoisie" to the class struggle 
in Cape Town is not raised by Bozzoli. 
32. 	 SAMA Ninutes: 24 November 1904 - Cl/!. 
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in the process of debating and formulating opinions on these matters, 
manufacturers came to see more clearly their common interests. 
They found practical uses for organization which extended beyond 
the limited (and largely unattainable) objectives of their Asso­
ciation. 
In a situation in which all manufacturers faced unpredictable 
competition frQm imports, it was sometimes possible for agreement 
to be reached on various aspects of business practice in order 
to limit cut-throat competition between local manufacturers. 
This was more likely in industries in which different labour pro­
cesses co-existed (for example, leather and clothing). The 
'larger' factories, which were more likely to belong to the Asso­
ciation, could agree on certain standards between themselves in 
competition against the sweaters and 'rat-shops'. Manufacturers 
had to be able to respond to changes in market conditions and 
in the absence of pressure from labour there was no point in set­
ting minimum wage levels. Agreements were thus around hours of 
work, holiday breaks and sharing the supply of skilled workers. 
It was only at times of labour unrest that manufacturers would 
all stand to gain by together negotiating a minimum wage with 
the workers. 
A new phase in the history of the CPMA began during the First 
World War. Former ad hoc subcommittees which had met occasionally 
to deal with problems specific to one branch of industry became 
more permanent "Trade Sections". The building contractors already 
) 	 33had a Master Builders Association by 1907 but few of the other 
industries were so organized. Several Trade Sections were formed 
directly as the result of strikes (as with the cabinet makers 
and clothing manufacturers)34 but all were a response to the "un­
rest in labour circles" which marked the years from 1917 to 1920. 
33. 	 SAMA Minutes: 27 September 1907 - C1/1. 
34. 	 CPMA Minutes: 20 February 1918 - C1/1. Some of the other 
Trade Sections were in the sheet metal, confectionery, mil­
ling, tanning and leather and baking trades (CPMA Minutes: 
4 February 1919 - Advisory Committee on the Factory Act; 
6 March 1919 - C1/1). 
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SA Commerce warned that: 
Unorganized capital is at the mercy of organized labour 
35but organized capital is respected by organized labour. 
Trade Sections were given an added fillip by the emergence of 
"conciliation boards", in which employers negotiated with union 
representatives. These were unofficial, in the sense of not being 
sanctioned by law, although in several cases their chairmen were 
nominated by the Minister of Mines and Industries. 36 A commen­
tator drew this lesson from one of the strikes, 
••• Conciliation Boards are proved a necessity, since 
they may be the means of preventing strikes. In addition, 
these institutions may succeed in securing better terms 
for the workers, besides creating confidence on both 
sides ••• it is evident that when Masters and Men face 
one another across a table, both arrive speedily at 
a better appreciation of their difficulties, desires 
and aspirations, than is possible by other means. Greater 
knowledge of the conditions facing employers is needed 
by the workers, whilst employers should of necessity 
get a closer view-point upon the aspirations of their 
employees. 37 
Once the immediate crisis had passed, the Trade Sections found fur­
ther areas for co-operation. Let us take the Clothing Section as 
an example: 
The clothing industry in Cape Town only developed a significant 
factory basis during the First World War. It was only after the 
"Tailors Strike" of 1917 that sufficient clothing manufacturers 
joined the CPMA to make a Trade Section feasible. This strike 
was settled by the Mayor and no conciliation board was formed 
in this case as the garment workers were insufficiently organized. 
35. 	 S.A. Commerce February 1918, p.18. 
36. 	 In the 1917 cabinet and bakers disputes. S.A. Commerce 
January 1918, p.18; SA Journal of Industries 1918, p.472. 
37. 	 S.A. Commerce December 1917, p.530. 
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But eight of the fifteen large clothing factories joined the 
Clothing Section which met regularly until 1920 and then spora­
dically until 1925. 
It is interesting that the Section was not united in its 
demands for higher tariffs on imported clothing. One of its 
principal members, Mr. M. Bertish, owned and managed a wholesale 
bespoke factory which was a branch of his factory in Bristol. _ 
He imported large quantities of clothes for sale in South Africa 
and·stoodto lose if tariffs were raised. Bertish did not oppose 
tariff protection in meetings but made it plain where his interests, 
lay. 38 All were united in condemning the flood of second-hand 
clothes that poured into South Africa from 1919 to 1921. 39 
The Clothing Section was of service to the manufacturers 
in the following instances: 
1) 	 In 1919 all members agreed .to reduce working hours. The 
resolution read: 
'In view of the fact' that there is a movement of foot [sic] 
for shorter working hours per week, this meeting of Cloth­
ing Manufacturers considers it will be in the interests 
of the industry to take united action by reducing the hours 
of labour to from 8 am to 5.30 pm daily, the new hours to 
come into operation on and from Monday 10 March,.40 
2) 	 Clothing manufacturers consulted with one another on how 
to give effect to the 1918 Factories Act. This required 
them to keep a register of outworkers and to sew a label 
onto completed items stating that they had not been pro­
41duced in a factory. 
3) 	 All agreed to pay workers for the Peace Holidays in 1919. 
Common decisions were taken on the duration of the Christmas 
break in 1919, 1920 and 1921 and on what payments should 
38. 	 Clothing Section Minutes: 28 January 191~ - Cl/l. 
39. 	 CPMA Minutes: 27 August 1919 (ACM) - Cl/l; Clothing Section 
Minutes: 26 April 1920 - MIll. 
40. 	 Clothing Section Minutes: 3 March 1919 - Cl/l. Clothing 
workers presented a petition for shorter hours shortly after 
similar demands had been made by shop employees (Clothing 
Section Minutes: 28 January 1919 - Cl/l). 
41. 	 CPMA Minutes: 27-28 January 1919 and 4 February 1919 (Advi­

sory Committee on the Factory Act) - Cl/l. 
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be made over this period. Holiday pay was rejected in favour 
of granting a bonus "if deemed ••• to be desirab1e".42 
4) 	 In the post-War boom there was a scarcity of trained machin­
ists. Employers found that good workers left because of 
the higher wages on offer elsewhere. One manufacturer sug­
gested that steps be taken, 
••• to obviate the unfairness to members of the industry which 
was caused by them losing labour which had been trained and 
·· 43rnade 	eff l.Cl.ent. 
The Section agreed that applicants for jobs would be asked 
why they had left their previous employer before being taken 
on. Non-members of the CPMA were also asked to co-operate. 
Concern was expressed that present conditions would lead 
"to undue increasing of wages".44 
5) During the War, clothing factories had expanded greatly as 
a result of government contracts for military uniforms. 
Contracts were awarded by tender, usually to the lowest bid­
der, and the 'better' factory owners often found that they 
were being underbid by sweaters, or that contracts were placed 
overseas. They "respectfully requested" that the government 
make a list of approved tenderers who would be awarded con­
. f 	 f' 45 Th ttracts l.n pre erence to overseas actorl.es. e governmen 
refused to favour local manufactureres in this way and dis­
satisfaction with tendering policy is a recurring theme in 
the minutes of Clothing Section meetings. In 1923, all paid 
46for Midd1emass to go to Pretoria for discussions on tendering.
In 1925 the Pact govenment's new industrial and labour policy 
required the urgent formation of an employers' association for 
the Cape clothing industry which was registered under the Industrial 
42. 	 Clothing Section Minutes: 19 November 1919 - Cl/1; 9 December 
1920 - MIll; 5 December 1921 - MIll. 
43. 	 Clothing Section Minutes: 2 September 1919 - CIllo 
44. 	 Ibid. 
45. 	 Clothing Section Minutes: 7 July 1918 - Cl/1; 18 June 1923 - MIll. 
46. 	 Clothing Section Minutes: 18 June 1923 - MIll. 
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Conciliation Act. The Clothing Section of the Cape Chamber of 
47Industries was able to respond immediately and decisively. 
The minutes of its final meeting ended as follows: 
'Resolved: that the meeting form itself into the Cape 
Wholesale Clothing and Shirt Manufacturers Association' .48 
In other industries, too, the Trade Sections of the CCI laid a 
firm basis for the more cohesive, newly-registered employers' 
associations which defended and advanced the interests of Cape 
mnaufacturers after the Pact government came to power. 
3 The Fits and Starts of Worker Organization, 1900 - 1925 
By 1925 the most significant factory owners in Cape Town had been 
organized by the Cape Chamber of Industries (CCI). This body 
had proved itself of considerable practical service to the manufac­
turers. It provided a forum in which they could meet to agree 
on some standards for 'fair' competition between themselves; 
it supervised collective appeals to the government on import du­
ties, railway rates and legislation which affected them; it assist­
ed them in dealing with trade unions and labour unrest. The CCI 
had very limited power in merchant capital - dominated Cape Town 
and still less nationally. But it ~~pted itself successfully
I 
to its position of weakness and stretched what influence it had 
to its limits. The CCI and its sub-units were poised to meet 
the threats and challenges which accompanied the Pact government. 
By comparison, the organization of labour in Cape Town be­
fore 1925 was a failure. Several craft unions gave a measure 
of protection to their restricted membership and a host of unions 
existed in the minds of honorary officials but there was nothing 
which deserved the name of a 'labour movement' in Cape Town. 
The local trade union co-ordinating body, the Cape Federation 
of Labour Unions (CFLU), was struggling for existence in the face 
of worker apathy and employer disinterest. Ironically, it was saved 
from extinction by the Industrial Conciliation,Act. 
The labour organizations which existed in Cape Town in the 
47. 	 The Cape Province Manufacturers' Association changed its 
name to the Cape Chamber of Industries in 1922. 
48. 	 Clothing Section Minutes: 24 August 1925 - MIll. 
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first two decades of this century were typically craft unions. 
Small, weak and hesitant; collapsing and being revived in phase 
with 	the trade cycle; they reflected the narrow and shaky base 
of Cape Town manufacturing industry. Some unions, such as the 
Printers, Engineers and Carpenters, survived the whole period, 
but many more sprang to life only to disappear within a few years 
or even months. At least five unions of clothing workers flashed 
on and off the scene between 1900 and 1925.49 The small, scat­
tered workshops and few factories, together with the pressures 
of intense competition between workers, made organization particu­
larly difficult. 
The first unions were formed amongst the white craftsmen, 
many 	 of whom were immigrants and had experience of unionism in 
Britain. A notable feature of these early craft unions is their 
non-racial character. Although there was certainly prejudice 
against malay and coloured artisans on the part of some whites, 
the latter often found it imperative to include all skilled workers 
. h·e1r un10ns. f or f ear 0f be1ng. undercut. 50 0ne 0f t he .. I es1n t 	 pr1nc1p 
of the CFLU was "no discrimination on the basis of colour" (Stuart, 
1950c). Cape unionists regularly refused to attend national con­
49. 	 The United South African Tailors' Union (SA News 3 April 
1901); The Amalgamated Society of Tailors (A6-1906, p.144); 
The Tailors' and Tailoress' Union (1917-1919); The Middlemen 
Tailors' Union 1919-20 (Cost of Living Commission 1916-1920, 
Central Archives Depot K17, Correspondence 26 [127] ); Cape 
Peninsula Tailors' Union (1921) (Gitsham and Trembath, 1926, 
p.lIO). 
50. 	 Before the 1920's the APO and Dr. Abdurahman appear to have 
encouraged "coloured" workers to leave 'mixed' unions and 
form their own. They could then undercut the whites and 
would be assured of regular work. (See Simons and Simons, 
1969, pp.226-7). In the 1930's there was a concerted effort 
by certain political groupings to get all 'coloured' workers 
to boycott the 'white-dominated' Cape Federation. The argument 
was that 'coloureds' would only get work if their wages were 
lower than whites. Coloured workers would only suffer unem­
ployment if they supported the efforts of the unions to raise 
wages, for whites would step into these jobs. This had been 
an obvious effect of the higher wage standards introduced 
under the Wage and Industrial Conciliation Acts (The Sun 
4 October 1935). The Sun carried several articles and letters 
on this debate. Some suggested that the boycotters had po­
litical motives behind their naive views - a separate 'coloured' 
union movement could be useful to them. (The Sun 13 December 
1935). 
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51ferences which prohibited the attendance of black delegates. 
The racial exclusiveness of northern unions was one of the main 
arguments of the Cape against joining a national trade union co­
ordinating body (Williams, 1974). In less skilled work it proved 
impossible to organize white and coloured into the same organiza­
tions. The coloured workers in building (bricklaying) and tailor­
ing, for example, owed their employment to their lower rates of 
pay. The "Bricklayers' Union No.2" was formed to accomodate 
coloured bricklayers in the hope of slowly raising their wages 
up to the level of the whites. This was not achieved until after 
1924 when all building workers could join a single industrial 
union. 52 Attempts to in~orporate Malay tailors into the various 
clothing workers unions were continually unsuccessful. They remained 
unorganized and intensely exploited. 
Before the CFLU came on the scene, the 'labour movement', 
such as it was, concerned itself with largely futile attempts 
to promote the election of "labour representatives" to the legis­
lature and municipality. A Cape Town District Trades and Labour 
Council was formed in 1899 (Ticktin, 1973, p.313). The Council 
did not concern itself much with the organization of workers into 
trade unions (Stuart, 1950c). Many unionists were members of 
the Cape Town Social Democratic Federation which was founded in 
1904. 53 It was a forum for heated political debate and the propa­
gation of socialist ideas. 
1913 	saw the formation of the Cape Federation of Labour Unions. 
51. 	 The CFLU was asked to send delegates to the 1919 'National 
Conference of Employers and Employees'. Mr. Batty of the 
Federation stated: "The Federation would not send a single 
delegate unless they had an understanding that coloured dele­
gates would be admitted ••• 'It is as likely as not that for 
this conference we should elect white workers to represent 
the coloured as is usually done. We have a majority of coloured 
men in the Federation but they generally appoint white men 
as their representatives. On this occasion they migh~still 
follow the usual procedure, but that is not the point. We 
desire to have a recognition of the principle settled once 
and for all. •• ' " (CPMA Minutes: 3 September 1919 - Cl/1). 
52. 	 The Western Province Building, Electrical and Allied Trade 
Union; Stuart (1950h). 
53. 	 Ticktin (1973, p.323). Simons and Simons (1969) give the 
year 1902. 
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The Cape Federation was largely the creation of one man - Robert 
Stuart. Just as W.J. Laite cajoled and bullied the manufacturers 
of Cape Town into their organization, Bob Stuart built a co-ordina­
ting body for labour. In so doing, he became the dominant figure 
in Cape unionism for forty years. 
Stuart was born in 1870, as were Lenin, Bill Andrews and 
Jan Smuts. 54 He had little formal schooling and began ~ork at 
an early age. At 14 he was apprenticed as a monumental mason 
and practised this trade in Canada and the United States before 
emigrating to South Africa in 1901. Stuart soon became honorary 
secretary of the local branch of the National Union of Operative 
Stone Masons. He claimed to be a founder member of the SDF, but 
to have withdrawn after a clash with "young Communists" who flooded 
the SDF after 1905. Stuart held "views of a practical character 
as against the Revolutionary theory of Marxism" and "determined 
to devote himself to solving the economic problems of the workers 
through organization into the trade unions".55 By Stuart's own 
account, he and some friends formed the CFLU in response to a 
press report that the Transvaal-based South African Industrial 
Federation intended to send a delegation to Cape Town to establish 
a local branch. Stuart saw the need for, 
... a Federation in the Cape which would be entirely 
independent in status, outlook and policy but which 
would, of course, be willing to consult, and co-operate, 
with any similar body in South Africa on all matters 
of national importance and Common interest. (Stuart, 
1950d) 
The Cape Federation was thus not formed to meet a need which arose 
out of the state of worker organization in Cape Town. It had 
to create a role for itself. 
Stuart was first honorary treasurer of the CFLU. In 1915 
54. 	 Most of the following is drawn from Stuart's hilarious auto­
biography, "I Look Back", published serially in the Trade 
Union Bulletin in 1950 and 1951 - Stuart (1950a-k; 1951a,b). 
55. 	 Trade Union Bulletin October 1941, p.26 - "Men Who Matter: 
No.1 - A Dour Scotsman. Robert C. Stuart" (by H.A. Evans). 
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he became the full-time secretary, a post which he held until 
1941. From this position he successfully and treacherously tor­
pedoed every attempt to unite the South African trade union move­
56
ment under a single co-ordinating body. Stuart's Federation 
was conservative, reformist and Cape chauvinist. For the first. 
ten years of its existence it was apparently weak and largely 
inconsequential. Most of the local craft unions affiliated to 
the Federation and odd new unions were formed, but there was a 
chronic lack of funds. Stuart was engaged as secretary at a wage 
equal to what he earned as a mason but for the first two years 
of his appointment there were no funds to pay him. 57 
The boom conditions which developed in the economy towards 
the end of the First World War provided an unprecedented opportu­
nity for organization. Worker militancy was spurred on by the 
victory of the Russian Revolutions and by the example of worker 
58
struggles in Europe and the United States following the War. 
Cape Town workers raised wage demands in the face of post-War 
inflation. They demanded the recognition of new unions and the 
59
right to call in the Federation to assist in negotiations. Dis­
putes and strikes occurred in every branch of industry and on 
the docks, where Clements Kadalie was organizing the ICU. Demon­
strations and strikes were held to stop the export of food while 
its price was so high. Industrial South Africa reported an "in~ 
creasing enthusiasm" for organization in Cape Town and noted, 
••• there is an uneasy undercurrent of unrest, which is 
60
spreading more every day. 
Similar militancy was seen in the Transvaal which included black 
workers as well as white. Natal was horrified by a "workers' 
soviet", supported by dissatisfied policemen, ousting the city 
council and occupying the Town Hall. 61 
56. 	 See Williams (1974). 
57. 	 How did Stuart survive? He may have been'paid small sums 
by the unions for which he acted as secretary. This was 
the case in the early 1920's. Stuart was the secretary of 
the Bakers' Union from 1911 (till 1950!). 
58. 	 S.A. Commerce February 1918, p.62. 
59. 	 Industrial South Africa August 1919, p.423. (Formerly 
Commerce ••• ) 
60. 	 Industrial South Africa January 1920, p.34. 
61. 	 February 1920, pp.67, 87; also see R.K. Cope 
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The tidal wave of post-War organization reached its climax 
on May Day 1920, which was celebrated nationally for the first 
time in South Africa. 62 A mass meeting of workers on the Parade 
in Cape Town pledged themselves 
' ••• to prepare by organisations of industries to be 
in a position to carryon production and distribution 
in the time of capitalist dissolution,.through the DIC­
TATORSHIP of the Working Class into the Co-operative 
Commonwealth. ,63 
The 1920 congress of the CFLU passed resolutions in favour of indus­
trial as opposed 	to craft unionism and "closed with lusty singing 

64

of the Red Flag ll • 
But there was nothing behind the new rhetoric of revolution. 
The congress of the following year was opened by the Mayor of 
Cape Town and the Minister of Mines and Industries. The Bolshevik 
(a paper published by 'militants') pointed out that, 
••• the passing of motions calling for militant action 
is useless and will only be nullified by craft unions 
affiliated to the Federation as long as these unions 
are controlled by reactionary officials •••• It is up 
to the militants on the congress ••• to realize that the 
main task is the reorganization of the Trades Federation 
of Labour Unions from a craft basis to an industrial 
basis, the organization of the workers into industrial 
unions, built up from the workers' committees capable 
of leading the masses to action. 65 
62. 	 Ticktin (1973, p.330) believes that -the first May Day gather­
ing held in Cape Town was in 1905. 
63. 	 Pamphlet: "Labour Day, 1st May 1920". (Ad2, TUCSA Archives). 
64. 	 The Bolshevik May 1920. 
65. 	 The Bolshevik April 1921. The report continues: n •••The 

last resolution of course called for the socialisation of 

the means of production etc (you know the formula). This 

is usual you know; no Trade Union congress which is self 

respecting could neglect to utter this benediction on the 

'sacred object of the working class' (by sacred they mean, 

I suppose, that it cannot be touched) ••• " 

[Parentheses in the original]. 
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The Federation took advantage of the labour unrest to win 
credibility with the employers, who were desperate to minimize 
"to the utmost the possiblity of industrial warfare".66 The Fede­
ration was regularly called in by employers faced with a strike 
or dispute. It eagerly participated in the formation of Concilia­
tion Boards in several strike-torn trades. It made no move towards 
the industrial unionism being promoted by the 'militants'. 
The Conciliation Boards became defunct after the depression 
began to bite in 1921. Employers interests moved away from labour 
and back to tariff protection as unemployment rose, wages fell 
and workers' organizations crumbled. 67 The Federation was again 
visited by hard times. Stuart stayed on although there was no 
money to pay his salary. By 1924, the Federation was in a sorry 
state. Stuart was owed over £700 - more than a year's salary;68 
unions which had not disappeared were mostly hollow shells, with 
few activities. As craft unions they were ill-suited for the 
forms of struggle which came to Cape Town with the growth of secon­
dary industry after 1925. 
Bankrupt financially and organizationally, abjuring any mix­
ture of politics with trade unionism, the Federation had no choices 
open to it when confronted by the new labour laws of the 1920's 
and the intentions of the employers' associations regarding their 
implementation. But it did not require any choices - the security 
offered to unions and union officials was exactly what it desired 
most. 
Industrial Legislation 
Before 1924, there were three principal laws which affected labour 
in the Cape - the Regulation of Wages (Specified Trades) Act, 
No.29 of 1918; the Factories Act, No.28 of 1918; and the Apprentice­
ship Act, No.26 of 1922. 
The Wage Regulation Act was never effective. Its enactment 
66. 	 S.A. Commerce February 1918, p.62. 
67. 	 The 1922 Annual Report of the CCI described the labour situa­
tion as being "entirely devoid of friction" (p.9 - C2). 
68. 	 CFLU: 13th Annual Report, 1925 (GWUSA Archives). 
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followed the reports of the Parliamentary Select Committee on 
sweated labour in factories which are referred to in Chapter one. 
The purpose of the Act was to regulate the wages and conditions 
"of women and young persons in certain callings where there was 
evidence of sweating or exploitation".69 The Act allowed for 
the establishment of "Wage Boards" in these industries. The Boards 
were to consist of an equal number of representatives of employeEs 
and workers and a neutral chairman. In 1926 a commentator wrote: 
The Act had little success. Organization among employees 
was weak or non-existent, many were too timid to appeal 
to the Boards, the attempt to fix progressive scales 
of rates led to untowards results (such as dismissal 
of those entitled to increases), and the fixing of the 
adult age at 18 meant either the adoption of a very 
low minimum or loss of employment when that age was 
· h b 	 h 70 reached oW1ng to t e rate e1ng. too h'19. 
In 1925, the Economic and Wage Commission reported that the Act had 
"fallen into desuetude".71 
The Factories Act, on the other hand, was one of the pillars 
of South African industrial legislation for sixty-five years. 
It set minimum standards for the operation of all factories in 
the country. It regulated the maximum number of hours of work 
per week. Provisions were made about the use of machinery, the 
deS1gn 0 actor1es an precaut10ns to prevent aCC1 ents at wor •· f f . d' "d k 72 
Factories, mainly clothing factories, which gave out work, had 
to keep a register of the names and addresses of outworkers, the 
quantity of work given out and the amounts paid out. The premises 
69. 	 Social & Industrial Review March 1926, p.140. 'The New Wage 
Act in South Africa' being a "reprint" from the International 
Labour Review of March 1926. 
70. 	 Ibid. 
71. 	 UG 14-1926, para. 77 of Conclusion. 
Although the tailoring trade was clearly? primary target 
of the Act, and steps were taken to apply it in the Cape 
clothing industry (UG 42 - 1920, p.43), I encountered no 
evidence that it had any effect on the industry. It does 
not seem either to have been used as an organizational focus 
by the CFLU. 
72. 	 See Budlender (1979, Chapter 5). 
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of outworkers could be visited by inspectors and if satisfactory, 
a label could be attached to garments, to indicate they were pro­
duced under approved condltlons." 73 y 1919 , t he 'B lnspectorate 
still had "had little time to really find out the true state of 
affairs" in the clothing industry.74 The six inspectors were 
far too few to police all the factories in the entire country.75 
The Act, it seems, only allowed the inspection of outworkers who 
took in work from 'factories' as defined in the Act. This excluded 
from regulation both small tailoring shops, with less than three 
workers, and the outworkers of merchant tailors who did not have 
indoor workshops. 
The Apprenticeship Act of 1922 made provision for the training 
of youths in skilled jobs. It allowed relatively high educational 
qualifications to be fixed for apprentices and thus tended to 
exclude coloureds from being trained as skilled workers, even 
in areas in which coloured skilled labour had long been important 
(Marais, 1939, p.262; Leslie, 1929). Trade unions in Cape Town 
participated in the Juvenile Affairs Boards set up under the Ju­
veniles Act, No.33 of 1921, to assist (effectively white) youths 
to gain employment and training. 
Before 1924, trade unions in Cape Town had no special status 
by law or tradition. The economic environment of fierce competition 
between small factories threatened by cheap imports gave little 
scope for the progress of a trade union movement. In the absence 
of effective worker organization or worker militancy, employers 
saw no point in according any real role to the trade unions of 
the CFLU •• We argue below that the new industrial laws of 1924 
and 1925 allowed a function to be created for these trade unions. 
The laws were the precondition for the growth of a more permanent 
73. 	 Annual Report of the Factories and Labour Division, Department 
of Mines, 1919 (UG 42 - 1920). 
74. 	 Ibid. 
75. 	 I found no evidence of these provlslons of the Act having 
any disruptive effect on the clothing industry beyond a ten­
dency noted by the factory inspectors "on the part of mer­
chant tailors to abolish their workshops and to give out 
work for completion" (ibid). This report does not specify 
in which towns this tendency was noted. 
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labour movement in the city. Before analysing the effects of 
the laws in Cape Town, we need to explain some of the main provi­
sions of the laws. The purpose of much of the narrative in the 
following chapters will be lost on the reader who does not under­
stand how the laws operated administratively. 
The Industrial Conciliation Act, No.l1 of 1924, allowed for 
the legal recognition of trade unions for the first time. A union 
could apply for "registration" under the Act to an official of 
the Department of Labour called the "Registrar of Trade Unions 
and Employers' Organizations". Registration was granted swiftly 
once the Registrar had approved the union's constitution and pro­
vided that there was a good prospect of the union attracting members. 
Registration tended to be applied for and granted on a regional 
basis although a union registered to operate in the whole Trans­
vaal might only have members in Johannesburg. A few "national 
unions" were registered where a single union had branches through­
out the country (for example, in printing, leather and furniture). 
In some industries, the presence of craft unions meant that two 
or more unions operated in a single industry in the same area. 
But the craft unions were restricted by their constitutions and 
registration conditions to organize certain industries only. It 
was a firm principle of the Registrar not to allow more than one 
union to be registered for the organization of the same workers. 
The Registrar always consulted with local officials of the Depart­
ment of Labour and any existing trade unions and employers' organi­
zations before he agreed to register a new trade union. The regis­
tration application of a new union was never rejected only because 
there already existed a union registered to operate in the same 
area. For example, an existing union registered to operate in 
the Western Cape, but having no members in George, might not object 
to a new union just being registered for this region, and the 
scope of its own registration being altered accordingly. If the 
existing union did object, the Department of Labour would try 
to arrange for the two unions to amalgamate. 1f this were not 
possible, the new union might anyway be granted registration if 
it could show itself to be 'representative' in the area in question. 
The administration of the aspects of the Act relating to registra~ 
tion thus encouraged regional rather than national unions and made 
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the secession of a branch of a national union easy. In several 
instances an existing, registered union was challenged by a new 
unregistered union operating in the same area. The Registrar 
would de-register the currently registered union and register 
the new union only if the latter could prove itself more represen­
tative. The criteria of representivity were decided by the Regis­
trar who relied on the information sent to him by the local labour 
inspectors before he took any action. 
Unregistered unions were never illegal, but they were not 
entitled to participate in the machinery of the Industrial Conci­
liation Act. Trade unionists soon came to regard registration 
as the essential condition for buildin,g a union. Registration 
did not ensure recognition from employers automatically but it 
helped to establish the credibility of a union. The most important 
advantage of registration was that it allowed unions the possi­
bility of negotiating a schedule of wages and conditions which 
were legally binding on employers in the industry. For this to 
occur, employers had to be organized as well. A reasonable pro­
portion of them had to be members of an "employers' association" 
also registered under the Industrial onciliation Act, for the 
same industry and a similar area to the trade union. 
Three types of legally binding wage regulations could then 
result: 
Firstly, if requested, the Minister of Labour might appoint 
a "Conciliation Board". This was composed of equal members of 
employer and employee representatives. It was established to 
settle any serious disputes between the union and the employers 
or to negotiate wages and conditions. The Minister could make 
any agreement arrived at by the Board legally binding on all em­
ployers and employees in the industry and area in question. The 
Department of Labour was responsible for enforcing the conciliation 
board agreement. The conciliation board was not a permanent body. 
It disbanded once it had reached an agreement. 
Secondly, the employers' association and the trade union 
could agree to form an "Industrial Council". The industrial coun­
cil was a permanent body which negotiated an agreement which the 
Minister could gazette as legally binding on all employers and 
workers in the industry in a particular area. Although the regis­
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tration of trade unions and employers' organizations was a pre­
condition for the formation of a legally recognized industrial 
council, it was not a sufficient condition. Once an industrial 
council was proposed, the Department of Labour often required both 
union and employer bodies to make changes to their respective 
constitutions and scrutinised the constitution of the industrial 
council. A more substantial representivity was required for par­
ticipation in an industrial council than for registration. In 
the first years of the Act's operation the Department was not con­
cerned only with the numbers of members on paper but also with 
how well the workers were organized. It was wary of employers 
forming paper unions which they would dominate or well-organized 
skilled workers dominating badly organized unskilled workers. 
Industrial council agreements were enforced by the paid "Agents" 
of the council in factories which belonged to the employers' organi­
zation and by inspectors of the Department of Labour in non-member 
factories. The council was financed by weekly levies on union 
members and their employers. Many industrial council agreements 
embodied 'closed shop' agreements and allowed for union subscrip­
tions to be collected by the employers after workers had signed 
a stop-order on their wages. The trade union and employers organi­
zation each had the same number of representatives on the indus­
trial council. 
Thirdly, if a conciliation board or industrial council failed 
to reach an agreement, the Minister could appoint one or more 
arbitrators. The recommendation of the arbitrator could be gazetted 
and made legally binding. 
The most controversial aspect of the Industrial Conciliation 
Act was the limitation it imposed on the workers' right to strike 
(and on the ability of employers to institute a 'lock-out,).76 
76. 	 The other controversial aspect of the Act was its racial 
exclusivity. All whites, coloureds and asiatics were de­
fined as "employees" for the purposes of the Act, but many 
African workers were excluded from the detinition. As is 
discussed below, in Cape Town, African workers could be sub­
ject to the Act. Consequently, this summary of aspects of 
the Act omits reference to its 'racial implications'. 
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Strikes were illegal until a long and complex procedure had been 
followed (Budlender, 1979, pp.97-102). 
The Industrial Conciliation Act was passed while Smuts' South 
African Party was still in power. It was allowed to operate un­
changed by the new Pact government. The Pact government intro­
duced the Wage Act. This became the second element in the legal­
ized wage regulation system which has applied to South African 
industry ever since. 
The Wage Act, No.27 of 1925, was to operate in industries 
in which workers and employers were insufficiently organized to 
allow the settlement of wages and conditions under the Industial 
Conciliation Act. The Minister appointed a permanent, three member 
"Wage Board" which, at his request, investigated the conditions 
of employment in an industry in specified areas, and produced 
a recommended schedule of wages and conditions for the industry. 
The Minister could eventually gazette this recommendation as a 
"Wage Determination" which was legally binding on all employers 
in the area. The Wage Board held public sittings around the coun­
try to hear evidence from employers and employees and their organi­
zations. Its recommendations had to take into account the ability 
of an industry to pay, but, if possible, should recommend wages 
which allowed workers a "civilized" standard of living. If the 
Board did not think an industry could afford to pay 'civilized 
wages' by virtue of its cost structure or competitive situation, 
it informed the Minister of this fact and did not present him 
with a recommendation unless he specifically requested this. The 
Wage Board operated slowly. After its investigations, it sub­
mitted its recommendations to the Minister. These first had to 
be gazetted to allow interested parties the chance to raise objec­
tions and had to be republished for objection if any changes were 
made by the Board as a result of the objections. The Minister 
had no power to alter a Wage Board recommendation himself, he 
could only reject it or refer it back to the Board. Once the 
objection phase had been completed - this usually involved the 
Board in writing a commentary on all the objections - the Minister 
gazetted the recommendations finally as a Wage Determination. 
The determinations were enforceable by the Department of Labour. 
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The new laws did not operate smoothly. The Department of 
Labour had insufficient staff to police the laws or administer 
them with speed and efficiency. The Department had to work out 
from scratch all the procedural aspects of the administration 
of the laws and decide on how the industrial laws ought to operate 
together. On top of these problems came an unending stream of 
court cases as employers and their legal advisers sought for (and 
found) loopholes in the laws and their administration which al­
lowed the avoidance of industrial council agreements and wage 
determinations. This required amendments to the acts as well 
as special acts in 1930 and 1934 to validate earlier wage deter~ 
't' 77mlna 	lons. 
5 The Stuart Machine 1925 - 1939 
The Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924 and the Wage Act of 1925 
set trade unionism in South Africa on new ground. Archie Crawford 
addressed a meeting of industrialists in 1923 as follows: 
The Rand Revolt has given the workers' movement a great 
setback and trade unionism is now in the melting-pot 
again. It is a mistake for employers to adopt the ostrich­
like policy and ignore the Unions. This is a time when 
they can help the Unions to grow up "within the pale". 
Workers organizations will quickly revive but they will 
assum~ new forms and it is vital to industry and to 
the whole community that the new unionism should be 
of a character which conduces to the smooth running 
of industry and the peace and good order of the community. 
The character of the old unions was such as to make 
for trouble and disaster. 78 
The laws which followed were tailored to resolve the particular 
crisis which the state faced as a result of the 1922 Strike. 79 
As such, they were the product of class struggle on the Witwaters­
rand. It is important to see that for the clasp struggle in Cape 
77. 	 See Budlender (1979, Chapters 3 and 4); Davies (1979, pp.211; 
216-7) • 
78. 	 Industrial SA June ~923, p.276. 
79. 	 See Davies (1977, Chapter 5) or Kaplan (1977, pp.77-113). 
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Town (and everywhere else in South Africa), these laws were an 
'external imposition'. Conditions in Cape Town simply did not 
enter into any set of equations for which the laws were a solution. 
Historical assessments of the legislation have properly focussed 
on the genesisBO or evolutionB1 of the laws in the struggles on 
the Rand. However. these assessments are less satisfactory when 
they examine the effects of the laws on worker struggles, for 
they still limit their attention to the Witwatersrand while the 
laws were applied allover the country. 
Davies (1976) and Lever (1977) note five principal effects 
of the industrial legislation (implicitly) in the context of the 
trade union movement on the Witwatersrand: 
1) There was a reduction in the number of strikes; 
2) New scope was given to the bureaucratisation of unions; 
3) The exclusion of African workers from the Industrial Concilia­
tion Act confirmed the separation of their struggles from 
those of white workers. 
4) In the short term, the Act led to an apathy amongst workers 
for organization and in some industries a decline in union 
membership. 
5) A new relationship of understanding came to exist between 
union officials and employers, leading to a reduction in 
labour militancy. 
These points are inadequate and misleading when one considers 
the effects of the laws on the class struggle in Cape Town. 
Firstly, the Industrial Conciliation Act did not secure (let 
alone confirm) a racial separation in working class struggles 
in Cape Town. Coloureds were included in the Act and so (for 
a period) were Africans who, in Cape Town, did not have to carry 
passes. In the Transvaal the primary division in the working 
class was on racial lines and this was enforced by the Industrial 
Conciliation Act. In the Cape the Industrial Conciliation Act 
BO. Davies (1976). 
Bl. Lever (1977). 
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opened up the possibility of working class struggles conducted 
through non-racial trade unions. Trade unions in Cape Town were 
generally nonracial, but organization did not encompass all workers ­
it was never (and has never been) extended to the mass of unskilled 
and semi-skilled workers.82 
Secondly, the effect of the labour laws in Cape Town was 
altogether different from the Transvaal. The Industrial Concilia­
tion Act was the product of the defeat of the militant white work~ 
ing class on the Witwatersrand and was followed by fewer strikes, 
falling membership and chaos in the Transvaal union movement. 
In Cape Town, on the other hand, (which was free of any strong 
or militant unions), the Act resulted in a flowering of organi­
zation and the rebirth and registration of new trade unions. 
From 1925 to 1928 the Cape Federation continually reported "the 
most successful year to date". In 1928 Stuart proudly reported: 
For the first time in the history of the Federation 

we can say that the Federation is solvent. 83 

A new relationship was built up between union officials and employ­
ers in Cape Town but it differed from that seen in the Transvaal. 
New unions were formed and recognised by the employers directly 
as a result of the Industrial Conciliation Act and the Wage Act. 
There were no militant struggles for union recognition; there 
was no need for Cape employers to encourage local unions to grow 
up "within the pale"; it was years still before industrial expan­
sion had created a material basis for the existence of a solid 
union movement. 
The legislation created a more favourable climate for organi­
zation than had ever existed in Cape Town. Stuart wrote in his 
82. 	 It may appear controversial to assert that semi-skilled and 
unskilled workers in Cape Town were never organized. If 
one ignores the unions which flourished briefly during the 
Second World War, what about the Garment Workers' Union of 
the Western Province, today the largest union in South Africa 
which has existed since 1927? What about tne Food &Canning 
Workers' Union which was founded in 1941? My argument in 
the case of the garment workers is that they were not so much 
organized as disorganized by the union. The FCWU has always 
experienced great problems in organizing in Cape Town itself 
which has always been a weak (and until recently) often non­
existent branch. (But see Lewis, 1976, pp.178-86). 
83. 	 CFLU: 16th Annual Report, 1928 (TUCSA Archives). 
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Annual Report: 
••• With the assistance of industrial legislation the 
Federation has without doubt benefited, organizations 
have come into existence during 1925 that without legis­
lation would never have been heard of, not that workers 
don't want organization but because of the economic 
position, afraid of the boss. Today the position is 
changed by the introduction of the Wage Board Act, the 
boss class knowing full well that they have exploited 
the workers and are afraid that the searchlight may 
be turned· to their profits, and to avoid exposure the 
boss class is urging upon all workers either skilled 
or semi-skilled to become members of their trade organi­
. 	 84
zatlons. 
There are a number of examples of Cape employers, terrified by the 
prospect of the new Wage Board imposing high wages on them, trying 
to form Industrial Councils and encouraging the unionization of 
their workers. Many of these efforts were initiated by W.J. Laite, 
then secretary of the CCI. Laite established firmer and more 
friendly links with the leaders of the CFLU, offering stop-order 
facilities for subscriptions and immediate recognition of any 
union they formed. So eager were Laite and Stuart to cover Cape 
industry with Industrial Councils, that they embarrassed the La­
bour Department by demanding the recognition of Councils before 
the participating unions or employer organizations had been regi­
stered.85 Fred Richfield, "a gentleman trade unionist,,86 who 
opposed Stuart, sheds additional light on the process: 
Many of the early Wage Determinations were much higher 
than the voluntary wages tendered by the employers who 
84. 	 CFLU: 13th Annual Report, 1925 (GWUSA Archives). 
85. 	 This happened in the case of the garment manufacturing in­
dustr~ biscuits and baking & confectioner~ industries. 
(Memoranda to Secretary for Labour, 9 May 1927; 25 August 
1927, C.A.D. ARB 1058/27). 
86. 	 It is with these words that Richfield described himself in 
an interview in 1978. He was an independent unionist but 
worked closely with the Cape Districts Committee of the Trades 
and Labour Council for several years. 
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sat up and pondered on what could be done to stern this 
sudden attack on their profits. With the craftiness 
of their class and with the assistance of petty oppor­
tunists they decided to apply for Industrial Councils 
in order to regulate their own wages and conditions • 
•••This necessitated the formation of Trade Unions, 
and the Cape Employers began a new era in their Commer­
cial History by forming Trade Unions to suit their own 
purposes and with the assistance of a group of men 
masquerading as Trade-Unionists were fairly successful. 
The Executive of the Cape Federation of Labour Unions 
consists of a group of men who depend on the movement 
for a living and the job of Industrial Inspector is 
handed out to them by Robert Stuart, Secretary of the 
Cape Federation. 
The workers in Baking Industry, Biscuits, Sweetmaking, 
Laundrying, Hairdressing, Tobacco, Garment Factories, 
Liquor &Catering Trades and now Commercial Employees 
have all been sent along by their bosses to attend meet­
ings addressed by Federation Officials on the benefits 
of an Industrial Council. Unions are immediately formed 
that night, a Committee elected and an Industrial Council 
applied for. One or two favoured employees are elected 
onto the Council and take advantage of the oath of secrecy 
to divulge nothing of the proceedings of that Council, 
fees are deducted off the workers' wages and the whole 
machine runs smoothly after the appointment of one of 
the Federation officials nominated by Stuart and paid 
as an inspector or agent ••• the Federation with the em­
ployer!s assistance runs these councils and makes jobs 
for their officials at the expense of the workers. 87 
These allegations against Stuart and the Feder~tion are born out 
87. 	 F.G. Richfield: "Policy of the Cape Federation of Labour 
Unions - 27th March 1934". Memorandum submitted to the 
1934 Annual Conference of the TLC by F.G. Richfield, secre­
tary, Glass Bevelling and Silvering Employees' Union and 
Cape Peninsula Commercial Employees Association. (TUCSA 
Archives). 
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by the facts. Stuart's reputation as a dictator, sell-out and 
bosses' man was well earned over his whole career. There are 
countless examples of his breaking strikes, dividing workers, 
signing low wage agreements behind their backs, colluding with 
employers and the police to defeat union dissidents or political 
activists and riding rough-shod over inconvenient clauses in con­
stitutions.88 He was supported in this by people who relied 
on his unions, industrial councils and the inspectorate of labour 
for employment. E.S. (Solly) Sachs, general secretary of the 
Transvaal Garment Workers' Union, clashed with Stuart continually 
over a twenty year period and had bitter feelings about Stuart 
and his associates: 
••• between 1926 and 1950 when he died, (Robert Stuart) 
did more to keep the [garment - MN] workers of the Cape 
on starvation wage levels than any man ••• unscrupulous 
and uncouth, cunning, crafty and crooked, without culture 
or education, he bossed over the majority of the workers 
of the Cape for twenty-five years. Surrounded by a 
group of loyal stooges, who held their jobs by the grace 
of their master, praised regularly by the capitalist 
press, serving faithfully the interests of the employers 
who willingly provided him with all the facilities, he 
successfully achieved two aims: 1) to keep the wages 
of the Cape workers down at the lowest level, and 2) to 
enrich himself. 89 
88. 	 Chapters four to seven of this thesis provide examples of 
each of these types of action in the garment industry in 
Cape Town up to 1939. For the period 1940 to 1950 see Nicol 
(1977). On Stuart's role in defeating the independent organi­
zationof 	millinery workers in Cape Town, see Nicol (1977); 
Garment Workers' Union Commission of Enquiry: Evidence of 
Pauline Podbrey; Millinery Association (Cape) Minutes: 24 
April 1944 (CCl Archives). More generally see Stuart's own 
autobiography (Stuart 1950, 1951) and Sachs' unpublished 
draft chapter of Garment Workers in Action in the GWUSA Ar­
chives, Bce 2.2.2, pp.146-168. Stuart's partiality to em­
ployers was stressed forcefully by several people I inter­
viewed, including David Lunn, Fred Richfield, Pauline Podbrey, 
and Dr. Anna Scheepers. 
89. 	 E.S. Sachs "The Struggle of the Garment Workers in the Coastal 
Areas" (Unpublished draft chapter for Garment Workers in 
Action, GWUSA Archives, Bce 2.2.2). 
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Throughout his life, Stuart was continually vilified as an enemy 
of the workers. Unlike Sachs, who promptly - and successfully ­
sued all who defamed him, Stuart sued for defamation only once 
(the respondent was Sachs!) and withdrew from the action before 
it carne to court. He was keenly aware of criticism but rarely 
defended himself in writing beyond issuing denials or asserting 
that he had been misunderstood. On those occasions when he did 
defend himself, he often refused to go into details,90 for to 
do so, 
••• would probably lead to unpleasant repercussion and 
91 
open 	old wounds, which can best be left for time to heal. 
His attitude to criticism might be described as philosophical. 
He wrote in his autobiography, 
The lot of the pioneer, in any sphere of human activity, 
is never free from difficulties, anxieties and disappoint­
ments. I experienced these in full measure, but what 
tended to dishearten me most, at times, was the criticism 
and hostility which were directed against me by the very 
persons whose position and standard of living I was striv­
ing to better. Fortunately, however, I did not allow 
these setbacks to deter me or to deflect me from the 
course which I had set myself. (Stuart, 1950i) 
An obituary remarked: 
Like everyone who dedicated their lives to the interests 
of the "bottom dog", Robert Stuart had enemies, the most 
bitter and the most treacherous being from among the 
class he sought to benefit. But was it not ever thus? 
Christ got the cross, Socrates the hemlock juice. But 
treachery never embittered him. He was aware that it 
90. 	 This is true both of his Annual Reports and his autobiography. 
But see 'An open letter in which the GWU-C? PRESENTS THE 
TRUTH to the Garment Workers of the Transvaal', 3 September 
1945, and also 'A reply to and exposure of the distortions, 
misstatements and methods of Solly Sachs', September 1945 
(GWUSA Archives). Both pamphlets are certainly the work 
of Stuart. 
91. 	 CFLU: Report 1939 (TUCSA Papers). Stuart refused to write 

his annual report in 1939 for this reason! 
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was all part of the day's work and just to be accepted 

and endured, like any other incident, pleasant or un­

pleasant. 92 

The crucial question to pose is what allowed Stuart and his re­
actionary companions to so dominate the labour scene in Cape Town 
for such a long time, even in the face of exposure as bosses' 
men? Stuart's dominant role between 1915 and 1950 cannot be as­
cribed merely to the strength of his personality;93 neither can 
the weakness of worker organization in Cape Town be ascribed 
merely to Stuart's existence. We need to show what conditions 
of class struggle in Cape Town allowed Stuart and his followers 
to flourish. 
Richfield outlines above the workings of what I shall refer 
to as 'the Stuart Machine' - the immensely powerful dominator 
and disorganizer of Cape Town workers between 1925 and the late 
1930's. The Stuart Machine relied on two supports: industrial 
legislation and an alliance between union officials (based in 
the Cape Federation) and the employers, organized in affiliates 
to the CCI. Internally, unions were dominated by officials. 
Before 1925 most unions were small and weak. They could not af­
ford a paid full-time organizer or secretary. Stuart came to 
take on the secretaryship of several unions and acted for all 
of them. 94 This immediately placed him in a powerful position. 
He performed the vital tasks of calling meetings and administra­
tion, he became known to employers and was their immediate contact 
in the event of any labour dispute. As long as a union was unable 
to pay the full salary of its secretary no challenger would seek 
to unseat him. No one could afford to. After 1925, with regis­
trations and stop-orders, the financial position of unions im­
proved. Stuart and his followers then used and abused their con­
stitutional power and real power as officials to keep control 
of the union. If this proved inadequate, they could rely on the 
employers to help dispose of dissident elements. Stuart estab­
lished himself as the leader of labour in the Cape. He was appointed 
92. Trade Union Bulletin March 1951, "Vale" by D. Livingstone. 
93. Such is the solution of Williams (1974). 
94. CFLU Minutes: 3 March 1927. 
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to represent the Cape on the South African delegation to the Indus­
trial Labour Organization. He used his position to block and 
undermine the consistent efforts of Transvaal and Natal unionists 
to draw the Cape into a united national trade union movement. 
The Cape Federation was never a uniformly reactionary body. 
It always sported a 'left wing' of some description,95 but this 
was kept 'under control' until the late 1930's. Within the unions 
there were recurring instances of worker and activist opposition 
to Stuart's type of unionism and mode of operation. These date 
. 	 96from the early years of the CFLU. On several occasions Stuart 
stepped down as secretary of a union and left it to go to oblivion 
in its own way after altercations with the workers. After 1925 
he was less prone to let a profitable union slip from his grasp. 
During the 1930's there were fierce attacks on the Federation's 
dominance and its reformist and reactionary politics. These re­
volved around the formation of a rival trade union co-ordinating 
body in Cape Town; the strengthening of the 'left opposition' 
within the Federation; and the bitter conflict between the Federa­
tion and the Transvaal Garment Workers' Union over who would orga­
nize the Cape garment workers. 
Stuart's refusal to join the South African Trades and Labour 
Council prompted the northern unions to establish a branch of 
the TLC in Cape Town. This Cape Districts Committee became active 
in 1935 and built up an array of new unions in the sweet, chemical, 
brewing, explosives and food &canning industries. In 1936 Stuart 
was ousted as secretary of the tramways union by a left winger 
(J.W. Emmerich). Soon afterwards the builders' union rejected 
the Federation's influence. The assault launched by the Transvaal 
Garment Workers' Union on the leaders of the Cape GWU 
forced the Stuart Machine into the most blatant alliance with 
the employers. Workers could see clearly the collaborationist 
policy Stuart was following and, where they could, they transferred 
their allegiances to alternative unions. 
By 1938 Stuart's monopoly on worker organization in Cape 
95. 	 See Williams (1974). 
96. 	 For example in the tramway strike in 1915 (Stuart 1951a, b) 
and after the 1917 tailors' strike (Stuart 1950i). See 
Chapter I, footnote 103, above. 
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Town had been broken. The Federation was forced into a unity 
agreemertt with the Cape Districts Committee of the TLC and Stuart 
struggled to keep control, inveighing against "disruptionists 
for a unity movement",97 opportunists, Communists and splitters. 
In 1941 Stuart resigned as secretary of the CFLU. He took offices 
in Woodstock, gathered around him the few unions still under his 
thumb (principally the garment workers), and continued his "acti­
vities in the cause of the workers H98as secretary of the new 
"Western Province and District Council of Trade Unions".99 
In summary, a real challenge to Stuart's dominance in the 
Cape labour movement did not emerge until 1936/7. Before this, 
his position was sustained by the Stuart Machine - internal control 
of unions, relying on the alliance with the bosses and the indus­
trial legislation. The industrial legislation was the means by 
which the Cape bosses cleverly fashioned unions sympathetic to 
their interests. The existence of registered, but effectively 
unorganized, bosses' unions delayed the emergence of 'democratic', 
organized trade unions in Cape Town. 
Legislation, Protection and the Class Struggle in Cape Town 
after 1925 
'In the present phase of imperialism there is really 
no such thing as external factors on the one hand, act­
ing purely from 'outside', and opposed to internal fac­
tors 'isolated' in their own 'space' and outclassing 
the others. If we maintain the primacy of internal 
factors, we simply mean that those coordinates of the 
imperial chain that are 'external' to a country - the 
global balance of forces, the role of a particular great 
power, etc. - act only on the country in question by 
way of their internalization, i.e. by their articulation 
to its own specific contradictions. But these contra­
dictions themselves, in certain aspects, represent the 
induced reproduction of the contradictions of the im­
perialist chain within the various individual countries. 
97. 	 Trade Union Bulletin September 1941. 
98. 	 Trade Union Bulletin October 1941, p.36; CFLU Minutes: 
3 June 1941. 
99. 	 Stuart was secretary of the WPDCTU (and the Cape Garment 
Workers' Union) until his death in 1950. The WPDCTU was 
dissolved when TUCSA was formed. 
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To talk of internal factors in this sense, then, is 
to uncover the real role that imperialism (uneven de­
velopment) plays in the evolution of the various social 
formations.' 
- Nicos Poulantzas (1977, p.22) 
Most analytical writing on South African labour history in the 
period preceding the Second World War has concentrated on the 
gold mining industry and the Witwatersrand. The Witwatersrand 
was the industrial hub of South Africa and a focus of political 
struggle. A history of the Witwatersrand demonstrates that the 
class struggle is a political struggle as well as an economic 
struggle. There is an organic interlinkage of trade union organi­
zation, the 1922 Strike, industrial legislation and the "civilized 
labour policy", The conditions of class struggle on the Witwaters­
rand are determined largely on the Witwatersrand. 
This is not at all the case in Cape Town. In a sense, class 
struggle in Cape Town is a discontinuous process because changes 
in its conditions are periodically dictated from outside. The 
manufacturers of Cape Town, despite a twenty year campaign, never 
won tariff protection from Cape commercial interests or the mines. 
Industrial protection was granted because of struggles in the 
north. The Industrial Conciliation Act was not directed at the 
labour movement in the Cape, nor were the Cape unions responsible 
for 'winning' the Wage Act. Yet both of these Acts are applied 
in the Cape with far-reaching results. The class struggle in 
Cape Town is thrown 'forward' by what is, for the Cape, a series 
of shocks which alter the conditions of class struggle. This 
process is an effect of the uneven development of capitalism in 
South Africa and appears, in the present instance, as the domi­
nance of the Witwatersrand over the Cape. 
In assessing the conditions of class struggle in Cape Town 
after 1925, one must acknowledge the pivotal effects of the policy 
of industrial protection and the new industrial legislation on 
determining the shape of the labour movement in Cape Town. It 
is significant that the industrial legislation did not arise out 
of the class struggle in Cape Town. It thus had a particularly 
severe rupturing effect on the class struggle in Cape Town. It 
is this that accounts for the dominance of the Stuart Machine 
in the ten to fifteen years before the War. 
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Emphasis on the effects of industrial legislation and in­
dustrial protection in Cape Town provide only a partial explana­
tion of the changed conditions of class struggle in Cape Town 
after 1925. One must still explain why the new legislation and 
policies of the state had the particular effects they did by ref­
erence to concrete conditions. These 'external factors' acted 
on the conditions of class struggle in Cape Town and transformed 
them. However, the precise way in which they acted was determined. 
by the conditions of class struggle already existing in Cape Town. 
A process of class struggle also shaped their efforts. This chap­
ter has raised three 'internal' determinants of the path taken 
by the economic class struggle in Cape Town. These are the nature 
of capitalism in Cape Town, the weakness of organization in the 
Cape labour movement, and the modest but successful organization 
of the manufacturers. It is useful to stress how the second fac­
tor is related to the first. 
The nature of capitalism in the Cape was different from that 
in the Transvaal. As we have said, Cape Town was dominated by 
commercial and comprador capital. It never became a significant 
industrial centre. Lacking any natural resources, beyond a supply 
of cheap black labour, manufacturing enterprise concentrated in 
food processing, building and consumer goods industries. Clothing 
was the only local industry to become of any significance in the 
national economy. The character of the labour movement was 
strongly influenced by the limited base of production in Cape 
Town (in contrast with that represented by the mining and asso­
ciated industries on the Witwatersrand). Industrial unionism 
in Cape Town lacked a sound material base. Manufacturing concerns 
tended to be small with a low organic composition of capital. 
This, combined with pressures from imports which continued after 
1925, set definite limits on wage levels and made for a less suc­
cessful economic class struggle. The working class was divided 
on skill lines (though not on racial lines) and the traditions 
of craft unionism dominated the CFLU. 
Our study of the garment workers in the following five chap~ 
ters suggests how the interaction of the industrial legislation 
and the policy of industrial protection,with the backwardness 
of Cape Town capitalism1conditions in the labour movement and 
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the organization of the manufacturers, combined to determine the 
specific conditions of class struggle that gave rise to the Stuart 
Machine and a boss-union alliance after 1925. 
These factors are essential to understanding the organizational 
history of garment workers in Cape Town but they are obviously 
insufficient to characterise the full social and political context 
of garment workers. Our present study does not lead us to take 
account of the whole arena of political class struggle in Cape 
Town (as it does the arena of economic class struggle). We get 
glimpses into the activities of the Communist Party and other 
marginal groupings who are important in trade union struggles, 
but we are not able to appreciate the full context in which their 
political activity takes place or how they link economic and poli­
tical struggle. We are not led either to examine the role of 
political groups like the African Peoples' Organization, the All 
African Convention or the National Liberation League, none of 
which had any special interest in the organization of labour. 
Consequently we can only note the separation of the economic and 
political struggles and the non-involvement of organized workers 
in the political campaigns of the time - over the Hertzog Bills, 
the housing crisis and city council politics. It is not possible, 
in this thesis, to investigate these characteristics of the class 
struggle in Cape Town satisfactorily. 
The focus of this thesis is the garment and tailoring workers 
of Cape Town. In order to explain their suffering, their exploi­
tation and domination, we have invoked two themes, both of which 
seek also to extend the relevance of the thesis beyond the garment 
industry. The first relates to the conditions of class struggle 
in Cape Town and the second to the effects of the industrial legis­
lation of the 1920's both in Cape Town and in South Africa generally. 
The wider aim of the first theme is to illustrate the need 
for a regional mapping of class struggles in South Africa. This 
chapter has set out some of the obvious differences in the tenor 
of the class struggle between Cape Town and the rest of South 
Africa, specifically the Witwatersrand. General statements have 
been made about the nature of the economic class struggle in Cape 
Town before and after 1925. These will be further elucidated 
by a close study of the Cape garment industry after 1925. While 
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this cannot alone account for or map out the whole terrain of 
class struggle in Cape Town, our study of this fast-growing sec­
tor of Cape manufacturing industry can provide suggestive poin­
ters. 
A statement of the main differences between the garment in­
dustries of the Witwatersrand and Cape Town indicates the aspects 
of class struggle in Cape Town which the thesis will attempt to 
explain. On the Witwatersrand after 1925 there is a garment in­
dustry in which militant worker action directed by a strong trade 
union is a constant factor. In addition, through participation 
in the union, garment workers are drawn into political class 
struggle as well. In Cape Town a fighting spirit among the gar­
ment workers emerges into the open only occasionally, and even 
then it is never spontaneous but is initiated and taken forward 
only with the aid and cajolement of organizers in the pay of the 
Transvaal union. The workers are never drawn into political 
struggles through any of the unions which attempt to organize 
them. In Johannesburg, organized worker strength is a crucial 
factor in improving wages and conditions. In Cape Town, wages 
and conditions improve - at a slower pace and to a lower level ­
without any organized pressure from local workers. In the Trans­
vaal, the union (aided by sympathetic employers on the industrial 
council) continually disciplines employers to follow the agreement 
and organizes successfully against police intimidation. In Cape 
Town, workers are unprotected from victimisation by their employers, 
tqe police and the Department of Labour. 
The comparison between the conditions of class struggle facing 
garment workers in the Cape and Transvaal is heightened by the 
two direct attempts of the Transvaal garment workers· union to 
export their strategies and forms of organization to Cape Town. 
In 1930-1 and 1934-8 Transvaal organizers tried to build in Cape 
Town a militant garment workers· trade union on the lines of the 
successful Transvaal union. On both occasions they failed. We 
shall show this failure to be rooted in the specific conditions 
of class struggle in Cape Town. 
The second theme has been mentioned in the context of the 
different effects which industrial legislation had on stimulat­
ing organization in Cape Town as opposed to the Transvaal. The 
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similarities in the ways that the legislation operated in the 
two centres however allow an argument of wider relevance to be 
advanced. 
Marxist theory in gen~ral and theories of the capitalist 
state in particular have played a key role in the reinterpretation 
of twentieth century South African economic history. This reinter­
pretation, and particularly that represented by Davies (1979) 
and Kaplan (1977), has had the effect of shunting the economic 
struggles of white wage earners after 1924, and with them the 
struggles of all trade unions registered under the Industrial 
Conciliation Act, into a siding of irrelevance. After 1924, 
white workers were effectively 'isolated', they were co-opted 
into support for the forms of state, they accepted the bounds 
placed on their economic struggles by the labour legislation of 
the 1920's, they accepted the enervating protection of a legal­
ized colour bar. As Kaplan says, the white trade unions were 
incorporated into the state structures in a way that ensured "that 
no direct confrontation between capital and the white wage earners 
on a scale comparable to the Rand revolt was repeated" (1977, p.109). 
From then on South African history had as its principal actors 
capital (national, imperial, large, small) and the black dominated 
classes. White wage earners were important only in their support 
100(or lack of it) for Afrikaner Nationalism in elections. The 
bureaucratic, co-optive and racially divisive tendencies of the 
Industrial Conciliation Act prevented white unions - and by impli­
cation mixed or 'coloured' unions - from playing any significant 
role in the class struggle. 
With the benefit of hindsight such an analysis is easily 
accepted. But, by being 'institutionalized', class struggle in­
volving white wage earners and black members of registered unions 
did not cease. It took on new forms. The process through which 
class struggle came to take on these new forms has never been 
investigated. Davies (1979) and others convincingly demonstrate 
100. 	Much recent writing on white trade unions is on this topic. 
See for example O'Meara (1978 and 1979); Davies (1979, Chapter 7); 
Lewis, J. (1977 and 1978); Berger (1982); Touyz (1979 and 
1982). With the exception of Lewis, D. (1976 and 1978), 
the fact that many registered unions had a large black mem­
bership is ignored. 
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the potential of the 1920's legislation and the "civilized labour 
policy" to tame the white wage earners and can refer to various 
statistics, the corruption and bureaucratisation of several unions 
and the absence of a strong labour movement to prove the point. 
However they never analyse the process through which the legis­
lation successfully contained the economic struggles of white 
101 
wage 	 earners. 
Trade union strategies of organlzlng underwent a marked change 
after the advent of the Wage and Industrial Conciliation Acts. 
Despite wide recognition of the divisive intentions of the legis­
lation and criticism of the restrictions placed on the right to 
strike, the trade unions straightaway entered into the spirit 
of the new industrial relations system. Their participation, 
as much as that of the employers, determined the real effects 
of the legislation on their organization. For just as labour 
and capital adapted to the new controls, the new legislation it­
self underwent a process of adaptation to the class struggle. 
This process was subject to least constraint in the early years 
before the Department of Labour, the courts, the employers and 
the unions had developed policies and established procedures. 
In 1924 the Industrial Conciliation Act was legislation, by the 
War it had become a practice and this practice developed out of 
class struggle. 
The initial application of the Wage and Industrial Conciliation 
Acts produced enormous discontent and conflict amongst workers 
(and manufacturers). This was attended by confusion and uncertainty 
about the scope and legality of wage determinations and agreements. 
The pressure of worker anger combined with complaints from manu­
facturers brought about changes in the operation of the institutions 
at the centre of the new system as well as several amendments to 
the laws. The white trade unions did not go gentle into that good 
night. They raged and fulminated against the incompetence of 
the Minister of Labour, the stupidity of the courts and the blind­
ness of the Labour Department. Union leaders such as Bill Andrews, 
101. 	 It is not important for their purposes to do this. The 
racial polarisation of the South African working class alone 
tended to confine the political relevance of white wage earn­
ers to parliamentary elections. 
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the secretary of the SATUC and SATLC, warned unions that they 
should not look to the government but to their own organization 
l02to secure the legal wages set in determinations and agreements. 
Where wages and conditions improved most there was always a strong 
union to hand. Registered unions in the 1920's and 1930's did 
not become overnight the same disorganizers of the workers that 
they are today. The emasculation of the registered unions only 
began in 1924. It is presumptuous to maintain that the dulling 
of worker militancy by means of the legislation requires no expla­
l03
nation. We need to follow through the struggles which finally 
allowed bureaucracy and legalism to triumph and which maintained 
racial divisions even within 'mixed' unions. 
The pattern of class struggle which continued within the 
confines of the industrial council system after 1924 is of vital 
interest today when a new mass of unorganized workers is being 
drawn into trade unions, several of which participate in, or are 
confronted by,industria1 councils. 
This study on the garment workers of the Cape shows how class 
struggle was expressed through the institutions of the Industrial 
Conciliation and Wage Acts in the case of workers who were in 
a weak economic position and were badly organized. The legislation 
played a role in keeping them so. A comparison of the experiences 
of garment workers in Johannesburg and Cape Town in the 1920's 
and 1930's shows that only with strong organization could a union 
in an industrial council act as a weapon of the workers. The 
Industrial Conciliation and Wage Acts conferred few advantages 
on unorganized workers and in the Cape garment industry both were 
ultimately weapons of the bosses in maintaining the disorganiza­
tion of the workers. 
102. 	 Ironically, the same point was made most forcefully by Ivan 
Walker, the Chief Inspector of Labour, at the SATUC Congress 
in 1928. Walker emphasised that he spoke "as a trade union­
ist, and not as a Government official",(Cape Times 9 April 1928). 
103. 	This point is made briefly in Fine, Ie Clercq and Innes (1981) 
but their vague reference to "definite historical conditions 
and a particular balance of class force~' (p.47), none of 
which are specified, hardly sustains it. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE DEMISE OF THE ILL-FATED JOURNEYMEN TAILORS' ASSOCIATION 
'People will always want clothes - no matter which govern­
ment is in power ••••Next to food, clothing constitutes 
man's most vital necessity. Tailoring, then, is a trade 
with an assured future.' 
- A.W. Allon, "How to Start a Career in Tailoring" (1928) 
The following two chapters describe the experience which the Cape 
clothing trades had of the Wage and Industrial Conciliation Acts 
in the first years of their operation. We wish to draw a distinc­
tion between the effects the legislation had on the clothing fac­
tories and on bespoke tailoring in Cape Town. In the case of 
the factories, the legislation had an extremely beneficial effect 
and aided the process of expansion set in motion by the imposi­
tion of protective tariffs on clothing in 1925. To the tailoring 
trades, however, the legislation brought only discord and speeded 
the slow eclipse which has marked their history in most developed 
countries. For the Wage Board sought to end many of the traditional 
practices of the clothing trade - outwork, piecewages, long hours 
and dirty workrooms. Such changes could easily be given effect 
by factories but they were conditions of existence for many tailors. 
They threatened not just to reform the trade, but to revolutionize 
it. 
The future for the clothing industry lay in factory produc­
tion. It is with factory workers that this thesis is primarily 
concerned. But before showing how the foundations for the future 
were laid, we will look back at the destruction of the past. 
The destruction of the tailoring workshop was no more the 
precondition for the rise of the clothing factory than the rise 
of the factory signalled a final end to all tailoring. Certainly 
tailors became fewer as readymade clothing improved in quality 
and out-competed the cheaper tailor-made suits. But tailors con­
tinued to exist. What the Wage Board challenged was the way the 
tailoring trade was ordered, it sought to end the evils associated 
with outwork, sub-contracting and sweating. It sought to revolu­
tionize the tailoring trade by confining tailoring to registered 
workshops or factories and stopping work in the home. In this 
aim it did not, could not, succeed completely. But its attempts 
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brought confusion and hardship to journeymen tailors in Cape Town, 
where these operatives were particularly vulnerable. 
The sad tale of the Journeymen Tailors' Association (JTA) 
cannot be said to be of any major historical importance. The 
number of people concerned was small, the Association had no dis­
cernible impact on later events in the tailoring trade, yet it 
provides a useful focus around which to trace the effects of the 
industrial legislation on the tailoring trade. It is a poignant 
illustration of how the ineluctable class struggle decides the 
real effect of laws and touches the lives of the most insignifi­
cant people. The history of the JTA and the tailoring trade at 
the time highlights tendencies in the Cape Chamber of Industries, 
the Cape Federation of Labour Unions, the Department of Labour 
and the Wage Board which emerge again and with more moment in 
the struggles around the factory section of the clothing industry. 
The new legislation created potentially powerful new structures 
in industry. No one was quite sure how each ought to function. 
Everyone was fumbling for the responses or actions that would 
advance their own interests or policies. This was as much the 
case with the newly formed Department of Labour and the Wage Board 
as with the unions, employers' organizations and industrial councils. 
The Journeymen Join the Club 
In 1925, the tailoring trades in Cape Town were much as described 
in Chapter one. There existed the merchant tailors, measuring 
and fitting customers for clothing; the journeymen or master tailors 
who took the cut cloth from the merchant tailor and arranged the 
making of the garments; and the tailoring workers who actually 
stitched, sewed and pressed. These three nclasses of person" 
in the trade might all be collapsed into one individual making 
clothes for customers himself, but more often they were as distinct 
in practice as in principle. A great degree of variation in or­
ganization and in conditions of work between shops was found by 
the Wage Board in 1926. 1 Some merchant tailors had 'inside shops' 
attached to their premises where clothes were made up under 
1. 	 Wage Board Report: Bespoke Tailoring Industry for Certain 
Areas, 23 February 1928, paragraph 29. 
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a master tailor. Others gave out work to journeymen who had their 
own workshops or worked from their homes. Some journeymen employed 
workers in 'sets', each doing a specific operation; some relied 
on unpaid help from their families. Some workers were paid for 
each garment they sewed or pressed, others received a weekly wage. 
The Wage Board noted that: 
The conditions in tailoring establishments in the Penin­
sula ranged from some that were ideal to some that 
can only be described as disgusting. 2 
It also found the rates of pay in Cape Town to be amongst the lowest 
in the country. 
In March 1926, eight of Cape Town's leading merchant tailors 
came together to create "an organization for the protection and 
assistance of those firms engaged in the Bespoke Tailoring Trade".3 
They agreed on a name - the Cape Western Merchant Tailors' Association 
(MTA), a constitution, and went forth to recruit additional members, 
of whom they expected about 50. W.J. Laite was appointed secretary 
and he arranged with the executive of the CCI that merchant tailors 
could become members at a special reduced subscription of three 
4guineas a year. The MTA was formed without any immediate object 
although its general purpose was clearly to safeguard the interests 
of the merchant tailors should an industrial council be formed 
or a Wage Board investigation ordered. 
The tailoring trade presented unique problems for statutory 
wage regulation. Its small scale and decentra1ised nature made 
enforcement a mammoth task. Uniformity in conditions of work 
between home workrooms and factories was impossible. But the 
three tier structure of the trade created the most immediate dif­
ficulties. Were the journeymen employers or workers? They combined 
elements of both. They were paid by merchant tailors to arrange 
the making up of garments, and invariably did part of the work 
themselves. They were paid as workers according to a log (wage 
scale). But out of their income, they had to pay their assistants 
2. 	 Wage Board Report: Bespoke Tailoring Industry for Certain 
Areas, 23 February 1928, paragraph29. 
3. 	 Cape Western Merchant Tailors Association Minutes: 15 March 
1926 - M3/1. 
4. 	 MTA Minutes: 25 March 1926 - M3/1. 
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and here acted as employe~s. This posed a problem for wage regu­
lation under the new legislation. Should minimum rates be set 
between journeymen and their workers or between the merchant tai­
lor and the journeyman? Did merchant tailors have any right to 
decide on the wage paid by the journeymen to their workers? These 
are the questions behind the conflict between the JTA, the MTA 
and the Bespoke Tailoring Union in Cape Town in the late 1920's. 
The same problems confronted the merchant tailors, journey­
men and tailoring workers in other regions of South Africa. These 
problems were not resolved in exactly the same manner in every 
region. The tailoring trade provides an instructive example of 
how the same industrial legislation, in the same branch of produc­
tion, could foster forms of worker and employer organization that 
differed in important respects. On the Witwatersrand and in Port 
Elizabeth industrial councils were established in the tailoring 
trade. However, in Johannesburg the journeymen were organized 
together with the merchant tailors in an employers' associationS 
while, in Port Elizabeth, the journeymen were organized with the 
workers in the trade union. 6 In Cape Town, conflict over the 
place of the journeymen under the industrial laws was a factor 
in the failure of all attempts to establish an industrial council. 
Consequently the Wage Board came to rule over the Cape Town tailor­
ing trade. 
It is one of the themes of this thesis that the real effects 
of the industrial laws of the 1920's cannot be understood outside 
of the conditions of class struggle in which they operated. The 
laws did not have a uniform effect in every area because the con­
ditions of class struggle in the various regions of South Africa 
differed significantly. The example of the tailoring trade lends 
strong support to this argument. Although the specific forms 
of organization in Johannesburg and Port Elizabeth are only re­
ferred to in passing, the case of the tailoring trade in Cape 
Town is used to demonstrate clearly that class struggles moulded 
the effects of the industrial legislation on this branch of Cape 
Town industry. Forms of worker and employer organization are 
5. See footnote 97 below. 
6. See footnote 44 below. 
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not only the result of all-determining laws nor can specific forms 
of organization be assumed to exist everywhere in South Africa 
merely because they predominate on the Witwatersrand or were the 
intended results of the industrial legislation. 
The JTA was formed in Cape Town early in 1926 to serve the 
interests of all who took in work from merchant tailors. It in­
cluded the Malay tailors who did this work but the majority of 
the journeymen were white and many of them were Jewish. 7 The 
journeymen were never quite certain of whether they were employers 
or employees. They styled their organization an 'Association' 
8 or a 'Union' as their perceptions of their role changed. The 
hermaphroditic character of the JTA put it at a great disadvan­
tage when applying for official registration under the Industrial 
Conciliation Act. The Act recognised only 'employers' and 'employ­
ees' and no one could decide which they were. Their applications 
for registration were consequently all put on one side and for­
gotten. 
In 1926 the journeymen saw themselves as the underpaid employ­
ees of the merchant tailors. They wanted to align themselves 
with their assistants in the newly formed Bespoke Tailoring Union 
(BTU) and applied to be admitted as a sub-section of the Union. 
The BTU, in the person of its secretary, Robert Stuart, rejected 
the journeymen out of hand. They were the employers of Union 
members and could not possibly join the Union themselves. 9 
It was widely rumoured that an industrial council for bespoke 
tailoring would soon be formed. Scared that they might be excluded, 
the journeymen asked for a meeting with the MTA to "ascertain 
what position the Master Tailors or Foremen Tailors would occupy 
in connection with the industry under the new legislation".10 
The merchant tailors were not sure how to respond. They were 
7. 	 Interview with Mr. A. Sadulla, a former member of the JTA. 
8. 	 Journeymen Tailors' Union of the Cape Peninsula: Constitu­
tion, 1926. Central Archives Depot (S.A.B.) ARB240 51465/79. 
The JTA was first known as the "Master Tailors' Union" and 
later as the "Master Tailors' Association". 
9. 	 MTA Minutes: 10 May 1926; 16 August 1926, - joint meeting 
with the JTA - M3/1. 
10. 	 MTA Minutes: 10 May 1926 - M3/1. 
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agreed, 
••• as to the advisability of endeavouring to evolve 

some method by which Merchant Tailors could maintain 

control of the Journeyman Tailors' organization and 

11yet co-operate with them to the advantage of the trade. 
But they were unsure of how this would best be achieved. Over 
the next three years, the merchant tailors thrice decided to in­
clude the JTA as a sub-section of their organization and thrice 
resolved against amalgamation. 12 On each occasion their decision 
was based on how they thought the journeymen would best be con­
trolled. Their perceptions of this underwent changes as new 
threats and possibilities became revealed in the application of 
the industrial laws. 
Merchant tailors enjoyed a dominant economic position in 
the tailoring trade in Cape Town. They controlled the giving 
out of work. They were able to play-off the sub-contractors against 
one another to keep prices down. In the absence of a strong sub­
contractors' organization, journeymen were easily held in check 
by the merchant tailors. In addition, the MTA was registered 
under the Industrial Conciliation Act and hence would be an auto­
matic member of any industrial council formed in the tailoring 
trade. The JTA was unregisterable under the Act and unrecognised 
by the government. The journeymen had to attach themselves either 
to the trade union or the merchant tailors if they wanted to be 
part of the planned industrial council. They could be pressured 
"t k" " h" h t accepted them."13 The~n 0 ma ~ng concess~ons to w 1C ever par y 
Union had already refused them membership, so on 10 May 1926 the 
MTA decided to absorb the JTA as a sub-section. The plan was 
that the journeymen would conduct their own business in their 
own way but would meet together with the merchant tailors on ques­
11. 	 MTA Minutes: 10 May 1926 - M3/1. 
12. 	 The decisions to absorb the JTA were recorded in the MTA 
minutes of 10 May 1926, 22 June 1926 and 14 January 1929. 
Each decision was reversed in the minutes of 27 May 1926, 
12 August 1926 and 23 January 1929 respectively - M3/1. 
13. 	 The merchant tailors were concerned to stop journeymen deal­
ing directly with the public. This deprived them of business 
and of the profit on cloth which was important to them. 
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tions where the interests of both were concerned. 14 
This decision was reversed at a meeting two weeks later at 
which the majority favoured the journeymen joining the BTU. J.W.K. 
Stephens of Garlick's Stores opposed this. He said that there 
were two choices open to the merchant tailors. Either they could, 
•••alter their existing methods of conducting their 
business, and start their own workshops, and have nothing 
whatever to do with the Journeymen Tailors' Association ••• 
or they could recognise 
••• that these men, under existing conditions, were essen­
tial to the satisfactory conduct of the business of 
the Merchant Tailors, and ••• it was to their advantage 
to make some arrangement which would enable them to 
co-operate with these men, and perhaps in some measure, 
1Sto control them when an Industrial Council was formed. 
Notwithstanding the feeling of the meeting, that journeymen should 
not belong to the MIA, Laite was asked to prepare suggestions 
f or adm~tt~ng t e Journeymen as a su -sect~on. ·· h' b' 16 
The debate on the merits of admitting the journeymen contin­
ued over the next few months. No deep division emerged within 
the MIA, but there were two distinct opinions on the role of journey­
men. Several tailors who had workshops of their own favoured 
excluding the journeymen from the MIA and allowing them to become 
ordinary workmen. They suggested that other tailors without their 
own workshops could combine and build common workrooms. They 
would then be freed from their reliance on the journeymen who 
took in private work when they had not sufficient work from the 
17
merchant tailors. 
The majority, however, wanted to retain the traditional organi­
zation of the trade. 
Those of them who had run tailoring workshops knew how 
14. MIA Minutes: 10 May 1926; 27 May 1926 - M3/1. 
15. MIA Minutes: 27 May 1926 - M3/1. 
16. Ibid. 
17. MTA Minutes: 8 June 1926 - M3/1. 
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expensive and unsafe a business it was. The journey­
man tailor could be dispensed with, but at present he 
was a very useful person, as he solved the problem of 
18 
a workroom and all the expenses connected with it.
There were additional advantages in continuing dealings with 
journeymen once minimum wages were enforced by law. The journey­
men would be responsible for giving effect to the law and, 
••• the Merchant Tailor would be free from the worry 
of terms of payment, workers and hours of work. Further, 
the merchant tailor could devote more time to his busi­
ness and organize it better. 19 
Before deciding finally on how to deal with the journeymen, the 
MTA held a "non-committal conference" with representatives of 
the Bespoke Tailoring Union. The BTU was an early product of 
the 'understanding' between the CCI and the CFLU that was to be 
a feature of the labour scene in Cape Town for the following de­
cade. The circumstances of its birth are of special interest 
also because in early 1927 the BTU, having already changed its 
name twice, chose a fourth and final title of the "Garment Workers' 
Union of the Cape Peninsula" (GWU-CP). At the same time, it amend­
ed its constitution to allow for the membership of workers employed 
in all branches of the clothing trades in Cape Town. The BTU 
was thus the forerunner of the GWU-CP, the union which is the 
principal institutional actor in this history of the clothing 
20
workers of Cape Town. 
It seems that the new organization of clothing workers was 
initiated by W.J. Laite, the secretary of the CCI. On Wednesday 
,17 February 1926 Laite put through a telephone call to Bob Stuart, 
the secretary of the CFLU, and asked him to organize a union. 
Stuart apparently agreed as Laite sent him a letter to confirm 
the arrangement. This letter is a fitting founding document for 
18. 	 MTA Minutes: 8 June 1926 - M3/1. 
19. 	 Ibid. 
20. 	 The Cape Peninsula Bespoke Tailoring Union applied for regis­
tration under the Industrial Conciliation Act in May 1926. 
(Stuart to Secretary of Labour, 6 May 1926 S.A.B. ARB210 
51465/71) • 
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a worker organization which has been stigmatized by three genera­
tions of critics as a "bosses' union". 
Dear Mr. Stuart, [wrote Laite] 

As promised On the telephone today, I have pleasure 

in enclosing you a list of firms in the Peninsula en­

gaged in the Bespoke Tailoring trade. 

At the moment the question of organizing the employers 

in this trade is under discussion, with a view to the 

formation of an Industrial Council, and it is necessary 

that the employees should also be organized to enable 

them to appoint responsible representatives to serve 

on a Conciliation Board should that policy be decided 

upon, it will be necessary for you to undertake the 

work from the employees side of the question. 21 

Stuart soon had the Union set up and in due course applied for 
its registration under the Industrial Conciliation Act. None 
of the office bearers was in the tailoring trade. Stuart himself, 
a monumental mason, was the secretary. Two members of the Federa­
tion executive, the one a printer and the other a carpenter, were 
22
chairman and treasurer. The BTU was the creation of the law, 
the bosses and the CFLU - not the tailoring workers. Nevertheless 
this Union had drawn up a schedule of wages which had been approved 
at a well-attended meeting in the Trades Hall. 
The BTU first met with the MTA in June 1926. Stanley George 
Raddall of the printers' union was the chairman of the BTU. He 
opened the joint meeting with the MTA with a strongly worded decla­
ration of the Union's wish to abolish the systems of piecework 
and sub-contracting in the trade: 
21. 	 Letter from Laite to Stuart, 17 February 1926 (GWUSA Archives, 
Bcc 1.20.1). The original of this letter is part of the GWUSA 
records because it was appropriated by Solly Sachs from the 
CFLU records in 1946 when he was seeking material to defend his 
assertion that the Cape bosses had called in Stuart to organize 
the GWU-CP. Stuart had brought a court action for defamation 
against Sachs. Sachs had access to the CFLU records since, by 
then, the CFLU had been taken over by the TLC. There is a fair 
quantity of other CFLU documents, also 'lifted' by Sachs in 1946, 
in the GWUSA archives. 
22. 	 Neither the MTA nor the Department of Labour were happy with this 
situation. See MTA Minutes: 15 June 1926 - M3/2; Memorandum, 
19 May 1926, initialled I.W. (Ivan Walker, the Chief Inspector 
of Labour) S.A.B. ARB210 51465/71. 
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If Merchant Tailors were aware of the conditions under 
which many garments were made, he was sure they would 
agree with the Union. They intended that the system 
should be stopped. They maintained that all clothing 
should be made in hygienic workshops, properly super­
vised by the employers, and under Government inspection. 
He knew it would be stated that the Union was asking 
for a big thing. That was admitted; it was a big and 
radical change •••• But from the humane point of view, 
23it would be agreed that a change was necessary. 
The merchant tailors agreed that some steps should be taken to 
bring into operation hygienic workrooms but asked what the Union 
proposed should be done about the journeymen. The Union repre­
sentatives said that journeymen would either have to become fore­
men, simple employees of the merchant tailors, or else should 
join the MTA as employers - as merchant tailors not middlemen. 
The Union's demand for the abolition of piecework was re­
jected outright. As Stephens explained later, 
••• although the Merchant Tailors saw the need for certain 
changes and improvements in the Industry, they were not 
prepared to revolutionize the trade. To adopt time 
rates at t h1S' stage would be d'1sastrous. 24 
Discussion on the Union's wage schedule, which the merchant tailors 
found unacceptable, would follow the formation of an industrial 
'1 25counC1 • 
The Union delegation had claimed a membership approaching 
two thousand but Laite sent a wire to the Registrar of Trade Unions 
to check that the Union was, 
••• accepted by your Department as thoroughly represen­
tative of the worker~ interest in this trade. 26 
23. 	 MTA Minutes: 15 June 1926 - M3/2. 
24. 	 Industrial Council for the Bespoke Tailoring Industry Minutes: 
29 November 1926 - M3/2~ 
25. 	 MTA Minutes: 15 June 1926 - M3/2. 
26. 	 Letter from Laite to the Registrar of Trade Unions and Em­
ployers' Organizations, 21 June 1926 S.A.B. ARB210 51465/71. 
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The Registrar replied that according to his records the BTU had 
154 members, while the MTA employed 350 people. He said that 
the Union could be registered but that it was "very doubtful whether 
the Minister would consider it sufficiently representative to 
justify the registration of an Industrial Council".27 
In consequence, renewed attention was paid to the question 
of the journeymen. Some merchant tailors urged that the wages 
paid to operatives were not properly their concern, whether these 
were set by the Wage Board or an industrial council. The journey­
men "were the actual employers,,28not the merchant tailors • 
••• (T)he Merchant Tailor bought his goods from the Jour­
neyman in the same way as any other person bought from 

29 

a contractor. 
Stephens finally persuaded his fellow merchant tailors to admit the 
journeymen as members of a sub-section of the ~ITA. He argued 
firstly that the ~ITA was in a position to dictate terms. Theirs 
was the only properly organized body in the trade; the journeymen 
had been rejected by the Union and had not been given recognition 
by the government. 
(This) put the Merchant Tailors in a strong position, 

and consequently they could regulate the industry.30 

Secondly, Stephens warned that the Wage Board might intervene 
in bespoke tailoring. It was already busy with an investigation 
of the clothing factories in CapeTown. Once the tailoring workers 
complained to the Board about their low wages, the journeymen 
would say they could afford no more because of the low rates paid 
by the merchant tailors. 
He thought the Merchant Tailors would find the position 
hard if the Wage Board acted, because they would have 
to fight the combined forces of labour, and the result 
27. 	 Letter from the Registrar to Laite, 21 June 1926 S.A.B. ARB210 
51465/71. Stuart was incensed by this reply to Laite and wrote 
an incoherent but hot-worded letter to the Registrar. This was 
not well received. The Registrar asked the Secretary of Labour 
to delay the registration of Stuart's Fishermens', Builders' 
and Tailors' unions until his letter was "withdrawn and replaced 
with communications which conform to a standard of ordinary de­
cency". (Letter, 7 July 1926 ibid.) 
28. 	 MTA Minutes: 22 June 1926 - M3/1. 
29. 	 Ibid. 
30. 	 MTA Minutes: 8 June 1926 - M3/1. 
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might be a higher log than the industry could bear pro­
fitably.31 
The MTA had a close interest in admitting the JTA and co-operating 
closely with it in the drawing up of a log with the Union. 
Once amalgamation had been settled in principle, there re­
mained the problem of who would be eligible for membership of the 
sub-section. The JTA comprised between 60 and 70 members and ad­
32
mi tted "any man taking tailoring work from a shop". The merchant, 
tailors said this was "no qualification".33 
The government was very much opposed to work being 
carried on in the homes of workers, and was taking every 
step to stop it •••• much weeding-out would have to be 
done to secure only "bona fide fl Journeyman Tailors. 34 
The journeymen "stated that few of them employed more than two or 
three assistants, and some only one". 
The Merchant Tailors' representatives emphasized the 
need for reform. Some would suffer but the position 
could perhaps be alleviated by isolated units combining 
into groups and working in co-operative workrooms, which 
would have to be registered as factories. 35 
The merchant tailors promised to give out work only to members of the 
journeyman sub-section. Solomon Valbene, the chairman of the JTA, 
••• stated that h  thought the formation of the sub­
section an excellent thing. It would assist the in­
dustry and solve the question of mixed prices and elimi­
" t"" 36na t e 	un f a1r compe 1t10n. 
Subsequently, a meeting of all the members of the JTA confirmed the 
31. 	 MTA Minutes: 22 June 1926 - M3/1. 
32. 	 MTA Minutes: 8 July 1926 - M3/1. 
33. 	 Ibid. 
34. 	 Ibid. 
35. 	 Ibid. 
36. 	 Ibid. Journeymen would similarly take in work only from re­
cognised merchant tailors and not deal directly with the 
public. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
135 

recommendation of their leaders that they should become a sub­
section of the MTA. 37 
In July 1926, the Wage Board was directed to prepare a report 
and recommendation on the bespoke tailoring industry. The news 
was received with mixed feelings by the MTA. On the one hand, 
given the difficulties they had faced in forming an industrial 
council, they were relieved that the Wage Board "was undertaking 
the responsibility of dealing with the complications arising from 
the peculiar conditions existing in the industry", and promised 
38it every assistance. On the other hand, the merchant tailors 
saw they had to have a strategy to safeguard their particular 
interests. They decided to continue negotiations with the journey­
men for a log, 
•••which would be acceptable to members of the Bespoke 
Tailors' Union, and at the same time afford the Master 
Tailors [i.e. journeymen - MN] a living without raising 
the cost of production above the purchasing power of 
the public. 39 
This would allow a "fairly representative" log to be presented to 
the Wage Board. In addition, 
The Merchant Tailors should co-operate with the Journeyman 
Tailors and they should agree on the evidence they wo~ld 
give at the inquiry of the Board. By representing a 
united front they would impress the Wage Board, and 
by adopting this method of procedure they would be more 
successful than otherwise. 40 , 
Laite was mandated to draw up a Memorandum to the Wage Board "set­
ting out the necessity of continuing with the piece-work system".41 
37. MTA Minutes: 9 August 1926 M3/1. The meeting was on 18 July. 
38. MTA Minutes: 9 August 1926 - M3/1. 
39. Ibid. 
40. Ibid. 
41. Ibid. 
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The journeymen were pleased to have been accepted by the MTA 
as a sub-section. They would now be able to participate formally 
in deciding how the tailoring trades would adapt to the new order 
of things hinted at by the Wage Board and the government. The 
MTA were satisfied that by including the journeymen in their orga­
nization they would be able to control them. 
2 Blackballed! 

These plans were upset by news that an industrial council agreement 

had been gazetted for the bespoke tailoring industry in Port Eliza­

beth. It appeared that the journeymen tailors there had, 

••• amalgamated with the operatives and hence formed 

42
part 	of the employees' side of the agreement. 
The agreement specified a piece-work log which met with general 
approval as to its reasonableness. Laite believed that the Port 
Elizabeth agreement would be used as a basis for the Wage Board 
as conditions there were similar to those in Cape Town. The JTA 
had just presented their proposed log to the MTA which was generally 
43
agreed to be unreasonable and in certain instances even ridiculous.
The Port Elizabeth example was attractive to the MTA. Its members 
saw the Port Elizabeth log, already printed in the Government 
Gazette, as something of a precedent. Why should they worry to 
argue with the JTA about their ridiculously high demands? The 
Port Elizabeth rates could surely be applied in Cape Town too. 
The MTA swiftly reversed its decision to admit journeymen to a 
sub-section of the MTA. It resolved that the journeymen should 
rather apply again for membership of the Bespoke Tailors' Union. 
This opportunism of the MTA was born of the uncertainty that sur­
rounded the operation of the new industrial laws. It was an oppor­
tunism that did not end with the peremptory expulsion of the journey­
44 
men. 
42. 	 MTA Minutes: 12 August 1926 M3/1. 
43. 	 Ibid. 
44. 	 The Port Elizabeth agreement was a specious reason for the MTA 
to reject the journeymen as members. There were very few jour­
neymen in Port Elizabeth and most tailoring work was done by 
tailors (often Malays) who made complete garments. Journeymen 
did not'amalgamate) with their employees. Stephens appears to 
have made this point, but did not press it. (MTA Minutes: 12 
August 1926 - M3/1; see also Wage Board Report, 23 February 
1928 op.cit., paragraph 24.) 
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The MTA also began to reassess its abandonment of an indus­
trial council. Stuart had approached Laite and asked that nego­
tiations for a council be resumed in spite of the Wage Board in­
vestigation. Laite told the MTA that, in his opinion, 
The peculiar character of the industry which involved 
the complicated. inclusion of a third party [the journey­
men - MN] made the formation of an Industrial Council 
45 
very 	necessary. 
Laite said further, that as the request for the formation of an in­
dustrial council had come from the Union, 
••• the Merchant Tailors might be successful in getting 
them 	to accept the Journeymen Tailors as part of their 
organization if it were emphasized that an Industrial 
Council could not be formed unless this happened. 46 
In the interim, the MTA appointed a sub-committee to draft a log 
on the basis of those submitted by the JTA and BTU and the Port 
Elizabeth agreement. The new log should take "into account that 
the journeymen tailors should be allowed a margin of profit".47 
Confronted with their unexpected rejection by the MTA, the 
JTA expressed doubts that they would find a home in the BTU. 
Their last approach had been most vehemently dismissed. Stuart 
had said he would not have amalgamation "even if it cost him his 
job".48 The JTA expressed thanks for the kind way its represen­
tatives had been received by the merchant tailors and for the ad­
vice and assistance they had been given. 
It was at this stage that Laite drew up a memorandum to the 
Wage Board on behalf of the MTA. 49 As required, this set out 
45. 	 MTA Minutes: 12 August 1926 - M3/1. 
46. 	 Ibid. 
47. 	 Ibid. 
48. 	 MTA Minutes: 16 August 1926 - M3/1. 
49. 	 Memorandum from the Cape Western Merchant Tailors' Association, 
Wage Board Investigation, Bespoke Tailoring Industry (no 
date). S.A.B. ARB240 1054/266. This was read out at a MTA 
general meeting on 25 August 1926 and praised by the chairman 
as a "masterly document" (MTA Minutes - M3/l). 
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an argument for retaining piece-work, but it was most significant 
for its strong support for the continued existence of journeymen 
tailors and its insistence that a place should be found for them 
in any restructuring of the tailoring trade. These views were 
almost totally reversed over the following six months. 
In the memorandum, the merchant tailors agreed that home 
work was undesirable and that tailoring workers ought to be allowed 
a "reasonably decent standard of living,,50 but they asserted that 
these conditions could be satisfied in a new system which still 
included the journeymen tailors. The journeymen were skilled 
craftsmen and essential to ensure that work was done properly; 
they allowed the existence of smaller merchant tailors who were 
not large enough to operate their own workshops; journeymen trained 
young people to become tailors. At the same time they lacked 
the "capital, organizing ability and business acumen" to take 
business from the public and in turn eliminate the merchant tailor. 
They were specialists in "the science of production".51 
The merchant tailors noted that the BTU wanted to eliminate 
the middlemen and to have the merchant tailor deal directly with 
union members. They pointed out that in the past a merchant tailor 
had never had to interest himself in the actual tailoring opera­
tive; it was left to the journeyman to employ whatever labour 
he needed at whatever rates he chose. The merchant tailors had 
no knowledge of the wages earned by the journeymens' employees. 
In principle they had no objection to eliminating sub-contracting 
but they were not satisfied that members of the BTU were, 
••• capable of undertaking the scientific production 
of garments of varying qualities and descriptions to 
meet the needs of their customers •••• In view of the 
fact that the Journeymen Tailors ••• are the real crafts­
ment in the trade and are trained experts, it is ob­
52
vious that they cannot be cut out of the Industry. 
50. Memorandum••• , p.7. 
51. Memorandum••• , p.4. 
52. Memorandum ••• , pp.6,7. 
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The memorandum suggested that "co-operative workrooms" be 
established for journeymen who worked for the smaller tailoring 
firms which could not ?fford their own workshops. These co­
operative workrooms would be registered under the Factories Act. 
No suggestion was made as to how such workrooms might be financed, 
but this was the first, and only, constructive attempt by the 
merchant tailors to resolve the problems surrounding the 'moderni­
sation' of the tailoring trade in Cape Town. The MTA later made 
destructive attacks on the JTA and spoke no more of their key 
importance. There was no single cause for this change in policy, 
but we will argue (see page 155 below) that it was fostered by 
the particular ways in which the Wage and Industrial Conciliation 
Acts were applied in the Cape tailoring trade. 
Before the Wage Board visited Cape Town, the new efforts 
to form an industrial council had gained momentum. The Union 
53had recruited more members and the Wage Board had urged "the 
association concerned" to form an industrial council in the tai­
loring trade. 54 As Laite had predicted, the BTU had yielded to 
the suggestion that it take responsbility for the journeymen. 
Laite explained to a joint meeting of the MTA and BTU: 
In the past the Journeymen Tailors had been the disturb­
ing element. They were not a registered body and no 
agreement could be made with them. They would however 
have to be included and the employees association was 
now agreeable to accept them as members. 55 
The draft constitution was ratified and a decision was taken that 
neither the merchant tailors nor the Union would give oral evidence 
to the Wage Board as they had formed an industrial council and 
would shortly negotiate an agreement. The MTA had already sent 
the Board its Memorandum and proposed log. The first meeting 
53. 	 Membership of the BTU was 225 in July 1926. (Pencilled note on 
letter from the Secretary for Labour to the Secretary BTU, 24 
July 1926 S.A.B. ARB210 51465/71). 
54. 	 MTA and BTU Joint Minutes: 25 October 1926 - M3/2. This action 
was characteristic of the Wage Board which was strongly in fa­
vour of the organization of employers and workers. 
55. 	 MTA and BTU Joint Minutes: 25 October 1926 - M3/2. (But see 
footnote 66, below). 
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of the "Industrial Council for the Bespoke Tailoring Industry 
of the Cape Peninsula" was held in November 1926. 56 
Meanwhile, the JTA, thinking little of their chances of 
friendly acceptance by the BTU, had applied for registration under 
57the Industrial Conciliation Act. Their request was for regis­
tration as an employees association - the Journeymen Tailors' 
Union - but the Secretary of Labour thought they were in fact 
employers. They were thus entitled to join the MTA (if the latter. 
agreed) or to be independently registered as an employers' organi­
. 58
zatlon. The MTA and BTU were asked if they objected to the 
registration of the JTA. Both objected in the strongest terms. 
Laite's reaction, on behalf of the MTA, is scarcely under­
standable in the light of the memorandum he had written to the 
Wage Board just three months before. There he had stressed the 
worth of the journeymen and stated that they were totally.respon­
sible for the employment of workers. Now he dismissed them as 
"individuals of a nondescript character" and their organization 
as "possessing no status and acting as an intermediary between 
employers and employees".59 He wrote that the MTA was "registered, 
and represents the employers". He continued: 
The (Industrial) Council (for the Bespoke Tailoring 
Industry) is engaged in negotiating an Agreement, which 
we hope, will result in the complete abolition of the 
middleman, who for purposes of his own, calls himself 
"The Journeyman Tailors' Union".60 
56. 	 'Industrial Council for the Bespoke Tailoring Industry' Minutes: 
24 November 1926 - M3/2. This body was not registered. 
57. 	 Letter from the Secretary, Journeymen Tailors' Union (JTA) 
to the Divisional Inspector of Labour, Cape Town, 27 Septem­
ber 1926 S.A.B. ARB240 51465/79. 
58. 	 Letter from the Secretary for Labour to Divisional Inspector, 
Cape Town, 4 November 1926 S.A.B. ARB240 51465/79. 
59. 	 Letter from Laite (MTA) to Registrar of Trade Unions and Employ­
ers' Organizations, 24 November 1926 S.A.B. ARB240 51465/79. 
60. 	 Ibid. The MTA was now in full support of the Union's original 
position. The minutes of the third 'industrial council' meeting 
state: "The MTA had agreed that there would be a determined ef­
fort made to eliminate the Contractor who will have to decide 
whether he is going to be a Merchant Tailor and join the ~ITA, or 
whether he is going to be an operative and join the Union" 
(6 December 1926 - M3/2). 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
141 

Stuart wrote an equally angry letter to the Registrar. He 
considered the journeymen to be "employers paying wages as other 
employers do and making profit in the same manner". They were 
not entitled to registration as the Industrial Conciliation Act 
did not provide for "composite unions or associations".61 Faced 
with this opposition, the application of the JTA was shelved. 
The whole question of the journeymen was now relegated to 
the background as the 'industrial council' became locked in con­
flict over the log. The struggle was focussed on the price for 
Lounge Coats, and so fierce were the arguments that one meeting 
"was abruptly broken up, both sides using language of an unfriendly 
character".62 Stuart threatened to withdraw from the 'council' 
63
and refer the whole business to the Wage Board. But sanity 
prevailed and after three months of recriminations an agreement 
was finally worked out. The Chairman of the MTA described the 
"arduous work" of negotiating the agreement to the annual general 
meeting, stating that, 
In getting labour to agree to £1.3.0 for the making 
of a 	Lounge Coat, a great victory had been won. 64 
The agreement set piece-work rates of pay and followed a direction 
from the Wage Board that it prohibit, 
••• work of any descrip ion being done in the homes of 
the employees, or under such conditions as were con­
sidered unhygienic. In future, all tailoring work would 
have 	to be done in properly constituted workshops ••• 65 
All these negotiations on the future of the tailoring trade took 
place without the interests of the journeymen being represented. 
In view of the Union's determination that outwork and middlemen 
should be abolished, it is not surprising that the JTA had not 
61. 	 Stuart (BTU) to Secretary for Labour, 22 November 1926 S.A.B. 
ARB240 51465/79. 
62. 	 W. Freestone, Divisional Inspector of Labour, Cape Town, 
to Secretary for Labour, 14 January 1927 S.A.B. ARB240 51465/79. 
63. 	 'Industrial Council for the Bespoke Tailoring Industry' 
Minutes: 13 December 1926 - M3/2. 
64. 	 MTA Minutes: 9 May 1927 - M3/1. 
65. 	 Ibid. 
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66joined the BTU. But the middlemen still existed. The bulk 
of the work of merchant tailors was still contracted out to them. 
They were the direct employers, the wage payers, of many members 
of Stuart's union. If the agreement were gazetted, journeymen 
would be bound to pay wages settled between the BTU and the MTA. 
Simply because of its registration as an employers' organization 
under the Industrial Conciliation Act, the MTA - in reality an 
interfering third party - was able to masquerade as the employer. 
In April 1927, the agreement was sent off to the Wage Board 
for approval. It formed part of a composite agreement negotiated 
between the parties to the new, unregistered, Industrial Council 
for the Garment Manufacturing Industries into which the bespoke 
tailoring 'industrial council' had been absorbed. The new council 
had been established after the clothing factory owners had failed 
to organize themselves a suitable union to participate in their 
proposed industrial council for the clothing industry. They then 
67
asked Stuart to form a union. Stuart agreed if he could simply 
expand the BTU to include factory workers and bring the enlarged 
union into an Industrial Council that would cover all branches 
of clothing manufacturing in Cape Town. The new body thus comprised 
the (unregistered) "Operative Garment Workers' Union of the Cape 
Peninsula" and employer representatives from the retail bespoke 
tailors, the wholesale bespoke factories and the manufacturers 
of shirts and pyjamas, ready-mades and waterproof garments, grouped 
68in the two employer organizations, the MTA and CWCMA. 
The merchant tailors were generally satisfied with the arrange­
ment. They were now closely associated with factory owners, who 
were employers beyond any doubt, and a single industrial council 
would spread the costs of administration more widely.69 Their 
66. 	 The exclusion of the journeymen from the BTU, despite the 
latter's agreement to absorb them, was raised at an 'indus­
trial council' meeting: 
'Mr. Stuart said the difficulty arose because Journeymen 
Tailors desired to continue outwork. To this the Union was 
diametrically opposed as it meant the continuance of a system 
whereby a certain class of workman occuped the dual position 
of employer and employee'. ('Industrial Council for the 
Bespoke Tailoring Industry' Minutes: 9 March 1927 - M3/2). 
67. 	 See Chapter 4, pp.167-8; 173-5 below. 
68. 	 'Industrial Council for the Garment Manufacturing Industries' 
Minutes: 30 April 1927 - M4/1. 
69. 	 MTA Minutes: 2 February 1927, joint meeting with CWCMA - M3/l. 
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outlook on the future was at its brightest. They had every hope 
that "the agreement mutually arrived at by the employers and emp10y­
70 
ees in the bespoke tailoring industry would be accepted" by 
the Wage Board. The Board had met with the 'Industrial Council' 
and had not seemed "particularly concerned with bespoke tai10ring".71 
3 The Wage Board Pulls a Fast One 
The merchant tailors were shaken out of their complacency by two 
events. Firstly, there were rumours that the members of the Union 
had repudiated the 'mutually acceptable' log. Laite, 
••• stated that he had been informed that the employees' 
representatives on the Industrial Council had met with 
a good deal of opposition and a fair amount of criticism 
72
when 	meeting the body who had elected them. 
Workers had joined the Union on the promise of higher wages. They 
were not prepared for the long delay before these came into effect. 
The Union was prepared to wait for a Wage Board determination 
or industrial council agreement to be gazetted before it tried 
to enforce higher wages. The workers became impatient, and their 
protests forced the Union to withdraw from the 'industrial counci1,.73 
Secondly, the Wage Board did not quietly accept the wage 
agreement sent in by the 'industrial council'. It asked the MTA 
to comment on a document it had drawn up suggesting "a new system 
for clothing manufacturing to allow higher wages and more output".74 
The merchant tailors all agreed that this was "unworkable". They 
would give the Wage Board "every assistance" but "not. •• depart 
d " 1 'd d . hf rom 	 t he terms an con ~t~ons a~ own ~n t e agreement one . ,,75d ~ota • 
The Wage Board proceeded with its investigation, completely 
ignoring the 'industrial council' agreement. In December 1927 
70. 	 MTA Minutes: 9 May 1927, annual general meeting - M3/1. 
71. 	 Ibid. 
72. 	 MTA Minutes: 30 May 1927 - M3/1. 
73. 	 CWCMA Minutes: 12 December 1927, joint meeting with MTA - M2/1. 
This is dealt with in Chapter 4. 
74. 	 MTA Minutes: 30 May 1927 - M3/1. The suggestions were not 
minuted. 
75. 	 Ibid. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
144 

76it circulated its draft recommendation for comment. The Board 
had taken more than a year to produce its first report on bespoke 
tailoring. This was partly because it was delayed by pressure 
of work, but it was "mainly the inherent complications in the 
tailoring industry itself" which held up the report. The investi­
gation covered all the main urban areas of South Africa and invol­
77
ved visits to 176 tailoring establishments.
The Board found all the traditional evils of the tailoring 
trade - outwork, low wages, unhygienic workrooms - although there 
was a great variation between towns and between shops. In view 
of the poor conditions, very few young people were becoming tailors 
or receiving proper training. Virtually all white tailors had 
learnt their trade overseas. If conditions were improved there 
would be scope for the employment "of a considerable number of 
78youths". The Board noted a considerable difference in wage 
levels between the Witwatersrand and other areas. Many employers 
stated that wages were too low but were forced down to these levels 
79by the competition of firms who paid sweated wages. There were 
bitter complaints that many up country people had their suits 
made by retail bespoke tailors in Cape Town where rates of pay 
were specially low. Firms such as Hepworths, Stuttafords and 
Garlicks employed travellers who visited country area~ and collected 
orders. In view of this competition between towns, the Board 
commented that, 
..• the standard of living, and, therefore, the class 

of workers coming into the industry, are likely to be 

determined by the standard of living of those who are 

being paid very low wages in Cape Town. 80 

76. 	 CWCMA Minutes: 19 December 1927, joint meeting with MTA - M2/1j 
Wage Board Report: Bespoke Tailoring Industry, 7 March 1928 
in Social &Industrial Review: Special Edition 1 (16), 22 June 
1928. 
77. 	 Wage Board Report, 23 February 1928,op.cit., paragraphs 2, 6, 7. 
78. 	 Ibid., paragraph 14. 
79. 	 Ibid., paragraph.17. 
80. 	 Ibid., paragraph 18. 
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Nevertheless the Board reported to the Minister that it could 
not propose wages which would allow all employees lito support 
themselves in accordance with civilised habits of life"; for to 
do so at that time would cause unemployment and hardship to both 
81
employers and employees. 
The Wage Board made two major proposals for restructuring 
the tailoring trade, both of which struck at the core of the exis­
tence of most tailoring establishments. The first was the aboli­
tion of outwork and the second a limitation on the system of piece­
work. Outwork was the chief difficulty in the way of inspectors 
enforcing prescribed wages, hours of work and working conditions. 
The suggestion was that indoor workshops be made compu1sory.82 
Equally threatening to many tailors was the recommendation of 
a flat rate minimum wage. The Board argued that time rates had 
been successfully adapted by several firms and that piece rates 
were wasteful. Employers had no incentive to regulate the amount 
of work given out and workers were often kept idle waiting for 
work. The system put employers in a stronger position because 
it led to competition between workers. 
It may be that if a system based on minimum time wages 
is introduced, the industry will have to become more 
compact than it is at present, but those who remain 
in it will be generally fully occupied, whereas today 
a considerable number during a great portion of the 
83 year are employed only for a short time each week.
The Board did not want to prohibit piecework entirely. Workers 
could be paid on a piece-work basis, provided they were guaranteed 
payment of a minimum time wage. 
This was of little consolation to the Cape Town merchant 
tailors who objected both to size of the minimum wage and to the 
removal of the workers' incentive to work hard, which they believed 
was entailed in piece-work. The recommendation did not purport 
to question the existence of journeymen tailors. A middleman 
81. Wage Board Report, 23 February 1928, op.cit., paragraph 36. 
82. Ibid., paragraphs 11, 21, 33. 
83. Ibid., paragraph 15. 
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or contractor could continue to operate as such provided his es­
tablishment was a registered factory or workshop. 
His services will be available for the merchant tailor 

84

who does not want to set up a workshop of his own. 
The Board intended that each area should reach its own decision 
on the role of journeymen. However the requirements for setting 
up factories was beyond the means of most journeymen in Cape Town. 
Ending outwork would mean their extinction unless they were well 
enough organized to secure co-operative workrooms. 
Laite prepared a memorandum of objections to the draft re­
commendation on behalf of the MTA and the wholesale bespoke factory 
section of the CWCMA. 85 He wrote that the Wage Board failed 
•.. to realise the serious position in which the industry 
will be placed if its present draft recommendation becomes 
law, manufacturers can see no alternative before them 
but a restriction in operations and the placing of a 
86large number of employees on the streets.
The main areas for complaint were in the definition of a wholesale 
bespoke tailoring factory and, most emphatically, in the recommen­
87dation of a flat minimum wage. 
The Wage Board was deaf to the appeals of the Cape tailors. 
It did not receive many critical comments on its draft recommenda­
tion - the Transvaal Merchant Tailors' Association even wrote 
88to express its "entire agreement". The recommendation was ga­
84. 	 Circular letter from the Wage Board, accompanying the draft 
recommendation for bespoke tailoring. Reproduced in paragraph 
1 of Wage Board Report, 7 March 1928, op.cit. 
85. 	 Wholesale bespoke tailoring was included in the rE~port and 
draft recommendation. The Board proposed that th(~ same minimum 
wages apply as in the readymade clothing industry <. Higher rates 
could be negotiated by the Union if it was able. Many MTA 
meetings were devoted to discussions on the relationship between 
wholesale and retail bespoke tailoring. Members of the MTA did 
not complain of competition from the wholesale bespoke factories 
and even supported an appeal to the Wage Board that the factor­
ies should be allowed to give try-ons. 
86. 	 Laite (CCI) to Wage Board, January 1928 - M2/1. 
87. 	 Memorandum of Objections to Draft Recommendation Submitted by 
Wage Board for Bespoke Tailoring Industry, December 1927 - M2/1. 
88. 	 Wage Board Report, 7 March 1928, op.cit., paragraphs 2, 4. 
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zetted for objections in June 1928.89 
The MTA held a special general meeting to decide on a course 
of action • 
••• (I)t was unanimously agreed that the industry could 
not possibly operate under terms set out in the proposed 

. . 90
Determlnatlon ••• 
and that an attempt should be made to persuade the Minister to 
accept the wages negotiated by the 'industrial council' .91 A 
fund was set up to pay the expenses of a deputation that would 
speak to the Minister in Pretoria. The Chairman of the Garment 
Workers' Union of the Cape Peninsula (GWU-CP) accompanied the 
92MTA representatives and supported their protests. However, 
the recommendation was published, virtually unaltered, as Wage 
Determination No.24 in December 1928. The determination was to 
take effect in January 1929. 93 
4 The Last Fling of the Journeymen 
As can be imagined, all these proceedings were viewed with even 
greater alarm by the JTA. The journeymen had been excluded from 
the 'industrial council' and lacked the resources of both the 
CCI and CFLU in obtaining information about the intentions of 
the Wage Board. 94 The JTA had given evidence to the Wage Board 
89. 	 Government Gazette 22 June 1928. 
90. 	 MTA Minutes: 3 July 1928 - the meeting included "others en­
gaged in the Tradeft - M3/1. 
91 	 Faced with the delay in the apearance of the Wage Determination, 
the GWU-CP had again endorsed the 'industrial council' agreement 
(CWCMA Minutes: 12 December 1927, joint meeting with MTA - M2/1). 
Of course, the Minister was not entitled to incorporate the 'in­
dustrial council' wage rates in a wage determination unless the 
Wage Board specifically recommended this. The MTA's request 
that the Minister should withdraw the proposed determination and 
"replace it with the bespoke tailoring log appearing in the In­
dustrial Council agreement"* was thus certain to fail (*MTA Minutes: 
9 July 1928 - M3/1). 
92. 	 MTA Minutes: 10 October 1928 - M3/1. 
93. 	 Government Gazette 8 December 1928. 
94. 	 William Freestone, formerly Divisional Inspector of Labour and 
a long time official of the CFLU, had joined the Wage Board 
early in 1928. 
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and had submitted objections to the recommendation,95 but the 
Board had not specified what their future role would be. While 
the intention of merchant tailors and the Union was that journey­
men should be phased out in the future, they still existed and 
needed to know where they would fit into whatever system of statu­
tory 	wage regulation was finally adopted. 
In November 1928, Mr. M. Herman, the secretary Qf the JTA, 
wrote to the Secretary for Labour and asked that the JTA be regis- , 
tered. 96 The Registrar suggested that the Divisional Inspector 
of Labour in Cape Town encourage the MTA and JTA to unite as this 
had worked satisfactorily in Johannesburg. 97 Charles Playfair, 
95. 	 Their objections suggest they were still plagued by confusion 
as to their status. The JTA, whose members would have to pay 
operatives, objected that £5.10 per week was too little for a 
skilled male tailor. They asked for the minimum to be £7.10. 
(Wage Board Report, Bespoke Tailoring Industry, 10 October 1928). 
When they again applied to join the MTA they were accused of 
having given evidence "from the employees point of view" (MTA 
Minutes: 4 December 1928, joint meeting with JTA - M3/1). 
96. 	 Letter from Herman (JTA) to the Secretary for Labour, 24 Novem­
ber 1928. S.A.B. ARB240 51465/79. 
97. 	 Just how different conditions in Johannesburg were from those 
in Cape Town, may be judged from this summary of events: The 
journeymen (master tailors) in Johannesburg were strongly orga­
nized. The Transvaal Merchant Tailors' Association did not ob­
ject to their registration. 
'The next step was that the newly registered Master Tailors' 
Association applied for membership of the Industrial Council 
for the Bespoke Tailoring Industry, Witwatersrand. Before 
any decision could, however, be reached, the Transvaal Merchant 
Tailors' Association decided to dissolve, the principal reason 
being the Department's inability to legalize an Agreement 
fixing contract prices as between the merchant and the master 
tailor. The Master Tailors' Association thereupon agreed 
with the Witwatersrand Tailors' Association to form a new 
Council. On further consideration, the Merchant Tailors 
_decided 	that their interests were so closely bound up with 
those of the Master Tailors that they could not very well 
remain outside of the Council, the result being that the 
Constitution of the Master Tailors' Association was widened 
so as to permit of Merchant Tailors being admitted to mem­
bership. The employers' organization is now styled "The 
Bespoke Tailoring Employers' Association." , 
(Letter from the Registrar of Trade Unions to Divisonal In­
spector of Labour, Cape Town, 31 October 1928. S.A.B. ARB240 
51465/79). 
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an Industrial Inspector, accordingly arranged a meeting between 
the two bodies. 
Despite an initial "strained feeling" between them, negotia­
tions began on amalgamation. 98 The merchant tailors hoped that 
by following the lead of the Registrar, they might get prompt 
recognition of an industrial council and thus "remove control 
99
of the Industry from the Wage Board". Laite wrote to Pretoria 
asking for the determination to lie dormant as they were about 
to form an industrial council for the retail bespoke tailoring 
. d 100ln ustry. 
Proposals were drafted for the formation of "The Cape Western 
Tailoring Employers' Association" by a sub-committee which included 
five journeymen. 101 But the majority of journeymen thought the 
conditions of membership "too harsh,,102 and the proposals were 
103
rejected by a general meeting of the JTA. The MTA asked for 
too much. The proposals excluded from membership all journeymen 
with fewer than two .employees, and would thus force the JTA to 
split. Under the Wage Board determination, journeymen could take 
in work from the public in slack periods; the MTA set as a condition 
that journeymen should only take work from recognised merchant 
tailors. They rejected the journeymens' request that merchant 
tailors only give \vork to members of the JTA sub-section. 104 
The JTA's non-acceptance of the amalgamation proposals was 
accompanied by a total breakdown in negotiations with the MTA. 
The wage determination was to come into operation on 21 January 
98. 	 Memorandum from C. Playfair (Industrial Inspector) to the 
Divisional Inspector of Labour, Cape Town, 5 December 1928. 
S.A.B. ARB240 51465/79. 
99. MTA Minutes: 9 January 1929 - M3/l. 
100. Ibid. 
10l. 	MTA Minutes: 15 January 1929, meeting of JTA and MTA repre­
sentatives - M3/l. 
102. 	Letter from Herman (JTA) to the Secretary for Labour, 21 
January 1929 S.A.B. ARB240 51465/79. 
103. 	MTA Minutes: 23 January 1929, emergency meeting - M3/1. 
104. 	MTA Minutes: 15 January 1929, meeting of JTA and MTA repre­
sentatives - M3/1. 
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1929 and the journeymen would be expected to pay the increased 
wages. To cover these new costs, the JTA had, in December, demanded 
increases of between 50 and 100 percent on contract prices. 105 
The merchant tailors had rejected these demands. They told the 
journeymen to ignore the new regulations as they were "acting 
on reliable information,,106 that the determination had been sus­
pended. This was not so. It was clear, said Herman, that the 
merchant tailors, 
••• even want us to assist them in evading 	all respon­
107
sibilities and make us for the scapegoats. 
The day before the determination was to come into force, a general 
meeting of journeymen voted to go on strike. They would take 
in no more work until the merchant tailors complied with their 
demands. 108 
The Department of Labour in Cape Town first hoped to resolve 
the dispute by aiding the rapid formation of an industrial council 
h d . Th·to admlnlster. . t e . 109 lS 	line of action wasetermlnatlon. suppor­
ted by the GWU_Cp. 110 But once the merchant tailors were informed 
that the determination could not "lie dormant" while an industrial 
council agreement was drafted, they lost interest in the formation 
of a council. In addition the CWCMA no longer favoured an indus­
trial council and thus the running costs would fallon the bespoke 
tailoring industry alone. The merchant tailors decided to have 
no further negotiations with the JTA. Each tailor would deal 
105. 	The demands were for "50% increase on the present prices 
now paid for coats", 75% on vests and 100% on trousers. 
(Letter from JTA to MTA, 16 December 1928, reproduced in 
MTA Minutes: 19 December 1928 - M3/1). 
106. 	Letter from Herman to the Minister of Labour, 1 February 
1929 S.A.B. ARB240 51465/79; Herman quoted in The Cape 
Argus 24 January 1929. 
107. 	Letter from Herman (JTA) to the Secretary for Labour, 21 
January 1929 S.A.B. ARB240 51465/79. He continued: " ••• we 
want to be registered so that our Association can grow and 
we want representation on any Council that will no doubt 
be formed'~. 
108 	 JTA Circular Letter to All Merchant Tailors, 21 January 1929 
S.A.B. ARB240 51465/79. 
109. Wire from 	the Department of Labour, Cape Town, to the Secretary 
for Labour, 22 January 1929 S.A.B. ARB240 51465/79. 
110. 	MTA Minutes: 23 January 1929 - M3/1. 
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111
with 	his own journeymen to work out an acceptable rate. 
The strike disrupted the tailoring trade for a week and affec­
ted about 300 journeymen and their assistants. Newspaper reports 
mainly reflected the views of the merchant tailors but all noted 
and reported that the wage determination was at the root of the 
trouble. 112 
The JTA made every effort to bring the dispute to an end. 
When the merchant tailors said they had rejected the demands for 
percentage increases because there was "no definite rate on which 
the increase can be demanded,,113, the JTA produced a detailed 
114log based on the higher wage costs. The merchant tailors did 
115
not even discuss this proposal. They had now decided that 
the JTA was not representative of all the journeymen and that 
"to deal with an unrepresentative body would serve no good pur­
posell. 116 Certainly, the JTA was not fully representative, neither 
was it closely organized. 117 But the weakness of the Association 
was largely due to the way that it had been denied recognition 
by the government and excluded from all wage. negotiations for 
118the preceding two years. Most journeymen saw no advantage 
in supporting the Association and continued to arrange contract 
prices on an individual basis with merchant tailors. 
The disadvantages thrust on the JTA by their non-recognition 
were stressed by Playfair in a wire to Pretoria as the strike 
started. He urged the registration of the JTA and asked for a 
Ill. 	MTA Minutes: 23 January 1929 - M3/1. 
112. The Cape Argus 	23, 24 January 1929; The Cape Times 23, 24, 
25 January 1929. 
113. 	Laite quoted in The Cape Argus 23 January 1929. 
114. The Ca2e Times 25 January 1929. 
115. 	MTA Minutes: 25 January 1929 - M3/1. 
116. 	 Ibid. 
117. 	Letter in The Cape Argus 26 January 1929 from "Thimble"; 
letter from the Divisional Inspector of Labour, Cape Town, 
to the Secretary-for Labour, 11 February 1929 S.A.B. 
ARB240 51465/79. 
118. The 	 strength of the MTA and GWU were based in a large mea­
sure on the legal status and legal powers which they had 
by virtue of being registered. See p.155, below. 
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o 0 t t bOd . 1 01 119senlor lnspec or 0 e sent to arrange an ln ustrla counCl • 
The Secretary for Labour replied that registration was impossible 
unless the JTA was "definitely representative of the interests 
120of employers or employees". Playfair sent a brusque wire in 
response: 
Surely position is farcical when the actual employers 
are deemed unregisterable in the sector of an industry 
where they hold the field and do nine tenths of the 
whole work ••••Quite unfair to support selfish interests 
of merchants who for this purpose are certainly not 
employers. 121 
This concise statement of the situation jolted the Secretary for 
Labour into agreeing that the JTA could be registered if the MTA 
was not "sufficiently representative" to absorb it. 122 
The MTA was again informed of the possibility that the JTA 
might be registered. They were naturally very opposed to the 
registration of another employers' association, especially one 
that might oust them from their influencial position as 'the em­
ployers' in the tailoring trade. Stephens, now Chairman of the 
MTA, warned 
••• that the Journeymen Tailors' Association succeeded 
in the endeavour to be officially recognised, then the 
merchant tailors would be placed in the hands of these 
. 	 .1 123Journeymen tal ors. 
Laite wrote to the Secretary for Labour stating that the journeymen, 
••• are merely the employees of members of Merchant Tai­
lors' Association, and whilst it is true that some of 
119. 	Playfair (Department of Labour, Cape Town) to Secretary for 

Labour (wire), 22 January 1929 S.A.B. ARB240 51465/79. 

120. 	Letter from the Secretary for Labour to the Divisional In­
spector, Cape Town,23 January 1929 S.A.B. ARB240 51465/79 
(my emphasis). The gist of this letter was contained in a 
wire of 22 January 1929. 
121. 	Wire from the Department of Labour, Cape Town to the Secre­

tary for Labou~ 23 January 1929 S.A.B. ARB240 51465/79. 

122. 	Postscript to Secretary for Labour to Divisional Inspector, 

Cape Town,23 January 1929 S.A.B ARB240 51465/79. 

123. 	MTA Minutes: 25 January 1929 - M3/1. 
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them employ members of the Garment Workers' Union, others 
. 124do not. •• 
Any journeyman who recognised himself as an employer could apply 
to the MTA for membership. 
Herman was indignant that the MTA should have been asked 
for its views on the registration of his organization. 
Sir [he wrote], it is like asking a cat for some milk 
125 
or butter. 
While Playfair continued his efforts to bind the Cape Town tailor­
ing trade into the structures of the Industrial Conciliation Act, 
journeymen began to take in work once more. Their strike was 
never officially called off by the JTA which was further weakened 
by this defeat. The MTA drew up a log of their own which they 
applied unilaterally, each tailor dealing with individual journey­
126 
men. 
The JTA had to confront the MTA when at its weakest. Member­
127
ship had fallen from seventy in 1926 to forty in 1929. The 
wage determination placed the responsibility for the payment of 
the new wage rates onto the journeymen while the merchant tailors 
had refused to negotiate higher contract prices with them. In 
128 
consequence, many journeymen dismissed their employees. Playfair 
found only sixteen members of the JTA who qualified as 'employers' 
under the definition of the Industrial Conciliation Act. He 
124. 	Letter from Laite (MTA) to the Secretary for Labou~ 25 January 
1929 S.A.B. ARB240 51465/79. 
125. 	Herman (JTA) to Minister of Labou~ 1 February 1929 S.A.B. 
ARB240 51465/79. 
126. 	Divisional Inspector of Labour, Cape Town to Secretary for 
Labou~ 11 February 1929 S.A.B. ARB240 51465/79; MTA Minutes: 
25 January 1929 - M3/1. 
127. 	Letter from the Secretary JTA to the Secretary for Labour, 
18 October 1926; letter from the Divisional Inspector of 
Labour, Cape Town to the Secretary for Labou~ 11 February 
1929 S.A.B. ARB240 51465/79. In the latter report, Playfair 
estimates that 94 journeymen took work from members of the 
MTA in Cape Town proper. "Many more" worked between Cape 
Town and Simon's Town. 
128. 	Divisional Inspector of Labour, Cape Town to Secretary for 
Labour,ll February 1929 S.A.B. ARB240 51465/79. 
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thought that the determination would cause more merchant tailors 
to start their own workshops and this would further reduce the 
number of journeymen tailors. Nevertheless he recommended that 
the JTA be registered. Most significantly, he was not impressed 
by the representivity of the MTA. This had a membership of thirty­
nine and, according to Laite, included all the firms that "mattered"; 
but, wrote Playfair, 
••• it is doubtful whether the Association is 50 per 
cent representative of the Merchant Tailors in the area 
129it purports to serve. 
He doubted whether 
••• either Association could satisfy the Minister ••• 

that it is sufficiently representative for the forma-

o f C 01 130tlon 	0 a ounCl. 
The MTA still refused to negotiate with the JTA. Despite the con­
tinued objection of Laite and the MTA, the Registrar offered regis­
tration to the JTA in respect of, 
••• persons who perform tailoring work on contract for 
Merchant Tailors and who complete such work outside 

131
the Merchant Tailor's premises. 
Herman submitted a draft constitution,132 but by October 1929 the 
JTA no longer existed. R. Beattie, the Divisional Inspector of 
Labour in Cape Town, wrote that 
The Association appears to have collapsed, and the Secre­
tary reports that, as a result of the lengthy negotiations, 
it has been found impossible to maintain the interest 
0 133 
of t he partles. 
129. 	Divisional Inspector of Labour, Cape Town to Secretary for 
Labour. 11 February 1929 S.A.B. ARB240 51465/79. 
130. 	Ibid. 
131. 	Letter from the Registrar to the Divisional Inspector of 
Labour, Cape Town 28 May 1929 S.A.B. ARB240 51465/79. The 
name of the JTA was to change to the Master Tailors' Association. 
132. 	Letter from the Divisional Inspector of Labour, Cape Town 
to the Registrar, 6 August 1928 S.A.B ARB240 51465/79. 
133. 	Letter from the Divisional Inspector of Labour, Cape Town 
to the Secretary for Labour,4 October 1929 S.A.B. ARB240 
51465/79. 
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Handwritten on this letter is an ironic comment by the Registrar: 
is a poor Union (sic) that must look to registration 
for its existence. 
Lament for the Journeymen 
This epigram can be applied with some justice to those rivals 
of the JTAj the BTU and the MTA. Both had ceased effective 
operation by the end of 1929, both were in the first instance 
children of the legislation. Neither had any claim to importance 
beyond that conferred on them by law as the recognised employer 
and employee organizations. During its entire the MTA re­
stricted its scope to matters concerned with the Wage Board or 
industrial councils. It did not, like the CWCMA, explore other 
areas for joint action. 
This story of the journeymen tailors shows how the new indus­
trial legislation enhanced the position of sharp brokers such 
as Laite and Stuart. That they did not succeed in all their efforts 
was due more to the complexity of the tailoring trades than to 
the efficacy of the legislation. It seems likely (as was later 
the case with the garment workers) that industrial councils with 
as little representivity as those in the Cape tailoring trade 
in the 1920's were registered and achieved the effects Laite and 
Stuart desired. 134 The need for Wage Board representations and 
industrial council administration created a role for the CFLU 
and additional functions for the CCI. It was not only union bu­
reaucrats that the new legislation spawned. 
The story of the JTA confronts us with more than the 
fatuity of its_ existence. It illustrates the inappropriateness 
of both the Wage and Industrial Conciliation Acts to the tailoring 
trade. The application of both laws undermined the tailoring 
trade. It challenged the archaic structure of the trade and applied 
enormous pressure to eradicate the evils of sweating but in a 
way which did not allow tailoring to reform itself. 
134. 	For instance in the Biscuit and Baking &Confectionery in­
dustries - see S.A.B. file ARB 1058/27. More study would 
be needed to catirm this. 
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The rigid structures of the Industrial Conciliation Act were 
totally at odds with the intricacies of the tailoring trade. 
The Act recognised only 'employers' and 'employees' and did not 
encompass the wide variation in relations of production that ex­
isted. This led to a ridiculous situation. In theory an agree­
ment under the Act should be negotiated between the direct workers 
and their direct employers - in the majority of cases the latter 
were journeymen. However, the merchant tailors were the first 
organized group in the Cape tailoring trade and they were able 
to secure early registration for the MTA as the organization of 
employers. They then interested themselves in setting or influenc­
ing the wages which they were not responsible for paying. It 
is tempting to suggest that what the journeymen most lacked was 
a partisan broker like Laite who might have organized them into 
an affiliate of his CCI and convinced the Department of Labour 
to recognise this body as the employers organization in 1926. 
But this could never have been. The definition of 'employer' 
in the Industrial Conciliation Act only covered people who employed 
more than one worker. This excluded a great proportion of the 
135journeymen tailors in Cape Town. (It also excluded small tai­
lors from membership of the MTA). 
The MTA exploited their privileged position to the full. 
This was not founded in the law alone but they used the law to 
retain and reinforce their economic dominance over the journeymen. 
By controlling the 'employers' organization' they were able to 
ensure that contract prices between them and the journeymen were 
never legislated. It was obviously important to them to prevent 
such a solution to the improvement of conditions in the trade. 
If the government was intent on raising wages in tailoring, the 
least threatening rise to the merchant tailors was in the wages 
of the journeymen's assistants. Minimum wages for operatives 
would not eliminate the price-reducing competition between journey­
men on which merchant tailors thrived. A degree of wage uniformity 
might even be beneficial in that it eliminated competition from 
135. 	Using the earlier estimates (see footnote 127 above) that 
94 of the approximately 300 tailoring workers in Cape Town 
proper were journeymen, a majority might have had fewer than 
two assistants. 
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other merchant tailors using sweated labour. It did not really 
matter whether these minimum standards were set by the Wage Board 
or an industrial council. The merchant tailors still avoided 
any responsibility for raising standards and could freely make 
scapegoats of the journeymen when complaints were made about sweat­
ing in the trade. 
Neither the Wage Board nor the industrial council was able 
to recognise the structural weakness of the journeymen with respect 
to the merchant tailors. The attitude of the Department of Labour 
was that, 
••• it is their (the journeymen's) business to see that 
they 	do not accept work from the merchant tailors at 
rates which will not allow them to pay their employees 
the legal wage rates. Theirs is the responsibility 
of complying with the law if they employ pers ns covered 
. . 136by t he Determ1nat1on. 
This view was endorsed by the Wage Board in its refusal to recommend 
any steps to regulate contract prices. This was an essential 
ingredient of any true reform of the tailoring trade in Cape Town. 
The realities of the trade did not give journeymen the power to 
enforce the contract prices they needed to be paid if they, in 
turn, were to pay their assistants and make a living themselves. 
Competition between journeymen ensured that no strong unity was 
possible against the merchant tailors. The Wage Board and Depart­
ment of Labour had to take account of this imbalance in power 
between the merchant tailors and the journeymen or their laws 
would fail to improve conditions in the trade. As it was, they 
acted in ways which further weakened the journeymen and made them 
still more vulnerable to the will of the merchant tailors. 
No one was more aware of the weakness and vulnerability of 
the journeymen than the merchant tailors. And they exploited 
this weakness to the full in the three years of wrangling over 
the regulation of the trade. Their policy towards the journeymen, 
136. 	Letter from the Chief Inspector of Labour (Ivan Walker) to 
the Divisional Inspector of Labour, Cape Town 13 February 
1929 S.A.B. ARB240 51465/79. 
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always opportunist and at every step moulded by the new legisla­
tion, was shortsighted and could bring advantages only in the 
short term. In the long term, enforced minimum wages for opera­
tives and minimum standards for workshops would tend to eliminate 
journeymen. Under normal conditions, the tailoring trade was 
highly competitive. Journeymen were pushed to rely on lowering 
wages, intensifying labour, lengthening working hours, using family 
help and working at home. The removal of all these sources of 
marginal profit put the squeeze on the individual journeyman tai­
lor who could exploit himself to the limit without breaking any 
law. 
It was in the nature of any enforced wage regulation under 
the new laws that the journeymen would bear the brunt of the hard­
ship. It is true that all the evils of the needle trades were 
manifested in the sub-contracting system, but this system was 
based as much on the merchant tailors as their unfortunate journey­
men who, in Cape Town, came to be singled out for harassment 
by the new industrial laws. 
But the prescriptions of the Wage Board were not enforced 
by the Department of Labour or by the GWU-CP. The former lacked 
a sufficient staff of inspectors to monitor the determinations. 
The GWU-CP was only formally an organization of tailoring workers ­
after 1928 it existed in name only. It did not recruit workers 
or settle their complaints. The pronouncements of the Wage Board 
had, at most, an indirect influence on the continuing decline 
of the tailoring trades. Its periodic determinations and reports 
stressed its wish to end all outwork and thus contributed to the 
tailors' sense of insecurity. But the main reason for the decline 
of tailoring lay in the increasing output of clothing factories. 
The Wage Board commented in 1935: 
The signs seen during previous investigations that work 
in the retail section of the clothing trade was decreas­
ing and that readymade and factory made garments are 
being bought in increasing quantities instead of bespoke 
tailored garments, were more in evidence in this than 
in any previous investigation. In the Union during 
the last few y~ars, the position has been similar to 
that reported in Great Britain, America and France, 
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where the retail tailoring trade is dying a natural 

death •••The picture of a steadily dwindling trade is 

one which faces most merchant tailors. 137 

In Cape Town it seems that there was an absolute decline in the 
number of white tailors138 but that coloured, specifically Malay, 
tailors resisted more effectively both the dictates of the Wage 
Board and the economic pressure placed on them by the factories. 
In 1931 the Wage Board stated: 
••• In Cape Town the competition is between European 
and Malay employees. In this competition the European 
is gradually being beaten and his numbers are getting 
less and less. 139 
Malay tailors simply ignored the provisions of the first wage deter­
mination which outlawed work at home or sub-contracting to tailors 
who did not have registered workshops. When a second, revised 
wage determination in 1932140 sought to enforce the same provi­
sions a Malay Tailors' Union sprang into existence. Such a law 
would "entail untold misery and hardship among Moslem tailors" 141 
The secretary of the union, S. Dollie, at a mass meeting called 
on all members not to register even if they were able to comply 
with the regulations. They should remember their friends who 
were unable to do so. Dollie asked, 
•••Which of the tailors present were able to carry into 
effect the conditions laid down in the act? He made 

142
bold to say, not one. 
137. 	Wage Board Report: Garment Making Trades, 12 April 1935 
Annexure 99-1936, paragraphs 73, 78. 
138. 	I found no statistical sources that allowed an estimate of 
the changing composition of the tailoring trade in Cape Town. 
139. 	Wage Board Report: Bespoke Tailoring and Clothing Manufactur­
ing Industries, 23 October 1931 Annexure 82-1931-2. 
140. 	Wage Determination No.44. 
141. 	The Sun 28 October 1932. 
142. 	Ibid. (Dollie was a London-trained pharmacist and the pro­
prietor of the Castle Bridge Pharmacy. He involved himself 
in local politics and was for some years a member of the 
Divisional Council). 
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Another speaker said: 
'Any man who registers will be a traitor to the cause'. 
•••There were very few Moslems in Cape Town or in the 
whole of South Africa who were able to satisfy the letter 
of the law. 'If you register, you are putting a rope 
around your own neck' •143 
In the face of an inadequate system of enforcement, this effort to 
"defeat the Determination,,144 was a success. The Wage Board com­
mented in 1938: 
The major portion of the workers in the retail trade 
at Capetown are Malays who are opposed to working under 
factory conditions and this probably accounts for the 
fact that the outwork system is more prevalent at this 
than at any other centre in the Union •••When Determina­
tion No.44 was first promulgated efforts were made to 
enforce the provision which requires all work to be 
performed in a registered factory, but ••• this attempt 
failed with the result that the Determination has not, 
in this respect, been enforced effectively for some 
considerable time. An organization of Malay tailors, 
apparently all working under the contract system objected 
strongly to the inclusion of any provlslon which would 
compeI t hem t 0 work · f . 145ln actorles. 
Ten years after the first wage determination for the tailoring 
trades, the Wage Act had failed to secure the elimination of out­
work. Wage Board reports during this period had repeatedly marked 
this as the essential condition for ending sweated conditions. 
All the Board's attempts to deal with outwork were "hampered by 
little enforcement".146 By 1938 the Board commented that although, 
••• the position of the workers, and in fact of many 
employers, is distressing ••• it is to be regretted that 
143. The Sun 	 28 October 1932. Also see The Cape Times 30 May 1933; 
14 December 1933. 
144. 	Wage Board Report, 12 April 1935 op.cit., paragraph 137. 
145. 	Wage Board Report: Garment Making Trades, 21 February 1938 
Annexure 190-193, paragraph 116. 
146. 	Wage Board Report: 12 April 1935 op.cit., paragraph 85. 
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so little can be done under the Wage Act to improve 
matters without the risk of repercussions harmful to 
the trade itself. 147 
To the Malay tailors this 1938 report must have appeared as a 
breath of realism after past Wage Board harassment. But it also 
signified a retreat from the idealism which had been a feature 
of Wage Board reports and policies in the first decade of its 
operation. The Board no longer saw itself as an instrument of 
progress and economic justice. The 1935 report stated categori­
cally that wage determinations in the bespoke tailoring trade 
148 
were of little use unless outwork was ended. The 1938 report 
149put forward suggestions to control rather than outlaw outwork. 
The actions of the Wage Board either had little effect on 
the tailoring trade in Cape Town or marginally hastened its de­
cline. The factory section of the clothing industry in Cape Town on 
the other hand, was transformed and strengthened by the influence 
of the Wage Board. It is to this branch of the clothing industry 
that we will next direct our attention. 
147. Wage Board Report: 21 February 1938 op.cit., paragraph 99. 
148. Wage Board Report: 12 April 1935 op.cit., paragraph 91. 
149. Wage Board Report: 21 February 1938 op.cit., paragraph 100. 
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CHAPTER IV 
BEING CRUEL TO BE KIND 

The Wage Board in the Cape Clothing Industry 

1925-1934 

•••The introduction of the Wage Act, which should be 
carefully distinguished from the Conciliation Act, was 
intended to apply only to classes of employees incap­
able of organization working under sweated and other­
wise unfavourable conditions and thus unable to benefit 
from the provisions of the Industrial Conciliation Act. 
The Department therefore aims consistently at emphasising 
the application of the Conciliation Act and limiting 
the Wage Act to the unfavoured classes of employment; 
recognizing that perhaps the greatest service which 
it can render to industry is the galvanic influence 
it has had and may continue to have upon laggard organi­
zation, exercising useful pressure in the direction 
of the establishment of Industrial Councils. 
- C.W. Cousins, Secretary for Labour, 19271 
gal'vanise. v.t. 	 to confer a false vitality upon ••• 
- Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary 
It was the Wage Act that induced the sudden formation of the Cape 
Wholesale Clothing and Shirt Manufacturers' Association (CWCMA) 
in August 1925. 
The very existence of the Wage Board filled the Cape clothing 
manufacturers with dread. The spectre was raised of this 'third 
party', with no special knowledge of the clothing industry, dic­
tating uneconomic wages and working conditions for factory workers. 
Their fears seemed doubly. justified once the Board was set to 
work in their industry and recommended wage levels which, none 
doubted, would bring immediate ruin implemented. 
For three years, the main aim of the CWCMA was to secure 
the clothing industry against the depredations of the Wage Board. 
To pre-empt a Wage Board investigation, the manufacturers first 
registered their organization and then tried to form an industrial 
1. 	 Minutes of a Conference between the Native Affairs Department 
and Native Affairs Commission, the Department of Labour and 
the Wage Board on the Regulation of Native Interests in Indus­
try, 25-7 October 1927, p.5 S.A.B. ARB1103. 
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council. But before they could organize a union for their workers, 
the Minister had asked the Wage Board to report on the clothing 
industry. The CWCMA wrote to suggest that the chairman of the 
Board "concentrate his efforts upon occupations less able to take 
care of themselves".2 When the Board persisted with its investiga­
tion the manufacturers launched a desperate publicity campaign 
u to save the industry".3 The Wage Board later commented: 
In no industry have such strenuous efforts been made 

to prevent the Board's recommendations resulting in 

. . 4 
a determlnatlon. 
The panic of the manufacturers is understandable. The Pact govern­
ment had come to power promising a new deal for white workers. 
This would mean general wage rises if these workers were not to 
be undercut by competition from cheaper black workers. The cloth­
ing industry was beginning to thrive under the new protective 
customs tariffs. But the government had always linked protection 
S
with the payment of civilized wages. The Wage Act was seen by 
the CCI as the means by which the government was going to force 
higher wages on the struggling manufacturers. None doubted that 
the Wage Board could enforce its will on industry. South African 
manufacturers were used to being bullied - by the government, 
by the mines, by merchant capital. No-one doubted that the govern­
ment could enforce civilized standards, even though it might cripple 
industry in the process. Before the Wage Board existed in reality, 
it existed in the imagination of manufacturers as a hungry-headed 
Scylla which would scoff up their profits. Had they escaped the 
Charybdis of foreign competition only to fall prey to the Scylla 
of the Wage Board? 
The manufacturers were too weak economically and organization­
2. 	 Letter from Laite to Minister of Labour f 8 March 1926 S.A.B. 
ARBIOS8/27. 
3. 	 CWCMA Minutes: 19 March 1928 - M2/1. 
4. 	 Wage Board Report: Work of the Board for the three years 
ended February 1928 f paragraph 304. Annexure 112-1929 f 2nd 
Session. 
S 	 See footnote 184 below. 
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ally to defeat any determined opponent. But they could manoeuvre, 
they could plead, they could protest, they could obstruct; and 
this opposition would be more effective if manufacturers presented 
a united front. So before the Wage Board did anything, it inspired 
the manufacturers to organize. 
Provision for the organization of employers was made in the 
1924 Industrial Conciliation Act, which also seemed to provide 
a way of escape from the Wage Board. For, if the workers were 
also organized in a registered trade union, an industrial council 
could be formed to set wages and conditions free from outside 
interference. The Wage Board reported in 1928: 
In many industries employers, in their desire to escape 
from the operation of the Act, have urged their employees 
to form trade unions for the purpose of their joining 
and setting up industrial councils. Some employers 
have gone so far as to pay the salary and expenses of 
persons to undertake the organization into trade unions 
of employees in the industry ••• 6 
Such was the enthusiasm amongst thenewmanufacturers t associations 
and union officials that tagreementst were negotiated before the 
name of the union had been decided upon. 
The galvanic effect of the Wage Act on both employer and 
union organization is seldom recognised in recent literature on 
the results of the 1920's labour legislation. In the Cape clothing 
industry the Wage Act was the crucial element in this organization 
and in the formation of industrial councils in 1927 and 1936. 
As the Wage Board commented in a review of its first three years 
of operation: 
, 
At the time when the Wage Board was set up very little 
use had been made of the Industrial Conciliation Act, 
except in the printing and building industries. By 
the passing of the Wage Act a tremendous fillip was 
given to the formation of industrial councils. 7 
6. Wage Board Report February 1928 op.cit., paragraph 48. 
7. Ibid. See also Lucas (1933) p.56. 
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The vitality conferred upon worker and employer organiza­
tion by these two Acts was deceptive. It was not the result 
of worker victories in the struggle against the bosses. It was 
not the result of a need on the part of employers to protect them­
selves against mounting worker demands. The spur to organize 
had its origins purely in the legislation. Employers organized 
to protect themselves against the uncertainties of state inter­
vention in their industries. In Cape Town, with its tradition 
of weak and limited worker organization, many new unions were 
created at the behest of the employers simply as a necessary step 
in the formation of an industrial council. These unions were 
created by the CFLU officials with very little participation by 
the workers they were supposed to represent. They had no reason 
for existence beyond their membership of the industrial council. 
The panic of the clothing manufacturers in the face of the 
Wage Act is an index of their extreme vulnerability. But if the 
threat of a Wage Board determination made the manufacturers panic, 
when faced by a determination in reality, the members of the CWCMA 
showed themselves resourceful in adapting to it and devious in 
adapting it to their needs. They came, very soon, to like the 
wage determinations and rejected numerous appeals from the still­
born Garment Workers' Union for the formation of an industrial 
council. 
In the ten years that wage determinations governed the Cape 
clothing industry (1926 to 1936), the Department of Labour was 
never in a position to enforce them properly. Several determi­
nations were declared invalid or delayed by court rulings. Manu­
facturers evaded determinations 'legally' by being granted exemp­
tions from paying the set wages. Their illegal ploys included 
bribing labour inspectors; forcing workers immediately to repay 
a portion of their wage; keeping two wage registers - one for 
inspection and one reflecting the wages actually paid; or simply 
ignoring the determination and counting on not being inspected. 
There were far too few inspectors to enforce the determinations 
systematically and in any event the fines imposed were very small. 
(Laite, 1947, pp.181, 232) 
It is the argument of Rob Davies (1979, p.213) that the Wage 
Board set minimum wages which were based on those already paid 
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by larger, more mechanised capitals which employed relatively 
more white workers. This gave such firms a competitive advantage 
over small, less mechanised capitals, for it obliged the latter 
also to pay higher wages. Such firms had to mechanise, merge 
or go under. The Wage Board thus promoted the trend towards mecha­
nisation in South African industry while also promoting the em­
ployment of whites. This argument can only be sustained if the 
wage determinations were enforced against small manufacturers. 
They were not so enforced in the clothing industry and there are 
strong indications that the same is true of other industries until 
at least the mid 1930's. This chapter shows that while the Wage 
Board was not irrelevant to the mechanisation of industry, the 
improvement of working conditions and the increased employment 
of whites, its role and that of the Wage Act, in these processes, 
was more complex and more interesting than is suggested by Davies. 
This chapter examines the growth of the clothing industry 
and the development of worker and employer organization in the 
ten years before the formation of an industrial council. This 
period is marked first by intense opposition to the Wage Board 
by the manufacturers and then by their acceptance of the Wage 
Board system and willing adaptation to it. The origins of the 
Garment Workers' Union of the Cape Peninsula and worker responses 
to the Wage Board's activities in the first phase are dealt with 
here but the full description of garment worker organization after 
1929 is reserved for the following chapters. The motivating power 
behind this organization was not the industrial legislation but 
the desire of the Transvaal garment workers' union to extend its 
influence to the Cape. The present chapter is intended as a case 
study of the early practices of the Wage Board as well as an account 
of the effects wage determinations had on the clothing industry. 
Home Rule Denied 
The agitation by Cape clothing manufacturers against the Wage 
Board was spearheaded by the CWCMA. Although the registered em­
ployers' organization, it was not properly representative of all 
the clothing manufacturers until 1935. Few small factories were 
represented and several of the large factories were not members 
1 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
167 

either. All Cut, Make and Trim factories and those producing 
at "the lower end of the trade" were excluded. 8 Such concerns 
existed because of the low barriers to entry into the clothing 
industry. They operated with the minimum of fixed capital and 
had to rely mainly on low labour costs to be competitive. Members 
of the CWCMA were the more 'responsible' employers who saw the 
value of an industry-wide minimum wage in ending the cut-throat 
competition from sweaters and rat-shops. 
Seven firms constituted the core of the CWCMA. A. Fraser 
&Co. and The African Clothing Factory were the largest and longest 
established factories, each employing over 200 workers and dating 
from before the First World War. They were represented by W.M. 
Middlemass, the doyen of Cape clothing manufacturers who served 
as chairman until 1937, and by Toby Roytowski. M. Bertish &Co., 
Hogsett, Stephens &Bishop and Ackermans Ltd. were also founder 
members of the Association. Monat &Co., a high quality shirt 
factory was established after tariff protection was granted and, 
with its founder, Edgar Jacobs, became one of the pillars of the 
organization. The last of the core members was Jaques Hau et 
Cie which joined in 1928. By 1928, the ten members of the CWCMA 
probably employed just over half of the factory workers. 9 W.J. 
Laite, the secretary until 1938, was the capable advisor, prodder 
and factotum of the CWCMA. His close knowledge of developments 
in other industries, his contacts in the trade union movement 
and the government, allowed him to set out clearly alternative 
courses of action for the manufacturers to choose between. 
The first battlement the CWCMA tried to erect against the 
Wage Act in 1925 was an industrial council "to settle the question 
of working conditions as between employer and employeen•10 Con­
sequently, 
••• it would be essential ••• to ask the Federation of 
Trades to arrange for 	the organization of the employees 

11
in the clothing trade. 
8. 	 Customs Tariff Commission: Minutes of Evidence 1935, pp.3202, 3502. 
9. 	 Report from the Divisional Inspector of Labour, Cape Town to 
the Secretary for Labour c.19 July 1928 S.A.B. ARB1069/22; 
CWCMA Minutes 1928 - M2/1. 
10. Clothing Section 	Minutes: 24 August 1925 - M1/1. 
11. 	 Ibid. 
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To assist in this Laite "persuaded the clothing manufacturers 
12to allow Stuart or his representatives to enter the factories ll • 
But even so, the formation of an union of clothing workers was 
no simple matter. The Federation was busy with the rejuvenation 
of their existing unions and the creation of new unions with better 
prospects than one for clothing workers. The failure of past 
efforts in this industry showed that organization was not easily 
sustained. After three months the CWCMA was still "waiting on 
the organization of labour" 13 And no progress had been made 
by March 1926 when the Wage Board was directed by the Minister 
of Labour to investigate the clothing industry.14 Nevertheless 
the CWCMA sent a deputation to the Minister asking that he condone 
the formation of an industrial council, 
••• and if labour was not properly organized, to ask 
the Minister to appoint representative employees in 
the clothing industry to serve on such Industrial Council. 15 
The Minister stated in a letter that he understood, 
••• that the employees in the clothing industry in the 
Cape are exceedingly difficult to organize and in the 

16
past 	have even feared to belong to any trade union. 
He encouraged the CWCMA to continue with the efforts to form a 
council which, he suggested, could take over the administration 
of the first wage determination. 
Stuart began to create his Bespoke Tailors' Union shortly 
afterwards but he apparently made no headway with the union for 
17
ready-make workers. Not even the semblance of a union existed 
. h . d' 18h t he Wage Board burst upon t he scene W1t 1ts recommen at10ns.w en 
12. 	 Report by Mr. Freestone (Divisional Inspector of Labour, Cape 
Town) c.March 1926 S.A.B. ARBI058/27. 
13. 	 CWCMA Minutes: 28 October 1925 - M2/1. 
14. 	 CWCMA Minutes: 12 March 1926 - M2/1; Government Gazette 
5 March 1926. 
15. 	 CWCMA Minutes: 12 March 1926 - M2/1. 
16. 	 Reply to Laite's letter of 8 March 1926 (see footnote 2 above) 
12 March 1926 S.A.B. ARB1058/27. 
17. 	 Report by Mr. Freestone c.March 1926; letter from Freestone to 
the Secretary for Labour, 11 September 1926 S.A.B ARBI058/27. 
18. 	 Social and Industrial Review Special Edition 30 September 1926. 
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The manufacturers reeled in shock and horror. The CWCMA 
called a Special Emergency Meeting to which all clothing factory 
owners were invited. 
The Board's determination (sic) was so extraordinary 

and the rates of pay so totally impossible, that some 

line of action should be decided upon to combat it. 19 

J.W. Mushet said the proposals of the Board were, 
••• so revolutionary that it would be absolutely impossible 
. d t . h C . 20t o carryon any ln us ry ln t e ape area. 
Middlemass admitted that the Board was correct in some of its criti­
cisms, particularly with regard to the training of labour, 
••• However, the drastic changes proposed so suddenly, 
if adopted would spell immediate ruin. 21 
On the face of it, the manufacturers were not over-reacting. In 
evidence to the Wage Board the CWCMA proposed a wage scale for 
female juvenile beginners in the industry. This scale, which 
they said was an improvement on existing conditions, compared 
22
with the Wage Board proposals as follows: 
CWCMA 	 Wage Board 
Recommendation 
First year first 3 months 10/- per week 20/- per week 
second 3 months 10/- 25/­
third 3 months 10/- 30/­
fourth 3 months 10/- 32/6 
Second year first 3 months 12/6 35/­
second 3 months 12/6 37/­
second 6 months 12/6 40/­
Third year 15/- (qualified) 
Fourth year 17/6 
Qualified Wage 	 25/- 40/­
19. 	 CWCMA Minutes: 7 October 1926 - M2/1. 
20. 	 Ibid. 
21. 	 Ibid. 
22. 	 Wage Board Report: Work of the Board for three years ended 
Febuary 1928, op.cit., paragraph 308. 
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The CWCMA wanted a four year learning period; the Wage Board wanted 
the qualified wage to be paid after 18 months. In terms of the 
Wage Board recommendation, all employees would be entitled to 
11 paid public holidays, one week paid annual leave, and one week 
of paid sick leave per year. Under existing conditions workers 
were paid only for time worked. The Board wanted a 15 minute 
rest period for workers in the morning. Mushet pointed out that 
this amounted to a loss of three working days per year. He said 
that, 
••• when all these additional charges were made, manu­
facturers would find their net profits considerably 
reduced. It was ridiculous to expect manufacturers to 
continue business when the return for their invested 
capital was so small. The position was that unless 
the award was altered manufacturers would be f rced 
to close their factories. 23 
Laite suggested that the manufacturers together submit a memoran­
dum of objection to the Wage Board recommendation. They should 
put forward al ternative wage scales which, he stressed, "should 
24be on the most liberal scale possible". Middlemass said that 
once they had agreed on the memorandum, each firm should secure 
the approval of its work force. He did not anticipate any diffi­
culty here: 
••• the coloureq employees of today were seriously scared, 
and were feeling that the Wage Board award was an attempt 
25to finally exclude coloured labour in various industries. 
The memorandum was finalised at another joint meeting of members 
of the CWCMA and other, factory owners. A special fund was estab­
lished to pay the expenses of a deputation which would present 
26the memorandum to the Wage Board in Pretoria.
23. CWCMA Minutes: 7 October 1926 - M2/1. 
24. Ibid. 
25. Ibid. 
26. CWCMA Minutes: 19 October 1926 - M2/1. 
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The deputation begged the Wage Board to postpone making a 
final recommendation. They wanted an opportunity to form an in­
dustrial council for the Cape clothing industry. They promised 
that, 
••• not only would no obstacles be placed in the way 
of the organization of the employees into a trade union, 
but that the formation of such an organization would 
27be actively encouraged. 
Laite stated that the firms were willing to issue 	notices, 
••• that no individual need fear any reprisals by asso­
ciating himself with an organization of this character, 
and that the employers wish them to be associated with 
. t" I . 28t he1r par 1CU ar un1ons. 
The Board wanted to encourage the formation of industrial councils 
and agreed to the request of the CWCMA for a postponement of 
the final recommendation. But the Wage Board set a condition. 
The draft industrial council agreement had to be sent to it for 
approval within four months. If the agreement was not "reasonable" 
a final recommendation would then be made by the Board and the 
agreement would not be gazetted. In the interview, the Board 
recommended that the Minister gazette as a determination the wages 
put forward by the CWCMA in their memorandum of objections. It 
did not regard these wages as adequate, but, it said, 
They 	are put forward at this stage as representing some 
improvement on existing wage rates and as a scale 	of 
29
wages which the manufacturers themselves proposed. 
Wage 	 Determination No.2 became effective in December 1926. 30 
27. 	 Wage Board Report: Interim Report on the Clothing Industry} 
20 November 1926 Annexure 58-1927. 
28. 	 Wage Board Report: Clothing Manufacturing Industry, 25 Sep-. 
tember 1927, paragraph 6 Annexure 134-1927-8. 
29. 	 Wage Board Report: Interim Report l 20 November 1926 op.cit. 
Although the CWCMA (through Laite) agreed to this "interim 
recommendation" the resultant determination was held to be 
invalid after Barone v. Rex (1927, TPD) as it had not been 
published for objections. 
30. 	 Government Gazette: 3 December 1926; fold out table 4.2 
on p.222, column 3. 
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Although the determination had been drawn up by the Cape 
manufacturers themselves, some were dissatisfied with the scale 
for male employees. Roytowski stated that "his firm could not 
31 pay the higher wages" and he thought it unwise to begin paying 
now wages which could not be continued in future. Laite, 
••• strongly advised manufacturers to pay the wages laid 
down •••He considered it would be a tactical blunder. 
if manufacturers sacked their employees wholesale, as 
it would •••make the formation of an Industrial Council 
for the industry more difficult and retard the bringing 
about of an agreement. Manufacturers had promised the 
Wage Board that they would do what they could to assist 
in organizing labour and had asked for the suspension 
of the initial award that they might form an Industrial 
Council for the industry. That undertaking should now 
be carried into effect. 32 
Middlemass supported Laite. He said there should be no sudden dis­
missal of workers. If dismissals were necessary they should be 
made gradually. The manufacturers should be willing to bear a 
small loss "in order to ensure the future administration of their 
industry".33 It was agreed that the determination should be imple­
mented "in the most sympathetic manner possible" as the manufac­
turers tried to beguile their workers first into a union and then 
into an industrial council. 
It was not the best moment to press the Cape Federation to 
form the union. Relations with Stuart were at a low ebb. Stuart 
had become obsessed with having wholesale bespoke factory workers 
paid at the same rate as the retail bespoke tailoring workers. 
He conducted a relentless campaign against the wholesale bespoke 
34
employers at joint meetings with the MTA. Laite thought that 
Stuart's hostility to the wholesale bespoke manufacturers might 
make difficult the organization of factory workers through the 
31. CWCMA Minutes: 8 December 1926 - M2/1. 
32. Ibid. 
33. Ibid. 
34. See MTA Minutes: 29 November 1926; 6 December 1926 - M3/2. 
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CFLU. The CWCMA decided to go it alone and organize the union 
for their workers t~emselves: 
••• each firm would ask its employees to elect represen­
tatives, and ••• these would meet to decide on the organi­
zation, and in consultation with the Chief Labour Inspector, 
. . 35 prepare a constltutlon. 
The name of the new body was to be "The Cape Wholesale Shirt and 
Clothing Factory Employees Union" and the manufacturers would 
ask their employees to join it. 
This union made no progress at all. Within a month the dis­
agreement with Stuart had been patched up and he was again engaged 
as union creator. But once again CWCMA meetings were punctuated 
by complaints from members that "nothing had been done to organize 
36the employees". Whatever problems surrounded the formation 
of a union, the formation of the industrial council went on apace. 
The CWCMA approved its draft constitution, agreed on acceptable 
wage scales and asked Stuart to send in the names of the employee 
representatives. 37 If the clothing industry were to be granted 
'home rule' under the Industrial Conciliation Act, the manufacturers 
would clearly be dominant. 
The precise nature of Stuart's problems in organizing the 
first of the two separate unions ordered by the CWCMA and the 
MTA is not clear. He had made progress with the organization 
of the tailoring workers and was including wholesale bespoke fac­
tory workers in the union. 38 This move had the early support 
of the wholesale bespoke factory owners who offered to distribute 
handbills to their employees to encourage them to attend a re­
cruitment meeting. 39 At every opportunity Laite urged all the 
clothing manufacturers "to do everything possible in their power 
35. 	 CWCMA Minutes: 29 November 1926 - M2/1. 
36. 	 CWCMA Minutes: 24 January 1927 - M2/1. 
37. 	 Ibid. The wage scale was the same as in Wage Determination 
No.2 except for the grading of qualified male employees. 
38. 	 The Wage Board was investigating wholesale bespoke tailoring 
with retail bespoke tailoring rather than with the other 
clothing factories. The wholesale bespoke factory owners 
always belonged to the CWCMA. 
39. 	 MTA Minutes! 6 December 1926 - M3/2. 
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. th' . II 40t o asslst . e unlon to organlze • Hindrances to organization 
did not come from the employers. In January 1927 Stuart approached 
Laite and said that his lack of success in organizing the factory 
workers was 
••• owing to the fact that the employees in the various 
branches of the clothing industry were at variance re­
garding the operations of workers in the different sections. 41 
He said that unless he could organize workers into one union for 
all the branches of the clothing industry "it would be impossible 
to organize them at all".42 Stuart therefore asked the manufactu­
rers to approve the formation of a single union which would then 
be a party to a joint industrial council for the tailoring and 
clothing industries. 
Laite persuaded the employers that such an industrial council 
would have independent sections and pointed .to the success of 
the national industrial council for the leather industry which 
had such a structure. He added that the union had agreed to admit 
the journeymen tailors as members and, 
This would be a great advantage in the formation of 
an Industrial Council as a better type of representative 
for the employees would be provided from the ranks of 
' 'I 43t he Journeymen tal ors. 
Roytowski sounded a note of caution. He said that by forming one 
industrial council 
••• manufacturers were putting a power in the hands of 
labour who would then be able in the event of a strike 
44to callout the employees in all sections.
Middlemass said that strikes would be illegal and punishable by 
imprisonment. In any event, all factory owners and tailors pre­
40. MTA Minutes: 6 December 1926 - M3/2. 
41. MTA Minutes: 2 February 1927, joint meeting with CWCMA - M3/1. 
42. Ibid. 
43. Ibid. 
44. Ibid. 
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ferred the risks of a joint industrial council to the certainty 
of a hostile dictatorship under the Wage Board. The establishment 
of the "Industrial Council for the Garment Manufacturing Indus­
tries" took place even before the Garment Workers' Union of the 
Cape Peninsula had been constituted. 45 
Although itself unregistered and including a union that had 
not even applied for registration, the 'industrial council' -sent 
off an agreement to the Wage Board for its approval in April. 46 
The agreement was rejected as unacceptable and the Wage Board 
set about framing a final recommendation. The Board in fact re­
opened its investigation of the clothing industry and held long 
informal discussions with the ~ndustrial council!.47 In August, 
just as the Garment Workers' Union was finally registered, the 
CWCMA decided to stop pressing for registration of the industrial 
council until the Wage Board had made its recommendation. 48 The 
bosses' wanted to be sure of where they stood before committing 
themselves to participation in an industrial council. 
Ivan Walker, the Chief Inspector of Labour, commented that 
he thought the delay advantageous: 
I am 	 not satisfied that the employees are organized 
to an extent justifying the early negotiation of a wage 

49

agreement. 
The GWU-CP then claimed a membership of between five and six hun­
dred50 - less than half the total number of workers in the industry ­
and the chairman, secretary and treasurer of the Union were none 
of them garment workers. 
The new Wage Board draft recommendation, while not as drastic 
as the first, proposed considerably higher wages than Determination 
45. 	 The Union's constitution was submitted to the Registrar of 
Trade Unions in April 1927. Letter from Stuart to the Registra~ 
28 April 1927 S.A.B. ARB1058/27. 
46. 	 'Industrial Council for the Garment Manufacturing Industries' 
Minutes: 5 April 1927 - M4/1; see Table 4.2 column 5, p.222,below. 
47 Wage Board Report, 25 September 1927, op.cit. 

48 Letter from Laite to the Secretary for Labou~ 27 August 1927 

S.A.B. ARB1058/27. 
49. 	 Note from Walker to the Secretary for Labou~ 2 September 1927 
S.A.B. ARB 1058/27. 
50. 	 Letter from Stuart to W. Freestone, 9 August 1927 S.A.B. 
ARB1058/27. 
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51No.2. The CWCMA then asked the Minister to register the Indus­
trial Council and gazette the agreement. But the GWU-CP had also 
seen the draft recommendation and temporarily withdrew its member­
ship of the Industrial Council as it thought it would get better 
52terms from the Wage Board. 
It again joined the council when it became clear that the 
new wage determination would still be delayed several months. 
Conditions in the industry were deteriorating as certain "unscrupu~ 
lous" employers, anticipating the final publication of a Wage 
determination, "were working at top speeds to produce stocks whilst 
paying low wages".53 Wage Determination No.2 had been declared 
54invalid in a court case so employers could pay as little as 
they wished. Stuart was under pressure from garment workers. 
The Wage Board could provide no statutory wage standard for at 
least several months - the recommendation had not been gazetted 
for objection yet - so Stuart called a mass meeting of garment 
workers which passed a resolution demanding that, 
••• the Industrial Council agreement be published imme­
diately ••• (I)f there is any further delay in the publi­
cation the Department of Labour will be responsible 
for any action that may be taken by the employees within 
. d 55 a reasonable per10 • 
Stuart explained to the Minister that the workers were extremely 
dissatisfied and had taken him (Stuart) to task for accepting 
all the delays. He had indeed "not done what was expected" of 
him and he admitted the criticism to be "in a measure justifiable". 
But, he wrote, this was because he "realised the difficulties 
of the Department", 
51. 	 See Table 4.2 column 4. The recommendation was circulated in 
a draft form in September 1927, see CWCMA Minutes: 2 September 
1927 ~ M2/1. The recommendation was gazetted on 30 December 1927. 
52. 	 The date of this incident is not clear. It is reported in a 
letter from the Labour Inspector, Cape Town to the Secretary for 
Labour dated 12 October 1929 (ARBI058/27) as having occurred 
sometime after the Wage Board had rejected the agreement. 
53. 	 CWCMA Minutes: 10 November 1927 - M2/1. 
54. 	 Barone v. Rex (1927 TPD). Text of judgement in Social and Indus­
trial Review 1 (18) June 1927, pp.607-612. 
55. 	 Letter from Stuart to the Minister of Labour, 11 October 1927 
S.A.B. ARBI058/27. 
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I kept on telling the Union from time to time that the 
agreement would in due course be published. The organi­
zation has now got tired of the promises I have made 
and have stated that they want the immediate publication 
of their agreement, the employers, they claim, are taking 
as much advantage of the position as they possibly can ••• 56 
Stuart hoped the resolution would be respected by the Department as, 
••• 1 am afraid I shall not be able to satisfy them much 
longer. 57 
Matters came to a head in November. Speeding up and overtime in 
the factories continued and Stuart was under ever-increasing pre­
sure. He appealed to the Minister: 
•.• 1 am being continually questioned as to the reason 
why the agreement has not become operative which I am 
unable to give and you will easily understand the diffi­
cult position I am in, and I shall be glad if you will 
be good enough to make the necessary inquiries as soon 
as possible as I am afraid that I cannot hold up the 
position any longer. 58 
59Then, at a "somewhat stormy" meeting in the Trades Hal1 the 
committee of the Garment Workers' Union, which was composed of 
workers and not just Federation officials, 
••• decided in their own minds that the agreement arranged 
by the National (sic) Council was not what they desired 
and preferred that the working conditions be laid down 
by the Wage Board. 60 
In spite of this decision, Stuart told Laite the very next day that, 
he thought the employees would be willing to come under 
the Agreement as set out by the Garment Industrial Coun­
56. 	 Letter from Stuart to the Minister of Labour, 11 October 1927 
S.A.B. ARBI058/27. 
57. 	 Ibid. 
58. 	 Letter from Stuart to the Minister of Labour, 3 November 1927 
S.A.B. ARBI058/27. 
59. 	 CWCMA Minutes; 10 November 1927 - M2/1. 
60. 	 CFLU Minutes: 1 November 1927 (TUCSA Archives). Rose Crawford, 
later an official of the GWU-CP, recalled later that "the wor­
kers turned down the industrial council" (GWU Commission of In­
quiry, Minutes of Evidence, Cape Town 1949, p.121). 
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cil ••• it would not be a difficult matter to get the 
employees to agree to the registration of an Industrial 
Council and to get the Minister to withdraw the terms 
61
of reference from the Wage Board. 
Stuart had no right to speak with such confidence. The Minister 
of Labour had never been pliable to Stuart's wishes - or to those 
of the CWCMA, and the workers on the GWU-CP committee were showing 
a wholly new and unexpected independence of mind. 
The Federation Executive strongly advised the GWU-CP against 
withdrawing from the industrial council: 
(It) pointed out to the Garment Workers that it would 
be in their best interest t.o accept the terms laid down 
in the agreement, they may not be all that was desired 
but they were certainly an improvement on their present 
d . . 62 con ltlons ••• 
The GWU-CP committee asked the Federation to call a general meet­
ing of garment workers "so that the rank and file could have the 
true position placed before them".63 The workers obviously pre­
ferred the higher rates of the draft Wage Board recommendation 
64to those of the 'industrial council' agreement. The meeting 
condemned Stuart's promotion of his agreement with the employers 
in the face of a more favourable Wage Board recommendation and 
repudiated the agreement. Stuart resigned as secretary of the 
Union. 
Twenty years later, Stuart recollected the meeting in his 
memoirs: 
A General Meeting of the Union was convened at which 
the proposed terms of settlement were submitted, and 
discussed, in great detail, together with the projected 
establishment of an Industrial Council for the entire 
industry, including bespoke tailoring •••The meeting, 
61. CWCMA Minutes: 10 November 1927 - M2/1. 
62. CFLU Minutes: 11 November 1927. 
63. Ibid. 
64. CFLU Minutes: 17 November 1927 (TUCSA Archives). 
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however, rejected the settlement which had been nego­
tiated, as also the proposal to establish an Industrial 
Council. The members present clamoured for a Wage Board 
investigation, and determination, which, they claimed, 
would accord them higher rates of wages, and better 
working conditions, than they could hope to secure from 
any agreement negotiated by an Industrial Council. My 
colleagues and I, who had conducted the negotiations 
on behalf of the Union, stressed that the terms of settle­
ment represented the maximum which we had been able 
to secure, and that we had agreed to the terms of the 
settlement, as submitted to the meeting. We outlined 
the full history of the negotiations and of the struggle 
which had been necessary to obtain these terms of settle­
ment. All this, however, proved of no avail, and it 
became abundantly evident that the general feeling was 
that I had negotiated an unacceptable agreement. In 
view of this, I informed the Meeting that I was, on 
no account, prepared to continue in office as Secretary 
and that I would never again be persuaded to conduct 
any negotiations on behalf of the Union. I accordingly 
again relinquished office,65 as Secretary, and my with­
drawal from this position was followed by a prolonged 
period of inactivity during the course of which the 
Union virtually ceased to function. (Stuart, 1950i) 
The Cape clothing manufacturers and the Cape Federation tried over 
a two year period to circumvent a Wage Board determination for 
the clothing industry by resorting to the formation of an indus­
trial council. Each had different reasons for. following this 
strategy. The manufacturers wanted to avoid uneconomic minimum 
wages and the interference of a II t hird party11 in their industry. 
65. Stuart had been asked to resign as secretary of the Tailors 
andTailoresses 	Union in 1917 after negotiating an unpopular 
agreement with the employers (Stuart 1950i). Although 
Stuart is correct in pointing to the subsequent inactivity 
of the GWU-CP he retained a close interest in the Union and 
negotiated often in its name. Until 1932 he remained the 
registered secretary of the GWU-CP. 
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Although an industrial council would involve the manufacturers 
in contributing to the costs of administering the agreement, the 
fact that the minimum wages payable under the agreement were lower 
than under the proposed wage determination would more than compen­
sate for contributions to the industrial council's running costs. 
Laite told the manufacturers that, 
••• it had been the experience in other Industries, where 
Industrial Councils operated, that employees were usually 
reasonable. The success of the deliberations of the 
Council very largely depended upon careful administration. 
66On the whole, the position was a very satisfactory one. 
The Cape Federation was attracted to the industrial council system 
because its stop orders and officially recognised unions allowed 
a rapid and easy growth of the 'labour movement'. The failure 
of the, apparently irresistible, combined determination of the 
organization-brokers, Stuart and Laite, to get their industrial 
council in the clothing industry is immediately ascribable to 
two factors: the opposition of the garment workers and the atti­
tude of the Department of Labour and the Wage Board. 
The garment workers were often described by Stuart as apathe- . 
tic. 67 Even when employers ceased to victimize union members 
after 1925 and assisted efforts to unionize all their workers, 
the response to the clarion call of the Federation was tardy and 
unenthusiastic. The great difficulty in organizing the garment 
workers delayed the formation of an industrial council for over 
a year. Once a union had been imposed on the workers, they deman­
ded improved conditions and resisted being manipulated into an 
industrial council subject to an agreement they had no part in 
negotiating and which set lower wages than recommended by the 
Wage Board. 68 In 1935, when the CWCMA again began negotiations 
66. 	 CWCMA Minutes: 10 November 1927 - M2/1. 
67. 	 Stuart 1950i; CFLU Annual Reports: 1931, p.12; 1932, p.5. 
68. 	 There is no evidence of malice in Stuart's conduct. He al­
ways believed he acted in the best interests of the workers, 
even when working as the tool of the bosses, and was always 
surprised when workers showed themselves ungrateful for his 
efforts. Stuart was never a meek servant of the employers 
he worked with; he often bargained hard and could be unpredic­
table if he did not get his way. But his unionism was that 
of the friendly society suited to advancing slowly the interests 
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for an industrial council, Roytowski reminded the employers that 

in 1927 they, 

••• in co-operation with the employees, had formulated 
an agreement which the Minister had refused to gazette, 
simply on account of the dispute which had subsequently 
arJ..sen among the members 0 f the U'nJ..on J..·tself. 69 
Roytowski's memory was too generous to the power of the workers. 
Other considerations also weighed with the Minister's decision. 
By late 1927 the Department of Labour had begun to resolve the 
practical difficulties which confronted it over the relationship 
between the Wage Board and industrial councils. Boydell, the 
Minister of Labour, had approved the policy that if an industrial 
council was set up in an industry after the Wage Board had begun 
an investigation, no agreement would be gazetted until after the 
70Board had reported. In the case of the clothing industry, Ivan 

Walker, the Chief Inspector of Labour, urged that an industrial 

council agreement for Cape Town should not be gazetted unless 

the final Wage Board recommendation was accepted as its basis. 

He set out two reasons for this. Firstly, he still doubted that 

. the workers were sufficiently in control of the Union as all the 
executive positions were held by non-garment workers. Secondly, 
he took account of the very keen competition between the coastal 
and Transvaal clothing manufacturers. the Minister were to 
legalize the payment of wages lower than those recommended by the 
Wage Board this would maintain rather than reduce the threat to 
the higher standards of Transvaal clothing workers. 
Together, the Wage Board, the Department of Labour and the 
garment workers decided that the Wage Board and not a boss-dominated 
industrial council would set minimum wages in the Cape clothing 
industry. 
of skilled artisans. There was no need to organize strongly 
when the scarcity and skill of workers was their strength. 
Most disputes could be settled by negotiation, most advances 
won through negotiation. The idea that a union of unskilled 
workers could only rely on their collective strength and wil­
lingness to strike was totally foreign to him. 
69. 	 CWCMA Minutes: 5 March 1935 - M2/1. 
70. 	 Letter from H.F. Cuff, "c" Division, Department of Labour 
to the Secretary for Labour, 6 December 1927 S.A.B ARB1058/27. 
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A Benevolent Despotism 
••• the Board's aim is to create a system of justice 
under which industry will be stimulated and its pro­
ducts justly distributed. 
71 
- Chairman of the Wage Board, 1926 
The promulgation of the Wage Act (No.27 of 1925) was delayed until 
February 1926, after the Economic and Wage Commission had presented 
72its reports. The Commission had made recommendations on how 
the Wage Board ought to function and had pointed to the industries 
which most needed wage regulation. One of the members of the 
Commission, F.A.W. Lucas, K.C., was appointed the first chairman 
of the Board. 73 
The political significance of the Pact government's "civilized 
labour policy", of which the Wage Act was but a part, has been 
well interpreted by Davies (1979, p.199 et seq.) and Kaplan (1977, 
pp.92-105). In the aftermath of the 1922 strike, there was a need 
to restore the confidence of white wage earners in the state as 
looking after their interests and there was a need to provide 
new structures to contain white wage earners' economic struggles. 
Poor whinism represented a threat to the state's attempt to draw 
all whites into a common position of support for the form of state 
and so to preserve its racially exclusive character. The aim 
of the civilized labour policy was to provide employment for 
whites at civilized wages and to prevent them from having cause 
to contemplate any sort of political alliance with poor blacks. 
The new forms of state intervention by which the civilized labour 
policy was advanced were made possible by the new era of capitalist 
development promoted by the Pact government. This new era was 
hallmarked by the growth of manufacturing industries behind a 
protective customs tariff. 
71. 	 'Inaugural Meeting of the Wage Board' Social and Industrial 
Review April 1926, p.241. 
72. 	 'The Wage Act Explained' Social and Industrial Review March 
1926, p.147. 
73. 	 The other two members of the Board were magistrates, one 
of whom was replaced by W. Freestone, the Divisional Inspec­
tor of Labour in Cape Town in 1928. Lucas was intensely 
interested in social legislation and was a champion of the 
weak working class. He put a progressive stamp on the ac­
tivities of the Wage Board in his ten years as its chairman. 
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The Wage Act had two aims within this context. The first 
was "to safeguard civilized standards of living for workers" and 
the second "to avoid holding back the productive energy of the 
country".74 The Board was very conscious of the special difficult­
ies of applying wage regulation in South Africa where the gap 
between skilled and unskilled wage levels was so great. This 
gap represented a serious threat to the attainment of "civilized 
standards". To prevent "the undercutting of civilized standards 
by the competition of low-paid, low-standard uncivilized labour,,75 
the Act had no 'colour bar' - the wage determination applied to 
all workers. Ultimately, said Lucas, 
••• there should be no-one in the community who will 
not receive from day to day sufficient of the necess­
aries of life to maintain a civilized existence. 76 
The task of setting 'civilized standards' while at the same time 
not hampering the growth of industry was self-limiting. When 
confronted by the realities of industrial economics in South Africa, 
the Board often did not raise wages immediately to a 'civilized' 
level. All the wage determinations in the clothing industry in­
cluded wages which did not allow a 'civilized' standard of living. 
Also, the Board did not set up some ideal scale of civilized wages 
and propel its industries in that direction. As Lucas said, 
The evidence given before the Economic Commission ••• 
showed that even in the worst sweated industries there 
is a proportion of employers who are paying fair wages 
and giving good conditions to their workers. It seems 
to us that where one employer can pay good wages and 
give good conditions there is no reason why those who 
are paying sweated wages should not be compelled eventu­
77
ally to rise to the same standard as the good employer. 
74. Lucas, 'Inaugural Meeting ••• ' op.cit., p.239. 
75. 'The Wage Act Explained' op.cit., p.138. 
76. Lucas, 'Inaugural Meeting ••• ' op.cit., pp.239-240. 
77. Ibid. 
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The Wage Board came to see industries in terms of good and 
bad employers. In practical terms the object of the Wage Board 
was to move all wages up towards those currently paid by the good 
employers. No fall in output should follow as the good employer 
would have "no additional burden placed on him that he does not 
carry today,,78 and the employer of sweated labour, after changes 
in "management", would compete on equal terms. As the Board- said: 
••• sweated wages mean inefficiency, ill-nourishment, 
79discontent, anxiety and consequently low output.
Better conditions would encourage workers to increase their effi­
ciency and output. 
The Board did not, as its early detractors feared, dictate 
'scientifically' sanctioned 'civilized' wages. Rather, after much 
consultation with employers and workers, it set minimum wages 
approaching those paid by "employers of good repute".80 
This statement might appear to contradict what we have seen 
in the Cape clothing industry, where recommended wages were far 
above those paid by the most enlightened employer and where the 
loudest opposition came from precisely this quarter. The problem 
was that in the clothing industry, the Wage Board found good em­
ployers only on the Witwatersrand and only bad employers in the 
coastal areas, of which Cape Town was the most important. So 
in attempting to bring more civilized standards to the clothing 
industry, the Wage Board had to tackle the question of the wage 
disparity between the Witwatersrand and the Cape. 
This wage differential was the underlying cause of virtually 
all 'labour unrest' in the Cape clothing industry between 1930 
and 1957 when Transvaal wages finally fell to coastal levels. 
It was also a major reason behind the Wage Board investigations 
of the clothing industry. The low wages in Cape Town threatened 
the standards of clothing workers on the Witwatersrand, 95 per 
cent of whom were whites and consequently specially deserving 
of civilized wages. It can be said that without the wage disparity 
78. Lucas, 'Inaugural Meeting ••• ' op.cit., pp.239-240. 
79. Ibid. 
80. 'The Wage Act Explained' op.cit., p.148. 
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the Cape clothing industry would have a very different history. 
Many different arguments were put forward to explain the 
wage disparity. Transvaal clothing manufacturers and the Trans­
vaal garment workers' union said that Cape manufacturers paid 
starvation wages to a more exploitable work force. Cape manufac­
turers disputed that the high wages of the Transvaal agreement 
were enforced. The Cape union argued that the Transvaal union 
and manufacturers only wanted Cape wages to rise so as to take 
all the business to Johannesburg. In many industries lower wages 
were paid at the Cape than in the Transvaal. It was commonly 
held that this was the penalty Cape workers paid to work at all 
. . 	 d 81l.n l.n ustry. 
At the time of the first Wage Board investigation into the 
clothing industry the wage differential was enormous. In 1925 
the Transvaal Clothing Manufacturers' Association and the Witwaters­
rand Tailors' Association had formed an industrial council which 
covered factory workers. The first agreement set wages more than 
double those paid in Cape Town. 82 The Wage Board wanted to estab­
lish a single minimum wage for the whole country to prevent unfair 
competition between the regions. It stressed that, 
••• in any scale of wages ••• there has to be such a rela­
tionship between the rates in one section of the country 
and the rates in another section that will not allow 
one section to exploit cheap labour and reduce the stan­
83dard 	of living in another part. 
But the wages on the Witwatersrand were so much higher than at the 
coast that, 
81. 	 Appendix A, below, discusses the extent, effects and causes 
of the wage disparity in the clothing industry between inland 
and coastal factories. 
82 	 See Table 4.2 column 11. 
This was the first agreement to be gazetted under the Industrial 
Conciliation Act (Government Gazette 4 September 1925). It ran 
until March 1927 when the TCMA refused to extend or renegotiate 
the agreement until the Wage Board had made a final recommenda­
tion for the coastal areas. As this agreement existed at the 
time the Wage Board investigation began, Transvaal workers 
covered by the agreement were excluded from its terms of reference. 
83. 	 Wage Board Report, 25 September 1927 op.cit., paragraph 36. 
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••• the enforcement of them there would seriously dis­
locate the industry and probably cause considerable 
hardship.84 
The Wage Board consequently planned to superintend a slow process 
of adjustment by which coastal wages would be brought up to the 
Transvaal level in stages. This intention is clearly expressed 
in the Wage Board reports surrounding its investigations in 1926/8, 
1931/2, and 1934/6. 
The core of a wage determination was, of course, the wage 
scale. But also important were the holiday, leave and sick pay 
provisions, the limits on the hours of work, the tea-breaks or 
rest periods specified and the payment for overtime. Manufacturers 
argued with the Board on each of these points. Their concern 
was not only with the absolute level of the wages but also with 
the structure of the wage scales. The salient features of this 
were the length of the period fo~ which new workers were classi­
fied as 'learners' on lower wages; the ratio between learners 
and qualified workers in a factory and the number of different 
wage categories allowed for qualified workers. 
There was no system of apprenticeship or formal training 
for machinists in the clothing industry. Workers were trained 
on the job. The Wage Board proposed wages for learners which 
rose by small amounts periodically until they reached the qualified 
wage. The manufacturers were concerned that the increments should 
be as infrequent as possible, that the period of learnership should 
be as long as possible and that the wages, specially the starting 
minimum should be as low as possible. If the learnership period 
was, say, three years, but most learners were in fact 'efficient' 
workers after 18 months, the manufacturers would have another 
18 months of output from workers paid artificially low wages. 
Manufacturers first wanted a four year learnership period but 
they later agreed that three years was acceptable. The Board 
indicated that it regarded 18 months as a more realistic period 
but it recommended three years as "the employees will accept it".85 
84. Wage Board Report, 25 September 1927 op.cit., paragraph 12. 
85. Ibid., paragraph 27. 
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This over-long learnership period obviously encouraged the 
manu~acturers to employ relatively more learners and to dismiss 
employees as they became entitled to the qualified wage. To 
limit this practice - which was effectively an avoidance of pay­
ing higher wages - the Wage Board set a minimum ratio of qualified 
to unqualified workers. The ratio provision caused much conflict 
between the manufacturers and the Wage Board and was also a source 
of disagreement between members of the CWCMA. 
The third characteristic of the wage determinations was their 
favouring of flat minima for large groups of qualified workers. 
The manufacturers preferred that a worker qualify for a specific 
job which had its individual wage rate. The more specific jobs 
in a factory and the more specific wages, the greater was the 
scope for marginal 'underpayment'. The Board was opposed to piece­
work and set only time wages. However factories could operate 
a modified piecework system with a guaranteed weekly minimum time 
wage. 
The Wage Board was frequently ridiculed by both employers 
and workers, as a group of outsiders who had no knowledge of their 
industry and no competence to recommend working conditions. The 
Board may have been ignorant when it began an investigation, but 
it did not remain so." One is impressed by the comprehensiveness 
of Wage Board reports and the seriousness with which they dealt 
with objections to the recommendations. Before framing its re­
commendations in the case of the clothing industry, the Board 
visited factories allover South Africa, spent long hours in in­
formal discussio  with employer and worker representatives and 
studied the effects which wage regulation had had on the clothing 
industry in other countires , such as Britain, Australia and New 
Zealand. The Board was strongly influenced by the experience 
of Britain and, in particular, by R.H. Tawney's book on the estab­
lishment of minimum wages in the clothing industry under the 1909 
Trades Boards Act (Tawney, 1915). 
Tawney documents and analyses the application of wage regula­
tion to an industry vastly larger and more complex than that in 
South Africa. The 'Tailoring Trades Board' differed in important 
respects from the South African Wage Board. It was made up of 
an equal number of appointed employer and worker 'representatives' 
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with a few more representatives of the public. Wage rates and 
certain other conditions were then fixed by a process of 'nego­
tiation'. The Act did not exclude organized industries - although 
the clothing industry was little organized - nor did it require 
wages to conform to a 'civilized standard'. Yet Tawney's evalu­
ation of the effects of imposing minimum wages on the clothing 
industry in Britain had obvious relevance for the Wage Board. 
His study showed the minimum wages legislation to have had 
largely beneficial results. Some struggling businesses had closed 
down but Tawney argued that the future of the industry did not 
lie with them but with the "efficient factory occupiers" who were 
paying more than the rates fixed by the Board before these became 
law. The "less progressive factory occupiers" had held their 
position in the trade "mainly by employing the worst paid women 
workers to produce the cheapest goods" (p.104). They had to choose 
between bringing "their management into line with that of their 
more efficient competitors" or going under. 
The enactment of minimum rates affected less than half of 
the 145 000 workers under the Tailoring Trades Board in 1914 (pp.65j71) 
and the wage rises were often very small, but evidence suggested 
that advances in wages stimulated improvements in both worker 
and factory efficiency. Tawney argued that under low rates of 
pay workers had no incentive to exert themselves to produce as 
the marginal return for the increased effort was so small. They 
were also less able to work at their best because of the "listless­
ness and despair" which accompanied low wages (p.133). Once higher 
rates were paid, workers worked more efficiently. This was stated 
by many employers (pp.121-135). The "economy of high wages" (p.135) 
was even more strikingly illustrated in improvements in factory 
management. Some employers did respond by increasing the intensity 
of labour ("slave driving") but apart from this, 
••• the evidence ••• suggests that almost the first effect 
of an advance in wages is to lead the employers most affec­
ted by it to search, and search successfully, for ways of 
producing cheaply to which they were indifferent before 
the increase (p.136). 
The supervision of workers was tightened up. More foremen and 
forewomen were employed to decrease time wasted in late arrival 
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at work, rest intervals and talking. "Speeding up" was sometimes 
taken toextremes. Workers were pressured into working harder 
to earn the minimum time wages on very low piece rates. Abuses 
.. 
like this were difficult to check, but other improvements in fac­
tory management made them less necessary. Learners were now care­
fully trained; work processes were rationalized, better methods 
were found of sub-dividing the work; and finally more machinery 
was introduced. Sewing machines were power driven, buttonholing 
and buttonsewing machines became more widespread (pp.13s-lss). 
The effect of advances in wages was, 
••• to increase the efficiency of the worst paid workers 

and to level up the organization of the most backward 

to that of the most progressive firms (p.ls9). 

Regional wage differences in Britain were even greater than in 
South Africa. The great divide was between the better paid workers 
in more mechanised factories in the north and the very badly paid 
London clothing workers. 86 Tawney held that low wages in the 
south were not due to any special characteristics of the clothing 
industry there, but rather to the fact that the labour market 
as a whole gave rise to a supply of artificially cheapened women I s 
87labour (p.lls). In such an area, if no minimum wage was in 
force, an employer could be as backward as he pleased and yet 
survive merely because labour was cheap (p.160). The imposition 
of a minimum wage by the Tailoring Trades Board (or by a trade 
union) was thus followed by "a general increase of efficiency 
both among workers and among manufacturers" as work was better 
organized and more mechanized (p.160). 
86. 	 No such dramatic difference existed in levels of mechanization 
between the Cape and Transvaal clothing industries. 
87. 	 "(I)t is very largely from the wives and daughters of the 
worst paid and most irregularly paid male workers that the 
ranks of the home-workers in the tailoring trade are recruited 
••••wages are lower in certain districts than in others, not 
because the industry cannot afford to pay as much in the former 
as the latte'r, but because the conditions in other industries­
in London,in particular, dock labour - are such that women are 
obliged to work on any terms that they can get ••• " (p.lls). 
See also Stedman Jones (1971, Part 1) and Schmiechen (1975). 
Both deal with an earlier period than Tawney but discuss this 
issue. 
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The minimum wage set by the Trades Board was never a maximum 
wage. Many workers were already paid above the minimum and the 
Trades Board system encouraged the formation or revival of trade 
unions which negotiated higher wages (p.90). Tawney comments: 
••• (The workers) are more hopeful, more alert and more 
enterprising. The State has given them a little help. 
Therefore they are more prepared to fight their own 
battles and help themselves. Even from the pu~ely eco­
nomic point of view they are better workers, because 
they are less spiritless and more hopeful (pp.134-5). 
Despite the fact that this report was fifteen years old and referred 
to the experience of a very different country, it was carefully 
88
read and cited by the Wage Board in its reports. It must have 
been a solace to the Board in the face of the bitter criticism 
from the Cape manufacturers. 
The CWCMA did not appreciate the research the Wage Board 
had done before framing its final recommendations. In their new 
memorandum of objections, the manufacturers asserted that the 
determination would mean immediate "ruination" to smaller, less 
organized firms and would be "a very serious menace" to the larger 
firms which would be forced out of business "by a gradual process 
of attrition".89 The CWCMA held that the determination would 
nullify all the advantage they derived from the customs tariff 
on imported clothing. They drew up tables of comparisons between 
Wage Board rates and wages currently paid in Britain and other 
competitors from overseas. These purported to show that the re­
commended wages were far higher than those paid by overseas cloth­
ing factories. 90 The memorandum continued: 
A careful perusal of this data will ••• convince the 
Minister how utterly impossible it is for the Clothing 
Industry to function successfully if a Determination 
88. 	 Wage Board Report, 25 September 1927 op.cit., paragraphs 17, 
18, 35, 40. 
89. 	 CWCMA Memorandum of Objections to the Wage Board's Recommen­
dations, January 1928 (CCI Archives). 
90. 	 In 1934 one Cape clothing manufacturer told the Customs Tariff 
Commission that "compared with South Africa, (England) is a 
low-wage country". (Minutes of Evidence, p.3497) 
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is made fixing the various rates of wages •••which are 
desired by the Wage Board ••• (T)he only result which 
can accrue from the efforts of the Wage Board will be 
the placing on the streets of a large number of employees. 91 
The Board replied to the objections but rejected them. 92 They 
regarded the wages as a "reasonable compromise between the claims 
93of employers and employees" and urged the Minister to gazette 
them as a wage determination. 
In March 1928 the Cape manufacturers began a public campaign 
against the recommendation. They agreed that "an organized fight 
would have to be launched in the interests of this industry".94 
The memorandum of objections was translated into Afrikaans and 
bilingual copies were distributed to Members of Parliament, Sena­
tors and the press. Much time was spent in lobbying Nationalist 
MP's. It was hoped that if enough pressure was brought to bear 
on the government by their own suporters, an interview with the 
prime minister could be arranged. The Wage Board later remarked 
that the press campaign against the recommendation "was conducted ••• 
with the utmost vigour, and a considerable disregard for the facts".95 
Despite the efforts "to prevent the ruination of the industrY",96 
the recommendation became law in June 1928 as Wage Determination 
No.15. 97 
Above and Below Board 19Z8-1934 
The fears of the manufacturers that the Wage Boad would bring 
ruin in its wake proved to be groundless. Although the next six 
years were marked by extremes of economic fluctuation in addition 
to the rule of the Wage Board, the Cape clothing industry emerged 
from the period stronger than ever before. In 1934, faced by 
a Customs Tariff Commission eager to pare away the tariff and 
91. 	 CWCMA Memorandum•••op.cit., p.12. 
92. 	 Wage Board Report: Clothing Manufacturing Industry, 23 February 
1928 Annexure 398 - 1927-8. 
93. 	 Wage Board Report, period ended February 1928 op.cit., paragraph 303. 
94. 	 CWCMA Minutes: 19 March 1928 - M2/1. 
95. 	 Wage Board Report, period ended February 1928 op.cit., paragraph 304. 
96. 	 Letter from Laite to J.H. Munnik, MLA (sic), 29 March 1928 
(CCI Archives). 
97. 	 Government Gazette 8 June 1928. 
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aggressive Transvaal attempts to force an increase in the coastal 
wages, the Cape manufacturers then showed not the least sign of 
panic. Edgar Jacobs said: 
••• the clothing industry, being next to the gold min­
ing industry, the largest industry in the country, had 
little to fear that its position would be prejudiced. 98 
Such strength and confidence did not, of course, attend the indus­
try immediately the wage determination was gazetted, nor was the 
Wage Board the only leavening agent. But a concentration on the 
the Wage Board's activities allows the other factors to be seen 
in perspective, while at the same time permitting judgement on 
the real effects of the Wage Act on the clothing industry. 
Depite the manufacturers' statements that the new wages were 
impossible, many immediately showed signs of observing the deter­
mination. The members of the CWCMA placed a joint order with 
Messrs. Jagger for seats with backrests made compulsory in the 
determination. They had several meetings with labour inspectors 
and the Wage Board itself to obtain clarity on the interpretation 
of the determination. 99 The bulk of discussion in the CWCMA meet­
ings concerned the implementation of the determination. Moves 
were made to find legal loopholes in the law and to secure exemp­
tion from paying less efficient employees the minimum wage, but 
there was clearly a determined effort to comply with aspects of 
of the new law. Some workers were dismissed, as parts of the 
industry adapted to the determination, but this trend was offset 
100by the engagement of new learners. 
The Garment Workers' Union meanwhile had fallen on bad times. 
Without the constant support of the manufacturers and participa­
tion in an industrial council, the Union could offer nothing to 
98. 	 CWCMA Minutes: 15 October 1934 - M2/1. 
99. 	 CWCMA Minutes: 31 August 1928; 11 October 1928 - M2/1. 
100. 	Laite refused to estimate the number of dismissals but denied 
he had mentioned a figure as large as 400 (Cape Times 10 July 
1928). The Divisional Inspector of Labour reported that 254 
workers were discharged because of the determination and 143 
new learners were engaged, reducing the total number of em­
ployed clothing workers from 2039 to 1945. (Letter to the 
Secretary for Labour, c.19 July 1928 S.A.B. ARB1069/22) 
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the workers and membership evaporated. Stuart was succeeded as 
secretary by Henry Evans, from the Bakers' Union, 
. 101 P 1 d E and one B••W P001e took over as chalrman. 00 e an vans 
spent the next six years vainly asking the manufacturers to form 
an industrial council. The CFLU was used to bargaining on behalf 
of skilled workers in craft unions. Such workers were in a position 
of some pow~r by virtue of the scarcity of their labour and their 
key positions in the labour process. They were relatively few 
in number and easy to organize. The CFLU did not appreciate that 
the unionization of the masses of less skilled or unskilled indus­
trial workers required a different form of organization. The 
organization of unskilled garment workers - even those grouped 
into large factories - was beyond their experience. Still less 
part of their experience was the strong organization such a union 
would need and the militant policy it would have to follow if 
it were to make any impression on the bosses. The Industrial 
Conciliation Act served to blur the difference between craft 
unionism and industrial unionism. Wages were negotiated in an 
industrial council on which the CFLU advised all workers instead 
of just the skilled workers. An industrial council was the imme­
diate and final objective of the 'leaders' of the garment workers. 
The formation of an industrial council would secure for them the 
members they could not organize and the subscriptions they could 
not hope to collect voluntarily. 
The Department of Labour and the Wage Board joined the offi­
cials of the Union in urging the formation of an industrial coun­
cil. 102 Such a council could not introduce lower wages but it 
would control the administration of the determination, including 
the granting of exemptions. Experience in other industries under 
wage determinations had demonstrated the inability of understaffed 
local labour inspectorates to police determinations. The Depart­
ment of Labour wished this work to be undertaken by the industries 
101. 	Poole was a recent English immigrant. He was more a factory 
manager than a garment worker and was the author of a success­
ful text book on cutting (Poole, 1927). He was chairman 
of the GWU-CP until 1936 when be became the first agent of 
the industrial council. 
102. 	CWCMA Minutes: 11 October 1928 - M2/1. 
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themselves. 
The basic attitude of the clothing employers to these sugges­
tions of a council remained unaltered until 1935. They would 
not form an industrial council unless the Minister agreed to ga­
zette an agreement that incorporated lower wages than in the deter­
. t" 103 Th M" . f d " h d k" 104m1na 10n. e 1n1ster re use to g1ve suc an un erta 1ng 
and so the industry remained under the Wage Board. 
After the wage determination had been in operation for a 
year, the attitude of the CWCMA to the Wage Board had changed 
radically. Conditions in the industry had improved in this period. 
Jacobs stated that, 
••• (the determination) had increased the efficiency 

of his employees, and he was now getting an increased 

output at a lower cost per unit under the conditions 

105laid 	down by the Wage Board ••• 
Roytowski, 
••• said that as far as he, personally, was concerned 

it had worked admirably •••and (he) was not in favour 

of setting up an Industrial Council as he was unable 

106to see any advantages which would accrue. 
Laite remarked that, 
••• the Clothing Manufacturers were the first set of 
employers he had known to have actually expressed them­
" f" d . h W B d D ". 107se1ves as sat1s 1e W1t a age oar eterm1nat10n ••• 
An important effect of the wage scale structure on the determina­
tion was obvious after this first year of operation. The deter­
mination had led to an increase in labour turnover in the industry108 
103. 	CWCMA I-linutes: 21 January 1929 - M2/1. 
104. 	Secretary for Labour to Laite, c.25 January 1929 S.A.B. 
ARB1058/27; CWCMA Minutes: 27 June 1929 - M2/1. 
105. 	CWCMA Minutes: 27 June 1929 - M2/1. 
106. 	 Ibid. 
107. 	 Ibid. 
108. 	" ••• the labour turnover in the industry was greater under 

the Determination, due mainly to the periodical increases 

in wages ••• " ibid. 
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and to a great increase in the proportion of juvenile employees. 
The wages of learners were set to increase periodically. 
Women beginners in the industry, for example, were entitled to 
a minimum wage of 15/- a week. After one year's experience this 
had risen (by degrees) to 22/6 and after three years' experience 
to 40/- a week. (See Table 4.2 below) The most efficient of 
workers might be kept on until she was due for the qualified wage 
of 40/-, but a less efficient worker was fired as soon as an em­
ployer thought she could not earn the increased wage to which 
she was entitled by virtue of having however many months of ex­
109perience. The dismissed worker was replaced by a new beginner 
who would, in turn, be fired as soon as her employer estimated 
that her efficiency did not warrant the extra cost of adding to 
. 	 . b d b th d . . II0herwage t he 1ncrement prescr1 eye wage eterm1nat10n. 
Employers could pay lower wages than those specified to old or 
physically handicapped workers who were issued with an 'exemption 
certificate' by the Department of Labour. Exemption certificates 
ought not to have been given to able-bodied workers. 
Because lower wages could be paid to learners, clothing fac­
tories rationalised their labour processes by splitting up work 
into simple tasks which workers could learn to do efficiently 
in a short period. The three year learnership period was a gift 
of up to two years or more of cheap labour. The wage structure 
set by the determinations thus encouraged a higher labour turnover 
and the rationalisation of the labour process. 
As the minimum wage to which a worker was entitled depended 
on the amount of his or her experience in the Cape clothing in­
dustry as a whole and not experience in a particular factory, 
manufacturers' sought out beginners or workers with relatively 
little experience. Beginners, naturally, tended to be relatively 
young. So the wage structure of the determinations led to a grow­
ing proportion of young workers in the industry. This process 
109. 	Some factories operated a piecework system and were thus 

able to determine this ability 'objectively'. 

110. 	" ..• many employees are dismissed on reaching the wage of 

£2 ••• " Wage Board Report: Clothing Manufacturing Indus­

try, 25 November 1931 Annexure 194 - 1931-2. 
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is particularly evident in the case of "juvenile" women workers 
(those younger than 21 years of age). The following employment 
figures were collected by the Wage Board. Table 4.1a gives figures 
for all Cape clothing factories and Table 4.1b figures only for 
factories that existed both in 1926 and 1929. 
Table 4.1: 	 Employment in the Cape Town Clothing Industry, 
1926 and'1929111 
a) All 	 establishments: 
February 1926 
February 1929 
White Black 
TOTALMen Women Men Women 
...A" ...J" A J A J A J 
43 12 40 47 180 50 364 369 1 105 
55 24 82 301 212 87 448 814 2 023 
42 12 29 22 148 29 314 314 910 
b) Certain establishments: 
February 1926 
February 1929 39 19 63 161 146 63 322 591 1 	404 
*A - Adult J - Juvenile (younger than 21) 
In 1926 there was almost an equal number of adult and juvenile 
women workers, and in 1929 juveniles made up' two thirds of the 
workforce. (This is true also for factories that existed both 
in 1926 and 1929.) 
Towards the end of 1929, the Cape clothing manufacturers 
experienced a "tremendous drop in demand,,1l2 for their output 
Ill. Wage Board Report: Work of the Board for the three years 
ending February 1928 op.cit., paragraphs 313, 314. 
112. CWCMA Minutes: 30 December 1929 - M2/1. 
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as imports flooded the market. Competition was keener than at 
" " 1925 113 I d"d d k f " any tlme slnce • twas eCl e to as or an lncrease 
in the tariff. The Board of Trade found several firms to be trad­
ing at a 10ss114 and, because of the unfavourable international 
conditions, the tariff was raised 5%.115 The position of the 
industry improved, but by mid-1930 general economic conditions 
were worsening and the CWCMA decided to make an appeal to the 
Wage Board. They wanted wage minima reduced, the ratio clause 
116
abolished and the 1earnership period extended to four years. 
Before this request was made, Evans of the GWU-CP met with 
the CWCMA and suggested the formation of an industrial council. 
An industrial council would be able to enforce the legal wages 
rigidly and end the 'unfair competition' that existed in the in­
. 	 f th d . t" 117 A thdust ry because 0f t he evaSlon 0 e etermlna lone no er 
enticement was that, 
•••Mr. Evans stated that the employees' representatives 
would be agreeable to a reduction of wages, provided 
they were satisfied such reduction would be in the best 
118interests of employees. 
Evans agreed to write to the Minister and to ask for, 
••• his assurance that he would be prepared to gazette 
an agreement mutually arrived at after negotiations 
between representatives of this Association and the 
" 119Trade Unlon. 
Without consulting the Union, the CWCMA sent its proposed new 
wage scales to the Secretary for Labour asking if they were accep­
120table for an industrial council agreement. The reply was in 
113. Customs 	Tariff Commission: Minutes of Evidence 1935. Jacobs, 
p.3466. 
114. 	 Ibid., p.3465. 
115. 	It was not increased to enable manufacturers to pay the wages 
set by the determination, although this was stated by the 
CWCMA representatives before the Customs Tariff Commission 
in 1935. See Board of Trade and Industries: Report 107 
Annexure 427 - 1930. 
116. CWCMA Minutes: 5 August 1930 - M2/1. 
117 • CWCMA Minutes: 4 September 1930 - M2/1.
. 
118. 	Ibid. 
119. 	Ibid. 
120. 	Letter from Laite to the Secretary for Labou~ 4 October 1930 
S.A.B. ARB1058/27. See Table 4.2 column 6. 
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121the negative. Evans proposed wages that were still lower than 
122those of the CWCMA , but they could not be taken advantage of 
because of the Minister's attitude. The Wage Board was asked 
to intervene and soon began a new investigation. 123 
The depression intensified from the middle of 1931. Three 
medium sized clothing factories closed down124and all the others 
125 
were on short time and retrenching workers every week. Japanese 
competition was cited as the main cause of the depressed state 
of the industry.126 Recognising the seriousness of the position, 
the Department of Labour suspended all increments due under the 
determination and gave the Divisional Inspectors wider powers 
to issue individual exemptions in an effort to prevent more unem­
ployment. 127 
In this context the Wage Board issued a draft recommendation. 
It was not well received by the CWCMA. Roytowski protested that, 
••• instead of a reduction, 'the new proposals represen­
128ted an appreciable increase in labour costs.
The manufacturers were hurled into still greater chaos when Britain 
left the gold standard and a devalued sterling led to deluge of 
cheap imports. Meetings to draft objections to the Wage Board 
121. 	Letter from Walker to CWCMA,29 October 1930 S.A.B. ARBI058/27 
" ••• it would be impossible to hold that it is not substantially 
less favourable to the general body of employees than are 
the terms of the determination". Section 7(5) of the Wage 
Act stipulated that a new industrial council agreement could 
not be less favourable to workers than an existing wage deter­
mination. 
122. 	CWCMA Minutes: 12 March 1931 - M2/1; see Table 4.2 column 7. 
123. 	CWCMA Minutes: 6 March 1931 (Shirt Section) - M2/1. 
124. 	Letter from Roytowski to the Minister of Labour, 23 June 1931 
S.A.B. ARBI069/22. 
125. 	Letter from the Divisional Inspector of Labour, Cape Town, to 
the Secretary for Labour, 4 July 1931 S.A.B. ARBI069/22. 
126. 	Ibid.; CWCMA Minutes: 24 July 1931 (Shirt Section) - M2/1. 
127. 	CWCMA Minutes: 1 September 1931; 12 October 1931 - M2/1. 
128. 	CWCMA Minutes: 7 September 1931 - M2/1. 
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recommendation were cancelled as all attention was diverted onto 
the tariff issue. The crisis persuaded the Wage Board to amend 
its proposals. The recommendation then made was substantially 
that proposed by the CWCMA, although the Board refused to reduce 
129the minimum qualified wage from 40 to 35 shillings per week. 
Although the Wage Board recommended a reduction in some wages 
and no wages were increased, its new recommendation continued 
the effort to end large regional wage disparities in the clothing 
industry. For the first time the recommendation covered the whole 
country.130 The Board advised that, 
In an industry so highly competitive as clothing, it 
is not only desirable but imperative that the provisions 
of wage regulating instruments should, subject to slight 
differentiation to meet local conditions be, as far 
as POSSlObIe, 1°dentlca ° I •131 
The Rand manufacturers were in an extremely unsatisfactory position 
as they were forced to pay higher wages than elsewhere. On the 
other hand coastal manufacturers complained that the wages of 
African male pressers in the Transvaal were not regulated. The 
Wage Board wanted to establish one wage regulating system. This 
would also protect Transvaal workers if the industrial council 
132
agreement was not renewed. 
The CWCMA were distraught that 'the qualified wage of £2 per 
week had not been reduced. They told the Wage Board that, 
Considering the class of labour, its mentality, its 
general inefficiency and irresponsibility, employers 
feel that the figure of £1.15.0. per week is a generous 
one to fix as the minimum wage for qualified female 
129. 	Wage Board Report: Bespoke Tailoring and Clothing Manufactur­
ing Industries, 23 October 1931 Annexure 82 - 1931-2. 
130. The 	 terms of reference were extended by the Minister after 
a request from the Wage Board in its Report on the Bespoke 
Tailoring and Clothing Manufacturing Industries, 20 July 
1931 Annexure 56 - 1931-2. 
131. 	Wage Board Report, 23 October 1931 op.cit. 
132. 	In 1927 the Transvaal manufacturers threatened to refuse 
renewal of the agreement. Wages would then have been subject 
to no legal minimum as Wage Determination No.2 excluded the 
Witwatersrand. 
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By January 1932, conditions were "infinitely worse" and all members 
of the CWCMA felt it "absolutely essential that this wage be re­
duced ll • £1.15.0. was "the absolute maximum the industry was econo­
mically able to pay as a minimum wage" 134 The manufacturers 
had prepared a budget, 
••• showing that a female employee in receipt of £1.15.0. 
a week would be able to maintain herself and have a 

135
little in hand at the end of the year. 
The Board commented, 
It may be possible for a woman to maintain herself on 
£1.15.0. per week, but the standard would be very low 
. d d 136 J.n ee • 
In support of retaining a £2 minimum, the Wage Board cited evidence 
given by the CWCMA itself. The manufacturers had stated that 
economic pressure had forced "a better class of employee" into 
the industry. One manufacturer said, 
I consider that the last determination was responsible 
for putting the shirt industry on its feet. It enabled 
137factories to attract much better types of people. 
The worst of the depression was over when Wage Determination No.42 
was gazetted in April 1932. 138 It attended on a new wave of ex­
pansion. The Cape clothing industry flourished as never before. 
But the revival of the economy brought with it new problems for 
the clothing manufacturers. The chief of these was competition 
from Cut, Make and Trim (CMT) factories. 
CMT establishments emerge in every boom. They meet the excess 
demand for clothes which the existing factories have not the stocks 
133. 	Wage Board Report: Clothing Manufacturing Industry, 18 March 
1932 Annexure 469 - 1931-2. 
134. 	CWCMA Minutes: 7 January 1932 - M2/1. 
135. 	Wage Board Report, 23 October 1931 op.cit., paragraph 7. 
136. 	Ibid. 
137. 	Ibid. 
138. Government Gazette 22 April 1932; see Table 4.2 column 8. 
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or capacity to meet. As such they might be given cloth by large 
factories which do not want to disappoint customers. But CMT 
establishments can obviously compete with other factories - and 
have an unfair advantage because of their low overhead costs. 
They kept no stocks of cloth or finished clothes, they often rented 
machinery and factory space on a short time basis, they were less 
than scrupulous in paying minimum wages. As soon as they took 
work from cloth importers or clothing retailers they posed a 
threat to all clothing factories. The Customs Tariff Act allowed 
clothing manufacturers a rebate on the duty imposed on imported 
textiles - this was the case with all cloth as the local textile 
industry hardly existed before the War. After the depression, 
some wholesale merchants set up factories which operated as CMT 
establishments. A retailer could buy cloth under rebate and have 
't 	 d . h f 139 N h' d . d' 'd 1 f1 rna e up ln t e actory. ot lng prevente ln lVl ua s rom 
setting up shop and competing for this business. The Wage Board 
stated that competition allowed merchants to hawk rolls of material 
from one CMT factory to another. 
Eventually prices are so low as to make it impossible 
for anything but sweated wages to be paid. 140 
The "legitimate manufacturers" in the Transvaal and Cape protested 
against, 
••• the encroachment of persons having no stake or re­
141
sponsibility in the industry other than a selfish motive. 
They wanted the Board of Trade to allow the rebated duty on raw 
materials only to "bona fide manufacturers" and not to "every 
tinpot importer calling himself a manufacturer".142 
••• (T)he small man who starts up with a few machines 
usually on the hire purchase system, is practically 
without responsibility, undercuts to the lowest possible 
139. 	Wage Board Report: Garment Making Trades, 12 April 1935 
Annexure 99 - 1936, paragraph 28. 
140.Ibid., paragraph 29. 
141. 	CWCMA Minutes: 19 February 1934 - M2/1. 
142. Customs 	Tariff Commission: Minutes of Evidence 1935, p.3178 
(Laite). 
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margin, evades all wage regulations, is a complete 
menace to the industry and eventually fails. 143 
The CWCMA supported a Transvaal proposal that only registered cloth­
ing factories be allowed a rebate. The criterion for registration 
was to be the use of fifty machines, 
••• with the stipulation that the said machines must 
be the manufacturer's own property and not obtained 
144 
on the Hire Purchase System. 
One manufacturer objected that this was too large a number as a 
factory with fifty machines would "employ a very large number of 
hands, say from 80 to 90ft • 
The Secretary pointed out that this would limit the 
145
number of manufacturers which was what was wanted. 
No firm action was taken by the Board of Trade or the Department of 
Labour to limit the bad effects of CMIT factories. Indeed their 
emergence was further stimulated by the invalidation of important 
aspects of the wage determination in two court cases in 1933 and 
1461934. The first judgement declared ultra vires the clauses 
of the determination which discouraged manufacturers from operating 
a piecework system. This meant that no minimum wage had to be 
paid 	to pieceworkers and, said the chairman of the CWCMA, 
••• if a factory was employing everyone of its work­
people on a piec work basis, the factory owner would 
be within his rights in refusing to allow Factory In-
h " bl' h 147spectors to enter 1S esta 1S mente 
The second judgement, a year after, declared the entire determina­
, " l"d 148t10n 	1nva 1 • 
143. 	CWCMA Minutes: 19 February 1934 - M2/1. 
144. Ibid. 
145. Ibid. The adoption of this suggestion shows clearly that 
the CWCMA at this time consisted exclusively of the larger 
clothing factories. 
146. 	Rex v. Cohen (25 October 1933, NPD) and (22 May 1934, AD, 521). 
The appeal of the state was dismissed. 
147. 	CWCMA Minutes: 15 October 1934 - M2/1. 
148. 	Rex v. Ryba (14 December 1934, TPD). 
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Many Cape Town employers immediately adopted a piecework system 
and some set piecework rates, 
which brought back in their factories the old sweated 
conditions which prevailed in this trade before there 
t · 149was any wage reguI a lone 
The invalidation of the determination brought "terrible and appall­
ing" conditions to the Durban clothing industry. However members 
of the CWCMA immediately agreed to uphold the determination. They· 
assured the Department of Labour and the Garment Workers' Union 
that "they would continue to carry out the Determination No.42 
in the same manner as prior to the judgement".150 Evans, of the 
GWU-CP, 
••• said this action on the part of the employers showed 
that the better class of employer was endeavouring to 
carryon the trade in a mutually beneficial manner. 151 
He did not let the opportunity slide to suggest the formation of 
an industrial council with, 
••• an Agreement that could be rigidly enforced [against] 
those employers ••• who would take advantage of the recent 
decision of the Court ••• 152 
Jacobs objected that, 
••• too much attention was being paid to those employers 
who it was alleged would take advantage. of the decision 
of the Court to underpay employees. He considered that 
the majority of employers in the Clothing Industry were 
members of the Association, and those who were not were 
a negligible quantity.153 
When Evans replied that he was most anxious about trouble from the 
CMT workshops, 
149. Wage Board Report, 12 April 1935 op.cit., paragraph 17. 
150. CWCMA Minutes: 28 May 1934 - M2/1. 
151. Ibid. 
152. Ibid. 
153. Ibid. 
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Mr. Roytowski ••• contended that the employers in the 
C.M.T. trade who would not ••• carry out the terms of 
the Determination since the decision of the Court would 
not have been in the habit of doing so before the deci­
.Sl.on. 154 
The government later passed the Wage Determination Validation Act 
(No.16 of 1935) which reinstated determina~ion No.42, but the 
above discussion suggests that the bulk of Cape clothing manufac­
turers were content to observe important parts of the determination 
voluntarily. They were happy with the determination as it stood. 
Despite their complaints that too many exemptions were refused 
or not renewed, and that the Department of Labour was unable to 
curtail the CMT factories, 155 
••• the general opinion of Clothing Manufacturers was 
that the present Determination was functioning satis­
'1 156f actorl. y. 
In late 1934, the industry was in "a very prosperous condition". 
It had "expanded at an exceedingly rapid rate", and was holding 
its own against foreign competition. 157 Six years with the Wage 
Board had removed the manufacturers' early fear and resentment 
of wage regulation. Asked by the Customs Tariff Commission if 
they did not consider Wage Board awards in favour of "reputable 
employers", Middlemass replied simply, "We like them".158 Jacobs 
said 	he had no wish to go back to the "old days", 
I would not remain in the industry if we had to 
employ sweated labour. 159 
154. 	CWCMA Minutes: 28 May 1934 - M2/1. 
155. 	CWCMA Minutes: 28 May 1934; 30 January 1935 - M2/1; 
Customs Tariff Commission: Minutes of Evidence, p.3472. 
156. 	CWCMA Minutes: IS October 1934 - M2/1. 
157. 	Wage Board Report, 12 April 1935 op.cit., paragraphs 10-12. 
158. Customs Tariff Commission: Minutes of Evidence, p.3482. 
159. 	Ibid. 
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This section of the chapter has so far set out the history 
of wage regulation in the Cape clothing industry fr~m 1928 to 
1934. It has stressed how the members of the CWCMA, the (relatively) 
'good' employers, changed their methods of operation to adapt 
to the determinations and has pointed to the difficulties they 
faced in the depression, competition from CMT factories and the 
invalidation of Determination No.42. The great expansion of the 
industry despite all these setbacks confirmed the manufacturers' 
good opinion of the Wage Board. We now need to look more closely 
at why the clothing manufacturers were able to be so satisfied 
with the Wage Board. First we shall show that the determinations 
were observed even more selectively than we have suggested and 
demonstrate that they were not enforced by the Department of Labour. 
Then we shall suggest why manufacturers made the (still great) 
efforts they did to observe even part of the determinations if 
they were not legally enforced. The next part of this section 
will also describe some of the experiences of garment workers 
during the period that the industry carne under the Wage Board. 
Members of the CWCMA did observe important parts of the deter­
minations and in most cases altered their operations to take account 
of its requirements. Other employers, particularly those in the 
CMT branch of production and at the lower end of the trade, were 
prone to evade or ignore the determination. They observed it 
only as a matter of chance. 160 Even the efforts of 'reputable' 
employers to adapt to the determination were not without their 
limits. The practice of dismissing learners as they became due 
161for higher wages was not in itself a contravention of the deter­
mination, although it was against the spirit of the Wage Act. 
But employers were legally obliged to maintain a ratio between 
the number of unqualified and qualified workers. Cape employers 
repeatedly complained about the impossibility of the ratio provi­
. dId' d' . . 162 I 1935 C TSlon 	an some open y a mltte 19nor~ng It. n ape own 
160. Customs 	Tariff Commission: Minutes of Evidence, pp.3469-72; 
CWCMA Minutes: 28 May 1934; 15 October 1934; 5 March 1934 
- M2/1. 
161. 	See p.195 above; Wage Board Report, 12 April 1935 op.cit., 
paragraphs 42; 52. 
162. 	Ibid., paragraphs 40-41. 
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had the lowest proportion of qualified employees in the country.163 
Where employers did pay attention to the ratio, they often tried 
to get exemption from paying certain of their workers increased 
wages. On occasion workers who were not physically disabled, 
164but rather "naturally slow" ,were told by their employer that 
they could only be kept on if an exemption were granted. In this 
situation, 
••• applicants themselves put up a very strong plea to 
be allowed to work at a reduced rate, as, otherwise, 

165
they 	are faced with the prospect of unemployment. 
It is impossible even to estimate how far the determinations were 
observed. This certainly varied conSiderably over time and between 
'good' and 'bad' employers. What is clear, however, is that the 
wage determinations were never properly enforced by the Department 
of Labour. From the outset, the Department of Labour was eager 
to have industrial councils formed to police the first determina­
tion. The Department was simply "not properly adapted for the 
work".166 It was always understaffed and never able to undertake 
systematic inspections of industries governed by determinations.1~7 
Clothing manufacturers appreciated that, 
••• employers would be troubled more by the agent of 
an Industrial Council than they were by the Labour In­
spectors who were now seeing that the Wage Determination 
. . d 168was be~ng carr~e out. 
163. The 	 proportion set by Wage Determination No.42 was 25%. Cape 
Town had 21% of its female machinists earning at least the 
qualified wage, Durban 23%, Johannesburg 37%, Germiston 32% 
and Pretoria 42%. (Ibid., paragraph 42). 
164. CWCMA Minutes: 30 January 1935 - M2/1. 

165.Cape Federation of Labour Unions Official Organ September 1937. 

166. Advisory 	Council of Labour: Minutes, 5th Session, October 
1925, p.18 S.A.B. ARB1701. 
167. The 	 point is strongly made in Laite (1947, p.232) with respect 
to determinations generally. It is made for Cape Town in 
a letter from the Divisional Inspector, Cape Town to the 
Secretary for Labour, 29 January 1929 (S.A.B. ARB1058/27). 
168. 	CWCMA Minutes: 27 June 1929 - M2/1. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
207 

This was one of the reasons they declined to be drawn into an 
industrial council. Looking back in 1934, a Cape Federation propa­
gandist said of the clothing industry: 
The risk of departmental control under the machinery 
of the Wage Act - admittedly ineffective and incapable 
of cleaning up any industry - was preferred (to the) 
efficient policing of the factories by Agents competent 
by reason of their practical knowledge of the trade. 
With calculating cuteness (the employers realized) the 
possibility of escape and evasion from the penalties 
of infringement through the sparse supply of Industrial 
Inspectors administe~ing a plethora of Determinations. 169 
In 1929 a "factory worker" stated in a letter to the Cape Argus 
that the clothing determination was not observed by employers 
and that Labour Inspectors were easily "hoodwinked" into believing 
170it was. Clever employers faked their wage registerJ71 and 
threatened workers with dismissal if they denied they were paid 
their due wage when questioned. The Department of Labour described 
such a situation where workers 'willingly' accepted wages below 
the minimum as "collusion".172 
During the depression, short-time, retrenchments, the suspen­
sion of increments and the liberal issue of exemption certificates 
kept wages specially low. 173 "Glaring and flagrant" contraventions 
169. 	"Methods Most Foul" (TUCSA Archives, Ad. 4.11). This document 
is written in prose which is garish even by Federation stan­
dards. I have altered the syntax, without affecting the mean­
ing. ("Methods Most Foul" was submitted to the 1934 Industrial 
Legislation Commission by the CFLU). 
170. Cape Argus 28 January 1929. 
171. See CWCMA Minutes: 10 November 1927 - M2/1. 
172. Annual 	Report 1933 (UG 43-1934) p.37; 
Rex v. De Freitas and 2 Others: Cape Supreme Court: Criminal 
Appeals 1 (79) 1936: Evidence of R. Beattie, Divisional In­
spector of Labour (C.A.D.) 
17). 	Letters from John Gomas (S.A. Garment Workers f Union, Cape 
Town) to E.S. Sachs, 24 June 1931; 15 August 1931 (GWUSA 
Archives); Cape Federation of Labour Unions: Annual Report 
1931, pp.12-13; Stuart (1950i). 
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of the determination were reported to the Department of Labour 
174but no prosecutions followed. The CFLU stated that exemptions, 
•••were obtained by methods of a questionable charac­
ter, such as inducing employees during working hours 
to sign forms agreeing to accept these exemptions from 
the Wage rates - a form of mental duress, despicable 
and cruel because enacted on-girls and women who because 
of the suggestive action of their minds fear losing 
their jobs. 175 
The non-enforcement of the determination was regularly given by 
the Garment Workers' Union as one of the reasons it desired an 
industrial council. 176 The CWCMA accepted such assertions until 
Evans stated, at a meeting in 1935, that at least 25 per cent 
of the firms were not observing the determination. The manufactu­
rers said that a Labour Inspector put the figure at 5 per cent. 
Jacobs felt Evans' claim to be exaggerated. He said that 80 per 
cent of the workers were employed by "about 15 reputable firms" 
and that it was only the CMT factories which caused the trouble. 
d " d 177 Evans l.sagree. 
The figures in possession of the Union were based on 
well-founded and serious complaints made by employees. 
Many cases of underpayment or illegal working conditions 
never reached the ears of the Labour Department at all 
because most employees stood in terror of losing their 
jobs if they made a complaint ••• (I)t was generally known 
that if a complaint was made by an employee to the De­
partment of Labour, the name of the employee was almost 
invariably divulged to the employer by the Labour In­
178
spector. 
174. 	Letter from Sachs to the Secretary, S.A. Trades and Labour 
Council, 28 September 1931 (GWUSA Archives). 
175. 	"Methods Most Foul" op.cit. 
176. 	CWCMA Minutes: 13 January 1930; 4 September 1930; 28 May 1934; 
5 May 1935 - M2/1; Garment Workers' Union Commission of 
Inquiry 1949: Minutes of Evidence, p.116 - Rose Crawford 
examined (GWUSA Archives Bce 4). Non-enforcement of clothing 
industry wage determinations is specifically referred to in 
CFLU Annual Reports of 1928, 1931 and 1932. 
177. 	CWCMA Minutes: 5 March 1935 - M2/1. 
178. 	Ibid. 
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This description of the situation is supported and extended by 
letters, speeches and memoranda emanating from the Transvaal gar­
ment workers' union which began an intensive organizing drive 
in Cape Town in 1934. Solly Sachs wrote that 
The vast majority of the workers do not even receive 
the miserable rates provided in the determination, and 
large numbers of workers earn as little as 5/- per week ••• 
The administration of the determination which is in 
the hands of the department of labour is, to say the 
least, damnable! ••• (S)o far there have been no prosecu­
tions ••• although the violations are flagrant and run 
. t 	 t housand 1791n 0 s. 
Sachs organized an investigation of the wages and conditions of 
Cape Town clothing workers. He collected statements from workers 
which revealed "wholesale and flagrant violations f the laws 
of the country, involving unlawful underpayment of wages to wor­
kers amounting to thousands of pounds".180 The strident alle­
gations of the non-enforcement of the determination by the Depart­
ment of Labour181 were not publicly challenged by the Department 
or the CWCMA. 
The Transvaal garment workers' union stated in evidence to 
the Industrial Legislation Commission in 1934: 
It is no exaggeration to state that Wage Board deter­
minations are observed only as far as it suits the em­
· d' 182p1oyers on w hom t hey are b1n 1ng. 
In this context, the 1934 undertaking of the CWCMA to carry out 
179. 	Letter from Sachs to Bill Andrews, 9 November 1934 (GWUSA 
Archives). 
180. 	 'Memorandum Submitted to the Honourable the Minister of Jus­
tice Regarding the Non-Enforcement of Determination No.42 
and Determination No.44 Cape.', 1935 (GWUSA Archives). 
181. 	In addition to the sources cited above, see, for example: 
The Sun 15 February 1935; 22 November 1935. 
Forward 13 September 1935. 
Report of Comrade E. Weinberg to the first general members' 
meeting of the S.A. Garment Workers' Union, 3 June 1935 (GWUSA 
Archives, Cba 2.4). 
182. 	Memorandum submitted to the Industrial Legislation Commission 
by the Garment Workers' Union (Transvaal), September 1934. 
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determination No.42 "in the same manner as before the judgement,,183 
which made it legally invalid, appears less magnanimous. But 
even if the determination was observed only selectively, it is 
nonetheless significant that Cape garment manufacturers voluntarily 
followed the lead of the Wage Board. For the fact that they fol­
lowed this lead (and also the extent to which they followed it) 
is revealing of the conditions of class struggle in the clothing 
industry in Cape Town. 
The forces which stilled the manufacturers' initial opposition 
to the wage determinations were on the one hand 'ideological' 
and on the other 'practical'. The civilized labour policy was 
a key element in the strategy of the Pact government. Part of 
its aim was to provide employment at 'civilized wages' for 1ess­
skilled white workers. Government spokesmen stated that the grant­
ing of tariff protection to industry was conditional on the increase 
of white employment in the industries which benefited from it. 184 
The Wage Board declared its intention of rooting out sweating 
and unfair competition against 'good' employers. These intentions 
were expressed from positions of objective weakness - but the 
clothing manufacturers were not then to know this. Their first 
adaptations to the determination were no venture of faith but 
a response to threats of coercion. 
Higher wages (and later the depression) brought a "better 
class of employee" into the industry.18S This factor, coupled 
with intensive training186 , greatly improved worker efficiency. 
As was the case in Britain after the Tailoring Trades Board began 
work, the~payment of higher wages encouraged the better manage­
ment of factories, a rationalization of production and the use 
of more machinery. The subdivision of tasks was first encouraged 
183. 	CWCMA Minutes: 28 May 1934 - M2/1. 
184. 	Cape Times 11 July 1928; Customs Tariff Commission: Minutes 
of Evidence, p.3207. Also see Kaplan (1976, p.87). 
185. 	Customs Tariff Commission: Minutes of Evidence, p.3476; 
Return of A. Fraser &Co.; Wage Board Report, 23 October 
1931 op.cit., paragraph 7. 
186. 	Customs Tariff Commission: Minutes of Evidence, p.3166; 
Return of A. Fraser &Co. 
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. h d . . 187by t he structure 0 f t he wage scaI e ln t e etermlnatlons. 
In 1931 the Wage Board remarked on the 'sectionalisation' of work 
that had occurred in larger clothing factories. A single shirt 
passed through the hands of twelve workers. The Board implied 
that as work was so sectionalized, a full three year learning 
period was unnecessary.188 Subdivision was further developed 
with the widespread adop~ion of piecework after the Cohen judge­
ment in 1934. Simpler tasks had lower piece rates to force wor­
' .. 'kl 189kers t 0 exert themseI ves more to earn t he mlnlmum wee y wage. 
Changes in the labour process were described by Cape clothing 
manufacturers to the Customs Tariff Commission in 1934. 190 Jacobs 
said: 
••• five years ago one girl made the whole garment. 

A shirt hand made the whole shirt and a pyjama hand 

made the whole pair of pyjamas. Today the work is 

subdivided into definite operations. (p.3166) 

Other manufacturers said that their factories were run on much 
the same basis as those in England. Operators specialised in 
one particular operation to fit in with the specialised machin­
ery used. They stated that their machinery was the most modern 
available. Middlemass said, 
The local representative of Singers went overseas and 

when he came back ••• he told me, 'Your factories are 

187. See p~195 above. 
188. 	Wage Board Report, 25 November 1931 op.cit. 
189. 	Wage Board Report, 12 April 1935 op.cit., paragraphs 17; 27; 47. 
190. 	The dangers of accepting at face value the evidence given 
by organized bodies to Commissions are indicated in Laite's 
instructions to the Cape clothing manufacturers. "(I)t be­
hoved maufacturers to put forward every item of information 
which would be likely to convince the Commission that a pro­
tective policy was vitally necessary for the welfare of the 
Industries of the country. They would have to show that 
under the protective regime there was an increase of civi­
lized labour employed, an increase of capital invested in 
their particular business, increased wages paid, and so on". 
(CWCMA Minutes: 15 October 1934 - M2/1). 
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better equipped than 80% of the factories in Great Bri­
191
tain', that 	shows we keep up-to-date. 
Graph 4.1: 	 Employment by Race in the Cape Town Clothing Industry, 
1925 - 1941 
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In the following year the Wage Board reported that electric cloth 
cutting knives were widely used and that many factories were sub­
stituting Hoffman steam presses for the heavy 14 lb. irons then 
191. Customs 	Tariff Commission: Minutes of Evidence, p.3509g. 
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in use. These increased output by a factor of five. 192 African 
Clothing was the first factory in Cape Town to introduce a con­
veyor belt. In about 1932 a conveyor system was installed which 
produced sixty pairs of trousers in~fifty-five minutes. The 
belt stopped for five minutes every hour to give" workers a rest.
From the late 1920's until the late 1930's there was a great 
influx of white women into the Cape clothing industry. White 
women had barely been employed at all in the clothing industry 
in 1926. In 1934 they made up 40% of the female workforce and 
this proportion was growing (see Graph 4.1 above). 
Graph 4.2: 	 Employment of Women Workers at A. Fraser &Co., 
1924 - 1933194 
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192. 	Wage Board Report, 12 April 1935 op.cit., paragraph 50. 
193. 	Interview with David Lunn, 8 July 1978. Lunn assisted a 
mechanic to instal this conveyor while he was a worker at 
the factory. He states that the Cape factories were then 
very advanced and bought all the newest American machines. 
194. Customs 	Tariff Commission: Return of A. Fraser &Co. Far 
fewer men were employed but the change in the racial composi­
tion of the male labour force follows the same pattern as 
that for women workers. 
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White women moved into the clothing factories partly because 
' d d h . 195the lmprove wages rna e t e work more attractlve ,partI y be-
cause the depression closed other avenues of employment, and 
partly because several factories developed a policy of employing 
white workers. This was specially true of the shirt factories. 
Monat &Co. employed only white women from its foundation in 1926. 196 
Fraser & Co. began to give preference to white workers in 1927. 
The dramatic results of this policy are illustrated above (Graph 4.2). 
The only reason indicated for the preference given to white 
workers was the request of the government that industry, and spe­
cially industry enjoying tariff protection and firms applying 
for government contracts, should employ more whites. 197 The Cape 
manufacturers never described white workers as being more effi­
cient than coloured workers or indeed as being a 'division' of 
the workforce. 198 Their concern was more with learners and quali­
fied workers; with slow and efficient workers than with 'white' 
and 'coloured' workers - all of whom received the same wages and 
worked side-by-side under the same conditions. 
It would, of course, be wrong to explain the evasion of the 
determination only by reference to the failings of the Labour 
Department. 199 Workers could also organize and use the law to 
195. 	See Cape Times 22 January 1929 "Girl Shirt Makers in Cape 
Town -Pleasant work under good conditions". 
196. 	Customs Tariff Commission: Return of Monat & Co.; Interview 
with Edgar Jacobs. 
197. 	Customs Tariff Commission: Minutes of Evidence, p.3207. 
The Cape clothing industry employed a much lower proportion 
of whites than that of the Transvaal and paid them much lower 
wages, yet in 1931 the Wage Board reported that the Cape 
got the bulk of government contracts (Report, 23 October 1931 
op.cit., paragraph 6). In 1927, 89% of government clothing 
contracts had been awarded in the Transvaal(Report, 25 Septem­
ber 1927 op.cit., paragraph 39). 
198. 	In an objection to the 1926 Wage recommendation, Cape employers 
asked that a lower wage be set for coloured workers as the 
higher wages would lead to their dismissal. This seems to 
have been more a ploy to get the Wage Board to set lower 
wages for a group of workers who shared this fear (see p.170 
above) than a serious contention that coloured workers were 
less efficient. The Wage Board rejected the request. (Wage 
Board Report, 25 September 1927 op.cit., paragraph 36). 
199. 	H.J. Laite (1947, p.232) states that the Department of Labour 
responded to criticism of the non-enforcement of determina­
tions by- saying "it was never contemplated that sufficient 
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enforce the prescribed minimum conditions or even force the em­
ployers to pay above the minimum. The Transvaal garment workers' 
union stated: 
The first essential in the enforcement of any Wage Regu­
lation is a well organized union of the workers concerned. 
Without such an organization the Wage Board Determinations 
and Agreements are barely worth the paper they are written 
200 
on. 
This was asking a lot of workers in the Cape clothing industry 
who fell under the Wage Board largely because they were not orga­
nized. Cape Town garment workers were in no position to make 
use of the Wage Act. They were unorganized, the registered union 
was defunct and its 'leaders' were interested only in the forma­
tion of an industrial council. The manufacturers' policy of main­
taining a high rate of labour turnover made workers extremely 
insecure in their jobs and specially vulnerable to threats of 
dismissal. The white labour policy of certain factories weakened 
the position of coloured workers. In addition there was always 
an ample supply of the young women workers needed by the industry. 
In these circumstances, the dominance of the employers went largely 
unchecked. They could decide for themselves how far they would 
comply with the intentions of the Wage Board. 
inspectors would be employed to undertake meticulous enforce­
ment, and employers and employees individually and collec­
tively were urged to co-operate with the Department so as 
to bring about general compliance with wage regulating in­
struments". 
The Minister of Labour said exactly this to W.J. Laite in 
1931 	 (CWCMA Minutes: 11 June 1931 - M2/1). It was then 
seen 	as "an entire change of policy". Earlier correspondence 
and memoranda in the files of the Department of Labour 
clearly express the wish to administer determinations "sys­
tematically". (See, for example, handwritten note by C.W. 
Cousins, Secretary for Labour, on the letter from the Di­
visional Inspector of Labour, Cape Town, 29 January 1929 
S.A.B ARBI058/27). 
200. 	Memorandum submitted to the Industrial Legislative Commis­
sion by the Garment Workers' Union (Transvaal), September 
1934 (GWUSA Archives). 
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The wage determinations were generally ignored or evaded 
by small clothing factories and CMT establishments in Cape Town. 
But the 'reputable' manufacturers, most of whom belonged to the 
CWCMA, did observe the determinations, if selectively. They dis­
cussed the implementation of determinations, and adapted to them 
as a group. The determinations were voluntarily applied by CWCMA 
for several practical reasons which complemented and strengthened 
the ideological inducements mentioned earlier: 
First, a higher wage level was consistent with the introduction 
of new machinery and new techniques of production. 
Second, the determinations provided the manufacturers with an 
agreed wage standard which limited undercutting and unfair 
competition between one another. 
Third, they found that higher wages could mean lower wage costs 
if coupled with careful training in performing subdivided 
tasks and the dismissal of workers as they qualified for 
higher wages. Unintentionally, the Wage Board led the manu­
facturers to find new methods of exploitation - by increasing 
the intensity of labour and the extraction of relative sur­
plus value. 
Fourth, the observation of the determination established them 
as reputable and responsible pioneers of industrial develop­
ment - from this position they could count on a sympathetic 
hearing from government bodies and commissions whose actions 
affected them. 
The Cape clothing manufacturers were impelled to follow the lead 
of the Wage Board by the conditions of class struggle they con­
fronted. The fact that they did not fully implement the designs 
of the Wage Board was also decided by the conditions of class 
struggle - in particular the weakness of labour organization. 
The precise effects of the Wage Act on the clothing industry in 
Cape Town thus grew out of the conditions of class struggle in 
Cape Town. 
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The Significance of the Wage Act 
Our inte'rpretation of the working of the Wage Act in the Cape 
clothing industry throws doubt on some of the arguments used by 
Davies (1979) to assert the importance of the Wage Act in the 
policy of the Pact government. For Davies, the great achievement 
of the Wage Act was to enhance capitalist development in South 
Africa while assisting to resolve the political problems connected 
with poor whitism. He argues this against liberal contentions 
that the Act was economically irrational as it interfered unneces~ 
sarily with the free working of the economy. (p.211, n.BB) He 
points out that the Wage Board always recommended wages close 
to those already paid by higher wage firms in the industry which 
employed more whites. These firms tended to be the more mechanized 
capitals • 
••• (T)he Wage Board in effect gave a further competi­
tive advantage to those capitals employing more mechanized 
labour processes and/or compelled other capitals to 
begin mechanization. (p.214) 
••• (I)n its attempts to promote white employment through 
the medium of the Wage Board the State was in effect 
harmonizing itself with and promoting the trend towards 
mechanizati~n in South African industry. (pp.213/4)201 
The forced increase in wages reduced the ability of small manufac­
turing capitalists to extract surplus value from less mechanized, 
low-wage labour processes. (p.216) Many of these firms lacked 
the capital to change and hence collapsed. 
Davies' argument about the significance of the Wage Act hinges 
on the enforcement of determinations against small employers. 
201. 	Umsebenzi 19 November 1926 makes a similar point: " 
most important bosses ••• support these scales: it is only 
a question of conforming to the standards found most pro­
ductive, from the exploiter's point of view, by the more 
up-to-date capitalists, such as Ford, who moreover will score 
by the elimination of the more backward firms, lacking the 
resources or business ability to compete with their advanced 
rivals. The Wage Board at best attempts to stabilize the 
conditions of the (capitalistically) most 'enlightened' 
factories". 
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Our study of the Cape clothing industry has shown this did not 
occur in this instance. There is every reason to suppose that 
enforcement in other industries was equally lacking. Quite apart 
from the invalidation of many determinations by court judgements 
(Davies, 1979, pp.211; 216-7), which made legal enforcement im­
possible, similar ploys were used by employers in other industries 
to evade determinations and the same shortage of inspectors pre­
202
vailed. Hansi Pollak carried out an intensive study of several 
industries on the Witwatersrand in 1931-2. She commented generally 
on the Wage, Factory and Industrial Conciliation Acts: 
The spirit in which the legislation was designed cer­
tainly surpassed its practical operation, as the elas­
ticity of its interpretation, the subtle ways and means 
devised by many industrialists to evade the Acts and 
the impossibility of vigorous enforcement, due to the 
numerical inadequacy of the Factory Inspectorate, fre­
quently allow of the persistence of those very condi­
tions which it was the aim of the industrial legislation 
to eliminate. (Pollak, 1933, p.56) 
W.H. 	 Hutt, the distinguished economist203 , wrote: 
It is commonly asserted in casual conversation that 
evasion (of wage determinations and agreements) takes 
place on so large a scale that inspectors and other 
officials are unable to cope with it, and are in a po­
sition to prosecute only in exceptional cases. (Hutt, 
1935, pp.40-l) 
All this calls into question whether the Wage Act had the signi­
ficance attributed to it by Davies in promoting either the em­
202. 	See "Methods Most Foul" op.cit.; Laite (1947, pp.181; 232). 
Budlender (1979, pp.131-137) summarizes well many of the 
difficulties surrounding the enforcement of the Wage Act 
before the Second World War. She does not criticise Davies' 
argument directly, but her endorsement of it is qualified. 
"Insofar as it was effectively applied and enforced ••• , the 
Act served to encourage the promotion of efficient industry, 
and the concentration and centralization of industry ••• " 
(my emphasis) (p.122). 
203. 	D.C.T. News February 1983. 
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ployment of white labour or the mechanization of industry. It 
certainly harmonized with both, but called the tune for neither. 
Our description of aspects of the Cape clothing industry in the 
ten years prior to the formation of the first registered indus­
trial council suggests that the Wage Board had a different signi­
ficance from that attributed to it by Davies, or the liberal com­
mentators. 
In the Cape clothing industry, the Wage Act stimulated the 
organization of the CWCMA and the registration of the Garment 
Workers' Union. Once the early attempts to form an industrial 
council had failed, the activities of the Wage Board and the pro­
visions of the determinations continued to be a factor of cohe­
sion for the CWCMA. The members of the CWCMA voluntarily followed 
the lead of the Wage Board in establishing accepted minimum wage 
standards in the clothing industry. The close organization which 
they maintained as a consequence placed them in a strong position 
to resist the attempts of the Transvaal garment workers' union 
to establish an organized base among the Cape garment workers 
after 1934. The possibilities of the Wage Board being used as 
a focus for independent worker (as opposed to employer) organiza­
tion do not emerge from this chapter, but will be seen in follow­
ing chapters. In 1934-5, the Wage Board was a key element in 
the strategy of the Transvaal garment workers' union to organize 
Cape garment workers and to improve their conditions. 
The indirect eff cts of the Wage Act on other industries 
in which industrial councils ~ formed in the 1920's have yet 
to be documented. However, these remarks of F.A.W. Lucas are 
suggestive: 
The existence of the Wage Act has led employers in many 
industries in their desire to escape from its provisions, 
to urge their employees to form trade unions, and then 
to set up Industrial Councils for those industries. 
Often unions so brought into being are very weak. They 
consist largely of the better paid employees who are 
readily liable to negotiate agreements which protect 
and improve their own position while neglecting the 
interests of those employees who are really in need 
of assistance. (Lucas, 1933, p.56) 
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Properly considered, the focus which much recent historical writ­
ing has placed on the Industrial Conciliation Act as the premier 
labour law of South Africa is grossly misleading. The interaction 
between the Industrial Conciliation and Wage Acts in the 1920's 
and 1930's had decisive effects on the character and strategy 
of the union movement (as well as on that of employers' organiza­
tions). Since the 1920's growing unions which have failed to 
get recognition from employers have turned to the Wage Board as 
a substitute opponent outside the factory. The existence of the 
Wage Board has legitimated certain worker struggles which, had 
they been directed against employers immediately, would have been 
suppressed. In other instances initial worker organization around 
demands made of the Wage Board have led to employer recognition 
and the formation of industrial councils. In the 1930's and 1940's, 
the Wage Act became the central element in the organizing strategy 
of emergent black trade unions as well as a main weapon of the 
204State in disorganizing and side-chanelling the black union movement. 
From the discussion above and our analysis of the activities 
of the Wage Board in the garment and tailoring industries in Cape 
Town, three points emerge: 
Firstly, the functions of the Wage Act in the class struggle in 
South Africa have changed over time. 
Secondly, the effects of the Wage Act were determined in the class 
struggle. The effects of the Wage Act were never simply 
what was intended by the legislators or administrators. On 
occasion the unintended effects of the Act were more signi­
ficant than its intended effects. This is seen, for example, 
in the Wage Act inspiring the organization of workers and 
employers under the Industrial Conciliation Act. Before 
the promulgation of the Wage Act,the Industrial Conciliation 
204. The 	 importance of the Wage Act and its changing functions 
are reflected in, for example, Budlender (1979, pp.116-7); 
Davies (1979, pp.256; 265-6); Roux (1964, pp.208-9); Wickins 
(1978, p.99); Stein (c.1978); Hirson (1977) and The Cape 
Times 14 July 1930 (the Wage Board was used in an ICU cam­
paign in Kroonstad). 
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Act had been little used. 205 
Thirdly, the effects of the Wage Act differed between areas and 
industries depending on the conditions of class struggle. 
For example, the wage determinations had very little effect 
on the bespoke tailoring industry in Cape Town compared with 
their effect on the wholesale bespoke and readymade cloth­
ing industry. 
A consciousness of each of these points (for any industry and 
for other industrial laws as well) is essential in interpreting 
local struggles and ought also to reflect on an understanding 
of class struggle in the social formation as a whole. The above 
criticism of Davies, which arises from his assumption that wage 
determinations ¥ere generally enforced, can now be taken further. 
Davies examines the intentions of the Wage Act and then looks 
for evidence of their realisation - which he finds in the increased 
employment of whites. He also examines the modus operandi of 
the Wage Board and looks for likely effects of the wage determina­
tions - a rationalisation of labour processes, more mechanization, 
more centralization and concentration of capital in industry. 
He finds evidence of all of these. Davies then concludes that 
the Wage Act was important in raising white employment and in pro­
moting industry. However, the non-enforcement of wage determina­
tions suggests that the Wage Act was not a major reason for these 
changes. The reason must still be tracked down - in the class 
struggle. 
Davies' interpretation of the Wage Act is flawed because 
it is not adequately based in an assessment of the concrete condi­
tions of class struggle. Davies is too concerned with showing 
that the Act did not adversely affect capital accumulation to 
concern himself with the real significance of the Act. These 
comments do not detract from Davies' analytical framework. The 
hypotheses he raises about the Wage Act remain extremely useful 
in relating the Act to the class struggle. Davies (and others) 
have presented a remarkable interpretation of how the Wage Act and 
other labour legislation of the Pact period arose out of class 
struggle. But the operation of laws, as well as their origins, re­
quires explanation in terms of the class struggle. 
205. See p.164 above. 
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Table 4.2: 	 Comparative Table of Wages of Female Machinists, 
1926 - 1936 
2Column 4 61 8 10 113 5 7 9 
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1st 3 

mths: 
 12/6 18/­ 20/­
2nd 
20/­ 10/­ 15/­ 18/­10/­ 15/­ 15/­ 15/­
22/­ 18/­12/6 22/6 
3rd 
10/­ 25/­ 17/6 12/6 15/­ 15/­ 17/6 
21/­26/­ 25/­
4th 
10/­ 17/6 17/6 15/­ 17/630/­ 15/­ 15/­
21/­ 27/610/­ 17/6 17/6 17/6 30/­32/6 17/6 15/­ 17/6 
22/6 22/6 20/­ 20/­ 25/­ 30/­
6th· 
12/6 22/6 25/­ 32/­5th 35/­
20/­ 25/­ 34/­ 25/­ 32/6 
7th 
22/6 22/6 20/­12/6 27/635/­
20/­ 30/­ 35/­
8th 
22/6 25/­ 36/­25/­ 25/­12/6 37/6 32/6 
40/­22/6 20/­ 25/­ 38/­ 30/­25/­25/­12/6 37/6 35/­ t 

9th 
 45/­
10th 
27/6 40/­'15/­ 40/­ 27/6 32/6 35/­27/6 30/­37/6 
42/­ 35/­ 45/­
11 th 
27/6 27/640/­ 27/6 30/­ 32/637/615/­
40/­ 50/­
12th 
45/­30/­ 32/6 32/640/­ 30/­ 30/­15/­ 37/6 
40/­ 50/­32/6 30/­ 32/640/­ 30/­15/­ 30/­ 37/6 457'= 
4th 

year: 
 50/­40/­ 45/­40/­ 40/­ 35/­ 45/-:17/­ 35/­ 35/­35/­
Qua 1­
ified 
 I 
50/­40/- • 35/­ 45/-, 45/­Wage: 40/­25/­ 35/­ 35/- 40/­35/- ! 
!! 
;" Determination 2 was rendered invalid by Barone v. Rex (TPD, April 1927). 
M, 	The clause discouraging piecework in Determination 42 was declared inval id in 
Rex v. Cohen (NPD, October 1933). Determination 42 as a whole was rendered 
invalid by Rex v. Ryba (TPD, December 1934). 
Sources: Government Gazette 3 December 1926; 22 April 1932; 8 June 1928; 12 July 1935; 
3 Apri I 1936. 
Wage Board Reports on the Clothing Industry dd, 30 November 1926; 23 February 1928. 
CWCMA Minutes: 5 August 1930; 12 March 1931; 3 November 1930 - M2/1. 
Garment Worker November 1936. 
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INVASIONS FROM THE NORTH - A NOTE 

The common subject of the next two chapters is the attempts made 
by the Transvaal garment workers' union to raise the wages of 
garment workers in the coastal areas, and especially in the Cape. 
Lower wages gave coastal factories a competitive advantage over 
Transvaal clothing manufacturers and held back the advance of 
wages in the Transvaal. For over thirty years, Transvaal wages 
remained substantially higher than those at the coast. For this 
whole period, the wage disparity between the inland and coastal 
garment factories was a major concern of the Transvaal garment 
l
workers' union. The ultimate failure of the efforts to form a 
national garment workers' union or to secure a rise in coastal 
wage levels up to those of the Transvaal, led t  Transvaal wage 
standards being cut drastically to conform with those of the 
coast in 1957. Today, garment workers in Cape Town, Durban and 
on the Witwatersrand, the three major centres of the industry, 
have comparably low wages. 
The first efforts of the Transvaal union to raise the wages 
at the coast involved three strategies: applications to the Wage 
Board to recommend Transvaal wage levels for the coast; attempts 
to draw the registered Garment Workers' Union of the Cape 
Peninsula into a national union which would negotiate a national 
industrial council agreement; and attempts to establish a branch 
of the Transvaal union in Cape Town in opposition to the GWU-CP. 
It was apparent from early on that to be effective, even a 
high wage determination would have to be accompanied by the 
organization of the workers. The Department of Labour was unable 
to enforce the wage determination itself and a strong union was 
needed to force employers to observe all the minimum standards. 
1. 	 "Since 1925 the Transvaal clothing manufac turers have made 
the main point of their objec tion to higher wages and 
better conditions for the Transvaal workers, the lower 
wages of the coastal centres" - Statement of E.S. Sachs, 22 
March 1949 (GWUSA Archives, Bbc 1.20.1). Appendix A, 
below, discusses at length the extent and nature of the 
wage disparity in the clothing industry. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
224 

In addition, workers' evidence would influence the Wage Board and 
a union could present worker demands to the Board more effect­
ively than individuals. 
With or without a progressive level of wages set by the Wage 
Board, a union of garment workers had to be formed in Cape Town. 
The GWU-CP existed from 1927 as the registered, recognised union 
of garment workers yet, .as we have seen, it was run by non­
garment workers and after 1928 ceased to have any membership to 
2
speak of. It was non-existent from 1929 to 1934 except in its 
registration certificate and occasionally in the persons of its 
officials. But as long as the shell of the GWU-CP was inhabited 
by Evans and Stuart, who looked no further than a quiet indust­
rial council, a strong garment workers' union in Cape Town would 
have to be a rival union to the GWU-CP. This ought not to have 
presented much difficulty. A rival union would recruit real 
members whereas the GWU-CP had not then even a paper membership. 
It was not a case, to begin with, of challenging an existing 
union or industrial council. The GWU-CP had been established by 
Stuart at the request of the manufacturers in 1926-7. After 1928 
it ceased to hold meetings. It had never represented tne garment 
workers and had no claim to speak for them. 
The moment the Transvaal union began to organize 1n Cape Town 
in 1930 and in 1935, it experienced strong opposition. It was 
reasonable to expect such opposition from the employers, who were 
aware of the militant policy of the Transvaal union in the fac­
tories of Johannesburg and Germiston. But a key weapon used by 
the employers was the Cape Garment Workers' Union, which they and 
the CFLU revived, briefly in 1930 and 1931 and permanently in 
1935. The local officials of the Department of Labour, the 
police and the courts also helped to defend the interests of the 
clothing manufacturers. As Solly Sachs, secretary of the 
Transvaal garment workers' union wrote: 
A determined struggle was carried on between the S.A. Garment 
Workers' Union, a branch of the Transvaal Union to 
organize the Cape Garment Workers into a strong trade union 
and to bring them into one union with the Transvaal Union 
The masses of the Cape Town Garment Workers supported the 
Transvaal Union. The Cape Federation of Labour Unions, of 
2. See Chapter 5 below, footnote 23. 
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which Mr Stuart was Secretary, and the Cape Garment Workers' 
Union, of which Stuart, Evans and Free~tone were secretaries 
at different times, conducted a determined campaign against 
the Transvaal Union and its officials and organizers ••• with 
the help of the Department of Labour, and more particularly, 
the active co-operation and assistance of the Cape Clothing 
Manufacturers, the efforts of the Transvaal Union were ulti­
3
mately defeated. 
This was followed by new efforts to draw the GWU-CP into a 
national union by negotiation. When this strategy failed, still 
more local organizing was undertaken to try to capture the GWU-CP 
'from the inside'. This assault by the Transvaal union continued 
over a 25 year period and led to great bitterness between the 
unions. 4 The battle between the two garment workers' unions also 
hampered the efforts to unite the trade union movement in South 
Africa. None of the published histories of the Transvaal garment 
workers' union do justice to the intensity of the Cape organizing 
campaigns, to their enormous financial costs or to the importance 
attributed to them by the leaders of the union from 1930 to 1955. 
Even Sachs' own history of the union, Garment Workers in Action, 
5barely refers to the major role played by the union in the Cape. 
The immediate intention of the narrative in Chapters 5 and 6 
~s to examine the contention of the Transvaal union that the GWU­
CP was, to all intents and purposes, a "bosses' union", and to 
assess the relative roles of the Cape Union, the CFLU, the CWCMA, 
the Department of Labour and the police and the courts in the 
defeats of the first organizing efforts of the Transvaal garment 
3. 	 'R. Stuart versus E.S. Sachs', c.1945 (GWUSA Archives, Cba 
2.4.4). 
4. 	 In 1941 (a"Vigilance Committee" was formed inside the GWU­
CP), 1943-4 (a direct Transvaal union organizing effort to 
absorb millinery workers in Cape Town), 1945-6 and 1954-5. 
See Nicol (1977). 
5. 	 The manuscript draft of Garment Workers in Action in the 
GWUSA Archives (Bce 2.2.2) contains a substantial but 
incomplete account of the Cape campaigns, 'The Struggle of 
the Garment Workers in the Coastal Areas'. This was not 
included in the book, perhaps because the GWUSA was negotiat­
ing a settlement with the Cape Union in 1955 and Sachs' 
straight condemnation of the GWU-CP as a bosses' union and 
Stuart as a bosses' lackey was, at that stage, best 
forgotten. 
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workers' union in the Cape. The wider purpose is to use the his­
tory of the two efforts - in 1930-1 and 1935-8 - to establish the 
South African Garment Workers' Union (SAGWU) in Cape Town to 
raise several matters for debate. 
First, we are able to take a close look at the strategies of 
worker organization followed in the 1930's by the Transvaal gar­
ment workers' union, by the Communist Party of South Africa and a 
few nascent Trotskyist organizations. Generally all favoured 
working stric tly to the patterns suggested by the Industrial 
Conciliation and Wage Acts. Frequent use was made of the law and 
the courts. As argued in Chapter 2, it is useful to develop an 
understanding of exactly how the industrial legislation contained 
the struggles of workers in registered trade unions. 
Second, the story is of the failure either to deregister a 
rival union which is registered under the Industrial Conciliation 
Act or to depose its reactionary leadership. The Transvaal gar­
ment workers' union was itself the target of various take-over 
bids by the Afrikaner Nationalists. Several of the defenses used 
by the Cape Union against the Transvaal take-over bids were in 
turn used by the Transvaal union against the Nationalists. The 
difficulty of unseating the 'traditional' leadership of a regis­
tered union by using the internal 'democratic' structure remains 
a topical issue today. By present day standards, up until 1939 
the GWU-CP was extremely vulnerable to take-over and opposition. 
It was not a participant in an industrial council of long stand­
ing and no industrial council-tied benefits were provided for 
workers. 
Third, just as the unions stuck to the contours mapped out by 
the Industrial Council and Wage Acts, so did the clothing manu­
facturers. After 1934, the CWCMA recruited many new members and 
persuaded the industry to go into an industrial council with the 
GWU-CP to escape the twin threats posed by a new, higher Wage 
Board recommendation and the growth of a militant union in the 
Cape Town clothing industry. 
Fourth, we are compelled to place the action in the context 
of class struggle in Cape Town. The campaigns provide an ideal 
opportunity to illustrate some of the hypotheses advanced in 
Chapter 2 to explain the characteristics of the class struggle in 
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Cape Town. In particular, they show up the role played by the 
Industrial Conciliation Act and the Stuart Machine in shaping the 
forms of class conflict in the city. No militant unionism com­
parable with that of the Transvaal garment workers ever took root 
in Cape Town. Garment workers in the two centres laboured in the 
same industry, under the same legal and industrial relations sys­
tem and were often the target of organizing efforts by the same 
trade unionists, yet they could hardly have more different his­
tories. Between 1928 and 1935 the Transvaal union participated 
in over one hundred strikes over wages, conditions and union 
recognition. In 1931 and 1932 general strikes brought the entire 
industry to a standstill. Despite lower-wage competition from 
clothing factories at the coast, Transvaal workers t wages and 
conditions improved after the Great Depression. In Cape Town in 
this period there were two strikes - at African Clothing in 1931 
and at I.L. Back in 1936. Neither was supported by the GWU-CP, 
both were directly incited by the Transvaal-funded SAGWU. Both 
strikes were unmitigated failures. Cape Town wages continually 
lagged behind Transvaal levels. 
A comparison of the effects of the Industrial Conciliation 
Act on the forms of worker organization in the Cape Town and 
Witwatersrand clothing industries shows that the Act adapted to 
different situations in starkly different ways. Such a compari­
son throws light on the important question of what conditions of 
class struggle in each situation determined the particular 
effects of the legislation. In the case of Cape Town, Chapter 2 
has suggested that the backwardness of competitive capitalism 
combined with relatively weak worker organization and relatively 
strong employer organization are the crucial factors to be 
considered. The Stuart Machine was a condensate of all these 
factors and the industrial legislation of the 1920's. 
The campaigns of the Transvaal garment workers' union not 
only revealed the power and vulnerability of the Stuart Machine, 
they influenced its future character by driving Stuart and his 
adherents into a still closer alliance with the bosses. 
Ironically, this led to the permanent entrenchment of the Stuart 
Machine in the GWU-CP while it undermined Stuart 's dominance of 
the CFLU and the Cape labour movement - workers saw Stuart and 
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I 
his friends in their true colours and rejected them where they 
were able to. 
Fifth, the campaigns constituted a tangible link between 
class struggle (in the garment industry and in general) in Cape 
Town and on the Witwatersrand. This is seen most blatantly in 
the organizing activities sponsored and directed by the Transvaal 
garment workers' union in Cape Town itself. But it is not only a 
case of the Transvaal intervening in Cape Town. Conditions in 
Cape Town - especially wage conditions - had a significant effect 
in undermining or threatening to undermine wage levels in the 
Transvaal industry. In this less direct, but no less real man­
ner, coastal class struggles set limits to the victories achiev­
able by the better organized workers in the Transvaal. 
The effects of coastal competition on class struggle in the 
Transvaal have their most extreme example in the garment indus­
try. But other industries were also affected by a wage dispar­
ity. This more general wage differential was one of the reasons 
for the Transvaal union movement's concern to unite the labour 
movement of South Africa in one co-ordinating body. The garment 
workers' union's Cape campaigns took place in the context of this 
wider effort to organize Cape Town workers and draw Cape Town 
unions into, first, the South African Trades Union Congress 
(SATUC) and then the South African Trades and Labour Council 
(TLC) • 
The TLC was formed in 1930 with a constitution specially 
tailored to' meet the Cape's demand that any co-ordinating body 
should be non-racial. Transvaal unions continued to be racially 
exclusive, or divided into racially-determined branches but the 
TLC allowed all unions to apply for affiliation - black, white or 
mixed - registered or unregistered. Although the Cape Federation 
participated in drawing up the TLC constitution, it refused to 
join the new body. Soon, the TLC went on the offensive in Cape 
Town. In 1931 it set up a Cape Districts Committee (CDC), made 
up of local branches of several national unions affiliated to the 
TLC as well as a few unions which were independent of the CFLU. 
This was to be a base for a truly national organization of unions 
that included Cape Town unions. The CDC did not achieve any 
notable success until after 1935 when, combined with a growing 
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'left opposition' inside the CFLU, its activities forced Stuart 
to start negotiations with the TLC on unity. The organizing 
crusade amongst the garment workers became a major focus of the 
CDC campaign. 
The different forms of organization/disorganization in the 
Cape Town and Witwatersrand clothing industries reflect on the 
wage disparity in the industry. The wage disparity was the basic 
reason for the campaigns. But it cannot be accepted simply as 'a 
fact of life'. It was the product of complex struggles in the 
garment industry over a thirty year period. The success or 
failure of the campaigns were important in determining both the 
dimensions of the wage disparity and the absolute level of wages 
in Cape Town and on the Witwatersrand. In 1931, the failure to 
force a rise in Cape wages partly accounted for a ten per cent 
cut in Transvaal wages in the following year. In 1935 and 1936, 
Transvaal-sponsored organization in Cape Town assisted to raise 
the wages of Cape garment workers. This, in turn, allowed wages 
in the Transvaal to be increased. 
In general, none of the efforts of the TLC and the Transvaal 
garment workers' union, of the Communist Party or of the numerous 
leftist splinter groups in Cape Town in the 1930's had much suc­
cess in mobilizing the broad mass of workers in the city. The 
economic organizations of the working class in Cape Town, despite 
the absence of a legal 'colour bar', never included the mass of 
less-skilled workers. The trade unions did not provide a nucleus 
for working class political organization which, such as it was, 
appears to have been dominated by the petty-bourgeoisie. The 
reactionary Cape Garment Workers' Union was not merely the 
product of the treachery of "scabs and traitors" - it was the 
issue of class struggle in Cape Town. 
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, 
CHAPTER FIVE 
THE FIRST CAPE CAMPAIGN 1930-1931 

The wage disparity between Cape Town and the Witwatersrand cannot 
alone explain the forays of the Transvaal union into the Cape. 
The undertaking of the campaigns required two additional elements 
- an unwillingness on the part of the Cape labour movement to 
. 1 
challenge manufacturers on the wage difference and a Transvaal 
union able and willing to spend a great deal of time a d money to 
organize workers a thousand miles from its home base. 
No South African trade union has a history more deserving of 
study than the Transvaal garment workers' union. 2 As the first 
successful non-craft union in manufacturing industry, as the 
organizer of women workers, as an originator of parallel unionism 
and as a bitter contender against Afrikaner Nationalism, its his­
tory expresses all the hopes of a strong and united workers move­
ment. It also reveals the impossibility of sustaining such a 
movement while retaining racial divisions in organization. 
Workers in the clothing factories in Johannesburg and 
Germiston were organized by the Witwatersrand Tailors' 
Association (WTA) in _______________________ 
1. 	There were significant wage differentials between the Cape 
and Transvaal in several industries - garments, leather, 
sweets and furniture, for example. The wage differences lead 
to the collapse of the National Industrial Council for the 
Furniture Industry (Cape Times 21 February 1930). 
2. 	The standard history of the union (now called the Garment 
Workers' Union of South Africa) is Sachs (1957). Since 1977, 
several new studies have made use of the considerable archive 
of the union at the University of the Witwatersrand. See 
Touyz (1979); Lewis, J. (1976 and 1978); Berger (1982); Nicol 
(1977). The widely-read article by O'Meara (1978) is 
severely criticised in Touyz (1979 and 1982). Most of these 
studies concentrate on the battle between the union and 
Afrikaner Nationalism which was fought out before 1960. None 
deals with the decline of the union since this date nor with 
the history of parallel unionism in the clothing industry. 
Also useful is Du Plessis (1955). 
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the early 1920' s. This union of male tailoring workers was 
: 
founded in 1913. The WTA was concerned that the factories would 
undercu t the ir bus iness by emp loying more cheap female labour. 
They set up a 'factory section' in their union for these workers 
and, in 1925, established an industrial council with the 
Transvaal Clothing Manufacturers' Association (TCMA). The first 
industrial council agreement was gazetted shortly afterwards. 
In 1928, E.S. Sachs became the general secretary of the WTA. 
The wages 1n the industrial council agreement were relatively 
favourable to workers but they were not widely respected by the 
4
employers and conditions for workers were very bad. The union 
was weakly organized and was unable to insist that employers 
observed the agreement. Although the majority of factory workers 
were Afrikaans-speaking women, no Afrikaner women were members of 
the central committee of the union and there were no women 
organizers. The union was dominated by the, largely Jewish, 
higher-paid, male tailors. Most women workers were ignorant of 
the purposes of a trade union and those who belonged to the union 
were members simply by virtue of a clause in the industrial 
council agreement that TCMA members could only employ trade union 
labour. 5 
Sachs slowly began to organize the Afrikaner women to play an 
active part in the union. Despite opposition from the central 
committee, he began an aggressive campaign to force employees to 
observe the wage agreement. Where he could, Sachs made full use 
of the law and was instrumental in bringing many prosecutions 
against underpaying employers. The union also resorted to strike 
action on many occasions. This often proved most effective. All 
of the women factory workers were white and the majority were 
young, poor Afrikaners who had recently migrated to town from the 
3. 	The WTA changed its name to the "Garment Workers' Union 
(Transvaal)" in 1931. 
4. 	Sachs, E.S. 'The Split in the Garment Workers' Union (Tvl.) 
1934' (GWUSA Archives, Bbc 1.136); Sachs (1956, pp.36-42). 
5. 	Clause 20 in the agreement gazetted on 17 August 1928 
(Government Notice No. 1408). The initial agreement of 1925 
contained the same 'closed shop agreement' between the TCMA 
and the WTA (Government Gazette 11 September 1925, GN 1514). 
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rural areas. The great achievement of Sachs and the: young 
Afrikaner women who were his lieutenants was to mould these work­
ers into a strong and militant trade union. This union, over the 
years, won impressive wage rises and defended itself against the 
divisive intentions of the Afrikaner Nationalists. The garment 
workers' union stood firmly on the left of the trade union move­
ment. It was active in (white and Labour Party) politics and 
gave material support to many strikes and organizing efforts 
outside the garment industry. 
From 1928, the union became identified with the name and 
personality of Solly Sachs. Sachs was born in Lithuania in 1899 
and came to South Africa as a boy with his family. His youth was 
spent in considerable poverty but he educated himself and was 
admitted to the University of the Witwatersrand in the mid­
1920's. Financial difficulties compelled him to leave university 
and he found employment as a trade union secretary. He was an 
active member of the Communist Party until his expUlsion in 1931. 
He remained a committed supporter of communism (and a special 
admirer of Joseph Stalin) until his death in London in 1976. 
Sachs was loathed by the Afrikaner Nationalists, to whom he was 
the embodiment of evil. He was a constant victim of state 
harassment from 1932 onward. His extreme arrogance and political 
opportunism earned him many enemies on both the left and right of 
the labour movement. But he was the key element in the success 
of the garment workers' union. He was secretary of the union for 
25 years until the Nationalist government removed him from office 
in 1953 under the Suppression of Communism Act. 
In 1930, the success of the garment workers' union lay in the 
future. Although Sachs' efforts to enforce the agreement did 
make headway, conditions in the industry remained very unsatis­
factory. The clothing industry on the Witwatersrand was extrem­
ely competitive. Profitability - often viability - was further 
threatened by competition from the Cape and from overseas where 
the wages of clothing workers were even lower than in the 
Transvaal. The struggling clothing manufacturers could often not, 
afford to pay the minimum wage - let alone consider a rise in the 
wage scale. 
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1. Organize or Starve! 
By 1930 our union realised that unless the 
workers of the coastal areas were organised, 
their conditions would remain deplorable, 
and 	our conditions would ultimately sink to 
theirs. 
6 
- Solly Sachs 
Solly Sachs visited Cape Town early in 1930. 7 He wanted the Cape 
garment workers to be properly organized and their union drawn 
into a national garment workers' union which could negotiate 
8
suitable wages for the whole country. Sachs called at the CFLU 
offices and spoke to Stuart, who referred him to Evans. This was 
not the first approach made to the CFLU on the subject of a nat­
ional organization of clothing workers. Early in 1928, the WTA 
held a conference to discuss the matter which Stuart and A.Z. 
Berman attended. 9 Nothing came of this. Nothing came of Sachs' 
new approach either. Sachs was not a diplomat. He did not 
approach Stuart and Evans to request brotherly assistance from 
the Cape labour movement and the GWU-CP to solve the problems 
created by the wage disparity. He made it plain that it was his 
intention to organize the Cape garment workers whatever the 
attitude of the leaders of .the CFLU. Before his arrival he had 
made statements to the press criticising the low wages and poor 
6. 	 'Statement of E.S. Sachs', 22 March 1949 (GWUSA Archives, Bcc 
1.20.1). 
'7. 	Sachs was part of a joint TCMA/WTA deputation to the Minister 
of Finance to press for a higher tariff on clothing. The 
deputation was expanded in Cape Town to include the CWCMA 
(CWCMA Minutes: 10 February 1930 - special meeting with 
representatives of the Industrial Council for the Clothing 
Industry (Transvaal». 
8. 	Sachs, E.S. 'The Struggle of the Garment Workers in the 
Coastal Areas' (GWUSA Archives Bce 2.2.2). 
9. 	CFLU Minutes: 20 January 1928 (TUCSA Archives). 
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10
organization of workers in Cape Town. He had declared his 
intention of forming a national industrial council for the 
" "d 11c1oth1ng 1n ustry. Stuart and Evans correctly regarded Sachs' 
request for co-operation as an ultimatum - either they submitted 
to Transvaal leadership voluntarily or Sachs would organize the 
Cape garment workers himself. 
Stuart lost no time in arranging a meeting with the CWCMA. 
He explained that "the Trade Union in the North" was striving to 
form a national union with the ultimate object of raising Cape 
wages up to Transvaal levels. The operation of the Transvaal 
industrial council agreement over a national area "would be 
I " ,,12detrimental to the Cape manuf acturers 1nterests • If the 
manufacturers did not want a national industrial council to be, 
••• forced on them, Mr Stuart said that they would have to 
assist by strengthening the trade un10n in the Cape by 
getting their employees to become members, and to still 
further insure against the contingency of a National 
Agreement and domination by the Transvaal, he suggested that 
the Cape clothing industry form its own industrial council 
and manage 1ts own a a1rs." ff" 13 
The manufacturers readily agreed to encourage their workers to 
become members of the Union. Laite suggested that they post 
notices in the factories stating that employers, 
••• had no objection to their employees being members of the 
Trade Union, and that it would be advantageous for them to 
"" J01n. 14 
The CWCMA also agreed to give "serious consideration" to the 
formation of an industrial council. 
Sachs meanwhile decided to 19nore the CFLU and establish 
direct contact with the workers. He wanted to assess the chances 
10. Cape Times 16 December 1929; 20 December 1929. 
11. Cape Times 6 January 1930. 
12. CWCMA Minutes: 13 January 1930 - M2/1 
13. Ibid. 
14. Ibid. 
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of organizing the garment workers indepen?ently of the CFLU and 
the GWU-CP. His main local contact was John Gomas, a tailor and 
political activist who had corresponded with the Transvaal 
garment workers union since at least 1927. 15 Gomas was a devoted 
member of the Communist Party (Cp). He had been an important 
figure in the ICU, holding the post of Provincial Secretary of 
the Western Cape when the communists were expelled from the ICU 
in 1926 (Wickins, 1978, pp.85,107,109). He then played a leading 
role in the revival of the ANC in Cape Town (Roux, 1964, p.204). 
Sachs and Gomas called a public meeting of garment and 
tailoring workers in Cape Town in February 1930. 16 About sixty 
workers attended. Sachs later wrote: 
They all told us of the terrible conditions under which they 
were compelled to work; that the Cape Garment Workers I Union 
was a bosses ' union, in which the workers had no confidence 
at all. They expressed great admiration for our Union, and 
begged us to send people to organize the garment workers of 
17the 	Cape. 
The Transvaal union opened an office in Cape Town to organize 
garment workers into a new body called the South African Garment 
Workers I Union (SAGWU). John Gomas was appointed part-time 
18
secretary at a salary of £10 a month. The SAGWU made little 
progress. Worker sUbscription income declined steadily from 16 
19
shillings in March to 6/6 by May. But from June the SAGWU 
showed new signs of life. Once Bennie Weinbren was employed to 
take over as secretary, membership began to rise. 
15. 	Letter from. Gomas to C.F. Glass (general secretary of the 
WTA), 31 May 1927 (GWUSA Archives). 
16. 	Pamphlet issued for 16 February 1930 (GWUSA Archives). 
17. 	 'The Struggle of the Garment Workers ••• I Ope cit., p.11/156. 
18. 	 Ibid; SAGWU Financial Statements, March-August 1930 (GWUSA 
Archives) • 
19. 	Ibid. Gomas was very likely diverted by the efforts of 
Thaele to expel him and other communists from the ANC. These 
reached a climax in 1930 (Roux, 1964, pp.236-43). 
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Weinbren had been chairman of the Federation of Non-European 
Trade Unions on the Witwatersrand and an organizer of several 
successful African unions which the CP had built up as the ICU 
declined (Roux, 1944, p.83; Simons & Simons, 1969, pp.377,424)' 
Weinbren was a believer l.n "a revolutionary and militant 
policy".20 He was a firm advocate of the strike weapon. At a 
trade union conference in Cape Town in 193021 he seconded a 
motion that the clauses of the Industrial Conciliation Act which 
prohibited strikes should be abolished. The minutes recorded: 
Mr Weinbren agreed with the motion but demanded the entire 
repeal of the Act. It arose out of the 1922 strike on the 
Witwatersrand. The Industrial Councils only functioned when 
unions are we 11 organized. In any case the class struggle 
continued and there could be no conciliation between employ­
22 
ers 	and employees. 
Weinbren's brief was to organize a strong union which would allow 
an application to be made for the skeleton GWU-CP to be 
deregistered and the SAGWU registered in its stead. On the face 
of it, this was a simple task. It did not involve drawing 
members away from the GWU-CP, as that union existed only on 
23 paper. It held no meetings, it had no representative on the 
CFLU executive24 , it organized no workers, it turned a blind eye 
20. 	Trades & Labour Journal of South Africa, December 1931. 
21. 	This was the founding conference of the SA Trades and Labour 
Council. Weinbren (and John Gomas) represented the Transvaal 
garment workers' union. 
22. 	All-In Trades Union Conference: Report of Proceedings, 4-6 
October 1930 (Ballinger Papers, Jagger Library, UCT - BC347 
AI0.II). 
23. 	This is beyond question. See, for example 'Statement of E.S. 
Sachs', op. cit.; 'R. Stuart versus E.S. Sachs, op. cit., 
'The Struggle of the Garment Workers in the Coastal Area', 
op. cit.; 'Statement of David Lunn', paragraphs 3,7,16 (GWUSA 
Archives Cba 2.4.4); Garment Workers Union Cormnission of 
Enquiry Minutes of Evidence: Evidence of Rose Crawford, p.120 
(GWUSA Archives, Bca 4). 
24. 	 See the CFLU Minutes 1929-1931 (TUCSA Archives). 
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to the "abominable" wages and conditions ~n the clothing 
25factories • But Weinbren found organizing to be slow, hard 
work. However disgruntled, workers were scared of confronting 
their employers. Weinbren wrote to Sachs: 
I am getting a number of complaints of underpayment, but 
unfortunately, some of them are afraid to make publicity of 
same in case of the sack. I use as much propaganda with 
these workers to try and induce them to allow me to proceed 
with these grievances, but like taking out teeth, they'll 
26
wait another little while etc. 
The employers, forewarned by Stuart, discouraged their 
workers from joining the SAGWU. Although Sachs later alleged 
that some workers were dismissed for their membership of the 
SAGWU27 , there is no strong indication that employers had to go 
so far. The mere expression of their wish that workers should 
not join the SAGWU was sufficient. The manager of The African 
Clothing Factory told a group of workers that, 
He did not object to them being· members of a respectable 
union ••• but he objected to workers associating with these 
Johburg hotheads, who were out to turn their heads and under­
mine the conditions of the factories and get all the trade to 
28Johannesburg. 
The CFLU stressed this last point to question the motives behind 
the formation of the SAGWU. Weinbren reported that at a CFLU 
meeting, 
••• we were attacked because we are anti-coloured and are out 
to get rid of all the Coloureds and give all jobs to the 
h . 29 w ~tes. 
25. 	Sachs, quoted in Cape Times 28 February 1930. 
26. 	Letter from Weinbren to Sachs, 7 August 1930 (GWUSA Archives 
Cba 2.4.1). 
27. 	 'R. Stuart versus E.S. Sachs' op. cit., paragraph 13. 
28. 	Letter from Weinbren to Sachs, 24 July 1930 (GWUSA Archives). 
29. 	 Ibid. 
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The same allegation was made by a speaker from the floor at a 
30local ANC rally. 
Despite the caution of the workers and opposition from both 
the clothing bosses and the Cape Town labour movement, Weinbren 
remained optimistic. He wrote in early August: 
The Union is gradually becoming more militant and before long 
I hope to make it an organization with a fighting policy.31 
By the end of the month the SAGWU had one hundred paying mem­
32bers d W ' b 	 h CMA k f ' an e1n l"Bn wrote to t e CW to as or a meet1ng to 
discuss the formation of an Industrial Council. The employers 
refused. 33 Weinbren then wrote to the Wage Board to request a 
new investigation of the Cape clothing industry. He stated that 
the workers had not been sufficiently represented at the previous 
Wage Board sitting and that the SAGWU was, 
••• the only organization in the Cape that can claim to be the 
representative union of the bespoke section as well as the 
' . 34manu f actur1ng sect10n. 
Although this was a hollow claim, given that over two thousand 
workers were employed in the industry and the SAGWU never claimed 
a membership of more than 120, the rival union probably had more 
members than the registered union and was the only active organ­
izing body. 
In late 1930, Evans approached the CWCMA to suggest the 
establ1S' hment 0 f an 1n'dustr1a'1 counC1.'  35 The 'SAGWU presence 1n 
Cape Town was not even mentioned in the minutes of the first 
meeting. The concern of the manufacturers was whether an 
30. 	Ibid. 
31. 	Letter from Weinbren to Sachs, 7 August 1930 (GWUSA Archives, 
Cba 2.4.1). 
32. 	Letter from Weinbren to Sachs, 20 August 1930 (GWUSA 
Archives) • 
33. 	Letter from Weinbren to CWCMA, 27 August 1930; letter from 
Laite to Weinbren, 30 August 1930 (GWUSA Archives). 
34. 	Letters from Weinbren to the Wage Board and to the Minister 
of Labour, 11 September 1930 (GWUSA Archives). 
35. 	See Chapter 4. 
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industrial council agreement would allow them to reduce wages. 
The SAGWU became an issue only once the Department of Labour 
revealed that it was to investigate the "representativeness" of 
the GWU-CP as the SAGWU had applied for registration. 36 Laite 
explained to the manufacturers that, 
••• unless the Dept. could be satisfied that their Union 
adequately represented the employees in the industry, it 
would be de-registered in favour of the registration of the 
other organization which had been fostered by the Transvaal. 
If this eventuated it would probably result in the formation 
of a National organization of employees, to be followed by 
the formation of a National Industrial Council ••• 37 
Laite stated that this interference would be prevented if the 
Cape manufacturers formed an industrial council of their own. 
The minutes recorded: 
It was the opinion of the members that it would be in their 
best interest to form a local Industrial Council and, if 
necessary, by means of a stop order system••• to ass ist the 
Trade Union to become representative of the workers in the 
38Industry. 
When the Divisional Inspector of Labour investigated the 
representivity of the two Unions ten days later he reported that, 
Both in a way are functioning, so far as holding meetings 
go •••The Manufacturers have given Mr. Evans a definite 
promise ••• that they will do all in their power to assist in 
the organization of the employees, in the way of distribution 
of notices of meetings or stop orders on wages for Union 
36. 	CWCMA Minutes: 30 September 1930 - M2/l. 
37. 	CWCMA Minutes: 30 September 1930 - M2/l. 
38. 	Ibid. The manufacturers, as in the past, abandoned the idea 
of forming an industrial council once the Minister again made 
it clear that he would not approve of an agreement with lower 
wages than in the current wage determination (Letter from 
Ivan Walker of the Department of Labour to CWCMA, 29 October 
1930 S.A.B. ARB 1058/27). 
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,. 39 
subscrlptlons. 
In consequence of such assistance the GWU-CP had a paying 
membership approaching 200. Weinbren's books indicated 109 mem­
bers. The Divisional Inspector was unsuccessful in arranging a 
. b W ' b d 	 1 h d' 40meetlng etween eln ren an Evans to reso ve t e lspute. 
In February 1931, the SAGWU sent a deputation to the 
Department of Labour in Pretoria to demand the de-registration of 
the GWU-CP as it "had become defunct" and was in no way represen­
tative of the garment workers. 41 The Secretary for Labour re­
fused to do this as he understood that, 
••• the Cape Garment Workers' Union is endeavouring to 
increase its effective membership by means of a propaganda 
. 42
campalgn. 
After a year of operation, SAGWU had 112 members and had failed 
to secure the de-registration of the GWU-CP. Weinbren returned 
to Johannesburg to be secretary of the Reef (Native Trade) 
Assistants union,43 leaving the organization in the care of John 
Gomas. 
As the depression deepened, the chances of carrying through 
the organization of a rival union of garment workers diminished. 
Gomas reported to S.achs that many· workers were on short time or 
unemployed and the manufacturers had not the least regard for the 
wage determination. He thought that if the GWU-CP were to con­
tinue their organizing effort, 
It seems to me there can be little difficulties in their way 
in gaining a certain amount of success. They have the 
39. 	Letter from Playfair to the Secretary for Labour, 10 October 
1930. S.A.B. ARB 1058/27. 
40. 	 Ibid. 
41. 	Letter from the SAGWU to the Secretary for Labour, 9 February 
1931 S.A.B. ARB 1054/306; letter from Secretary for Labour 
to Sachs (Transvaal Garment Workers Union), 29 May 1931 
(GWUSA Archives, Bbe 1.1.1). 
42. 	Letter to Sachs, 29 May 1931 op. cit. 
43. 	Trades & Labour Journal of South Africa, December 1931. 
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manpower, finance and halls of the Federation behind them. 
This on the other hand has been the entire drawback with 
44 
us. 
2. 	 Organize and Starve 
IlThe workers are determined to win and only 
starvation can drive them back defeated." 
- SAGWU circular, 29 August 1931. 
The SAGWU should have died quietly and unmourned in mid-1931. 
But the decline of the SAGWU coincided with new crises within the 
garment industry, the Communist Party and the South African 
labour movement. The unfortunate garment workers of the African 
Clothing Factory were pushed into a suicidal strike in which 
these crises all found expression. The SAGWU died not with a 
whimper but a bang. 
The crisis in the garment industry had two sources - the wage 
disparity between the Cape and Transvaal and the depression. In 
1931, for the first time, the bulk of government clothing con­
45tracts were awarded in Cape Town. The Transvaal union was 
extremely concerned about this as the TCMA had attributed this 
loss of business to the lower coastal wages and had refused to 
renew or improve the industrial council agreement. The Transvaal 
union had to go through the motions of calling a general strike 
before it was decided to extend the old agreement until October 
1931. This merely served to postpone the battle but any success 
achieved in the Cape campaign in the interim would strengthen the 
union's hand. Sachs promised Gomas continued and increased 
financial support and urged him to renew his efforts to organize 
46the 	Cape workers. 
In July 1931 the Divisional Inspector of Labour reported that 
work was IIpractically at a standstill" in the clothing factories 
apart from work on a few government contracts. At African 
44. 	Letter from Gomas to Sachs, 24 June 1931 (GWUSA Archives). 
45. 	Wage Board Report, 23 October 1931 op. cit., paragraph 6. 
46. 	See letter from Gomas to Sachs, 15 August 1931 (GWUSA 
Archives) • 
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Clothing, for example, sixty workers had already been retrenched 
and sixty more were under notice. 
The factory is particularly quiet and it is plain to see that 
the Proprietor is worried and irritated to such an extent 
that he will scarcely see Inspectors. The position here is 
further complicated by the fact that many of the Coloured 
workers who have been sacked or are under no~ice have offered 
47to work at any wages. 
Workers at African Clothing, the largest factory in Cape 
Town, were informed of a third wave of retrenchments in mid-
August. The leaders of the SAGWU used this opportunity to call a 
strike. It was the worst possible moment for workers to confront 
the management. Even if all the workers had supported the 
strike, its success would have been doubtful. The factory was 
decreasing output as markets contracted and it was unable to meet 
48foreign competition and still make a profit. The management 
stated that, 
••• the strike could not have taken place at a more convenient 
49time in so far as they were personally concerned. 
But 	 the SAGWU did not succeed in convincing even a third of the 
workforce to join the strike. The SAGWU was not properly organ­
ized in the factory. Few of the workers were even members of the 
union. A unionist later commented, 
••• there can be no doubt that at the beginning of this 
.. SO
strugg1e t here was not a semblance 0 f organ1zat10n. 
The 	 strike was lost before it began. 
To understand why Gomas promoted the strike we need to look 
47. 	Letter from R. Beattie to the Secretary for Labour, 4 July 
1931 S.A.B. ARB 1069/22. 
48. 	Cape Times 20 August 1931. 
49. 	Letter from A.G. Forsyth, chairman of CDC of the TLC to W.H. 
Andrews, secretary of the TLC, 25 August 1931 (GWUSA 
Archives) • 
SO. 	 Letter from Forsyth to Andrews, 3 September 1931 (GWUSA 
Archives). 
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beyond Sachs I eagerness for results and the effect!3 of the de­
pression to the crises which dismembered the Communist Party of 
South Africa after 1930. 
By 1930, the CP had recovered from the setback it suffered on 
the expulsion of its members from key positions in the ICU. It 
had built up a membership, the majority being black, approaching 
3 000 (Roux, 1944, p.104) and had organized successful African 
trade unions on the Witwatersrand which embraced over 10 000 
workers (Roux, 1944, p.83). In 1929 the Party ran a campaign in 
the Transkei where S.P. Bunting stood for election to Parliament 
as a native representative. Bunting lost the election but, as a 
propaganda exercise, the campaign was a great success (Roux, 
1964, p.217). The following year, the CP set up a League of 
African Rights which was to be a mass organization to fight for 
the abolition of pass laws, the extension of the franchise and 
free education. It was enthusiastically supported by a wide 
range of opposition groups. The CP was successfully tuning its 
actions to the class struggle in South Africa and was growing 
stronger and more influential despite intense police repression. 
But by 1933 the Party was reduced to a membership of 150 
after engaging in an orgy of self-destruction which made it impo­
tent for a decade. 
The destruction of the CP had its origins in the role played 
by the 3rd Communist International. The Comintern was conceived 
by Lenin and Trotsky as a world Party which would lead the world 
revolution they confidently expected after ,the First World War. 
When this revolution failed to emerge and the Soviet Union came 
under attack from the capitalist countries, the Comintern degen­
erated into an arm of the Soviet government. Foreign communist 
parties were manipulated to serve the selfish interests of Soviet 
foreign policy.51 As serious was the effect the Comintern had on 
inculcating within communist parties a blind adherance to and re­
liance on the policies of the Soviet Party. Loyalty to the party 
line, however irrational, however swiftly veering between oppo­
sits, became the most essential attribute of a party member. In 
51. See Claudin (1975); Trotsky (1974); Carr (1982). 
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th~ Soviet Union dissidents were shot or exiled, in other count­
ries they were merely expelled from the Party. 
The Comintern had first left the tiny South African party to 
its own devices and allowed it to work out its own ways of giving 
effect to the resolutions of the congresses of the International. 
But as the organizational apparatus of the Comintern grew and as 
the fomenting of revolution in the colonies became an aim of 
soviet foreign policy, it began to establish a tight control on 
the South African party (Roux, 1944, pp.86,87; Claudin, 1975, 
pp.270-l). This was first seen in the imposition of the Black 
Republic policy on the CPSA in spite of it being opposed by the 
majority of the Party. It continued with an instruction coming 
from Moscow to disband the League of African Rights as it put 
forward reformist demands and then with the installation of 
Douglas Wolton as the general secretary, and effective dictator 
over the Party in September 1930. Through Wolton, his wife Molly 
and Lazar Bach, the CPSA began to mimic the attitudes and actions 
of the Soviet Party and, in chorus with other parties, mechanic­
ally repeat the "guiding slogans" of the "world revolution". 
The harm wrought by these practices in South Africa was small 
when compared with the dire effects they produced elsewhere, most 
notoriously in China and Germany. In China, Stalin's insistance 
that the Chinese Party should remain allied to the Kuomintang led 
to its decimation in a massacre planned by Chiang Kai-Shek 
(Deutscher, 1966, p.396; Claudin, 1975, pp.271-4). In Germany, 
the insistence that the KPD should attack the social democrats as 
'social fascists' paved the way for the Nazi victory and the de­
struction of the most advanced working class in Europe (Claudin, 
1975, p.152 et seq.). In South Africa the policies of the 
Comintern merely put an end to the influence the Party was begin­
52
ning to have over the mass of black workers and peasants and 
rooted within it a Stalinism which endures to this day. 
In late 1931, the SACP was in the process of following 
52. 	Roux 0944, p.88). Roux notes that the storm in the Party 
"destroyed the influence of the CP over the Bantu masses more 
effectively than even the police of the South African 
Government could have done". 
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Stalin's latest move to the 'left'. 53 The emphasis of the Party 
was on two points - crushing the "Right Danger" and on mounting 
"revolutionary" campaigns to heighten the class struggle. The 
right danger was represented by social democrats and reformists. 
No alliances were to be considered between the Party and social 
democratic organizations. Party members who betrayed social de­
mocratic tendencies were ruthless 1y expelled (as were any who 
dared question 'Party' decisions54). The CP had been a prime 
target of the 'reign of terror' launched by Pirow against all 
radical opposition after 1929. Hirson (1982) suggests that this 
was a time to retreat and protect the Party and its membership, 
but instead, "the leaders urged new struggle and still spoke of 
the coming revolution" (p.18). The main organizational resol­
ution at the 1930 Party conference stated: 
It is the task of the party to take the initiative in pre­
paring strikes and to win the independent leadership of all 
economic struggles and to convert the local partial struggles 
increasingly taking place, into wide class battles developing 
55into mass political struggles. 
In mid-1931, Wolton 'revived' the Federation of Non-European 
Trade Unions which had declined rapidly after the departure of 
Weinbren and the expulsion of T.W. Thibedi in 1930. The organ­
ization was renamed the African Federation of Trade Unions (AFTU) 
and stood for, 
••• a revolutionary class struggle, uniting all workers, black 
and white, against the Government, Employers and Trade Union 
Bureaucrats who now form a united trinity against the 
workers. 56 
53. 	See Roux (1944, p.123 et seq.), Roux (1964, p.255 et seq.). 
54. 	Most 'Party' decisions were taken by Wo1ton, who also con­
trolled the Party newspaper Umsebenzi. Much of Umsebenzi 
reads like anti-communist satire. On page 2, column 2 of the 
25 February 1933 edition we read of the expUlsion of Gana 
Makabeni. The expUlsion notice is signed by one Comrade 
Mafisa who is himself expelled in a notice tucked away in 
column 1. 
55. 	Quoted in Hirson (1982, p.18). 
56. 	Umsebenzi 4 September 1931. 
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The AFTU broke new ground in ~trongly opposing the participation 
of unions in "class collaboration legislation ll Up to this point• 
(and afterwards) the use of legal machinery to improve wages and 
organize unions was an accepted strategy of the CPo But from the 
end of 1931 any communist in trade unions who did not renounce 
the Industrial Conciliation and Wage Acts was expelled. Few 
trade unionists were left in the Party by 1934. The AFTU does 
not seem ever to have organized unions itself. It confined its 
role to forming "revolutionary opposition groups in the existing 
. . 11 57 
re f orm~st un~ons • 
The AFTU launched itself upon the scene just as the SAGWU was 
· . h . .. ff 58 fto beg~n w~t ~ts new organ~z~ng e ort. On account 0 the 
close links of Gomas (and Sachs59 ) with the CP, SAGWU became 
allied with the aims of the AFTU. The unsuspecting workers of 
African Clothing were to be the first to experience the effects 
of a IImilitant Red Trade Union based upon a sharp class struggle 
policy,,60 Even before the strike began, "orthodox labour cir­
cles" in Cape Town condemned the promotion of a strike as "the 
effort of Communists acting on instructions to infiltrate trade 
unions". It was being fostered, 
••• because of the general communist principle that all 
strikes are desirable because they rouse the fighting spirit 
of the workers and promote aggressive class hostility.61 
Gomas did not engineer the strike alone. He was assisted by 
a group of militant garment workers and James La Guma, the chair 
57. 	Umsebenzi 4 March 1932. See Simons & Simons (1969, p.444) 
In the Transvaal garment workers' union the AFTU organized a 
"mass trial of disloyal garment workers" in 1933. Sachs 
first welcomed the AFTU as "an organization to ginger up the 
membership" (Umsebenzi 24 July 1931). See Touyz (1979, pp.61­
2 and 65-68) and Sachs, E.S. 'The Split in the Garment 
Workers' Union (Tvl) 1934 Ope cit. on the activities of the 
AFTU in the Transvaal union. 
58. 	Umsebenzi 10 July 1931. 
59. 	Sachs supported the formation and intentions of the AFTU in 
Umsebenzi 24 July 1931. 
60. 	Umsebenzi 21 August 1931. 
61. 	Cape Times 20 August 1931. 
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62 
man of SAGWU. ! Also, the strike was fired by many grievances 
beyond the intended dismissals. Workers were seething with frus­
tration at past dismissals, wage cuts, short time, underpayment 
of wages due, swearing by foremen and the continual dismissal of 
qualified workers and their replacement by juveniles. The wage 
determination pro,vided minimum wages for "learners" and qualified 
workers. For example, the wage of a female learner with no pre­
vious experience' in the industry was fifteen shillings a week. 
This minimum was increased by small amounts periodically until, 
after three years of employment, workers were entitled to a mini­
63 
mum wage of forty shillings a week. As most tasks could be 
mastered in a matter of months, employers tended to fire workers 
as they became entitled, through length of service, to higher 
wages and to replace them with low-paid beginners. Thus a CWCMA 
meeting was told that the new batch of dismissals at African 
Clothing were necessary not because the factory was reducing its 
staff, but because the workers concerned, 
••• were unable to earn the minimum wage fixed under the Wage 
• • 64Board Determ1nat10n. 
Simon Roytowski, the owner of the factory, had told the workers 
that if they obtained exemption from the increments they could be 
65kept on, "but otherwise they would have to be put off" • This 
was a common strategy by which clothing manufacturers adapted to 
the wage determination. It was not prohibited in the det~rmin-
ation and was merely intensified by the depression. As long as 
garment workers ,were unorganized this practice could not be 
checked. As Gomas wrote, 
••• the alternative is to organize strongly and to resist the 
systematical attack on their conditions and to follow the 
62. 	La Guma had recently been readmitted to the CP after expul­
sion in 1929. Before then he had been general secretary of 
the ICU (until 1926) and secretary of FNETU. He had been a 
leading supporter of the Black Republic policy and had twice 
been to Moscow. 
63. 	Wage Determination No. 15. 
64. 	CWCMA Minutes: 1 September 1931 - M2/1. 
65. 	Cape Times 21 August 1931. 
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66lead of the Johburg workers. 
But the encouragement of a strike l.n an unorganized factory in 
the depths of a depression was sheer adventurism. 
The morning after the planned retrenchments were announced, 
the SAGWU, said Gomas, 
••• issued immediately an incl.tl.ng leaflet calling the workers 
• d' 	 • 67to a meetl.ng an urgl.ng them to strl.ke. 
The meeting was poorly attended but those present, "the most 
qualified and experienced workers" joined the union and agreed to 
persuade other workers to "join up and prepare for a strike. 1I68 
Gomas wrote to Sachs that, 
We have emphasised to the workers that strong financial 
assistance can be expected from the Joburg workers in the 
'd ,69event t hey decl. e to strl.ke. 
Through the next week the SAGWU held lunch-time meetings near 
the factory and an evening meeting at a "packed" Fidelity Hall. 
70More workers signed up. The controversy over the retrenchments 
was well aired l.n the press. The Cape Times described the 
" around the retrenchments as a "".l.ntrl.gue ,,71 ,agl.tatl.on Comnunl.st 
but printed in full all the demands, pamphlets and resolutions of 
the SAGWU. When the SAGWU stated that it had wide worker backing 
for the threat to strike, the African Clothing Factory responded 
by showing the press a declaration, signed by 367 workers, 
••• repudiating their association with the SA Garment Workers' 
Union and denying that any attended the SA Garment Workers' 
Union meeting at which the resolution (to strike) was 
72passed. 
66. 	Letter from Gomas to Sachs, recounting the SAGWU's message to 
workers at the start of the campaign, 15 August 1931 (GWUSA 
Archives). 
67. 	Ibid. (The leaflet was quoted in full in a Cape Times report 
of 20 August 1930, see below). 
68. 	Ibid. 
69. 	Ibid. 
70. 	Letter from Gomas to Sachs, 19 August 1931 (GWUSA Archives). 
71. 	 20 August 1931; 22 August 1931. 
72. 	Cape Times 22 August 1931. 
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The declaration, taken round for signature by the foreman, stated 
that workers were not dissatisfied with their employment. This 
incident demonstrates the lack of worker solidarity in the fac­
tory, quite apart from the lack of organization. 
Despite all the portents of disaster, the leaders of the 
SAGWU and their supporters were determined to call. a strike. A 
pamphlet read, in part: 
Because you are the mos t unorganized ••• your wages are the 
lowest ••• The garment workers of Johannesburg, they are 
organized! They struggle! They strike! Against sweating! 
Against wage cuts! Against short time and unemployment! 
They are more successful. 
Cape Town factory and bespoke tailors, do the same! ••• 
Wake up! Organize! Strikel 73 
The strike began on Monday 24 August 1931. 
Gomas had told Sachs that the SAGWU had no money, no meeting 
. d . 74p1ace and no exper1ence organ1zers. The Transvaal union im­
mediately sent off money and two organizers to Cape Town, but it 
was several days before they arrived. Roytowski refused to speak 
to Gomas or La Guma, the leaders of SAGWU. In this situation 
there was a role for A.G. Forsyth and the brand new Cape 
Districts Committee of the Trades and Labour Council. Through 
the involvement of Forsyth, the strike at African Clothing was 
vested with an additional significance as a site of struggle be­
tween the trade union movement of the north and that of the 
south. 
Since the formation of the South African Industrial 
Federation in 1911, there had been numerous attempts to unite all 
unions under a single co-ordinating body. The Cape (where the 
CFLU held sway) constantly found excuses to avoid joining a 
73. Cape Times 20 August 1931. 
74. Letter from Gomas to Sachs, 18 August 1931 (GWUSA Archives). 
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national body.75 The major: stumbling blocks to unity were the 
racial attitude of many Transvaal unions, who refused to allow 
blacks to attend union conferences, and the wish of the CFLU to 
retain its autonomy. In 1930, the differences between the north 
and south seemed close to resolution. The CFLU was an active par­
ticipant at an 'all-in' conference in Cape Town which drew up the 
constitution for the S.A. Trades & Labour Council. 76 This placed 
no racial restrictions on affiliation to the TLC. It was agreed 
that the Transvaal-based SATUC and the CFLU would each dissolve 
and recommend that their affiliates join the new body. The SATUC 
dissolved at the end of 1930 and transferred all its funds to the 
TLC, but the CFLU did not follow suit. A member of the CFLU ex­
ecutive, A.Z. Berman, attacked the TLC as being a plot to secure 
labour backing for Cresswell in his fight in the SA Labour Party. 
There was no truth in the allegation, but the Federation delayed 
in repudiating Berman's insulting remarks and the tenuous unity 
in the trade union movement was broken. Stuart continued to pay 
lip service to national unity but he refused to countenance the 
dissolution of the Federation. He wanted absolute autonomy for 
the Federation in any national body but refused to agree to the 
Federation becoming an autonomous local committee of the TLC 
(Williams 1974). 
The TLC decided little was to be gained by continuing nego­
tiations to absorb the Federation. In August 1931 they founded a 
local committee in Cape Town which was independent of the Feder­
ation. Bill Andrews, the TLC secretary, visited Cape Town to 
launch the Cape Districts Committee (CDC) with a membership of 
75. 	The only account of the North-South conflicts in the trade 
union movement is Williams (1974). He errs in seeing an end 
to this conflict after Stuart resigned from the CFLU in 1941. 
Stuart formed a new body and the conflict continued until the 
formation of TUCSA in 1955. In all other respects, however, 
it is a most excellent and useful article. 
76. 	38 Unions participated in the conference. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
251 

about ten unions or branches of na~ional unions. 77 Andrews at­
tended the meeting at which the SAGWU announced its new campaign 
. h 78to organ~ze t e garment workers. 
The chairman and leading light of the CDC was A. G. Forsyth, 
the secretary of the Brewery Workers' and other unions indepen­
dent of the CFLU. Forsyth arrived back in Cape Town from a 
meeting in Johannesburg on the morning of the strike. He acted 
as much as the agent of the National Executive Committee (NEC) of 
the TLC as he did as the chairman of the scarcely constituted 
CDC. Both Forsyth and the NEC saw the strike at African Clothing 
as, 
••• a unique opportunity of proving to the workers of South 
Africa that the Council is desirous of assisting any section 
of the workers who are determined to resist any unjust treat­
79
ment by the Employers. 
In Cape Town the support of the TLC would serve to cement friend­
ship between the workers of the north and the south. 
While the progress of the strike was determined by conditions 
in the Cape Town garment industry and labour movement, the strike 
had its origins as much in the Transvaal as in the Cape. Without 
the support given and promised by the Transvaal garment workers' 
union to the Cape campaign, it is unlikely that the strike would 
have occurred. Once it began, the strike became the embodiment 
of the hopes of the Transvaal garment workers' union, the TLC and 
the CP for establishing a base of worker organization in Cape 
Town independent of the Cape Federation. 
About 70 of the 380 or so workers came out on strike on the 
Monday morning. All through the week there was peaceful picket­
ing outside the factory and more workers were encouraged to join 
77. 	The unions included branches of four national unions affili­
ated to the TLC, the printers, engineers, boilermakers and 
woodworkers as well as, the dockworkers, stevedores and 
furniture, explosives, breweries, liquor & catering and 
hotels and boarding house workers (Cape Times 18 August
1931). 	 ~~-=~~ 
78. 	Letter from Gomas to Sachs, 15 August 1931. 
79. 	Letter from .Forsyth to Andrews, 27 August 1927 (GWUSA 
Archives) • 
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the strike through daily meetings and house visits. Soon about 
! 
one hundred workers were out. Roytowski betrayed not the least 
concern about the strike. He told the CWCMA: 
The police had the matter well in hand and while they had 
been prevented from taking any direct action, they had kept 
the strikers moving and had prevented successful picketing; 
but nevertheless the pickets had interfered with a number of 
employees on their way to the factory and made it very un­
pleasant for them. SO 
The factory continued working, and was apparently little affec~ 
ted. The Cape Times reported that, 
••• nearly all the women were standing by the employers, but 
ok Slmost 0 f t he men were on strl e ••• 
It continued, 
There is no sign of trouble at the African Clothing Factory 
and the working appears to be normal xcept for the absence 
of nearly all the men employees. 
At the end of the week M. Miller and G. Malan, organizers of 
the Transvaal union arrived from Johannesburg. They assisted 
Forsyth in meeting the management and labour inspector in an 
effort to settle the dispute. The three immediately became the 
effective leaders of the strike. Neither Forsyth nor the 
Transvaal organizers were looking for an honourable defeat. They 
were under pressure to win the strike if they could. The future 
security of the Transvaal garment workers' wage standards 
depended on success in the Cape campaign. There was now no 
chance of success without a victory in the strike at African 
clothing. The Transvaal union placed all its hopes on a last, 
desperate gamble. In Cape Town the issue at stake was not only 
the future of the hundred workers on strike, but the standing of 
the Transvaal union and the TLC in the eyes of thousands of Cape 
workers. Malan told a meeting of 300 garment workers: 
so. CWCMA Minutes: 1 September 1931 - M2/1. 
SI. Cape Times 26 August 1931. 
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We 	 have come from Johannesburg to organize you as the 
Federation of Trades has failed to organize you and we want 
82
nothing to do with a union that exists only on paper. 
On Saturday 103 workers received strike pay sent down by the 
Transvaal garment workers' union. Forsyth wrote to Andrews: 
Meetings are being held daily and a great amount of propa­
ganda work is being done, the result of· which will finally 
mean the establishment of a proper Union for Garment Workers 
in the Cape ••• this generous act (the provision of strike pay 
. 	 83 
- MN) has added fresh courage to the workers. 
But no more workers joined the strike as it entered its 
second week and several who had accepted strike pay returned to 
work. 84 A new attempt to negotiate with Roytowski ended in dead­
lock. At a meeting that night Miller was reported as saying: 
••• the union's representatives were not being backed by the 
workers. "We are general s without an army", he dec1ared. 
The workers were not organized, scabs had got into the 
factory because pickets were not at their posts by seven 
0'c1ock. 85 
La Guma, 
••• urged the members to stand by their leaders. "The 
stalwarts have remained with us," he said. "For the last 
week you have fought with the gloves on but the time is 
coming for us to get into it with our bare hands.,,86 
Malan was more cautious. He said, 
"If 	we lose, let us have a fight to lose - a legal fight. II87 
82. 	CaEe Times 29 August 1931. 
83. 	 Letter from Forsyth to Andrews, 25 August 1931 (GWUSA 
Archives). 
84. 	Letter from Forsyth to Andrews, 3 September 1931 (GWUSA 
Archives) • 
85. 	CaEe Times 1 September 1931. 
86. 	Ibid. 
87. 	Ibid. 
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He suggested instituting a civil prosecution against the factory 
for underpayments. 
The workers followed the lead of La Guma. The next morning 
several cars bringing "scabs" to work through the picket line 
were stoned by strikers. A force of thirty policemen were on 
hand as a matter of course and after scuffles between the scabs 
and strikers and the police, twelve people were arrested. These 
included La Guma, Gomas, Lazar Bach and seven "girls". 88 
This incident effectively ended the strike. Many strikers 
were put off by the "disturbances" and did not turn up to picket 
on the following day. Bail for the three communists was set at 
ElOO each and they stayed in jail overnight while Forsyth, Malan 
and Miller struggled to find people to stand surety for their re­
lease. On Thursday more strikers returned to work and Miller 
took the train for Johannesburg. Malan continued to hold organ­
izing meetings at other clothing factories but the SAGWU was now 
dead. 
3. 	 Dirty Work and Special Pleading 
Although the strike was lost, Forsyth, Malan and Miller were all 
impressed by the enthusiasm of many workers and the potential 
which existed for the organization of the Cape clothing workers. 
Miller reported: 
I am convinced that the Cape Town workers can be organized, 
if a proper person is found to carryon the work. A good 
number of workers approached me to stay over longer and they 
would help me to organize. The workers are willing to be 
• d 89organl.ze • 
88. 	All were later convicted under the Riotous Assemblies Act. 
Gomas was jailed for three months for perjury. He denied 
having thrown stones while a police witness said he had (Cape 
Times 15 September 1931; 26 and 31 October 1931; 12 November 
1931; 7 June 1932). 
89. 	 'Report by Mr M. Miller on position in Cape Town', 4 
September 1931 (GWUSA Archives). 
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He added that the workers were totally disillusioned with "Stuart 
and his clique" and that the strikers had much appreciated the 
help from Johannesburg. The strike had shown that there was a 
crying need for organization. Forty statements were taken from 
workers at African Clothing detailing all manner of contraven­
tions of the wage determination. The Transvaal organizers found 
conditions at other factories no better. R.Beattie, the labour 
inspector, was not able or willing to enforce the determination. 
Only a strong new union could improve the position. 
The Cape Garment Workers' Union would play no role here. 
After the strike had been in progress a week Evans and Stuart met 
with the manufacturers. They tried to 'blackmail' them into for­
m1ng an industrial council. Evans stated, 
••• the position was very critical. At present the local 
Union could not claim to be representative and within recent 
weeks the membership of the non-registered ••• S.A. Garment 
Workers' Union had been increased, so that at present it ex­
ceeded the membership of their registered Union. What he 
wished to put to the manufacturers was that they should pre­
vent the control of the employees getting into the'hands of 
the Northern executive, and he suggested that they should 
assist the employees to establish a Union and in time con­
90
sider the advisability of forming an Industrial Council ••• 
The manufacturers were wary that a "national union of employees 
would cause unrest in the Industry", but they did not want to 
f orm an 1n ustr1a counC1. owever t ey agree , ' "d "1 "I 91 H h d 
••• it was advisable to make the Cape Union sufficiently rep­
" d f" d " "92resentat1ve as to prevent any anger 0 1tS ereg1strat10n. 
Again they offered to collect subscriptions for the Union under a 
stop order system. Evans wrote triumphantly to the Registrar 
that stop order forms had been issued to the employers. 
90. CWCMA Minutes: 1 September 1931 - M2/1. 
91. Ibid. Cf. Chapter 4. 
92. Ibid. 
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You will theref9re conclude that the union will become 	 com­
93pletely representative and beyond challenge in this area. 
Unfortunately for Stuart and Evans, the threat posed by the SAGWU 
in 1931 was not great enough to induce the manufacturers to go 
that one step further and form an industrial council. The GWU-CP 
was destined to wait another four years before a stronger SAGWU 
reappeared in Cape Town and did it this service. 
Throughout the organizing campaign, the great economic power 
wielded by the factory owners over workers was apparent. The 
strike at African Clothing brought into sharp focus the parts 
played by the Divisional Inspector of Labour, the police and the 
CFLU in enhancing the power of the employers. 
Labour inspectors could reasonably disclaim responsibility 
for not systematically enforcing the wage determinations - they 
were far too few. But the conduct of the inspector R. Beattie 
appears to have shown a strong partiality towards the employers. 
Beattie regularly inspected the African Clothing Factory and ap­
parently turned a blind eye to many infringements. The Transvaal 
organizers and Forsyth took down detailed statements from forty 
workers which showed underpayments, illegal deductions from 
wages, a failure to give due notice of dismissals and the quest­
ionably legal inducement of workers to apply for exemption from 
being paid the full wage. The affadavits were given to Beattie 
and a meting was held for him to question the workers concerned. 
By the end of September no action had been taken against the em­
ployer. 94 In addition Beattie told the press that there was no 
real dispute and that the strike was illegal. Both Forsyth and 
Miller reported that the Labour Department sided with the em­
. 	 1 'k 95pI oyer ~n tIe str~ e. 
93. 	Letter from Evans to the Registrar of Trade Unions, 5 
September 1931 S.A.B. ARB 1054/306. 
94. 	Letter from Sachs to the secretary of the TLC, 28 September 
1931 (GWUSA Archives). 
95. 	Letter from Forsyth to Andrews, 30 August 1931; 'Report by Mr 
M. Miller on the position in Cape Town I, 4 September 1931 
(GWUSA Archives). 
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Given the association of;the strike with attempts to build a 
rival trade union centre and rival garment workers' union in Cape 
Town, the CFLU could not have been expected to give the striking 
workers direct support. But the leaders of the Federation took 
an openly hostile attitude to the strike. Evans publicly de­
nounced it as: 
••• ~n 	unjustifiable disturbance of a portion of the industry 
, f 'bl d ,96at a tLme 0 terr1 e epreSS1on. 
Evans and Stuart had done nothing to organize the garment workers 
or to challenge the poor conditions - "approaching semi chattel 
slavery" - which they admitted to exist in the industry. 97 In­
stead they treacherously conspired with the employers to maintain 
the paper membership of the GWU-CP at a level which prevented the 
-
registration of a union which would try to organize the garment 
workers and improve their conditions. 
The SAGWU was justified in using strong words in a circular 
to unions asking for financial assistance. It spoke of, 
••• the dirty work of the leaders of the Cape Federation of 
Labour, who, together with the Labour Inspector, are working 
hand in hand with the police and the bosses in a joint effort 
'k 	 98to break t he str1 e ••• 
The strike was a disaster for the workers who were not re­
employed, for the Transvaal union and for the CDC. The goodwill 
displayed towards the friends from the North while the strike was 
on was genuine, but it dissipated once the Transvaal organizers 
returned home and strike pay was not repeated. In 1935, when the 
Transvaal union again came to the Cape, its desertion of the gar­
ment workers in 1931 was remembered. For the CDC, the strike did 
not prove to be the royal road to the hearts of the Cape workers 
96. Cape Argus 26 August 1931. 
97. CFLU Annual Report 1931, page 12 (TUCSA Archives). 
98. SAGWU circular, 29 August 1931 (GWUSA Archives). 
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that Forsyth had hoped for. 99 The CDC was an irrelevant body for 
the next four year~. 
For the AFTU, the losing of a strike was an impossibility. 
Umsebenzi trumpetted that: 
This struggle ended with a victory for the workers; the wage 
cuts were resisted, the demands such as ten minutes tea time, 
cessation of the vulgar language of the boss and the mana­
gers, sanitary arrangements, were successfully carried 
through. 100 
The workers had learnt, 
••• the necessity for building up a strong revolutionary trade 
union and already a factory committee under the leadership of 
the AFTU has been set up in the African Clothing Factory to 
reorganize the· fighting forces of the workers for further 
struggles which are close at hand. lOl 
Having goaded the workers into a strike that could not possibly 
succeed, the AFTU dared to hail its defeat as a victory. It then 
added insult to injury by distorting the events of the strike to 
reflect credit on itself and discredit on the Transvaal union and 
TLC. 
The strike coincided exactly with Woltoris most notorious 
purge of the CPo S.P. Bunting, Sachs, Weinbren, Andrews, C.B. 
Tyler of the building workers' union and a host of others were 
expelled. 102 This cleared the way for an open propaganda war 
against the reformist line of the TLC, the Garment Workers' Union 
and other unions who involved the workers in "class collaboration 
99. 	 The CDC did not abandon the garment workers. It raised 
funds to pay for the defense and fines of the "genuine" 
strikers (Trades and Labour Journal of SA December 1931, 
p. 24). The AFTU branded the TLC lithe leader of the fight 
against the militant workers" for not paying the fines of 
the three communists (The Hammer November 1931). 
100. Umsebenzi 	 2 October 1931 "Lessons of the Cape Town Garment 
Strike"• 
101. Umsebenzi 18 September 1931. 
102. Umsebenzi 4 September 1931. 
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machiner1" and abjured "revolutionary trade union work". The 
striking garment workers in Cape Town were commended by 
Umsebenzi: 
During the struggle the workers refused to swallow the bait 
of 'Industrial Conciliation' offered to them by the represen­
tative of the Garment Workers' Union of the Transvaal and the 
S.A. T.L.C. and stood solidly for a policy of revolutionary 
struggle under the leadership of the AFTU. 103 
Umsebenzi revealed that: 
••• the workers severely condemned the intentions of the 
S.A.T.L.C. to register the S.A. Garment Workers' Union of the 
Cape, 	 thus dragging it into the reactionary machine of Indus­
" 1 C "1" " 104tr1a onC1 1at10n. 
These statements were gross distortions of the truth. Their 
falsity was betrayed a few weeks later when James La Guma was 
again expelled. from the CP as the Cape district party committee 
joined the assault on the "Right Danger". Umsebenzi now carried 
a story that, far from the African Clothing strike having been 
under the militant leadership of the AFTU, leadership of the 
strike had been handed over to the TLC by La Guma. lOS La Guma 
was guilty of "formulating opportunistic deviations and frac­
tional tendencies". He had held up the reactionaries as "'brave 
leaders of the masses '" and, in his "capitulation before the re­
actionaries", had failed to convert, 
••• the struggle against wage cuts into a struggle against the 
class collaboration policy and the trad~ union bureauc­
106 
racy. 
The order of expulsion was signed by John Gomas. As 
secretary and organizer of the SAGWU, Comas had been instrumental 
103. 18 September 1931. 
104. 2 October 1931. 
105. 30 October 1931. 
106. Ibid. 
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TLCl07l.n involving both the Transvaal union and the in the 
strike. As late as 18 September he wrote to the Transvaal union 
to ask for further aid and to express, 
••• sincere gratitude for your efforts in coming to our 
assistance, which we appreciate as a deed of working cla96 
l Od 1080so l. arl.ty. 
Leadership of the strike at African Clothing slipped from the 
grasp of the CP from the first day, when Gomas accepted Forsyth's 
109
offer to approach the management. The AFTU and its champions 
had no slogan or tactic beyond "revolutionary struggle". But 
they had no revolutionary workers to lead, so they had no alter­
native but to accept the lead of experienced "social democratic 
opportunists" like Forsyth and the Transvaal organizers. Gomas 
was no less responsible for the path taken by the strike than La 
Guma. His direct participation in La Guma I s expulsion for his 
0 h ok b 110ro1e l.n t e strl. e was a ase act. 
4. Trapped by the Act 
The first effort to organize the clothing workers of Cape Town 
failed. The unfavourable economic climate during the depression 
was a significant factor in the failure. It made organization 
extremely difficult and was also a reason behind the sudden with­
drawal of Transvaal support for the Cape campaign after September 
1931. The intransigence of the TCMA was then forcing the 
Transvaal union into its first general strike. III It needed to 
107. TLC NEC Minutes: 25 August 1931 cited in Touyz (1979, p.55). 
108. Letter from Gomas 
Archives) • 
to Sachs, 18 September 1931 (GWUSA 
109. Letter from Forsyth 
Archives) • 
to Andrews, 25 August 1931 (GWUSA 
110. Cf. Simons & 
reproduced for 
Simons (1969, pp.449-50; this 
easy reference in Appendix B). 
paragraph is 
Their brief 
account of the African Clothing strike and the role of La 
Guma and Gomas is misleading and substantially incorrect. 
111. This lasted from 28 October to 19 November 1931. 
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consolidate all its resources to win. 
Other factors, beyond the :depression, made Cape Town a 
hostile environment for independent worker organization. The 
SAGWU got very little assistance from Cape-based trade unions and 
relied immoderately on support from the Transvaal. In the early 
1930's, the 'left opposition' to Stuart within the CFLU was too 
weak to overrule or challenge his attitude to the organization of 
garment workers. The SAGWU's strategy was modelled on the 
Industrial Conciliation Act. In the context of the Cape Town 
labour movement this presented particular problems. The 
Industrial Conciliation Act operated in a different manner in 
Cape Town from in the Transvaal. The class struggle in Cape Town 
had, over the previous five years, moulded the Act to accord with 
its specific character. 
In the Transvaal, the Act operated (in company with the Wage 
Act and government policy) to institutionalize the struggles of 
white wage earners and grant them limited economic conces­
sions. 112 Transvaal employers were forced to acknowledge the 
power of organized labour. The conditions of class struggle in 
the Transvaal and in the Transvaal garment industry allowed the 
Transvaal garment workers to engage in a real struggle with the 
employers through the structures of the Industrial Conciliation 
Act. The Act was framed to help solve problems that confronted 
the state on the Witwatersrand in the aftermath of the 1922 
strike. 
No similar problem confronted the state 1n Cape Town. At the 
time the Industrial Conciliation Act was promulgated the Cape 
'labour movement' was absurdly weak. There was no struggle to 
institutionalize. In Cape Town, this allowed the Act to secure a 
different control over the more muted struggles of the working 
class. In the garment industry it blocked the emergence of an 
o~ganized or militant trade union by encouraging the formation of 
a 'bosses union'. The SAGWU faced opposition from the CWCMA, the 
CFLU and the Department of Labour. These were united, in various 
ways, through the Industrial Conciliation Act and together they 
could frustrate the SAGWU's organizational strategy in its first 
112. See Davies (1979, Chapter 5 - especially pp.182-l99). 
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phase, as the union attempted to get official recognitio~ as a 
registered trade union. For the manufacturers and Stuart and 
Evans, the Industrial Conciliation Act was a handy and effective 
defense against the strategy of the SAGWU. The Transvaal-founded 
union's respect for using the machinery of the legislation vir­
tually guaranteed that the opposing boss-bureaucrat alliance 
would remain strong and triumphant. The SAGWU's pursuit of par­
ticipation in the Industrial Conciliation Act as a first prin­
ciple secured no advances in worker organization. Its desperate 
resort to strike action brought final defeat. It is spurious to 
argue, as did the SAGWU in its pamphlets, that calling the Afri­
can Clothing workers out on strike was calling them to follow 
the successful path of the Transvaal union. The Transvaal union 
did not frivolously encourage every urge of the workers to strike. 
Its strike tactics were wedded to its involvement in the indus­
trial council system. There is no ground for comparison with 
the promotion of this strike in Cape Town. The SAGWU's earlier, 
unsuccessful efforts to gain admission to the industrial relations 
system had laid no basis for a policy of confrontation with the 
forces ranged against the union. 
Since the first clothing factory opened in Cape Town in 1907, 
113the industry has known only three strikes. For this reason 
alone the strike at African Clothing in 1931 was remarkable. 
The strike was used as a vehicle for propaganda by the Transvaal 
garment workers' union, the TLC, the CP and the AFTU and (for 
an opposite purpose) by the CWCMA and leading elements in the 
CFLU. Neither the strike, nor the campaign of which it was the 
culmination, made any contribution to garment worker organization 
in Cape Town. 
The intertwining of class struggles in the garment industries 
f 	 .of C Town and t he W· d re erred to earI"ler114 , lS,ape ltwatersran, 
at first sight, most obvious in an analysis of the industry in 
Cape Town. The Transvaal union invaded Cape Town. The battle 
was fought out on Cape Town soil. But the Cape Town industry 
113. 	In 1917, 1931 and 1936. This figure excludes 'stay-aways' 
and work stoppages lasting less than one day. 
114. 	See pp. 228/9, above. 
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was hardly affected by the defeat of the Transvaal assault, where­
as failure to raise Cape wages in 1931 was a major factor underly­
ing a long and intense struggle between bosses and workers in 
the Witwatersrand clothing industry. This ultimately led to the 
virtual destruction of the Transvaal union in the strike of 1932 
and a fall in Transvaal wage rates. 
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CHAPTER VI 
! 
THE SECOND CAPE CAMPAIGN 1935-1938 
Four years later, a second effort by the Transvaal union to raise 
wages and to organize workers in the Cape clothing industry was 
more successful. Largely as a result of pressure from the Trans­
vaal union1 the Wage Board issued a new recommendation which made 
a substantial move towards wage uniformity in the industry. A 
revived S.A. Garment Workers' Union recruited more than a third 
of Cape workers as paying members and aroused the spirits of many 
more to support national unity between the garment workers' unions 
of Cape Town, Johannesburg and Durban. 
These events, supported by wider worker organization through 
the rejuventated local committee of the TLC, were countered by 
the "Unholy Alliance,,2 between the clothing manufacturers, the 
Department of Labour and the leaders of the Cape Federation. 
The employers forced their workers to join the dead but registered 
GWU-CP by signing stop-order forms. Together, the CWCMA and the 
officials of the Cape Union formed an industrial council and nego­
tiated wages much lower than in the new wage recommendation ad­
vanced by the Wage Board. The Department of Labour registered 
the industrial council although the GWU-CP had little claim to 
be a representative union. The Minister of Labour refused to 
gazette the Wage Board recommendation and legalized the industrial 
council agreement in~tead. Supporters of the SAGWU then tried 
to capture control of the GWU-CP by organizing within it. The 
Union bureaucrats, after a tussle, defeated these efforts aided 
by the employers and the Department of Labour. 
As a result of the second campaign, the GWU-CP was firmly 
established as the union for garment workers in Cape Town under 
the reactionary control of the minions of Robert Stuart. It be­
came part of an industrial council which superceded the.WageBoard 
1. 	 Letter from Sachs to J.C. Bolton, Secretary of the Garment 
Workers' Industrial Union, Durban, 4 September 1935 (GWUSA 
Archives). 
2. 	 Trades & Labour Journal of S.A. February 1936. 
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as the arbiter and improver of wages and conditions in the Cape, 
clothing trades. 
The chain of events is complicated. It is set out in fairly 
complete detail in order to provide a solid basis for the conclu­
sions put forward in the next chapter on the nature of the Stuart 
Machine, the effects of the industrial legislation and the condi­
tions of class struggle in Cape Town. The intention is also to 
bring to life again a long-forgotten episode of Cape Town labour 
history. 
For a brief period the Cape garment workers, outwardly the 
very image of submissiveness and docility, were the leaders of 
a militant labour revival in Cape Town. They were the spearhead 
of a wider movement to drive out the "rats and traitors,,3 who 
continually sold the workers to the bosses and kept wages low. 
From 1935, progressive elements in the Cape Town labour movement 
began to challenge the long dominance of the Stuart Machine over 
the Cape Federation and the workers of Cape Town. The second 
Cape Campaign was fought with mass meetings, court cases, strikes, 
marches and a style of organizing that shone a spotlight on the 
Stuart Machine and revealed its true nature. The Campaign gave 
a decisive momentum to the efforts of the more militant union 
leaders and workers in a broad range of industries to depose Ro­
bert Stuart as the 'kingt of the Cape labour movement. The Cam­
paign is thus of crucial significance in the regional labour his­
tory of Cape Town. Stuart did win control over the garment wor­
kers, but he gradually lost his influence over the rest of the 
Cape labour movement as a result. 
Growth in the Cape Town Clothing Industry 1933-1939 
The clothing industry in Cape Town recovered quickly after the 
depression. It grew impressively both as an employer of labour 
and as a producer of manufactured goods. It is however difficult 
to give a full picture of the growth of the local industry by 
using statistics. The industrial census and reports of the Wage 
3. Garment Workers t Union Commission of Inquiry: Evidence of 
E.S. Sachs, p.1839 (GWUSA Archives, Bca 4). This was a 
phrase often used by Sachs according to his friend, Mr. E.J. 
Burford, whom I interviewed. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
4 
266 

Board and the Board of Trade and Industries do not give satisfac­
tory regional data - they either aggregate statistics for the 
whole country or present regional statistics which represent only 
a section of the local industry. Where figures do exist, it is 
hard to judge whether data from separate sources is comparable. 
For the country as a whole during the five year period between 
1933/4 and 1938/9, the number of wholesale clothing factories 
grew by 42 per cent, from 197 to 280 (Barker, 1961, p.245). The 
number of garment workers grew by 28 per cent, the gross value 
of output by 70 per cent, salaries and wages paid by 59 per cent 
5
and the gross value added to materials by 75 per cent. This 
was the precursor to still greater growth during the Second World 
War. Cape Town, along with the Witwatersrand, was a major growth 
area." During the 1930' s Durban began to develop as a third centre 
of the clothing industry. 
Cape Town remained the leading producer of shirts, pyjamas, 
and mens' underwear. In 1938 these made up at least two thirds 
of the value of production in the Cape Town clothing industry.6 
The Witwatersrand dominated all other lines of production includ­
ing the new women's clothing industry.7 This is illustrated in 
Table 6.1. 
In 1937/8, the industrial census recorded a total output 
of £3m for the 248 establishments in the clothing industry in the 
Western Cape. These included 70 wholesale factories and 145 ttre­
tail factories" and tailors. 8 
4. 	 Barker (1962, p.22) comments: "Authentic data .indicating 
the pattern and the extent of regional development (in the 
wholesale clothing industry) up to 1938/9 are inconsiderable 
and appear very irregularly". 
5. 	 The Clothing Industry Report 303 of the Board of Trade and 
Industries, 9 December 1947, paragraph 2. These figures 
are apparently based on current values. The retail price 
index (1938=100) increased from 94,5 in 1934 to 99,9 in 1939. 
6. 	 Wage Board Report: The Garment Making Trades, 21 February 
1938 Annexure 190 - 1938, paragraph 69. 
7. 	 Report 303 of BTl op.cit., paragraph 9. 
8. 	 UG 21-1941, Table VI. The remaining 33 establishments were 
presumably laundries and dry cleaners. The 1938 Annual 
Report of the Department of Labour suggests that 31 Cape 
Town factories employed about 83 per cent of garment workers 
(See Table 6.2, below). 
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Table 6.1: Value of Clothing Production (Certain Items), 1938/9 9 
Value 
%(£m)1. Mens' & Boys Outer Garments 
Transvaal 2,160 67 
Cape Town 0,873 27 
Durban 0,118 4 
Rest of Union 0,094 2 
3,245 100 
2. Womens' and Girls' Outer Garments 
Transvaa 1 0,413 80 
Cape Town 0,085 17 
Rest of Union 0,01] 3 
0,515 100 
3. Pyjamas and Shirts 
Cape Town 0,907 52 
Transvaal 0,335 19 
Durban 0,296 17 
Rest of Union 0,216 12 
1,754 100 
More comprehensive information available on the changes in 
employment in the Cape clothing industry. The employment statis­
tics show up the increasing employment of white women workers 
as noted in Chapter 4. White women increased from 26 per cent 
of the female labour force in 1931 to 40 per cent in 1934 and 
44 per cent in 1937/8. Their numbers fell at the start of the 
War, while the industry still expanded. By 1943 the percentage 
of white women had dropped to 27. Table 6.2 also reveals a steady 
9. CCMA Minutes: 2 March 1956 (CCI Archives). 
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decli~e in the proportion of 'juvenile' women workers after 1929/30. 
, 
(This does not necessarily reflect a reduced reliance on cheap 
'learners'. The practice of dismissing learners as they became 
due for higher wages continued right through the 1930's). There 
are no indicators of changes in the rate of labour turnover in the 
Table 6.2: Employment in Cape Town Clothing Factories 1926-1943 10 
DATE WHITE 'COLOUR~D' AFRI CAN 
ASIATIC 
TOTAL
--' 
%of 
women 
workers 
younger 
than 
21 years 
Tot'al 
weekly 
wage 
costs 
(£) 
Average 
weekly 
wage 
(£) 
men 
A J 
women 
A J 
men 
A J 
women 
A J 
aFeb • 1926 
43 12 
55 
40 47 
87 
159 49 
208 
359 368 
727 2il 1 105 
51 
1 368 1.4.9 
bFeb • 1~27 
43 15 
58 
47 51 
98 
179 37 
216 
401 374 
775 20 1 167 
49 
- -
aFeb • 1929 
55 24 
79 
82 301 
383 
201 87 
288 
448 813 
1 261 12 2 023 
68 
3 307 1.12.8 
aFeb • 1931 
78 49 
127 
292 296 
588 
191 67 
258 
685 977 
1 662 41 2 676 
57 
4 441 1.13.2 
cSept. 1934 
208 101 
309 
828 912 
1 740 
382 111 
493 
1521 1077 
2 598 114 5 254 
46 
8 003 1.10.6 
dHar • 1936 
209 62 
271 
. 975 730 
1 705 
242 47 
289 
1415 514 
1 929 61 4 255 
34 
- 1.13.11 
e1937-8 347 2 060 670 2 638 63 5 778 - - 1.12.6 
f1938* 322 1 476 562 2 267 157 4 784'~ - - -
e1943-4 285 1 774 911 4 759 141 7 870 - - 2.15.0 
* for 31 factories only 
A stands 	for 'Adult', J stands for 'Juvenile' (younger than 21 yearsJ 
10. 	 a. Wage Board Report, 23 October 1931, Annexure 82 - 1931-2, 
Table II. 
b. Social & Industrial Review Special Edition, September 1926. 
c. Wage Board Report, 12 April 1935, Annexur~ 99 - 1936. 
d. Wage Board Report, 21 February 1938, Annexure 190 - 1938, 
Tables I and IV. 
e. Report 303 of BTl, 1947, Tables XIV and XVII. 
f. Department of Labour Annual Report 1938, UG 51-1939, p.53. 
There is no ready explanation for the remarkable fluctuation 
in employment between 1934 and 1937/8. The Board of Trade 
Report 303 speaks of the "steady and consistent growth" of 
the clothing industry between 1933 and 1939. Barker (1961, 
p.245) refers to "a cyclical movement in a downward direction" 
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Cape clothing industry. As with the industry elsewhere in the 
world, this was high. 11 Comparable employment figures for the 
Transvaal clothing industry are given in Table 6.3. 
Table 6.3: Employment in Witwatersrand Clothing Factories 1929-194312 
%of Total Average 
DATE WHITE AFRICAN •COLOURED , TOTAL women
-­
weekly weekly 
workers wage wage 
men women men women men women younger costs 
A J A J than (£) (£)21 years 
150 25 938 606 40 a l929 175 I 544 539 0 20 107 2 385 5 117 1.14.10 
bl931 
140 42 1069 846 44 
182 1 915 489 6 1 125 2 717 - 1 .17 .8 
383 107 3955 1219 23 
cHar. 1936 490 5 174 588 4 27 102 6 385 - 1.19.5 
d1937-8 569 5 923 1101 8 73 250 7 924 - - 2.2.6 
.. 
d1943-4 660 6 322 2313 454 278 1850 11 877 - - 3.7.0 
A stands for 'Adult', J stands for 'Juvenile' (younger than 21 years.) 
which "saw some measure of unemployment and short time in 
clothing factories" but dates this from mid-1937 which is 
too late to account for the fluctuation. Nowhere in any 
of the Wage Board Reports or CWCMA Minutes is there a refer­
ence to a depression in the Cape clothing industry between 
1934 and 1936. The inconsistent set of figures is that for 
September 1934. Elsewhere in the Wage Board Report from 
which they were extracted is a table which shows 4 412 women 
workers as being employed in Cape Town whereas the employment 
table gives a figure of 4 338. This inconsistency may be 
an indication of the unreliability of all figures in this 
report. Otherwise the inflated employment figure of 5 254 
may reflect the upsurge in CMT factories at this time and 
the prosperity of the industry noted in the report. 
11. 	 Report 303 of BTl, paragraphs 190-1; Wage Board Report 12 
April 1935 op.cit., paragraph 42. 
12. 	 a. Wage Board Report, 23 October 1931, Annexure 81 - 1931-2, 
Table IV. 
b. 	 Wage Board Report on its activities March 1929 to December 
1931, Annexure 108 - 1933. 
c. 	 Wage Board Report, 21 February 1938 op.cit. , Tables I 
and IV. 
d. 	 Report 303 of BTl, 1947 Tables XIV and XVII. 
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Thus between 1931 and 1938 employment in the Cape Towniclothing 
, 
industry increased by about 128 per cent, while that in the Trans­
13
vaal 	increased by 192 pet cent.
Between the depression and the outbreak of the Second World 
War the membership of the CWCMA increased from sixteen to about 
thirty, while that of the GWU-CP grew from next to nothing to 
over 3 000, making it the largest trade union in Cape Town. 
The Transvaal Bastion 
The Transvaal garment workers' union emerged from the depression 
still keenly concerned about the low level of Cape wages. In 
1931 and again in 1932 the employers had tried to cut wages down 
to the Cape Town level. The union prevented any change in the 
industrial council agreement in 1931 by winning a three week general 
strike, but a second general strike in the following year ended 
with the defeat of the workers. The union was forced to agree 
to wages being set by an arbitrator. Wages were cut across the 
board by 10 per cent. The major reason given by the arbitrator 
for imposing the wage reduction was the lower wages paid in the 
14
coastal areas. 
The Transvaal union was for some time powerless to re-open 
its efforts to organize and unite with garment workers in Cape 
Town. The strikes had drained the union of all its reserve funds, 
the industrial council had collapsed15 and Sachs was banished 
from the Witwatersrand for a year under the Riotous Assemblies 
Act. Workers were demoralized by defeat after they had fought 
so hard and suffered arrest and assault by the police. Many 
stopped paying subscriptions and attending meetings. 16 Sachs 
later commented that the union was "substantially destroyed" by 
the 1932 strike and had to be rebuilt. 17 This took two years. 
13. 	 See Appendix A. 
14. 	 Arbitrator's Report, 27 September 1932 (GWUSA Archives, Bcc 1.20.1). 
15. 	 The ICCI (Transvaal) was de~registered by Government Notice 
No.1226, Government Gazette 16 September 1932. 
16. 	 Sachs (1957, p.71). 
17. 	 Garment Worker November/December 1950, p.3. 
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The revived garment workers' union was constructed on the experiences 
of the general strikes. The strikes had thrown up leaders from 
amongst the workers who became union officials. New leaders such 
as the Cornelius sisters, Anna Scheepers, Katie Viljoen and Dulcie 
Hartwell made the union not simply for the workers but of the wor- . 
kers as well. Under the strong leadership of Solly Sachs, the 
union grew and thrived as never before. The industrial council 
d18" and rose I"19 t h 1 y. "dwas soon resusc1tate wages s They rema1ne 
however five per cent below the pre-depression wages and employers 
refused to consider a restoration of the full wage as Cape levels 
remained so much 10wer. 19 
General conditions in the Transvaal garment industry remained 
far from satisfactory. In 1934, the union stated: 
Fifty per cent of the women workers engaged in the [Trans­
vaal] clothing industry live on what might be called 
a starvation level, even with their present rate of 
pay, and not more than five per cent live in anything 

l "k d" f ort. 20
1 e or 1nary com 
The union was convinced that the way for improved conditions in the 
Transvaal would only be opened if low wage competition from the 
Cape garment factories were eliminated. The organization of the 
Cape garment workers thus became apriority for the Transvaal 
union. Sachs stated: 
••• to protect the interests of the thousands of garment 
workers outside Johannesburg and Germiston ••• and to 
secure our own conditions, it is absolutely imperative 
that we concentrate all our efforts on building up a 
national Trade Union of garment workers, embracing the 
whole of South Africa. 21 
18. 	 The ICCI (Transvaal) was re-registered by GN 1687, Government 
Gazette 8 December 1933. 
19. 	 Coastal wages had been further reduced by Wage Determination 
No.42 in 1932. 
20. 	 Memorandum submitted to the Industrial Legislation Commission, 
September 1934 op.cit. 
21. 	 Report of the General Secretary, E.S. Sachs, on his visit 
to Durban and Cape Town, submitted to the Central Executive 
Committee of the Garment Workers' Union (Transvaal), May 
1935 (GWUSA Archives). (Hereafter, 'Report to CEC'). 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
272 

Such an effort required a strong and stable union in the Trans­
vaal, able to bear the financial and organizational burdens of 
the campaign. For this reason, the Transvaal union again bargained 
for a clause in the industrial council agreement to make membership 
22
of the union compulsory for all workers. Sachs also sought 
the active co-operation of the employers in the industrial council. 
He said that there was, 
••• an excellent opportunity now of raising the coastal 
standard of wages and thus solving partly the menace 

.. 23 

of coasta1 compet1t10n••• 
His union, he continued, would agree to his going to organize in the 
coastal areas, 
••• but only on one condition - and that is that every­
thing be put in order in the Transvaal before I can 

24
travel to other centres. 
Sachs' specific requests were for the TCMA to ensure that all 
workers were enrolled in the union and for employers to assist 
in collecting subscriptions. National unity between all garment 
workers and between all clothing employers was, he said, desirable 
25for all the parties to the Transvaal industrial council. 
There were obviously glaring contradictions in the stated 
aims of the unity campaign. The Transvaal employers were expect­
ing that higher Cape wages would make the Transvaal factories 
more competitive and bring them more business and better profits. 
The Transvaal u ion expected that a rise in Cape wages would allow 
Transvaal wages to rise. Cape workers, while seeing the possible 
benefits which would flow from national unity and higher wages, 
also feared that the complete removal of a wage differential would 
lead to the stagnation of the Cape industry, or worse, its removal 
22. 	 Report to CEC, May 1935 op.cit. 
23. 	 Report of E.S. Sachs to the Industrial Council for the Cloth­
ing Industry (Transvaal) on his visits to Cape Town and Durban, 
May 1935 (GWUSA Archives). 
24. 	 Ibid. 
25. 	 Ibid. Sachs also asked for financial aid from the ICCI (Trans­
vaal) to support his efforts at the coast. 
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to the Transvaal. 
The Transvaal garment workers' union had two strategies to 
uplift the low standards of the coastal garment workers. The 
first involved the formation of a national union of garment workers 
and the provision of material support and advice to the coastal 
workers in any actions they took to improve their conditions. 
The second involved using the machinery of the Wage Board to fix 
a uniform wage scale for the whole of South Africa based on the 
higher Transvaal standards. 26 
So in 1934, the Transvaal union, backed up by the TCMA, asked 
the Minister of Labour to order a new Wage Board investigation 
into the clothing industry.27 It stated that the industry was 
now out of the depression and that the specially low coastal rates 
set by the Board in 1932 prevented the Transvaal industry from 
paying the wages it could otherwise afford. Much to the chagrin 
28
of the Cape manufacturers ,the Wage Board again began an inves­
tigation in late 1934.29 The Transvaal union prepared a detailed 
memorandum and Sachs travelled round the country one step ahead 
of the Board to marshall workers support for higher wages and 
to present evidence on behalf of unorganized workers. 
The [Transvaal] Union utilised the public sittings of 
the Wage Board to expose the bad conditions under which 
the Garment Workers workeq, to rouse the masses of wor­
kers from their long sleep, and to appeal to the masses 
30
of coastal workers to come into one National Union. 
The Reconnoitre 
Sachs arrived in Cape Town in October 1934. He did not contact 
Stuart or Evans this time as he thought, 
26. 	 'R. Stuart versus E.S. Sachs', c.1945, paragraph 19 (GWUSA 
Archives). 
27. 	 E.S. Sachs, 'The Struggle of the Garment Workers in the Coas­
tal Areas' (GWUSA Archives, Bce 2.2.2). 
28. 	 See CWCMA Minutes: 15 October 1934 - M2/1. 
29. 	 Government Gazette 5 October 1934. 
30. 	 'R. Stuart versus E.S. Sachs', c.1945 op.cit., paragraph 19. 
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••• a visit to them would serve no useful purpose. They 
will not do anything themselves and they will do all 
they can to hinder others from organizing the workers 
and trying to improve their conditions. 31 
Instead he approached the Cape Districts Committee of the TLC 
to ask for its assistance in organizing the garment workers "for 
the purpose of submitting evidence before the Wage Board". 32 Sachs 
was testing the water before again plunging into the murky depths 
of Cape Town worker organization. 
33The CDC was then weak and hamstrung. Its efforts to expand 
and consolidate its membership had been nullified by the depression. 
In 1933 the TLC Annual Conference instructed the CDC to open nego­
tiations with the CFLU on local co-operation (Williams, 1974, p.9). 
This resulted in the formation of a Joint Committee hich had "a 
tendency to delay certain organizational work,,34 as the Federation 
demanded consultation before any new organization was undertaken. 
The Federation tried to use the Joint Council to limit the expan­
sion of the CDC. When Sachs appeared on the scene, the Federation 
asked the CDC for a guarantee that it would not assist him (Williams, 
1974, p.9). A CDC meeting ignored this demand. The CDC reported 
that there might have to be, 
••• an open fight ••• the Local Committee intended to 

do any good so far as the organization of the workers 

was concerned. 35 

Although the Federation was, as ever, firmly opposed to co-operation 
with the TLC on a national level. Stuart's dominance in the Fede­
ration was coming under internal attack. This was led by J.W. 
Emmerich, a tramdriver who had deposed Stuart as long time secre­
tary of the tramways union. Emmerich was a keen member of the 
Cp36 and an important ally of the more militant members of the 
31. 	 Letter from Sachs to Andrews, 9 November 1934 (GWUSA Archives). 
32. 	 Ibid. 
33. 	 Nora Forsyth had taken over as secretary of the CDC in 1932 
when her husband A.G. Forsyth succeeded Andrews as general 
secretary of the TLC. 
34. 	 Trades &Labour Journal of S.A. November 1934 
35. 	 CDC Report to NEC, TLC on the Joint Committee, 13 December 1934, 
quoted in Williams (1974, p.9). 
36. 	 See CFLU Minutes: 24 July 1933 (TUCSA Archives). 
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CDC. In 1934 the monolith of the Federation still towered above 
the Cape labour movement but it was beginning to crack. 
The GWU-CP maintained its ghostly existence. In July 1934 
the Federation decided to concentrate its efforts on organizing 
the garment industry "thoroughly,,37 but next to no progress was 
made. At the poorly attended "annual general meeting" of the 
Union in January 1935, 
Bro. Evans said of Executive Committee work: "Sometimes 
the work was disheartening but they all felt that the 
Union must be kept intact, although they did not get 
much support from the members who were very apathetic, 
and up to now the number of new members was very small. 
If it was not for the stop order system operating in 
a few shops, the Union would have collapsed long ago. 
There seems no life, and no response from the workers 
generally, they only thought of the Union when they 
were out of work or in trouble". 38 
There is no doubt that when Sachs began to organize around the 
Wage Board investigation, the GWU-CP was not functioning as a 
trade union. 39 After eight years of registered 'existence' it 
did not even have a paper membership. 
With the aid of the CDC, Sachs held a series of public meet­
ings for workers to tell them of the Wage Board inquiry into their 
wages and of the need to organize. Six hundred workers attended 
a meeting the night before the first Wage Board hearing and voted 
that Sachs should argue their case. Evans represented the Cape 
'Union' and put forward a wage scale 25 per cent below Transvaal 
levels. 40 The publicity around the Wage Board hearing and Sachs' 
allegations of poor wages and conditions and the flouting of the 
existing wage determination aroused great interest amongst garment 
37. 	 CFLU'Minutes: 3 July 1933 (TUCSA Archives). 
38. 	 GWU-CP Minutes: 16 January 1935 - Annexure AA to affidavit 
of H.L. Evans - Smith v'. Crawford and Others Cape Supreme 
Court Motions ~ (949) 1935, (Cape Archives Depot - C.A.D.). 
39. 	 See Chapter 5 above, footnote 23. 
40. 'R. Stuart versus E.S. Sachs', c~1945 op.cit., paragraph 21. 
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workers. Sachs made contact with individual workers who informed 
him about conditions in their factories "and wrote reports to him 
about the situation in Cape Town when he returned to Johannesburg 
to complete the negotiation of the Transvaal industrial council 
agreement. He wrote to one of them: 
If we arrive at a satisfactory agreement, one or two 

of us will proceed to Capetmvu••• and will stop there 

until such time as we have built up an organization 

of the garment workers. I know that there are plenty 

of obstacles in the way, but I do not feel in the least 

perturbed about it. From what I saw during my short 

stay in Capetown, I am convinced that the majority of 

the workers desire to be organized and to fight for 

d "" 41bett er con 1t10ns. 
In March 1935, the Wage Board circulated a copy of its draft pro­
posed recommendations on the clothing industry.42 It had found 
the industry to be in "a very prosperous conditionlt ,43 this being 
illustrated by high profits and the extension of factories. Con­
" h 44 ThsequentI y t he wages proposed b y t he Board were h19. e wage 
scale represented a significant effort to establish a single wage 
standard for the clothing industry which would not allow the coastal 
areas to undermine the standard won by the garment workers' union 
in the Transvaal. This was the aim of the Board from its first 
investigation in 1926 and the strong argument of the TCMA and 
the Transvaal union. 
41. 	 Letter from Sachs to D.L. Lunn, 10 December 1934 (GWUSA Archives). 
42. 	 Letter from Sachs to Lunn, 20 March 1935 (GWUSA Archives). 
Draft proposals were circulated to interested parties whose 
comments were considered by the Board before it formally 
submitted its Recommendation to the Minister. Once a Recom­
mendation was gazetted, there was a further 30 day period 
in which objection could be made before the Board prepared 
a final Recommendation which the Minister, only then, gazetted 
as a Wage Determination. 
43. 	 Wage Board Report, 12 April 1935 op.cit., paragraph 10. 
44. 	 See Table 6.4, p.356, below. This is a fold-out table which 
will be referred to frequently. 
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Sachs immediately wrote to his contacts in Durban and Cape 
Town to get them to start mobilising all the forces they could 
45in support of the Board's proposals. He anticipated fierce 
opposition from the Cape employers. Sachs again travelled with 
the Board as it held a final series of meetings with interested 
parties before submitting a recommendation to the Minister. 
The Transvaal union was now preparing to launch its national 
unity campaign properly. Sachs came to Cape Town ready to set 
up a Cape Town branch of his union. This would recruit Cape Town 
garment workers as members although the Transvaal union was not 
registered to operate in the Cape and could not be registered 
as long as the GWU-CP was recognised by the Department of Labour. 
It was not in any sense illegal for the Transvaal union to organize 
in Cape Town but asan.unregistered union in the area it could 
not itself make use of the Industrial Conciliation Act. 
When Sachs arrived by ship from Durban early in April 1935, 
John Gomas and Eli Weinberg had booked a hall and printed circulars 
for a meeting. 46 Two hundred workers attended and responded enthu­
siastically to the announcement that a branch of the Transvaal 
union was to be established locally. The meeting elected ten 
workers to serve on the executive committee. 
Before the meeting Sachs had offered David Lunn, a senior 
worker at African Clothing, the job as paid secretary of the Cape 
Town branch. Lunn had met Sachs on his previous visit and expressed 
interest in building a union amongst the garment workers. He 
had organized about a third of the African Clothing Factory and 
got them to join the Cape Union. 47 They were the first block 
of workers to join the Cape Union 'voluntarily' and Sachs was 
anxious to capture these workers for his branch. But Lunn turned 
down Sachs' offer. While organizing his fellow workers, Lunn 
had found that many were extremely suspicious of the motives of 
45. Letter from Sachs to Lunn, 20 March 1935 (GWUSA Archives). 
46. Report to CEC, May 1935 op.cit. 
47 •. DavidLunn: 'Statement', 1945 (GWUSA Archives - This was 
one of the affidavits drawn up while Sachs was preparing 
his defence against a libel action brought by Stuart in 
1945. Stuart withdrew before the case was heard in court). 
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Sachs and the Transvaal union in coming to Cape Town. Some workers 
remembered how the SAGWU had decamped after using the African 
Clothing workers as cannon fodder in the 1931 strike. Looking 
back on these events, some believed that Sachs' aim then had been 
to create labour chaos in Cape Town to prevent contracts from 
being completed by the factories and so secure their transfer 
to the Transvaal. The workers told Lunn not to trust Sachs. 
In this situation, Lunn believed that the best chance of 
organizing Cape garment workers lay in organizing workers into 
the GWU-CP and then using their support to capture control over 
the reglstere unlon rom t e lnSl e • unn spo e rom t e. d· 'f h··d ' 48 L k f h 
floor at Sachs' public meeting and criticised the Transvaal union's 
unilateral decision to form a rival union in Cape Town. He con­
demned Sachs for "splitting the ranks of the workers by forming 
another Union".49 Sachs responded by dubbing Lunn "a bosses' 
man" because of his association with the registered union. 50 
Eli Weinberg then accepted the job of s cretary at a salary 
of £10 a month. Sachs described him as "a hard-working, class­
conscious and thoroughly reliable comrade".51 As Sachs planned 
the Cape campaign, the objective was to compel the Cape clothing 
manufacturers to form an industrial council with the Cape Town 
branch. At a later stage this would combine with the councils 
in Johannesburg and Durban to form a national industrial council. 
Sachs had no thoughts of 'plant level b~rgaining' and saw the 
industrial council system as a useful tool in raising wages. He 
was not in principle against a weakly organized union joining 
~n industrial council, in fact, in the Transvaal he had found 
the industrial council a positive aid to proper organization. 
He wrote to Weinberg: 
The setting up of an Industrial Council will certainly 
mean a step forward in getting access to the masses 
of workers. Hence we should do all in our power to 
.1 52get a counCl set up. 
48. 	 Interviews with David Lunn. 
49. Report to CEC, May 1935 op.cit., pp.5; 7. 
so. Ibid., pp.5; 7. 
51. 	 Ibid., p.8. 
52. 	 Letter from Sachs to Weinberg, 17 April 1935 (GWUSA Archives, 
Cba 1.2). 
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Sachs accurately divined the problems Weinberg was about to encounter. 
Of course, (he continued) an Industrial Council can 
only be established with a registered union which is 
representative of the industry and there is a grave 
danger that the Cape bosses will approach the Federation 
and form a Council behind our backs. You must do all 
in your power to prevent this happening. The best method 
. t 0 t ryand get as many members as POSSl'b1e. 53lS 
The national unity effort was taking its first faltering steps. 
Despite the dangers of collusion between the bosses and the Fede­
ration leaders, Sachs was optimistic: 
The vast mass of workers of Capetown are either opposed 
to the Federation or do not know of its existence. The 
name of, our Union and its Secretary is held in high 
esteem. The workers trust us. The Federation does 
no work until we come and start moving, then they also 
get busy - as soon as we leave they do nothing. The 
employers seem to consider us more reliable' than the 
Federation but they fear us more. They know that they 
can get the Federation to agree to anything they want. 
We must immediately concentrate all our forces and re­
sources on building up a strong Branch in Capetown. 
Our conditions are at stake, the making of a national 
union is at stake. There are many excellent people 
outside the Trade Unions who will help us. We must 
54
utilize everything and everybody to obtain our objective.
Siege Defences 
Although these warlike preparations were carried out amidst much 
clamour and were attended by vicious verbal attacks on the Fede­
ration and on sweated labour in Cape Town, both the CFLU and the 
CWCMA were slow to show much concern. They were awakened to 
the seriousness of the situation only by the publication of the 
53. 	 Letter from Sachs to Weinberg, 17 April 1935 (GWUSA Archives, 

Cba 1.2). 

54. 	 Report to CEC, May 1935 op.cit., p.ll. 
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draft wage recommendation and by the actual launching of the rival 
union. 
In early March 1935, before the draft recommendation had 
been released, the CWCMA held a desultory discussion with Evans 
about forming an industrial council. 55 The threat of the Transvaal 
union was not mentioned in the minutes of the meeting. The debate 
was whether an industrial council would have any advantages over 
a new wage determination. The manufacturers had an ambivalent 
attitude. Some said that policing the payment of wages would 
be better under an industrial council with its own agent to en­
force the agreement. Others said that the new Wage Determination 
Validation Act56 would make it equally possible to curb unfair 
competition from sweaters under a wage determination. Then there 
was the old question of whether the Minister would accept an in­
dustrial council agreement based on the existing wage determina­
tion (with which the manufacturers were perfectly satisfied) or 
whether he would still insist that the new r commendation of the 
Board be taken over by an industrial council. Evans was agreeable 
to accepting the old determination as the basis for an agreement. 
The matter of the industrial council was left in abeyance until 
the new Wage Board recommendation became available. 
The manufacturers were, of course, totally opposed to the 
new wage scales, which entailed an average increase of about 35 
57 per cent on current rates and in some instances even exceeded 
58the minima in the Transvaal agreement. But so was the Cape 
Union against the Wage Board proposals. Poole and Evans told 
the manufacturers, 
••• they realised that it would bring about more unem­
ployment in the industry and would increase the practice 
55. 	 CWCMA Minutes: 5 March 1935 - M2/1. 
56. 	 Act No.16 - 1935. The Act was promulgated on 10 April 1935. 
Wage Determination 42 had been partly inoperative from 25 
October 1933 (Rex v. Cohen, NPD) and totally invalid from 14 
December 1934 (Rex v. Ryba, TPD). As its title indicates, the 
Act made the determinations which had been declared invalid by 
these court cases legally valid once more. It also allowed 
future determinations to set minimum wages for pieceworkers. 
The court cases had found such provisions to be ultra vires. 
57. 	 CWCMA Minutes: 25 March 1935 - M2/1. 
58. 	 CWCMA Minutes: 21 March 1935 - M2/1. 
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of employing girls as learners, who as soon as they 

became entitled to a higher wage, were discharged. 59 

Accordingly, the Union put forward its own proposals. The CWCMA 
agreed that, 
••• the employees' suggestions were very fair and the 
wage increases they suggested were not nearly as drastic 
as those proposed by the Wage Board. 60 
In view of the fact that the Union officials "would be willing to co­
operate with the manufacturers in opposing the Wage Board's proposed 
Determination",61 the manufacturers again considered the question 
of an industrial council. Now that the Wage Board advised higher 
wages, 
••• it would be distinctly advantageous (the chairman 
suggested) to have an Industrial Council with an Agree­
ment negotiated on the basis of the existing Determina­
62tion.
The question, however, was whether the Minister would permit this. 
In the past his policy had been that a newly formed industrial 
council should take over the new Wage Board recommendations, if 
the Board was in the process of investigating the industry con­
cerned. 63 There was no point in forming an industrial council 
with all the expense and bother if wages anyway had to follow 
the Wage Board recommendation. 
Before this issue was clarified, Solly Sachs arrived on his 
follow-up visit to Cape Town. Sachs stridently declared his inten­
tion of forming a national union of garment workers and of fighting 
to improve wages and conditions in Cape Town. Apart from his 
meetings with workers, he met with leading employers and W.J. 
Laite (still the secretary of both the CWCMA and the CCI). Sachs 
59. CWCMA Minutes: 25 March 1935 - M2/1. 
60. Ibid. (The details of the suggestion were not minuted). 
61. Ibid. 
62. Ibid. 
63. See Chapter 4 above, p. 181. 
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thought he had made a favourable impression on the employers at 
the Wage Board sitting and by stressing, 
••• the advantages of an industrial council and the need 
to form a strong trade union in the fight against ratshops.64 
But the employers were very seriously alarmed. Simon Roytowski of 
African Clothing met Sachs on the morning of 8th April. On the 
afternoon of the same day, at a meeting of the CWCMA Shirt Section, 
Mr. Roytowski assured members that if their employees 
became allied to the Transvaal Union there would be 
endless trouble in the industry. Mr. Sachs and his 
colleagues were aiming at obtaining a higher membership 
for the new Union than for the existing one and once 
that was accomplished, they would apply for the existing 
Union to be de-registered and their's to be registered 
in its stead. Members would be unanimous that it would 
be better to negotiate with the Cape Union and be urged 
that manufacturers should put no obstacles in the way 
of their employees immediately joining the Cape Garment 
Workers' Union in order to facilitate the forming of 
a local Industrial Council and so safeguard the industry 
from the machinations of the Transvaal agitators. 65 
The manufacturers held a general meeting a week later,. This consi­
dered a formal request from the Cape Union for another discussion 
on the formation of an industrial council. 
The chairman (William Middlemass) said that recent de­
velopments had caused manufacturers to look more favour­
ably on the formation of an Industrial Council than 
in the past. The statements recently made to the Wage 
Board by a representative of the Transvaal Garment Wor­
kers' Union had shown that the Transvaal Union was mak­
ing a determined bid to obtain control of the Cape In­
dustry. If a new Union was formed with a greater member­
ship than the present one the Minister would have no 
64. Report to CEC, May 1935 op.cit., p.8. 
65. CWCMA Minutes: 8 April 1935 - M2/1. 
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option but to de-register the Cape Union in favour of 
the new Union. Members were agreed, he thought, that 
much value was to be attached to having an Industrial 
Council which would control the Industry by joint action 
66between employers and employees. 
The manufacturers agreed to assist the Cape Union to recruit members 
in their factories. Once the Union "had reached the strength 
required for the formation of an Industrial Council",67 the CWCMA 
and the GWU-CP could jointly approach the Minister and "request 
him to gazette whatever Agreement they reached instead of putting 
the proposed Wage Determination into force".68 Meanwhile the 
CWCMA had begun an effort to draw all non-member clothing manufac­
turers into the Association. 69 
The 'organization' of garment workers into the GWU-CP now 
began in earnest. The Cape Union, dead to the workers virtually 
since its registration in 1927, began to hold recruiting meetings 
70in the factories. These were advertised in notices stating 
that each meeting was held "by kind permission of the Management".71 
New members were enrolled by simply signing stop order forms which 
authorised their employers to deduct weekly subscriptions from 
72their wages and hand the money over to the Union. In some cases, 
employers put pressure on workers to sign. If they refused they 
were told very plainly that they either sign the stop order or 
take a week's notice. 73 
66. 	 CWCMA Minutes: 15 April 1935 - M2/1. 
67. 	 Ibid. 
68. 	 Ibid. 
69. 	 CWCMA Minutes: 9 April 1935 - M2/1. 
70. 	 Trades &Labour Journal of S.A. June 1935. 
71. 	 Garment Workers' Union (Cape): notice of meeting 8 May 1935 
(TUCSA Archives, Dc 8.17 1935). This notice is signed by 
Stuart, who is designated the union secretary. 
72. 	 Garment Workers' Union (Cape): Stop Order No.1750 S.A.B. 
ARBI054/306. Stop order signing did not, in fact, constitute 
enrolment under the constitution of the GWU-CP. The deduction 
of union subscriptions from a worker's wage was itself illegal 
under clause 4(4) of Wage Determination 42. 
73. 	 S.A. Garment Worker 1 (1) May 1936 (GWUSA Archives). 
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At I.L. Back, Weinberg reported that: 
Young Rubin Back, the "socialist", went round the fac­
tory with the stop-orders and compelled everybody to 

sign. When some of them refused, as they had been ad­

vised by us, Rubin told them: "You will have to draw 

the consequences, boys!" So they signed ••• 74 

Rosie de Freitas, then a seventeen year old machinist at Fraser & Co., 
later recalled: 
Nearly all the workers of Frasers were members of the 

Cape Garment Workers' Union. They told me that they 

had been forced to sign a stop-order against their will 
and did not want to belong to the Union. 75 
Such 	blatant coercion was probably not as widespread as these 
quotations suggest, but for the mass of workers 'membership' of 
the Cape Union began with a stop order and involved nothing more. 
By this means the enrolment figures of the Cape Union rose meteori­
cally. The inaugural meeting of the (unregistered) 'Industrial 
Council' was held on 28 May 1935. 76 By this date the Union claimed 
771 800 out of 4 500 workers in the industry as its members. 
The minute books of the CWCMA alone show conclusively that 
the Cape Garment Workers' Union was 'organized' in 1935 with the 
help 	of the employers and that the bosses and Union officials 
had the dual and shared aims of preventing the proposed wage de­
termination from becoming law78 and preventing the growth or re­
gistration of a rival union committed to national unity.79 
74. 	 Letter from Weinberg to Sachs, 24 May 1935 (GWUSA Archives, 
Cba 2.4.1). The letter continues, If ••• but at the subsequent 
election of shop stewards one of our comrades was elected. 1f 
75. 	 Rose Kemp (nee de Freitas): 'Statement', 1945 (GWUSA Archives). 
76. 	 Industrial Council for the Clothing Industry (Cape) Minutes: 
28 May 1935 (Annexure I - Smith v. Crawford and Others, 
op.cit.). The ICCI (Cape) was registered in February 1936. 
77. 	 CWCMA Minutes: 16 May 1935 - M2/1. A month later 2 500 
members were claimed (CFLU Minutes: 27 June 1935 - TUCSA 
Archives). 
78. 	 See in addition to the above, CWCMA Minutes: 16 May 1935, 
p.4 	 - M2/1. 
79. 	 See also CWCMA Minutes: 19 July 1935, p.4 - M2/1. 
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The aims of the alliance between the bosses and the Union 
officials were realized, as we shall see, with the connivance 
of the Department of Labour, the collaboration of the police and 
the complacency of the courts. Cape garment workers might well 
have been persuaded that a national union dominated by the Trans­
vaal was not in their best interests but the Union officials and 
the officials of the CFLU colluded with the employers to exclude 
the workers from this decision. The task of the rest of this 
chapter is to show how they succeeded. 
The Beachhead 
The Cape Town branch of the Transvaal union adopted the name of 
the old S.A. Garment Workers' Union. Its immediate aims were 
to recruit members, to hamper the efforts of the Cape Union and 
CWCMA to form an industrial council and to undermine and attack 
the officials of the Cape Union and their supporters in every 
way possible. When the SAGWU was launched in April 1935, the 
Cape Union lacked even paper members, but once it awoke and began 
recruitment, a bitter fight developed between the unions. This 
conflict both reinforced and was complemented by a sharp deterio­
ration in the relationship between the TLC and the CFLU. 
The TLC, with its 26 000 members, was as ever anxious to 
absorb the CFLU, with its 12 000 members,80 into a central national 
trade union co-ordinating body. Failing this, it wanted to estab­
lish formal co-operation with'the CFLU to lead joint action on 
general matters affecting labour (such as new legislation, the 
cost of living and international contacts) and to resolve specific 
problems (such as the wage disparities between the coast and Trans­
vaal). The CFLU was unco-operative and fiercely independent. 
Stuart, the dominant figure in the Federation, was extremely an­
tagonistic to the left wing elements in the TLC who wanted to 
form a "political wing" to the trade union movement and saw trade 
80. 	 Letter from W. Freestone (President, CFLU) to the Minister 
of Labour, 8 March 1935 (printed in Trades &Labour Journal 
of S.A. April 1935). These figures represent the claimed 
membership of affiliated unions. Affiliation fees received 
by the two bodies at this time were £1 231 per annum for 
the TLC and £237 per annum for the CFLU. 
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. . 	 l' . 1 d 81un10n1sm as a means to po 1t1ca en s. He was intent on keeping 
the Cape Town labour movement under his control and as free as 
possible from such 'white anting'. 
Faced with the growing intransigence of the leaders of the 
CFLU, the CDC withdrew from the Joint Committee early in 1935. 82 
In April the Annual Conference of the TLC resolved to appoint 
a special organizer for the Cape. His task was to organize new 
unions in Cape Town "to create an alternative power base from 
which to push the unity movement" (Williams, 1974, p.lO). There 
was no intention to subvert existing Federation unions, but the 
Federation interpreted this move as a hostile act to break its 
83influence in the Cape. Such a view appeared quite correct once 
the fight in the garment industry got under way. The severing 
of all friendly contact between the TLC and the CFLU removed all 
restrictions from the actions of the CDC. The CDC was revitalised 
and helped the Transvaal garment workers' union's efforts to es­
tablish its own alternative power base for its own unity movement. 
Eli Weinberg, the secretary of the SAGWU in Cape Town, was 
then 27 years old. He had arrived in South Arica in 1929 having 
. f d . " "" . L t" 84fled 	f rom persecut10n or tra e un10n act1v1t1es 1n a V1a. 
In 1933 he was sent by the Communist Party in Johannesburg to 
assist the local party committee in Cape Town. Sachs was happy 
that Weinberg should use the SAGWU office as a base for whatever 
party work or other organizing he had time for - so long as he 
85
organized the garment workers.
The attitude of the CP to industrial legislation had reverted 
t o accept 1ng·"1t as a gU1'd t"0 un10n organ1za 10n.86e 	 . t" 
81. 	 Trades &Labour Journal of S.A. October, November 1934. Stuart's 
attitudes are ponderously expressed in CFLU Annual Reports and, 
from 1936 in a new monthly journal, Cape Federation of Labour 
Unions: Official Organ. 
82. 	 CFLU Minutes: 7 February 1935 (TUCSA Archives). 
83. 	 CFLU: Official Organ March 1937. 
84. 	 Forward 29 November 1935. 
85. 	 Weinberg was extremely active. His trade union concerns covered 
the CDC and the sweet workers as well as garment workers. He 
was an activist in the Anti-Fascist League, the Friends of the 
Soviet Union and on May Day organizing committees. He wrote many 
articles and letters in The Guardian, Forward and The Sun on a 
wide range of subjects. ------­
86. 	 This even preceded the official change in line to a 'people's 
front' against fascism after the 1935 congress of the Comintern. 
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Weinberg later recalled that: 
Solly's idea was that we should build up an alterna­

tive union with the eventual aim of either superced­

ing the existing union or possibly coming to an agree­

ment with them for higher wages and better conditions 

87
and negotiating a new industrial council agreement. 
The SAGWU opened its office at 57 Plein Street on May Day 1935. 
It offered members "free medicine, free medical attendance and 
free legal advice".88 It held public meetings addressed by TLC 
speakers, Cissie Gool, Goolam Gool and Dr. Abdurahman. Workers 
were invited to meetings at the office and to "tea parties" at 
the homes of SAGWU supporters. Workers were visited at their 
homes and addressed outside factories. The message was to join 
the SAGWU and help the fight for better wages and conditions. 
The need to support the Wage Board recommendations and the need 
for national unity were stressed but the SAGWU believed that: 
The best means of enrolling members into our Union is 

to show the workers by our activities that we really 

defend their interests. 89 

Workers were encouraged to come forward with complaints. As wor­
kers were often scared of being victimised should their individual 
complaint become known to their employer, the SAGWU first approached 
the local labour inspectors. When this produced little success, 
the SAGWU loudly complained of the non-enforcement of the wage 
determination in the press. A pamphlet was issued showing workers 
the wages they were entitled to under the determination 90and 
the SAGWU systematically began to collect details and proof of 
determination evasions and the refusal to enforce the law on the 
87. 	 Transcript of interview with Eli Weinberg, December 1976. I am 
indebted to Baruch Hirson for allowing me to use this document. 
88. 	 SAGWU Pamphlet advertising a meeting for 9 May 1935 (GWUSA Ar­
chives). The doctors who agreed to see the SAGWU members free 
included Dr. Goolam Gool and his brother (Report to CEC, May 
1935, op. cit. ) . 
89. 	 'Report of Comrade E. Weinberg to the first general members' 
meeting of the S.A. Garment Workers' Union, Monday 3rd June 1935' 
p.2. 	 (GWUSA Archives). 
90. 	 Ibid. 
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91part of both the Labour Department and the public prosecutor.
All the evidence was presented to Smuts, the Minister of Justice, 
in October 1935.92 Sachs personally took statements from 424 
workers (about a tenth of the entire industry) which showed whole­
sale contravention of the determination93 and the partiality of 
94labour inspectors to the employers. Sachs later recalled: 
We arranged public meetings and exposed the wholesale cor­
ruption which prevailed and demanded that the laws govern­
ing wages should be enforced against the employers with the 
same vigour as the anti-strike laws against the workers. 95 
The SAGWU arranged social events such as dances and picnics and 
held political education classes in the office. 
After a month the SAGWU held its first general members' meeting. 
It then had 142 members. At the meetings a permanent committee 
was elected and Eli Weinberg was elected to continue as secretary. 
The office rent and other expenses, as well as Weinberg's salary, 
were paid from monthly contributions from the Transvaal union. 
The SAGWU started organizing just at the time Evans was beginn­
ing his visits to the factories with the books of stop order forms 
for workers to sign. The SAGWU responded to this move with an 
intensive propaganda drive. It made much of the fact that the Cape 
Union advertised its meeting as being under the auspices of the 
factory owners and questioned why this union, which had never 
even been a name to most workers, had now suddenly become active. 
The answer, the SAGWU said in a pamphlet, was that, 
The employers •••wish the Cape Federation of Labour Unions 
to build a BOSSES' UNION for them! 
•••The employers do not want increased wages; they wish 
to avoid such a wage determination, and they are out 
91. 	 'Memorandum submitted to the Honourable the Minister of Justice 
Regarding the Non-Enforcement of Determination No.42 and Deter­
mination No.44, Cape', 1935 (GWUSA Archives). 
92. 	 Cape Argus 30 October 1935. 
93. 	 Statement of E.S. Sachs, 22 March 1949, paragraph 63. (GWUSA 
Archives, Bcc 1.20.1). 
94. 	 'Memorandum ••• ',op.cit. 
95. 	 E.S. Sachs 'The Struggle of the Garment Workers in the Coastal 

Areas', p.164/20 (GWUSA Archives, Bce 2.2.2). 
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to set up an Industrial Council with the assistance 

of the Cape Federation of Labour Unions, in order to 

BIND VOU DOWN TO THE PRESENT LOW WAGE LEVEL FOR A LONG 

TIME TO COME. 96 

But the SAGWU was not yet organized inside any factories and was 
unable to prevent the Cape Union from signing up a growing number 
of workers. Weinberg stated that: 
•••many workers have been forced to join the other Union. 
The bosses simply threatened them with victimisation 

97

and other measures.
 
98
There was intimidation of this sort in several cases, but many, 
probably most, workers did not understand much about trade unions 
and were "fooled,,99 and scared as much as directly coerced into sign­
ing stop orders associating them with the GWU-CP. Duncan Burnside MP 
stated in Parliament: 
The employers made the union ••• by the simple process 

of going round to their workers with stop orders and 

saying, "Vou sign that". In some instances ••• the em­

ployer actually threatened the employee that if~ she ••• 

did not sign, she would get the sack. But in most in­

stances it was not necessary to sack. Such are the con­

ditions in the garment workers' industry, such is the 

fear, such is the intimidation engendered into these 

people, that it is only necessary for the employer to 

put down a piece of paper and say, "Vou sign," and they 

. 100 
s~gn. 
Weinberg reported to the general meeting: 
96. 	 SAGWU Pamphlet advertising a meeting for 27 May 1935 (GWUSA 
Archives). 
97. 	 'Report of Comrade E. Weinberg ••• ', 3 June 1935 op.cit., p.5. 
98 	 See CWCMA Minutes: 4 October 1935 (M2/1) and Forward 13 October 
1935 on intimidation by Victoria Clothing and Shirt Manufac­
turers (Pty) Ltd. 
99. 	 Letter from Weinberg to Sachs, 15 May 1935 (GWUSA Archives, Cba 2.4.1). 
100. Hansard 18 March 1936, 1510-1511. 
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Today we are in such a position that most of the gar­
ment workers have joined, if you call that joining, 

· 101
t he other Unlon. 
Consequently the SAGWU supporters should work inside the Cape Union, 
••• to expose to the workers that the leaders of that 
· d f d h" 102other Unlon are not out toe en t elr lnterests. 
The aim was to prise workers away from the Cape Union and to destroy 
it. 103 Weinberg said: 
I think that by careful work we will succeed in winning 
all the workers over to our side. The most important 
thing is that we must really take up the grievances 
of the workers and fight for them, so that they can 
see with their own eyes which is their Union. So the 
basis of our policy is a relentless and uncompromising 
fight against all bosses in the interests of all garment 
and tailoring workers. 104 
The Cape Union went about the formation of the industrial council 
and the negotiation of an agreement amidst great secrecy. The 
negotiations were conducted by self-appointed officials and a 
self-appointed executive committee. General meetings of the Union 
were due every month in terms of the constitution. But not one 
was held. In 1927 the officials of the Union had their painfully 
negotiated agreement repudiated at a general meeting when, as 
in 1935, it contained wages lower than those recommended by the 
105Wage Board. By 1935, the officials had learnt their lesson 
from history. They were not again going to make the mistake of 
asking a general meeting to approve the agreement or even the 
formation of an industrial council. This would be playing into 
101. 	 'Report of Comrade E. Weinberg ••• ', 3 June 1935 op.cit., p.5. 
102. 	Ibid. 
103. 	Not yet (as was later the case) to capture the union from the 
inside as David Lunn proposed. 
,104. 	 'Report of Comrade E. Weinberg ••• , 3 June 19350p.cit., p.5. 
105. 	See Chapter 4, p.178, above. 
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the hands of the growing rival union. Token meetings for specific 
factories were held in early July for members to tlconfirmtl the 
agreement l06 but no general meeting was allowed to decide on 
the matter as required by the Union's constitution. 
The position of the SAGWU was greatly strengthened in mid­
July when, at long last, the recommendations of the Wage Board 
appeared in the Government Gazette. l07 This provided the rival 
union with a new organizing focus which promised tangible benefits 
to workers. The proposed wages were substantially more favourable 
108to workers than the 'industrial council' agreement. But the 
SAGWU made the error of assuming that this publication of the 
recommendation amounted to a positive statement by the Minister 
of his intention to gazette it as a new wage determination. l09 
The union thought that garment workers were now guaranteed at 
least the minima set in the Wage Board recommendation whether 
110the 'industrial council' was formed or not. They used the 
publication of the recommendation to encourage workers to resign 
from the Cape Union and join the SAGWU, which all along had cam­
paigned for the Wage Board proposals. Now that higher wages were 
as good as assured, the absolute priority was to stop the registra­
tion of an industrial council comprising the CWCMA and their stooge 
union, the GWU-CP. 
The CWCMA, however, tlhad the sympathy of the Department of 
Labourtl •lll The Divisional Inspector told the manufacturers that 
if the Minister received the proposed 'industrial council' agreement 
before 12 August and if he "was satisfied that the employers had 
106. 	Cape Peninsula Garment Workers' Union (Registered) Pamphlet: 
'Home Rule in the Cape Clothing and Shirt Manufacturing Industry', 
July 1935 (GWUSA Archives). 
107. 	12 July 1935. 
108. 	The first draft of the agreement provided lower wages for quali­
fied workers than were finally settled upon. See Table 6.4, 
p. 356, below. 
109. 	See SAGWU Pamphlet advertising a meeting for 25 July 1935 
(GWUSA Archives). 
110. 	Sachs wrote: " ••• after the Minister has published his intentions 
of publishing the original recommendations of the Board as a De­
termination (Govt. Gazette 12/7/35), it is extremely unlikely 
that he will now desist from making a new Determination in spite 
of all rumour". Letter to J.C. Bolton, 4 September 1935 (GWUSA 
Archives). 
Ill. 	CWCMA Minutes: 19 July 1935 - M2/1 (Mr. L.H. Lewis, p.5). 
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made a reasonable attempt to meet the sitaution",112 he would 
accept the agreement even if it set lower wages than the new Wage 
Board proposals, 
The manufacturers were now intent on forming an industrial 
council at all costs, Roytowski, 
, •• said the North were determined to rule the Clothing 
Industry in the South and he felt that the Industry 
should fight even if it meant they had to pay the wages 
as laid down by the Wage Board to get the Industrial 
Council registered and so have control of the Industry 
themselves,113 
Jacobs, 
••• stated that Mr. Sachs' great argument was that Mr. 
Evans was acting in the interests of the "bosses". 
He was said to have sold the employees because the In­
dustrial Council Agreement laid down th  wages of a 
qualified (female) worker at 42/6d. Mr. Sachs had said 
that he would see that the workers got 45/-. Mr. Jacobs 
felt that employers should endeavour to meet employees 
by giving an increase of 12 1/2% on present wages which 
he thought would be a fair arrangement satisfying both 
the employers and employees, and would also squash the 
114
argument of Mr. Sachs. 
This suggestion was accepted. As a result of the SAGWU campaign 
and independently of any request from the Cape Union , the bosses 
raised the wage of qualified women machinists up to the level 
proposed by the Wage Board. The wages of learners remained sub­
stantially below those put forward by the Wage Board and the 'agree­
ment' divided qualified workers into eight divisions, each with 
a different qualified wage. As a result, certain jobs (for example 
packers, cleaners, markers and sorters) had lower qualified minimum 
wages than under the existing wage determination. The Wage Board 
112. CWCMA Minutes: 19 July 1935 - M2/1 (W.J. Laite). 
113. Ibid., p.4. 
114. Ibid., p.6. 
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set flat minimum rates for men and women while the 'agreement' 
set minima for specific jobs, allowing employers to make small 
cost reductions. The Wage Board proposed one week's leave on 
115full pay per year; the 'agreement' allowed two days paid leave.
The 'agreement' also enabled the industrial council to grant ex­
emptions to up to ten per cent of a factory's workforce "who by 
" " ,,116 Ireason 0 f s1owness are unable to earn t he mlnlmum wage n 
virtually all respects, the proposals of the Wage Board were more 
favourable to the workers than those of the 'industrial council' .117 
The revised 'industrial council agreement' was sent to the 
Minister at the end of July 1935 with the request that he register 
t he counCl an gazette t e agreement. e actlvltles 0 t e"I d h 118 Th """ f h 
SAGWU, meanwhile, were reaching new heights. Solly Sachs returned 
to Cape Town in July to help with organization for six months. 
119By September the SAGWU had a paying membership of 750. The 
union was increasingly visible to workers with more meetings, 
pamphlets and house visits. Sachs wrote to J.C. Bolton of the 
Garment Workers' Industrial Union in Durban, 
Our influence amongst the thousands of non-members is 
enormous and if the bosses here would not intimidate 
the workers we should have a membership running into 
thousands. At our last mass meeting we had over 500 
present •••Our membership is growing daily and so is 
our influence, and in spite of all the obstacles, treachery 
and attempts to mislead the workers, we feel confident 
that 	in the near future we shall have the majority of 
the Cape workers in our ranks •••• The Cape Town workers 
115. 	Clause 8.5. 
116. 	Clause 8.4. 
117. 	The above comparison is based on the Wage Board recommendation 
(Government Gazette 12 July 1935) and the 'industrial council 
agreement' sent to the Minister late in July 1935 (Annexure BB ­
Smith v. Crawford and Others op.cit.). See also 'Comparison 
of Wage Scales between Determination No.42 (Clothing Industry) 
and Agreement (Cape) published in the Government Gazette of 
April the 3rd 1936' (GWUSA Archives, Ccb 1.2.1.3). 
118. 	ICCI (Cape) Minutes: 24 July 1935 (Annexure K - Smith v. Craw­
ford and Others op.cit.). 
119. 	Letter from Sachs to J.C. Bolton, 4 September 1935 (GWUSA Archives). 
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want the terms of the Wage Board recommendation and 

will accept nothing less, they will do everything in 

their power to prevent the imposition of an agreement 

upon them with less favourable conditions. 120 

Sachs marched around Cape Town like a showman - picking arguments 
with the bosses and Cape Federation officials, bragging about 
the successes of the Transvaal union and exuding arrogance and 
self-assurance. 
Roytowski told a CWCMA meeting, 
••• that somebody in the Association was handing Sachs 

copies of the minutes. Mr. Sachs had produced copies 

of minutes to him, and had been able to tell him of 

certain remarks he had made at meetings which were not 

even recorded in the minutes. Messrs. Andrews, Weinberg 

and Sachs could be seen sitting in public cafes with 

coloured girls from the factories. One of his firm's 

girls had been picked to go to Russia, and Sachs came 

in and said he presumed that this girl's job would be 

121kept open for her while she was away. 
The SAWGU inundated the Labour Department with allegations of 
. f th d . . 122 d I h d t he evaSlon 0 e wage etermlnatl0n an emp oyers a to 
fend off a growing number of complaints from inspectors (lithe ma­
jority of which", said the CWCMA, "on enquiry are found to be 
untrue,,123). 
So although the Cape Union claimed 2 700 members, the manufac­
turers did not feel as secure as they would have wished. They 
took the matter up with Evans. One manufacturer told Evans that, 
••• (his) Union was not working as hard to obtain new 

members as they ought to. He found from 12 to 16 opera­

tives dropping out of the Union after Mr. Sachs had 

120. Letter from Sachs to J .G. Bolton, 4 September 1935 (GWUSA Archives). 
121. CWCMA Minutes: 4 October 1935 - M2/1. 
122. CWCMA Minutes: 19 July 1935 - M2/1. 
123. CWCMA Minutes: 4 October 1935 - M2/1. 
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visited the factory. They were allowing them to be 

lost after getting them to join the Union. 124 

Jacobs, 
stated that Mr. Sachs was very active, and disputed 

wage rates, etc. He thought that Mr. Evans ought to 

do a little more propaganda work and that 12 of his 

employees had resigned out of 250 members. 125 

He stated that the GWU-CP ought to attack the statements of the 
SAWGU that "the local Trade Union had never looked after the in­
terests of the employees".126 
Evans replied that only 85 workers had in fact resigned and 
that the Union would issue a circular within a week to inform 
workers of Union doctors and chemists and of the "Lady Welfare 
Visitor" who had been appointed. 127 
Under the influence of the SAGWU campaign some workers began to 
gain in confidence in the factories. A significant number renounced 
the stop orders they had signed and openly joined the SAGWU. 
Employers found a new attitude of defiance amongst some of their 
workers. Middlemass, 
••• pointed out (to the CWCMA) that it was quite impos­
sible to deal with employees with the same independence 
128 
as formerly - times had changed. 
One forewoman told her employer, 
••• that he could 	not boss her about, as she had Mr. 

129
Sachs behind her. 
124. 	CWCMA Minutes: 13 August 1935 - M2/1 (Mr. Gasgarth). 
125. 	Ibid., p.6. 
126. 	Ibid., p.7. 
127. 	Ibid. This post was held by Mrs. E. Noble, an executive member 
of the Union since 1927, at a salary of £12 a month. (Affi­
davit of Reginald Smith, p.ll - Smith v. Crawford and Others 
op.cit.). 
128. 	CWCMA Minutes: 17 February 1936 - M2/1. 
129. 	CWCMA Minutes: 4 October 1935 - M2/1. 
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Employers did not know how to cope with the obvious effect which 
the SAGWU was having on their workers. H. Furman of Victoria 
Clothing called the police to remove Sachs and Weinberg from his 
factory when they tried to hold a meeting inside it. Furman's 
brother told Sachs, 
••• that if any of his employees joined Mr. Sachs' Union, 
130they would be dismissed from the factory. 
The SAGWU made a great deal of publicity around this incident. 
Sachs told Furman he would call the workers out on strike unless 
he stopped his interference. 131 The SAGWU issued a series of 
demands and threatened to apply for a conciliation board if they 
132 
were not acceded to.
Middlemass thought it was very unfortunate that this incident 
had occurred. It was u a tactical error". "It was giving Sachs 
. . . th U 133 H 'dammunltlon to use agalnst em. e sal : 
••• any action such as Mr. Furman had taken was most 
inadvisable ••• they should let their workers join any 
134Union they liked without influencing .them in any way. 
The other manufacturers concurred. Jacobs said: 
••• (he) thought that Mr. Furman should take steps to 
state publicly that the workers at his factory were 
absolutely free to join any Trade Union they wished, 
and that what he had meant to convey previously was 
that he favoured them joining the Cape Garment Workers' 
.Unlon. 135 
In the space of six months the Transvaal union had established a 
secure beachhead in Cape Town. The SAGWU campaign was directed 
at building an organization of Cape garment workers to challenge 
their bosses. The union initiated confrontation with the bosses 
over the right to organize and the evasions of the wage determination. 
130. CWCMA Minutes: 4 October 1935 - M2/1. 
13I. Ibid. 
132. Forward 13 October 1935. 
133. CWCMA Minutes: 4 October 1935 - M2/I. 
134. Ibid. 
135. Ibid. 
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It also put pressure on the Minister to gazette the new wage deter­
mination - this being the swiftest means at the time of improving 
wages and conditions. It was on the basis of this real union 
activity that the SAGWU challenged the existence of the Cape Gar­
ment Workers' Union. 
The Beleaguered Cape Union 
The Cape Union still did not submit the decision to form an indus­
1 'I th' , 'f 136t . counC1 or e agreement to a meet1ng 0 . bers.r1a 1ts mem 
Sachs wrote to Bolton: 
Over 2 000 workers have Union dues deducted from their 
wages, but no general meetings have been held because 
the self-appointed leaders are afraid to face the workers. 
These same leaders have also concluded an agreement 
behind the backs of the workers with lower wages and 
worse conditions as compared with the recommendations 
of the Wage Board. Of course this agreement is not 
worth the paper it is written on, and very shortly we 
137hope 	to put the self-appointed leaders in their places. 
In September, some 27 SAGWU sympathisers who were members of the 
Cape Union signed a petition requesting the union leaders to hold 
a general meeting. Under the constitution of the Union it was 
obligatory for the leaders to hold a general meeting if twenty 
workers requested this. The leaders ignored the petition. Sachs 
then decided to launch a legal challenge to the Union leaders.• 
He arranged for one of the petitioners, Reggie Smith, to bring 
a Supreme Court action against Evans, Freestone and the Union 
executive to force the Union to abide by its constitution. Smith 
sought an interdict to stop the executive from participating in 
the establishment of an industrial council until a general meet­
138ing had been held to allow members to vote on the matter.
136. 	Letter from Weinberg to the Registrar of Trade Unions, 10 
September 1935 S.A.B. ARBI054/514. 
137. 	Letter from Sachs to Bolton, 4 September 1935 (GWUSA Archives). 
138. 	Smith v. Crawford and 6 Others (15, 16, 21 October 1935, 
CPD, not reported). 
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The case proved highly embarrassing to the Cape Union. Evi­
dence presented to the court139 indicated that the Union was com­
pletely dominated by Stuart and the Federation bureaucrats who 
surrounded him - none of whom was a garment worker. This clique 
ran the Union with scant regard for the constitution not only 
as far as concerned the rejection of members' petitions but also 
in the general administration of the Union. The Union constitution 
allowed great flexibility for members to exercise their rights 
.. . d 1 140 Th 1 t . f bof part~c~pat~on an contro. e genera mee ~ng 0 mem ers 
was the most powerful body inside the Union and all but day to 
day matters had to be decided by a general meeting. The executive 
had little power in itself - certainly not the power to form an 
industrial council and bind members to an agreement without the 
majority vote of a general meeting. The constitution was open 
and democratic. But the constitution was never adhered to. There 
was doubt as to whether the Union in 1935 had a single properly 
elected official or executive member. 
The judge, Mr. Justice Jones, granted the interdict. He 
slated the Union officials, 
It seems to me that everything that has been done on 
the part of the Executive Committee in 
constituting an Industrial Council and coming to an 
agreement with employers was improperly and irregularly 
done ••••While they were denying the general body of 
members the right to express their views upon matters 
of supreme importance to the workers in the industry, 
they proceeded to effect amendments to the constitution••• 
and enter into agreements with the employers materially 
affecting the interests of the workers. The papers 
before me indicate that the respondents, knowing what 
they were doing was irregular and contrary to the consti­
tution, deliberately and without any justification re­
139. 	See Cape Supreme Court: Motions Volume 12 No.946 1935 (C.A.D.). 
140. 	 'The Constitution of the Garment Workers' Union of the Cape 
Peninsula' (Annexure B - Smith v. Crawford and Others 
op.cit.). 
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frained from doing their duty and when requested to 

do what they were required under the constitution to 

do, turned a deaf ear to the request. Not only was 

their conduct grossly unreasonable, but I venture to 

t hln" k t h" I ack"lng ln"bona f"des.
at lt was 	 1 141 
The judgement was a severe blow to the prestige of the Cape Federa­
tion as well as to the GWU-CP officials. William Freestone, the 
paid secretary of the Union, was president of the CFLU. Forward 
printed the entire judgement under the heading "Dictators on 
the Run".142 The court case also interfered with the rapid regi­
stration of the proposed industrial council. But the Cape Union 
was scared to call a general meeting while the SAGWU was making 
such an impact on the workers. Stuart approached the manufacturers 
and asked them to agree to employ only Cape Union members. This, 
he hoped, would put an end to the Transvaal's interference. The 
employers did not think that the blunders of the Cape Union of­
ficials could be so easily brushed aside. One of SAGWU's fighting 
points was its right to organize and Sachs had threatened to cause 
strikes over this issue only a few weeks previously. Roytowski 
told Stuart that the manufacturers "were not justified" in agreeing 
to hlS request ln Vlew 0 t e way t e nlon was elng run •· " " " f h h U " b . " 143 
Jacobs agreed. 
(He) thought it would be a fatal step for the employers 
to do this at the present time. It would be placing 
a weapon in Sachs' hands. 144 
The CWCMA meeting made clear to Stuart their dissatisfaction with the 
Cape Union. Jacobs said, 
141. 	Judgement: Smith v. Crawford and Others (CSC Motions 12 (946) 
1935 - C.A.D.). Jones ordered that the costs of the case be 
borne by Evans, Freestone and four executive members in their 
personal capacities and not by the Cape Union. 
142. 	Forward 8 November 1935. 
143. 	CWCMA Minutes: 7 November 1935, p.5 - M2/1. 
144. 	Ibid., p.7. 
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••• that if Mr. Stuart did not mind him saying so, he 
thought that the Union was going about the formation 
of their Union in a very slipshod manner ••• for every 
once Mr. Evans had been going out, Mr. Sachs had been 
going out about a dozen times. Unless the Union be­
came more active they would lose entire control. There 
was no initiative amongst their Executive members, 
whereas the other people were at it all the time, get­
ting into touch with the employees, taking them out 
145to tea and all that kind of thing. 
The manufacturers were particularly concerned about the way in which 
the GWU-CP had successfully been dubbed a bosses' union. They 
urged the Union to distance itself from them in order to gain credi­
bility with the workers. 
Mr. Mauerberger said that the cause of all this trouble 
was certain grievances that the employees were complain­
ing about ••••They had to look for the cause of the trouble, 
and he told them that there was a definite decision 
amongst the workers that they had no confidence in Hr. 
Evans' Union, and unless the Union woke up and took 
action against the manufacturers or anybody else, to 
show that they were a live body, they would lose the 
support of the employees. The Union must be militant. 146 
The Cape Union was under attack from both the workers and the manu­
facturers for being a bosses' union. 
The CWCMA secured an undertaking from Stuart that the Union 
would hold a general meeting soon. The CWCMA minutes record: 
Mr. Stuart said that he promised that whatever they 
did at this meeting would be within the four walls of 
the Constitution. They might get out two or three hand­
bills pointing out the main benefits of the new Indus­
trial Council agreement and ask the manufacturers to 
distribute them. 147 
145. CWCMA Minutes: 7 November 1935, p.4 - M2/1. 
146. Ibid., pp.6,7. 
147. Ibid., p.8. 
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The agenda of the general meeting consisted of a series of reso­
lutions which "ratified" all the actions of the Executive over 
the previous year in enrolling new members, forming the 'indus­
148trial council' and signing the 'agreement'. It was vital 
to the future of the Cape Union that these resolutions be carried. 
The Cape Union officials knew that the SAGWU and its supporters 
were mobilizing workers to defeat the resolutions. They took 
def . The . h b f e ore t e genera meetlng149enSlve measures. nlg t hI' t hey 
informed at least fourteen leading supporters of the SAGWU that 
they had been suspended from membership of the GWU-CP "for openly 
t " th h" f th h t'l "d" ." 150 Se-·suppor lng e c alrman 0 e os 1 e lnva lng unlon 
veral suspended members applied to the Supreme Court for an urgent 
'd d hI' 151order t hat t hey be permltte to atten t e genera meetlng. 
The application was heard by Justice Jones, who was well acquainted 
with the background to the case, but he refused to grant the order 
as this, 
••• would constitute an interference in the internal 

" f h . 152
affalrs 0 t e unlon. 
The meeting was held in an uproar. The Cape Argus reported that, 
despite the presence of policemen in and outside the City Hall,. 
"pandemonium reigned for the greater part of the meeting" 153 
Poole was in the chair and he refused to take questions or allow 
the meeting to elect its own chairman. He rejected the demand 
that the vote be by ballot. 154 Evans had brought with him a band 
148. 	GWU-CP Pamphlet advertising general meeting in the City Hall on 
26 November 1935 (Annexure C - Ex Parte Ernest Petersen and 5 
Others Cape Supreme Court: Motions 22 (1088-1093) 1935 C.A.D.). 
149. 	Letter from Freestone (secretary GWU-CP) to Rose Crawford, 
dated 23 November 1935, delivered 25 November 1935 (Annexure D ­
Ex Parte Ernest Petersen and 5 Others op.cit.). 
150. 	Letter from Poole to Registrar, Cape Supreme Court, c.27 November 
1935 (Filed in Ex Parte Ernest Petersen and 5 Others op.cit.). 
151. 	Ex Parte Ernest Petersen and 5 Others (26 November 1935, C.P.D., 
not reported). 
152. 	Jones ~ in Ex Parte Ernest Petersen and 5 Others op.cit. 
153. 	27 November 1935. 
154. 	CDC Pamphlet: 'To all Trade Unions, Trade Unionists and Workers', 
c.12 	December 1935 (GWUSA Archives). 
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155
of "chuckers-out" from the lorry drivers' and bakers' unions 
who physically ejected people who tried to address the meeting 
from the floor. Amidst "whistles, cat-calls and yells,,156 Poole 
declared all the resolutions to be carried. The CFLU and Cape 
Union officials knew they were involved in a fight to the death 
and were losing. They could not afford to be generous with de­
mocracy. 
The CDC issued a protest pamphlet: 
Clear the bosses' friends out of the Trade Union Move­
ment! •••We call upon all trade unionists and honest 
workers to come to the aid of the garment workers by 
condemning the Hitler-Mussolini tactics of Messrs. 
Evans and Co., by demanding that the malicious suspen­
sions from the Union be immediately cancelled and the 
suspended members be reinstated, by demanding that the 
garment workers be allowed to express their opinions 
freely and in a democratic and constitutional manner 
. . 1 	 . h 157on matters 0 f t he most vlta lmportance to t em. 
But the damage was done. The general meeting had been a major 
defeat for the SAGWU. 
This was followed by another setback in the struggle against 
the Cape Union officials. The GWU-CP won an appeal it had lodged 
158
against the judgement in Smith's action against the Executive. 
There, Justice Jones had ordered the holding of a general meeting 
as the Union officials had flouted the constitution and, he sug­
gested, were acting in bad faith. In the appeal, to a full bench 
of the Supreme Court, Justice Watermeyer held that the order should 
have been refused as the petition for the meeting had not been 
issued in proper form (it did not state the business of the requi­
sitioned meeting). He continued to ask rhetorically: 
155. 	Cape Argus 27 November 1935. 
156. 	Cape Times 27 November 1935. 
157. CDC Pamphlet: 'To all Trade Union ••• ' op.cit. 
158. Garment 	Workers' Union and Others v. Smith (1936 C.P.D. 251), 

10 and 24 December 1935. 
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Upon what ground can the Court interdict the executive 
from doing unconstitutional acts which may have the 
approval of the majority of members and which the ma­
. . . d t· f ?159Jorlty lnten to ra 1 y. 
This judgement had no practical effect as the general meeting had 
now been held, but it gave the Cape Union a propaganda victory 
which they referred to gloatingly for the next ten years. More 
important was that this judgement indicated that the courts could 
not, in general, be relied upon to ensure democratic procedures 
. th . t d . 160 0 .. I· WWl ln ra e unlons. nce permlsslon to appea agalnst ater­
161meyer'~ judgement had been refused, the SAGWU halted the legal 
efforts it was making to challenge the validity of the November 26 
.
meetlng. 162 
The Cape Union was fighting back and making significant gains 
everywhere except amongst the workers. It began to issue replies 
to SAGWU and CDC propaganda. 
This hostile and warlike Labour Council [TLC] and its 
pup invaded Capetown and prevented Capetown garment 
workers receiving upward of £25 000 in increased wages 
which their employers had made an Agreement with them 
to pay ••• 
They say, "down with the Cape Federation of Trades" •••• 
because they want the job for themselves. Of course 
they say it because they want the Cape Unions to give 
up their own self-governing body, and change it for 
a set of tyrants whose hiding-hole is Johannesburg. 
"Comrades" they call themselves; Comrades, yes it does 
smell like the bloody revolutions of Europe, where the 
workers' blood washed the streets, and their bones 
rotted in the gutters •••• 
159. 	At 251, Ibid. 
160. The 	 same may be said of the outcome of Ex Parte Petersen and 
5 Others op.cit. 
161. Smith 	v. Crawford and Others N.O. (1936 C.P.D. 261), 24 January 
1936. 
162. See 	affidavit of Adv. T.H. Snitcher in Smith v. Crawford and 
Others N.O. CSC: Motions 1 (63) 1936 (C.A.D.). 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn7 
304 

The Cape Federation••• does not pretend to shelter po­
litical revolutionary propaganda under its cloak of 
Trade Unionism. It is Trade Unionism and nothing else ••• 
The type of worker the "Comrade Labour Council" gives 
its benign and empty blessing to, is one who remains 
in a Cape Union to lead it to destruction. That is 
the love they have for Cape Unions ••• they are doing 
their utmost to divide the workers and play the bosses' 
game. They are the true bosses' union, and have put 
many tens of thousands in the bosses' pockets. They 
care for the workers less than the bosses do. 163 
Help from Above 
To put the matter in a nutshell, the employers are pre­
pared to form an industrial council for the specific 
purpose of getting over the provisions of the wage de­
termination and they are doing it with the connivance 
of the Minister of Labour and with the connivance and 
the assistance of his department. 
164 
- Duncan Burnside M.P., 1936
The greatest injury suffered by the SAGWU organizing campaign 
was inflicted by the Department of Labour, which spiked the new 
wage determination and reg stered the industrial council. 
In November 1935, the Minister announced that he did not 
intend to publish the final recommendations of the Wage Board 
. . 165 S h d . . d d Thas a determ~nat~on. uc a ec~s~on was unprece ente. e 
Minister often asked the Board to re-consider their recommenda­
tions in the light of objections received, but no minister had 
simply refused to gazette a recommendation of the Board as a de­
termination. The reasons later given by the Department of Labour 
for this decision were that, 
••• it was considered the Wage Board's proposals would 
163. 	GWU-CP Pamphlet: 'Reply to S.A. Trades &Labour Council's 
(The Bosses' Union) attack issued 12th December, 1935.', 
December 1935 (GWUSAArchives). 
164. 	Hansard 18 March 1936, col.1508. 
165. 	Cape Argus 7 November 1935. 
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not be to the benefit of the bulk of employees and would 
operate detrimentally to the interests of the country 
as a 	whole. 166 
The Secretary for Labour, Ivan Walker, stated that the Wage Board 
reports had not contained "detailed information" on the financial 
position of the industry. The matter had been referred to the 
Board of Trade and Industries which reported that, 
••• the coastal manufacturers would not, under present 
conditions, be able to absorb the extra cost involved 
in the new Determination. 167 
The Wage Board had spent more than a year on an intensive investi­
gation of the industry. Part of its brief under the Wage Act 
was to take account of an industry's ability to pay before it 
recommended wage increases. The Board had financial returns from 
most of the clothing factories168 and had found the coastal manu­
facturers to be making large profits. 169 The CWCMA had itself 
seriously discussed 'voluntarily' including the full Wage Board 
170proposals in their 'industrial council agreement' In view 
of these facts, the hasty opinion of the Board of Trade is open 
to question. 
Hindsight allows a different interpretation of the refusal 
to gazette a new wage determination. Whatever their ability to 
pay, the manufacturers naturally resisted any legislative effort 
to increase wages. By 1935 the coastal clothing industry was 
solidly established as an important and growing sub-section of 
manufacturing industry. The Cape clothing manufacturers now had 
an ec~nomic influence they had lacked in 1925 and manufacturing 
industry as a whole was more strongly placed to discourage the 
government from upsetting its expansion. It is likely that the 
Minister listened more closely to the objections of the Cape manu­
166. Department of Labour: Annual Report 1935 (UG 4 - 1937). 
167. Quoted in ibid. 
168. 	CWCMA Minutes: 25 March 1935 - M2/1. 
169. 	Wage Board Report, 12 April 1935 op.cit. 
170. 	CWCMA Minutes: 19 July 1935 - M2/1. 
(See p.292, above.) 
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171facturers for this reason. In addition, the employment of 
'civilized' labour in the Cape .clothing industry was increasing 
steadily despite lower wage rates relative to the Transvaal. 
Secondly, by the mid-1930's poor whiuasm had ceased to be 
the burning political problem it had been (Davies, 1979, pp.260-1). 
Industrial expansion, born of the policy of tariff protection 
for industry, had. shown itself to be the most effective way of 
providing jobs for whites. Wage determinations at 'civilized' 
levels, especially if they were enforced, threatened to hold back 
growth while not being productive of any compensating political 
advantages. The Wage Act was no longer needed to serve its original 
political purposes and so the economic implications of the Act 
were no longer tolerable to the government. By the mid-1930's, 
the government was preparing to change the functioning of the 
172Wage Board and the functions of the Wage Act. These changes 
found legislative expression only in 1937, when the Wage Act was 
amended to remove the duty of the Board to s t 'civilized' wages. 
An earlier warning of the changes is seen in the fate of the 1935 
Wage Board recomm:~dations for the clothing industry. 
The signing of the final report on the clothing industry 
coincided with the Minister's sacking of the whole Wage Board. 
F.A.W. Lucas had been chairman of the Board since its inception. 
In the past his tenure as head of the Board has been periodically 
171. 	Hostility to the principle of using the Wage Board to equalize 
wage rates in industry between the Cape and the Transvaal 
was shared generally by members of the CCI (CWCMA Minutes: 
24 April 1935 - M2/1). 
172. 	This general point is made by Davies (1979, pp.256, 264-5). 
His argument, while not in conflict with that suggested here, 
is different. Davies sees the Wage Act before "the early 
'fusion' period" as a most important promoter of the 'civilized 
labour policy'. The changes in the Wage Act in 1937 are 
interpreted as part of "a restructuring of the apparatuses 
concerned with the assignment of white agents to wage-earning 
places in industry" (p.256). This role was taken over in­
creasingly by the industrial councils (pp.264-5). In the 
case of the Cape clothing industry we have disputed the va­
lidity of Davies' generalizations about the direct role of 
the wage determinations in promoting white employment. 
(See Chapter 4, above). 
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d b t w en 1 h apsed'1n ugust e was not . d 173 renewe u 't I A 1935 h reappo1nte. 
Neither were the other two members of the Board. Lucas had always 
seen the Wage Board as an instrument of social progress. It raised 
wages where employers made large profits out of unorganized workers 
and it tried to eliminate unfair competition between high and 
low wage regions. These aims were at odds with the political 
and economic objectives of the state once poor whitism was no 
longer such a pressing political problem. The Minister had no 
appointees ready to take over the work of the Board which remained 
non-existent for six months before a new Board was named. The 
Wage Board was thus unable to protest the Minister's decision 
174in November. 
The Transvaal garment workers' union and its Cape Town branch 
were extremely angry at this betrayal by the Minister. The Wage 
Board had been the pivot of the organizing campaign against the 
'industrial council'. The Transvaal union and the SAGWU could 
justly claim some credit for having initiated the Wage Board in­
vestigation and having influenced the high wages recommended. 
The gazetting of the new determination would have further enhanced 
their prestige and greatly strengthened the national unity movement. 
The Transvaal union organized pr test meetings and a march in 
Johannesburg175 while in Cape Town, the SAGWU held a "Monster 
173. 	See Budlender (1979, p.138). Lucas was informed in April 
1935 that he would not be reappointed (Cape Times 28 May 
1936 (sic) cited by Budlender). 
174. The 	Wage Board produced no annual report for 1935. See De­
partment of Labour: Annual Report 1935 op.cit., pp.68, 72. 
175. 	The refusal of the Minister to gazette a new wage determination 
was the context for this poem, later published in the Garment 
Worker: 
LIED VAN DIE WERKELOSE 
Fourie is ons Minister van Arbeid, ons sal niks ontbreek nie 
Hy laat ons neerle, op harde park banke 
He lei ons na vry sop-huise 
Hy lei ons op die pad na verwoesting 
Vir sy Party se ontwil. 
Ja, al gaan ons in n dal van skaduus van hongersnood 
Ons is gelukkig, want hy is teen ons. 
Hy berei n besnoesing van ons lone 
In die teenwoordigheid van ons vyande. 
Hy maak ons hoof swaar met boete 
Ons uitgawes oortref ons inkomste 
Immers sal werkeloosheid en armoede ons volg 
In al die dae van die Verenigde Party se Administrasie 
en ons 
Sal bly in pondokke (Klerewerker November 1936) 
Vir ewig en ewig. 
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Demonstration" in the Drill Hall and a march to the Houses of 
Parliament. Pamphlets and press statements railed against the 
Minister for "breaking his promise" to publish the new determina­
tion and against the Department of Labour for its partiality to 
. d·· t . th . t· d t . . 176 IempI oyers ln a mlnlS erlng e eX1S lng e ermlnatlon. n 
addition, Sachs sought a court order to compel the Minister to 
177gazette the recommendation. F.A.W. Lucas, who had returned 
to the Bar after his dismissal as Wage Board chairman, appeared 
for the Transvaal union,178 
But the demonstrations had no effect and the Supreme Court 
held that the Minister had full discretion on whether to publish 
.. 179 
a wage determlnatlon or not. The SAGWU now threw all its efforts 
into sabotaging the 'industrial council' between the GWU-CP and 
the CWCMA. 
Following the initial judgement against the Cape Union in 
Smith v. Crawford and Others, the SAGWU wrote to the CWCMA vainly 
180
offering to form an industrial council without the GWU_Cp. 
Sachs told Roytowski that he was prepared to take over the 'agree­
ment' negotiated with the Cape Union. 
He even said (Roytowski reported) that if the manufac­
turers' assisted in breaking up the Cape Garment Workers' 
Union, he would see that the employers got better terms 
181than 	had been laid down in the Agreement. 
This form of parody of the 23rd Psalm is not original. See 
Lasswell and Blumenstock (1939, p.95) "The Hobo's Prayer" 
and Umteteli Wa Bantu 29 October 1932 "'Civilized' Labour 
Policy", reprinted in Chapman (1981, p.142). 
176. 	SAGWU Pamphlet advertising meeting on 14 November 1936 (GWUSA 
Archives). 
177. 	Cape Argus 9 November 1935. 
178. 	Garment Workers' Union of the Transvaal v. A.P.J. Fourie N.O. 
(GWUSA Archives, Bcc 1.6). Lucas had earlier given an opinion 
that the action had a good chance of success. 
179. 	Garment Workers' Union (Transvaal) v. Minister of Labour (30 
January 1936, TPD, 113); Department of Labour: Annual Report 
1936, p.61 (UG 44 - 1937). 
180. 	Mentioned in CWCMA Minutes: 26 November 1935 - M2/1. The 
letter referred to was dated 9 November 1935. 
181. 	CWCMA Minutes: 7 November 1935 - M2/1. A draft letter from 
the SAGWU to Roytowski, dated 1 November 1935, read: "We have 
been stigmatized time and time again as 'revolutionaries' and 
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The manufacturers were disillusioned with the Cape Union but not 
to the extent that they could see any point in abandoning their 
'industrial council'. They had participated in the ruses of the 
Cape Union to increase its membership and treated it as their 
ally in defeating the Transvaal union. 
If it was unreasonable for the SAGWU to expect the CWCMA 
to change its attitude to the GWU-CP after the initial court judge­
ment, the same cannot be said for the Department of Labour. The 
court case starkly exposed the corruption in the Cape Union. An 
impartial judge had said the officials were acting in bad faith. 
They flouted the constitution, they had no mandate from the wor­
kers to form an industrial councilor negotiate an agreement with 
the employers. Evidence presented on the recuitment methods of 
the officials cast grave doubt on whether the Union was represen­
tative of workers in the industry, even though it claimed a member­
ship of 2 700. None of these revelations had the least effect 
on the policy of the Department of Labour towards the Cape Union. 
The more the officials of the Department became aware of the dis­
pute between the GWU-CP and the SAGWU, the more they seemed con­
cerned to protect and promote the Cape Union and its Cape Federa­
tion union bosses. The partiality shown by the Department of 
· bl . d" 182La bour to t he Cape Unlon was as atant as lt was eC1Slve. 
When A.P. Fourie, the Minister of Labour, announced his re­
fusal to gazette the wage determination, he said he was consider­
ing the draft agreement submitted to him by the industrial council 
183!tin the process of being formed" in Cape Town. He knew then 
that the 'industrial council' had not been formed validly in terms 
U ·, .. 184 Th D t . t t dof t he nlon S constltutlon. e epar ment was unln eres e 
'anti-conciliatories' ••••These descriptions are nothing but 
misleading. Our activities on the Witwatersrand in forming 
and participating very effectivelyinan Industrial Council, 
and a well administered industrial agreement, speak for them­
selves" (GWUSA Archives, Bbe 1.1.2). This draft was not sent. 
182. 	The partiality had a 'bureaucratic' impetus which derived from 
the GWU-CP's status as a registered union, but more important, 
key officials actively sided with the GWU-CP against the SAGWU. 
The most obvious of these is R. Beattie, the Cape Town Divisional 
Inspector. Ivan Walker, the Secretary for Labour, was as impor­
tant a supporter of the GWU-CP and its officials. He had a per­
sonal antipathy towards Sachs. 
183. 	Cape Argus 7 Nqvember 1935. 
184. 	Judgement in Smith v. Crawford and Others was on 21 October 1935. 
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in the undemocratic procedures at the general meeting. When it 
noticed flaws in every single resolution 'passed' at the meeting,185 
its response was to give the Cape Union (much needed)186 advice 
and assistance on how it could clear its way to participate in 
a registered industrial council. The Department of Labour acted 
in full knowledge of the efforts of the SAGWU and the failings 
of the Cape Union officials. It assisted the GWU-CP and did its 
•
utmost to ignore the SAGWU. 
The 'bureaucratic' reasons behind the stance of the Department 
was that the GWU-CP was registered and had more members on paper 
than the SAGWU. 187 The Registrar of Trade Unions was not moved 
by the outraged protests of the SAGWU at the press-ganged 'member­
ship'of the Cape Union and the irregularities in the actions 
of its officials. He wrote to Weinberg rejecting the SAGWU appli­
. f . . 188catlon or reglstratlon, 
It is true that the judgement referred to by you indi­

cates that the business of the registered union was 

conducted in an irregular manner, but this does not 

entitle me to disregard the fact that the body is a 

trade union within the meaning of the Act and that it 

has a large de facto membership.189 

In view of all the deficiencies in the wording of the resolutions 
'passed' at the Cape Union general meeting of 26 November, the 
Department of Labour wanted the Union to call another general 
185. 	Letter from Under Secretary of Labour to Divisional Inspector 
of Labour (DIL), Cape Town, 11.December 1935 S.A.B. ARB1054/306. 
186. 	The Under Secretary of Labour wrote to the Divisional Inspector 
in Cape Town (ibid.): itA perusal of your [letter] of the 6th 
December would seem to indicate that members of the above Union 
[GWU-CP] have little idea of the action necessary to avoid legal 
difficulties at a later stage". 
187. 	Memorandum from B.N. Wainwright, "c" Division, Department of La­
bour, Pretoria to the Registrar of Trade Union, 6 November 1935 
S.A.B ARB1054/514. 
188. 	The SAGWU applied for registration as early as August 1935 and 
complained then of the unconstitutional acts of GWU-CP officials 
(Letter from Weinberg to Registrar, 28 August 1935 S.A.B. ARB1054/514). 
189. 	Letter to SAGWU, 5 December 1935 S.A.B. ARB1054/514. The letter 
continued: "In any case, the position of all members has now, I 
understand been regularized". This is a reference to the general 
meeting of the Cape Union on 26 November 1935. 
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meeting at which amendments to the constitution (drawn up by the 
190Department) would be approved. 
Meanwhile the internal opponents of the Cape Union officials 
had petitioned for the calling of another general meeting. Its 
purpose was to rescind by majority vote all the resolutions car­
ried at the last general meeting. 191 The Cape Union Executive 
acted swiftly. It suspended from membership all the sixty workers 
who had signed the petition. Then it called the meeting they 
requested - placing first on the agenda its own resolutions to 
amend t he const1 u 1on, 192 an secon a mo 10n t 0 expe f't t' ddt' I rom the 
Union the sixty petitioners. Last on the agenda was the resolution 
to "review and rescind" the resolution of the general meeting 
of 26 November. The agenda pamphlet explained to members: 
If you allow a miserably small minority to obstruct 
your Union and keep you from the increases of wages 
already promised to you and only awaiting the Registra­
tion of your Wage Agreement, then you will deserve to 
lose the increases ••••Will you allow these 60 obstruc­
tionists to keep better wages out of the pockets of 
3,000 to 4,000 garment workers? •• 
COME AND VOTE IN YOUR OWN STRENGTH AGAINST THIS WICKED 
RESOLUTION. 193 
The proposed amendments to the constitution would remove most 
of the powers of the general meeting of members under the exist­
ing constitution and place them in the hands of the Executive. 
This would allow the Executive to further amend the constitution 
at its leisure and without the further approval of a general meeting. 
190. 	Letter from Under Secretary for Labour to DIL, Cape Town, 
11 December 1935 S.A.B. ARBI054/306. 
191. 	GWU-CP Pamphlet: agenda and notice of general meeting on 
9 January 1936 (GWUSA Archives). 
192. 	Ibid. These were not the amendments advised by the Department 
of Labour in Pretoria but, it seems, by the GWU-CP lawyer. 
See letter from Under Secretary for Labour to DIL, Cape Town, 
23 December 1935 S.A.B. ARBI054/306. 
193. 	GWU-CP Pamphlet: agenda and notice of general meeting on 
9 January 1936 (GWUSA Archives). (Original emphasis). 
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The SAGWU was totally out-manoeuvred. Its leading supporters 
in the Cape Union could not attend the meeting and without their 
influence the meeting would probably go the way the Cape Union 
wished. The SAGWU issued a pamphlet to tell workers how to vote: 
••• The Evans-Poole-Freestone clique want you at this 
meeting ­
a) To amend the Constitution in such a manner as to 

give them full control over the Union and to deprive 

you of any say in your own affairs. They want to tie 

you hand and foot. They want to do away with general 

meetings and place all power in the hands of a small 

coterie. 

b) They want you to act as traitors and expel 60 wor­
kers whose only crime is that they dared to demand a 
general meeting. 
They 	are not interested in your welfare but only in 
protecting the interests of the bosses. 
Turn Messrs. Freestone, Evans and Poole out of your 
Union for they are enemies. Elect your own people whom 
you can trust to lead you, workers! 
Vote for the rescinding of the resolutions of the general 
th
meeting of the 26 November, as that-meeting was packed 
with bakers and lorry drivers and the garment workers 
were prevented from speaking by the hooligans of the 
I " 194c lque. 
The meeting was held in the Trades Hall on 9 January 1936. It 
was even more disorderly than the previous general meeting. As 
Forward195 reported the occasion, police were stationed outside 
194. 	 'Garment Workers of Cape Town - BEWARE!', n.d. (GWUSA Archives). 
195. Forward 	17 January 1936. This account. is suppported by the 
Cape Times 10 January 1936; Rose Kemp: 'Statement', 1945 
op.cit.; Evidence of Rose Crawford to the Garment Workers' 
Union Commission of Inquiry, 1949, op.cit., pp.116-117, 
and an interview with Mrs. Rhoda Kets (nee Strichen). 
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the Hall to prevent suspended members from entering. The chair­
man (Poole) refused to put a motion to the meeting that they be 
allowed to attend. 
Pandemonium then broke loose. In the confusion, de­
spite the frantic efforts of Mr. Evans and his police 
escort, the suspended members trooped into the meeting 
and took their seats. It was at this stage that the 
chairman received some attention in the form of over­
ripe tomatoes, the effects of which a woman worker 
tried to remove by pouring the contents of the chair­
man's water bottle over his head. Although it was a 
well-meaning gesture, the result was scarcely satis­
factory to the chairman's appearance and temper ••• 
Shortly afterwards, as the uproar continued, the meeting was closed • 
•••The chairman and secretary then left the platform 
and marched out of the hall followed by a crowd of 

excited, gesticulating and hostile workers ••• 

The workers then reassembled in the hall and decided 

to conduct their own meeting. One of their number 
started to explain matters to a meeting which had, in 
the absence of the obnoxious officials, become suddenly 
quiet and orderly. 
The venerable secretary of the Union was then seen to 
creep quietly into the corner of the hall in which the 
electric switches were located. Whenever the speaker 
made a pointed reference to the arbitrary behaviour 
of the union officials, including Mr. Evans, that gentle­
man switched the lights off. This, of course, drew 
yells of protest from the assembled workers, and the 
lights were then switched on. This undignified game 
went on for a time when the police were called in by 
the officials to clear the hall. The workers made a 
rush at the secretary who, like little Jack Horner, 
was still in his corner, but he disappeared with remark­
able agility into the shelter of the Federation offices. 
Poole, the chairman, had long since made himself scarce. 
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The workers then assembled outside the hall to hold 
a meeting by mo.onlight ••• The meeting proceeded without 
further incident in perfect calm and after giving hearty 
boos for Messrs. Evans, Freestone and Poole, the workers 
quietly dispersed to their homes. 
Twenty-five workers signed a letter to the Registrar which stated 
that as no discussion had been allowed the workers had refused to 
vote on the amendments to the constitution, 
••• but the Chairman nevertheless shoute<L out that the 
amendments had been carried and left the meeting to­
gether with the ••• other officials of the Union, without 
196
continuing with the rest of the agenda. 
Before this letter reached Pretoria, Poole and Evans hurriedly sent 
off the resolutions to Beattie with the request that he ask the 
Registrar, 
••• to be good enough to certify these amendments imme­
diately on receipt, and wire you that he has done so, 
as the existence of this Union is in danger owing to 
the blocking motions adopted by the hostile and opposi­
tion Union governed by Messrs, Sachs and Weinberg. 197 
The Department of Labour was not known for its swift processing 
of constitutional amendments. But now the amendments were certi­
fied inside three days! This speed was still more remarkable 
because the Department was not happy with the procedure adopted 
in calling the meeting. Proper notice of the amendments had not 
been given and the exclusion of members without "authenticated" 
membership cards, as threatened in the notice of the meeting, 
was also unconstitutional. 198 But the Department was convinced 
of the need to make allowances for the "present difficulties,,199 
196. 	Letter from 25 members of the GWU-CP to the Registrar, n.d., 
received 16 January 1936 S.A.B. ARBI054/306. 
197. 	Letter from Poole (President, GWU-CP) and Evans (Hon. Secre­
tary) to R. Beattie, DIL, Cape Town, 11 January 1936 (incor­
rectly dated 11 January 1935) S.A.B ARBI054/306. 
198. 	Memorandum from B.N. Wainwright, ftC" Division, Department 
of Labour to the Registrar, 14 January 1936 S.A.B. ARBI054/306. 
199. 	Ibid. 
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of the Union. Beattie had impressed upon the Registrar the urgency 
of the situation. He wrote: 
The position of this Union is very difficult. There 

is a small group of employees who belong to the S.A. 

Garment Workers' Union, who consistently attempt to 

smash up the meetings, being armed with whistles, etc. 

A further procedure is to submit under the existing 

Constitution requisitions for general meetings signed 

by at least twenty of these members, who in all number 

about forty. It seems that the line of attack is to 

exhaust the funds of the Union by calling upon them 

. 200t o h0 ld repeated generaI meetlngs. 
The letter from the twenty five garment workers was received by the 
Registrar seven days after the meeting. They asked the Registrar, 
••• to refrain from registering (the amendments) until 
such time as the Union has held a proper meeting and 
201
allowance is given for discussion on the amendments. 
The Registrar replied that the amendments had already been certified. 
In regard to the irregularities mentioned in the petition, 
this office was furnished with a certificate to the 
effect that the provisions of the Union's constitution 
were duly observed in connection with the adoption of 
the amendments. 202 
The Registrar may well have had such a certificate from Beattie, 
who attended the meeting203 but he also possessed an internal 
memorandum that "the position was in fact not considered to be 
strictly in order,,204 and that the Divisional Inspector in Cape 
Town ought to "make it clear to the Union that there is some doubt 
200. 	Letter from Beattie, DIL, Cape Town to the Registrar, 10 January 
1936 S.A.B. ARBI054/306. It is a moot point whether these 
statements are calculated lies. The quote is here intended 
merely to illustrate the partiality of certain officials 
towards the GWU-CP. 
201. 	Letter from 25 members of GWU-CP ••• op.cit. 
202. 	Letter from the Registrar to Rose Crawford, 17 January 1936 
(GWUSA Archives). 
203. 	Letter from Beattie to the Registrar, 10 January 1936 S.A.B. 
ARB1054/306. 
204. 	Memorandum from Wainwright to the Under-Secretary for Labour, 
4 May 1936 S.A.B. ARBI054/306. This memorandum reviews the 
documents in the file on the constitution of the GWU-CP. 
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205
attached to the legality of the procedure". However, the Depart­
ment was united in its decision to lend all its support to the 
GWU-CP in its battle with the rival union. In February 1936 the 
Industrial Council was finally registered. 
In the following months the Department continued to disregard 
its own internal rules of procedure in order to push through a 
whole series of new amendments to the constitution. The .intention 
and effect of these amendments was to protect the Union leadership 
from attack, whether from internal dissidents or a rival trade 
union. 
Ivan 	Walker, the Secretary for Labour, noted that: 
Under normal conditions the Department could reasonably 
insist upon the Union acting on the lines suggested. 
[That amendments to the constitution be approved by 
a general meeting and not simply by the Executive - MN.] 
There is however a very bitter fight in progress; the 
employees are of a type who know not loyalty and are 
without trade union tradition; the union officials too 
are singularly inept and appear to have no organizing 
ability and in the meantime the employees continue to 
receive wages lower than those the decent employers 
206 
are willing to pay. 
By June 1936 the GWU-CP constitution still had not been finalised 
(although it was a party to the Industrial Counc~l for the Cloth­
ing Industry, Cape which had been registered in February, and the 
agreement had been gazetted). A memorandum to the Registrar stated 
that: 
205. 	Memorandum from Wainwright to the Registrar, 14 January 136 
S.A.B. ARB1054/306. 
206. 	Handwritten comment on memorandum from Wainwright, 5 February 
1936 S.A.B ARB1054/306. Many memoranda in this file register 
the irregularity of Departmental procedures tolerated in deal­
ing with the GWU-CP constitution. In addition to those already 
cited and the two cited below (11 and 24 June 1936), see the 
letter from the Registrar to Divisional Inspector of Labour, 
Cape Town, 20 March 1936 and the memorandum from Wainwright 
to the Under Secretary for Labour, 4 May 1936. 
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In view of the difficulties of calling another general 
meeting of members (the rival Garment Workers' Union 
at Cape Town is still very active), the executive committee 
of the union ••• asks that the new Constitution be certified 
without the specific amendments suggested by the Depart­
207
mente 
The author of this memorandum earlier wrote: 
I appreciate the difficulties of the Union's officials 
but it would not be doing the Union a good turn to certify 
the Constitution, especially as we hold certificates 
which go to shew that the proper procedure has not been 
followed. 208 
The Registrar did not concur. He certified the constitution, 
without it having been approved by a general meeting of members 
of the GWU-CP, on 26 June 1936. 209 
The Department of Labour's action in allowing the GWU-CP 
to form an industrial council210 and allowing the union officials 
their undemocratic constitution had an enormous, probably decisive 
effect, on the fate of the SAGWU and the national unity campaign. 
The officials of the Department clearly hoped it would be a destruc­
tive effect. 
Strike! 
By February 1936, the SAGWU campaign was rapidly losing purpose 
and direction. It had recruited over 1 000 enthusiastic members, 
angry at the methods of the Cape Union officials and had even 
won the support of two members of the Cape Union's executive com­
mittee. But the situation had changed decisively over the preced­
207. 	Memorandum to the Registrar, 24 June 1936 S.A.B ARBI054/306. 
(Author not clear). 
208. 	Memorandum to the Secretary for Labour, 15 June 1936 S.A.B. 
ARBI054/306. 
209. 	Undirected Memorandum, 'GWU-CP: Certification of Amended 
Constitution', datestamped 29 June'1936 S.A.B. ARBI054/306. 
210. The 'Industrial Council for the Clothing Industry (Cape) ­
rccr (Cape) - was registered on 24 February 1936 (Government 
Gazette 6 March 1936), the first Agreement was gazetted on 
3 April 1936. 
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ing nine months. The GWU-CP now had a real existence. It had 
always been recognized by the employers and the Department of 
Labour. Now stop orders and worker fears of victimization allowed 
it to claim three times as many members as the SAGWU. The SAGWU's 
efforts to replace it as the registered recognized union had failed. 
The industrial council, despite all opposition, was in the final 
211
stage of formation and the proposals of the Wage Board had 
been rejected by the Minister. It is understandable that the 
SAGWU now grasped at the straw of strike action, to advance their 
campalgn. "t h" h I fITrade U' . ". 2120 a 19 er pane 0 rea nlon actlvltles. 
Early in 1936 King George V died. The government named 22 
January a National Day of Mourning and labour inspectors saw to 
it that all factories closed for the day. Workers lost a day's 
pay. The SAGWU took up the issue. It called on all garment wor­
kers to appoint deputations to see their employers and to demand 
f M ay. or ers were warne to e prepare to " D 213 W k 	 d b dpayor ournlng 
go on strike and to protect members of the deputations against 
" t"' . 214 W " b h CCI d th D t tV1C lmlzatlon. eln erg wrote to t e an e epar men 
of Labour asking both to influence the clothing manufacturers 
to pay up and settle the grievance peacefully.215 But he did 
say, 
It is our intention not to rest until the demand of 
the workers' has been satisfied. 
Several clothing factories had already paid a half-day's wage to 
their workers. Others paid over the following weeks after depu­
tations had called on them. The SAGWU called lunch-hour meetings 
outside factories to encourage workers to approach their bosses. 
The issue was widely supported among the workers. The industry 
was in its slack period and, with short time being worked, wages 
211. 	The final application for registration was submitted on 10 
February 1936 (Evidence of R. Beattie in Rex v. de Freitas, 
Fontaine &Weinberg CSC Criminal Appeals 1 (79) (1936 C.A.D.). 
212. 	Letter from Weinberg to Sachs, 14 February 1936. 
213. 	SAGWU Pamphlet: 'A Day of Mourning Bulletin', 25 January 1936 
(GWUSA Archives). 
214. 	Forward 31 January 1936. 
215. 	 'A Day of Mourning Bulletin' op.cit. 
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at the time were lower than usual. In addition, the public holiday 
came just after the factories had been closed for two to three 
weeks over Christmas and New Year. Workers received no pay at 
all for this period. 
Not all factories agreed immediately to meet the demands 
of the deputations. At African Clothing, workers had to wait 
a week for the employer to make a decision in spite of their strike 
216threat. At H. Shames &Co., the owner refused to speak to 
the deputation. When the workers persisted with their demand 
217he fired the leader of the deputation on the spot. She was re­
instated ten minutes after her fellow workers stopped work but 
a half-day's pay was deducted from the week's pay packets because 
of the stoppage. The next day 63 out of the 80 workers at H. 
Shames refused to enter the factory to begin work. Shames refused 
to speak to Weinberg who was at the factory advising the' workers. 
He refused to speak to a worker deputation until all returned 
to work. Beattie, the labour inspector, then arrived. His pre­
sence had been urgently requested by the SAGWU on behalf of the 
workers. But he walked straight to the employer's office without 
consulting the workers. He was followed by Stuart and Evans, 
whose arrival was greeted by "an outburst of booing and shouting 
from the crowd of workers".218 On emerging from Shames' office, 
Stuart and Evans tried to address the workers, but without success. 
After they left Shames met the deputation and "after a heated 
219
argument" agreed to pay a full day's wages for 22 January, 
and also for time lost during the three hour strike. He also 
agreed not to victimize any strikers. The SAGWU hailed this "100% 
victory" as "the first successful Cape TownClothing Workers' stike". 
It has definitely exposed the reactionary elements con­
fronting those workers who are making an attempt to 
216. 	 'A Day of Mourning Bulletin' op.cit. 
217. The folloWing 	account is based on reports in Forward 7 February 
1936 and the Trades & Labour Journal of S.A. February 1936 ­
'Cape Town's Unholy Alliance - Employers, Labour Department, 
Cape Federation and the Press' by Eli Weinberg. 
218. 	Trades &Labour Journal of S.A. February 1936, p.9. 
219. 	Ibid. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
320 

build their own free union. It has demonstrated clearly 
the courage and militant spirit existing among the wor­
220kers 	of Cape Town. 
Inspired by this quick success, Weinberg did not hesitate, when the 
opportunity arose, to call a strike at the I.L. Back factory in 
Commercial Street. I.L. Back &Co. was one of the larger factories 
with about 150 workers. It was also none of the more reputable 
employers". 221 This strike arose out of a deputation of workers 
demanding payment for Mourning Day. Back agreed to pay half a 
day's wages. The next morning he fired the leader of the deputation, 
Mrs. Maggie Alexander. 222 
The SAGWU wrote to Back asking him to reinstate Maggie Alex­
ander and threatened to apply for a Conciliation Board if this 
was not done. 223 Supported by Bill Andrews, Duncan Burnside MP 
and several local unionists, Weinberg addressed a lunch time meeting 
outside the factory.224 He advised the workers to come out on 
225
strike if Alexander was not immediately re-engaged. She had 
stood up for her fellow workers and they should stand by her. 
Workers marched into the factory at 2 p.m. and demanded Alexander's 
reinstatement. Back refused. About half of the workers then 
226
walked out on strike. The strike lasted for seven weeks.
From the start, the strike involved much wider issues than 
the victimization of Maggie Alexander. The struggle between the 
SAGWU and dissidents inside the GWU-CP on the one side, and employers, 
the Cape Union officials and the Labour Department on the other 
220. 	Trades &Labour Journal of S.A. February 1936, p.9. 
221. 	Letter from Weinberg to Sachs, 10 February 1936 (GWUSA Archives). 
222. 	SAGWU Pamphlet: 'Workers of Cape Town!', March 1936 (GWUSA 
Archives). 
223. 	SAGWU Pamphlet: 'To all workers employed at Messrs. I.L. 
Back!' (GWUSA Archives). 
224. 	 Ibid. 
225. 	Letter from Weinberg to Sachs, 10 February 1936 (GWUSA Archives). 
226. 	Forward printed regular articles on the strike. The SAGWU 
alleged that the Cape Times and Cape Argus complied with 
a request from the CCI to keep their coverage of SAGWU 
activities to a minimum. 
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was simply taking a new form. In a CWCMA meeting, Back denied 
that Alexander had been dismissed because she had led the deputation • 
••• (T)he facts were (said Back) that she had made her­
self a nuisance to the other employees by taking advantage 
of every opportunity that offered for advancing the 
· f h .. 227calmsI 0 anot er organlzatlon. 
Weinberg saw immediately a still wider significance in the strike 
and prepared for "a lengthy stay out". He wrote: 
It is absolutely essential that victory is scored by 

the workers of I.L. Back, since it will powerfully 

affect the whole of the trade union movement in the 

Cape • 228 

••• (T)he employers very well realize that it is the 

death or life of the Cape Peninsula Garment Workers' 

Union which depends on this struggle. 229 

But from early on, the prospects of the I.L. Back workers winning 
the strike were bleak. Less than a half of the workforce remained 
out on strike and the factory continued working. The other cloth~ 
ing manufacturers, the Cape Union, the Labour Department and the 
police squarely supported Back. Despite the poor outlook, now 
that the SAGWU had no grip afforded to it for organizing by the 
industrial legislation, this strike became its main activity and 
perhaps its last chance of winning a permanent place amongst 
the Cape Town garment workers. If 1.L. Back had been won, and had 
sparked off a series of successful strikes under the SAGWU banner, 
the rival union might have had a chance of displacing the Cape 
Union. 
The stike at I.L. Back became a symbol first of the SAGWU­
led opposition to the officials of the GWU-CP and soon of the 
conflict between the Transvaal and Cape labour movements. For 
these reasons, and specially because of the enthusiasm with which 
the issue was taken up by workers in Cape Town - garment workers 
227. CWCMA Minutes: 17 February 1936 - M2/1. 
228. Letter from Weinberg to Sachs, 10 February 1936 (GWUSA Archives). 
229. Letter from Weinberg to Sachs, 14 February 1936 (GWUSA Archives). 
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and non-garment workers alike - the strike dragged on for several 
weeks beyond its 'natural' term. Eli Weinberg recalled, in 1976, 
of his work in Cape Town in the 1930's, 
All these activities were not just trade union activi­
ties. We turned every single issue, every single acti­
vity in the unions into a large-scale mass campaign. 
For instance, when we had a strike of 57 at I.L. Back 
&Co. we used to call meetings in support of that strike 
on the Grand Parade on Saturday afternoon and Sundays 
which were attended by 5 000 people and more. You know 
it was only 57 workers who were involved but it became 
a national issue in Cape Town •••we raised every little 
230issue onto the level of an important political issue. 
The strike was further used by the Transvaal garment orkers' union 
and the TLC to focus nation-wide publicity on the evils of the 
Cape Garment Workers' Union and the Department of Labour and on 
the virtues of the national unity efforts of the Transvaal union. 
Sachs wrote: 
The coastal workers want higher wages, as they cannot 

live on the miserable pittance which they receive at 

present. We have decided jointly, therefore, to fight 

to the bitter end 

a) for a National Union of Garment Workers, 

b) for the standard laid down by the Wage Board ••• 

Our campaign will entail the printing of tens of thousands 
of pamphlets, several Supreme Court actions and hundreds 
of meetings ••• Accordingly we appeal to the entire trade 
. 	 . 231
un10n movement to come to our ass1stance. 
The Cornelius sisters, Joanna and Hester, came down from Johannes­
burg to lend their more than adequate experience to the picket 
lines. 232 Police were outside the factory every morning and con­
230. 	Interview. See footnote 87, above. 
231. 	Letter from Sachs (Garment Workers' Union, Transvaal) to 
NEC TLC, 11 February 1936 (TUCSA Archives Dc 8.26). See 
also NEC circular letter to unions, 13 February 1936 - SATLC 
Correspondence 1936 (TUCSA Archives). 
232. 	Letter from Weinberg to Sachs, 14 February 1936 (GWUSA Archives). 
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sistently harassed the pickets. Every lunch~hour, the SAGWU held 
meetings which were regularly attended by between two and three 
thousand workers from surrounding factories. The meetings were 
first held outside I.L. Back, but as the growing crowds obstructed 
the traffic, they were moved "to the big square at the top of 
Plein Street".233 Evening meetings were held as well, the greatest 
of these being a meeting held on the Parade which attracted 10 000 
234people. 
The SAGWU was able (only with the generous help of the Trans­
235
vaal union) to pay full wages to the strikers. Apart from 
picketing activities and meetings, the union, one Sunday, arranged 
a picnic for the strikers and their parents and relatives on the 
236beach opposite Sachs' holiday house at Clifton.
Other garment workers were quick to show their support. 
One hundred workers at the New Model factory came out on strike 
237for two days in solidarity with the I.L. Back workers. Wein­
berg considered organizing one hour sympathy strikes in the "fac­
tories in which our influence is greater".238 The SAGWU called 
239 
on workers to refuse to do cutting or any other work for I.L. Back. 
The CFLU and the Cape Garment Workers' Union largely kept 
aloof from the strike. The GWU-CP hung up notices in all the 
factories stating that it had "no differences with any employer 
in Cape Town" although many of the strikers were members of the 
240Union. The Federation refused to see a deputation of the 
strikers and also to approve the SAGWU circularizing its affiliates 
to ask for financial assistance. 
233. 	Letter from Weinberg to Sachs, 14 February 1936 (GWUSA Archives). 
234. 	This figure is given in Forward 28 February 1936 and in a 
letter from Weinberg to NEC TLC, 21 February 1936 (GWUSA 
Archives). 
235. 	Letter from Weinberg to NEe TLC, 21 February 1936 (GWUSA 
Archives). 
236. 	Letter from Weinberg to Sachs, 14 February 1936 (GWUSA Archives). 
237. Forward 28 	February 1936, 'Trade Union Movement in the Cape 
Wakes Up' by Eli Weinberg. 
238. 	Letter from Weinberg to Sachs, 14 February 1936. It is not 
clear that this was taken up by any workers. 
239. 	SAGWU Pamphlet: 'Workers of Cape Town!', March 1936 (GWUSA 
Archives). 
240. 	Letter from Weinberg to Sachs, 14 February 1936. 
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The regular meetings, the smouldering pamphlets and the daily 
meetings failed to draw out any more I.L. Back workers to join 
the s t rl'kers. 241 The poI'lce were outSl'de t he f actory every day 
and frequently arrested picketers under the Riotous Assemblies 
Act. There were more than fifty prosecutions against strikers 
242
and their supporters. The series of bail applications and 
court cases that this gave rise to seriously hampered the conduct 
of the strike. SAGWU leaders had to spend days in court, both 
as witnesses for the defence and as the accused. Much time was 
t aken up brle. f'lng 1awyers and'ralslng. money to pay bal'I and f'lnes. 243 
The most publicized prosecution was under the Industrial 
Conciliation Act. Weinberg and eight others who had been at the 
lunch hour meeting which decided on the strike were charged with 
244inciting an illegal strike. The accused also included Bill 
Andrews, Adv. Harry Snitcher (the SAGWU legal adviser), and two 
Labour MP's as well as Jimmy Emmerich, the secretary of the CFLU­
affiliated tramways union. 245 The issue of summons was protested 
at a massive meeting called by the CDC on the Parade. Ten thousand 
~eople came. After the meeting 2 000 joined a march through Cape 
Town, past the I.L. Back factory and Parliament, to the Trades 
Hall in Corporation Street. 246 There, reported Weinberg, 
•••a further meeting was held and fierce attacks were 

247
launched upon the Cape Federation of Labour Unions.
The magistrate found Weinberg, the SAGWU president, Jimmy Fortuine, 
and the union organizer, Rosie de Freitas, guilty of inciting 
241. Evidence 	heard in a case in the Magistrate's Court on 21 February 
suggested that two thirds of the workers were not on strike but 
working (Rex v. de Freitas and 2 Others op.cit.). Weinberg, in 
his report at the end of the strike, put the fraction at about a 
half. ('Strike at I.L. Back & Co. Capetown. Full Report' c. 
April 1936 - GWUSA Archives). 
242. Weinberg, ' ••• Full Report' op.cit. 
243. 	Letter from Weinberg to Sachs, 10 March 1936 (GWUSA Archives). 
244. 	Rex v. Burnside and 8 Others, Cape Town Magistrate's Court, 21 
February 1936 and 18 March 1936 (judgement) (GWUSA Archives). 
245. 	CDC Pamphlet advertising a 'Monster Protest Meeting' on 20 
February 1936 (GWUSA Archives). 
246. Forward 28 February 1936. 
247. 	Letter from Weinberg to NEC TLC, 21 February 1936 (GWUSA Archives). 
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an 1'IIega1 strl'ke. 248 They were each fined. The other accused 
were dismissed. The main witness for the state in the case was 
Beattie, who had listened to the speeches from inside the I.L. Back 
f act ory wh1'le s t and'lng on a ch'alr beSl. d e a Wln'dow. 249 
Although successful meetings were held right through March, 
police harassment of picketers increased, with obvious effects 
on the morale of the strikers. At one stage police were in the 
habit of arresting everyone outside the factory. On one morning 
twenty-two women workers were arrested and charged under the Rio­
250tous 	Assemblies Act. 
Hester Cornelius wrote a letter to a friend in Johannesburg: 
It is very quiet here, we are not allowed to stand picket 
any more; all we can do is holding meetings at various 
factories; and there we also have police; a few times 
they tried to stop us, but we took no notice f them, 
we carried on, and opposed them as much as we can. 
I suppose you heard about the wholesale arrest here. 
That was our best picket. 22 strikers were arrested 
for doing nothing. They marched us off to the charge 
office, and lock us up, but what a row we kicked up. 
It was early in the morning, before we had our Coffee; 
so we all shouted together: "We want Coffee", we kept 
on for a few minutes, until they promised us coffee; 
248. 	The judgement was upheld on appeal to the Supreme Court. There 
being no registered industrial council at the time, the strike 
was illegal until the Minister had refused to appoint a Concil­
iation Board (Rex v. de Freitas and 2 Others (I936 CPD 413) 
decided on 29 June 1936). The Minister advised the SAGWU of 
his refusal to appoint a Board only a month after the strike 
began (letter from Weinberg to the Secretary for Labour, 9 March 
1936 - TUCSA Archives, Dc 8.26). 
249. 	Burnside in Hansard 18 March 1936, column 1511. 
250. 	Weinberg ' ••• Full Report' op.cit.; Forward 10 March 1936; Letter 
from Weinberg to Sachs, 10 March 1936. The workers were fined 
£3 each. Weinberg wrote a play, 'The Trial of the 22' (GWUSA 
Archives) about the incident. It was performed locally (with 
Morris Kagan acting the part of the judge) and in Johannesburg. 
Drama was a favourite medium of the Transvaal union for educat­
ing workers. 
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then we shouted for bread. After a while, we started 
singing songs: "There's a bobby round the corner", 
Oh speak to me scabby" and "the red flag". The people 
gathered outside in a mass to listen to our songs; They 
took us away to the cells underground, but what a time 
we had! The cell was 12 feet by 12, and we were 17 
in one ~ cell. The non-European strikers were in 
another cell. We started kicking and shouting, "We 
want·a11 our Comrades together". They begged us to 
'keep Quiet, but without success. They brought the 
other Comrades to us, and gave us a bigger cell. So 
we started singing, and dancing. The matron was very 
nice, but we were very cheeky and so she started crying 
and that was fun to us. They put us in a long corridor, 
where we could see all the other prisoners; so we started 
having speeches; to unite, all the workers of South Africa. 
When there were no prisoners to listen we addressed 
our meeting to the police. 4 o'clock in the afternoon 
they released us; but our case is remanded unti11 Thurs­
day. Nearly every day the court is packed with strikers 
with red bows. 
The scabs will never forget us; they got hidings of 
their 1ifes. Now and then you heard about a new arrest 
made of strikers assaulted nonstrikers. I was arrested 
3 times; but I expect another one. This morning, two 
policemen walked up in plein street; and did not make 
way for me; I stopped in front of them; and they stopped 
too. They wanted me to give way, and be damned if I 
would. I walked in them and shouldered the one nearly 
251
off the pavement and walked on. Oh, I hate these fools. 
The SAGWU constantly made efforts to settle the strike. The workers 
were not in a strong bargaining position but it was several weeks 
before the SAGWU was prepared to accept the humiliating settlement 
that finally ended the strike. The local Labour Department gave 
no assistance to the SAGWU in negotiating an early end to the 
251. 	Letter from Hester Cornelius to Miss Maud1en, n.d. (GWUSA 
Archives). 
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.k 252strl e. The officials were concerned more with their prosecu­
tion of the leaders under the Industrial Conciliation Act. The 
SAGWU rejected a proposal by I.L. Back that the dispute be sub­
mitted to an 'independent' committee of enquiry consisting of 
Beattie and representatives from the CCI and the GWU_Cp.253 The 
strikers accepted a suggestion of Ivan Walker that the committee 
consist of a magistrate and two social workers and that workers 
return to work, assured of no victimization, until the committee 
decided on the position of Maggie Alexander. Back refused to 
consider this. 254 On 7 March, the Minister informed the SAGWU 
that he refused to appoint a Conciliation Board as the ICCI (Cape) 
had never been registered. He wanted the dispute to be settled 
by the industrial council!255 Weinberg replied: 
••• (A)ny Council that may have been formed has not been 
formed with the consent of the workers in the Clothing 
Industry in the Cape, nor even with the consent of the 
256
membership of the ••• registered Union in the Cape. 
He said that the workers would not "submit their case to a body which 
257is hostile to their interesttt • To the TLC he wrote, 
••• (W)hilst we are prepared to consider every possible 
manner of settling the strike, the course suggested 
by the Department of Labour will not only mean a humi­
liation of the workers, but would mean 'the defeat of 
the very principle of free trade unions. 258 
Three thousand workers thronged the Parade in support of the refusal 
to submit the dispute to the Industrial Council. 259 A thousand 
252. 	Letter from Weinberg to Sachs, 14 February 1936 (GWUSA Archives). 
253. Weinberg, ' •••Full Report' op.cit. 
254. 	Letter from Weinberg to NEC TLC, 21 February 1936 (GWUSA Archives). 
255. 	Letter from Weinberg to the Secretary for Labour, 9 March 1936 
(GWUSA Archives). 
256. 	 Ibid. 
257. 	Ibid. 
258. 	Letter from Weinberg to the General Secretary, TLC, 9 March 1936 
(GWUSA Archives). 
259. 	Forward 13 March 1936. 
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workers joined a procession which marched to the I.L. Back factory 
with banners reading "Down with Fourie" (the Minister of Labour) 
and "For Free Trade Unions". At the factory there were scuffles 
with the police, stones were thrown at the factory windows and 
seven peopI e were arrested. 260 
For a period such worker enthusiasm had obscured the poor 
prospects for the strike itself. This was specially the case 
because these widely-supported solidarity marches and meetings 
were a new phenomenon on the sleepy Cape Town labour scene. But 
after four weeks of the strike, on the very day of this great 
demonstration, Weinberg wrote a dejected letter to Sachs. 261 
I must admit with bitter regret that I have made a 
mess 	of this strike. I have made a number of bitter 
mistakes, for which I must now pay. The strike is not 
finished yet and we can still give the employer a lot 
of trouble, but it is more or less certain that we are 
losing. I am deeply worried over this, but I suppose 
defeats are part and parcel of this struggle. We shall 
certainly stand up again. 
The strike was called off at the end of March. A.G. Forsyth, 
secretary of the TLC, and Morris Kentridge MP arranged a settle­
ment after talks with the CWCMA and the Department of Labour. 
It was a humiliating defeat for the SAGWU. The CWCMA found jobs 
for forty strikers and agreed to reabsorb the remaining fifteen 
or so when places became available. In return for the employers 
• I
agreeing to re-employ the workers, the SAGWU had to slgn a state­
ment that, 
During the progress of the dispute many inaccurate 
charges were made against the employers. These the 
officials of the Union have unreservedly withdrawn. 262 
260. Forward 13 March 1936. 
261. 	Letter from Weinberg to Sachs, 10 March 1936. This is a 
personal letter (beginning 'Dear Solly') differing in style 
from his other letters to Sachs (which begin 'Dear Comrade'). 
262. Quoted 	in Weinberg ' ••• FuII Report' op.cit. It was not made 
clear to the SAGWU which statements were referred to. They 
signed the agreement under protest on account of these two 
sentences. 
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The strikers had not achieved their immediate objective, but the 
strike did have a positive content to it. Weinberg wrote: 
The workers thus returned to work after having put up 
a splendid and glorious fight. They have gone through 
a school of solidarity and unity which has been a shin­
. 1 	 k' h C 263lng examp e to many wor ers ln t e ape. 
The activities surrounding the dispute gave a notable impetus to 
new organization among the workers of Cape Town. The membership 
of existing unions (including that of the SAGWU) increased during 
the strike. Weinberg wrote to the TLC: 
These powerful mass meetings together with other forms 
of publicity have so aroused the workers of Cape Town 
that a fertile soil has been created for the building 
up of organizations in the various industries. Our 
office is flooded with deputation after deputation from 
workers, not only from the Clothing Industry, but from 
the tobacco factories, leather factories and other indus­
tries. It is to be hoped that this splendid spirit 
will be well utilised by the Trade Union Unity Conference 
with a view to bringing about unity and to intensify 
organizing activities among the unorganized or loosely 
264
organized workers of the Cape. 
A Change in Strategy 
We shall not hesitate to adopt any tactics, fair or 
foul, in dealing with a bunch of unmitigated scoundrels 
who thrive solely on the poverty and misery of the 
workers. 
- Solly Sachs, 1936265 
For Eli Weinberg, the strike at I.L. Back &Co. raised questions 
about the suitability of the strategy of the SAGWUfor victory 
in the campaign to organize the garment workers of Cape Town and 
draw them into a national union. As originally conceived in 1935, 
the strategy was to organize workers into the SAGWU - if necessary 
263. Weinberg, •••Full Report' op.cit.I 
264. 	Letter from Weinberg to NEC TLC, 21 February 1936 (GWUSA 
Archives). 
265. 	Letter from Sachs to Rose Crawford, 19 March 1936 (GWUSA 
Archives). 
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by pulling them away from the GWU-CP, to upset the formation of 
an industrial council including the Cape Union (using legal means 
and disrupters inside the Cape Union) and to get the Minister 
to gazette a new wage determination. The strategy was to break 
up the Cape Union and replace it with the rival union. It had 
suffered severe setbacks with the growth of the membership of 
the GWU-CP, the refusal to gazette the determination and finally 
with the registration of the industrial council. The situation 
had changed significantly. Weinberg wrote to Sachs, tentatively 
suggesting a total change in the strategy to capture the Cape. 
The establishment of the Industrial Council has placed 
us before a great difficulty. We could, of course, 
still attempt to upset it and obtain a temporary inter­
dict against them. But in the long run it seems to 
me that we shall not be able to stop it ••• the Minister 
of Labour is determined to have it his way. The biggest 
difficulty of all is, however, the fact that the workers 
can benefit immediately from an increase in wages, if 
the Industrial Council is established and their agree­
ment registered. We have nothing to offer against that ••• 
I have thought here, that we might change our whole 
front over to an internal oppositionary fight for leader­
ship in the Garment Workers' Union of the Cape Peninsula, 
and that we allow them to establish their Industrial 
Council •••• 
I am leaving it to your better judgement and experience 
· . thO 266t o a dv~se us ~s.~n 
By the time the SAGWU had celebrated its first anniversary in 
May 1936, the new policy had been adopted. There were no more legal 
attacks on the Cape Union or on the industrial council as workers 
were exhorted to build up their own strength within the Cape Union: 
We have to fight for democracy in the registered Union, 
in order to enable the workers to chuck the treacherous 
leadership and to elect their own officials and Committee. 
We have to carryon the fight for higher wages and better 
conditions. 
266. Letter from Weinberg to Sachs, 10 March 1936 (GWUSA Archives). 
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In order to be able to carryon this fight we must train 
and teach workers to become leaders in the factories ••• 
We have to fight for the right of the garment workers 
to control their affairs independent of the Bosses •••• 267 
A later pamphlet stated: 
It is not enough to pay membership dues to a Union. 

You must learn to become active members of the Union, 

to control the destiny and affairs of your organization. 

You must select for positions not those who talk big, 

but those who by their everyday activity show you, that 

they are fighters on your behalf and that they take 

up your demands. 

You must build your organization on the basis of control 

by the rank and file so that in future you should be 

268

able 	to prevent any further wage cuts. 
The SAGWU continued to exist. Its membership reached a peak of 
1 300 in May 1936. But its task was now to give a lead to workers 
to organize themselves strongly in the factories and to use this 
power to win influence inside the Cape Union. The SAGWU advised 
workers on how to take forward complaints and urged the need "to 
269force the bosses to observe their own agreement and carry it out tl • 
10 	 Turncoats and Trotskyists - Early Internal Opposition to 
the Union Bureaucrats 
Opposition to Stuart, Evans and company had never been the exclusive 
preserve of the SAGWU and its members. Many workers reacted against 
the dictatorial and undemocratic methods of the Federation as 
soon as it began to revive the GWU-CP. At least two loose oppo­
sition groups had grown up inside the Cape Union around these wor­
kers. The one group, led by Rose Crawford, allied itself with 
the SAGWU campaign during 1935, while the other, in which David 
267. The South African Garment Worker 1 (1) May 1936 (GWUSA Archives). 
268. 	SAGWU Pamphlet: 'Another Wage Cut for Garment Workers', October 
1936 (GWUSA Archives). 
269. The South Africa Garment Worker 1 (1) May 1936. 
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Lunn 	was the key figure,first opposed the SAGWU. 
Rose Crawford became a most important leader of the Cape 
Union - if not quite in the manner the SAGWU would have hoped. 
When she retired in 1956 she was general secretary of the Union, 
after twenty years' service as a paid Union official. Crawford 
had entered the clothing industry in 1908270 at the age of nine­
271teen. In 1935 she worked at M. Bertish &Co. She had been 
a member of the special executive committee of the Union since 
1928 but stated that, in 1928, 
••• after the wage determination became law the meetings 
fell off in attendance and few turned up. They were not 
, t d 2721n ereste any more. 
Evans was a friend of hers, but in 1935 she "had a fallout with 
273the officials of the Union", including Evans. Rhoda Kets, 
a fellow worker and later an organizer for the Cape Union, stated 
in an interview that the disagreement arose partly over the posi­
tion Poole held in the Union: 
We worked for Mr. Poole. He was the manager in the 

cutting room. And you can't have a man serving two 

masters. And that was the first time I wrote a letter 

' h . f th' 274t o demand a publ1C ear1ng 0 1S. 
Workers also wanted to know by what right Evans and Freestone 
served as secretaries275 of the Union. They had never been 
270. 	Evidence of Rose Crawford: Garment Workers' Union Commission 
of Inquiry: Minutes of Evidence, 1949 op.cit., p.120. 
271. 	Letter from R.C. Kets to the Africana Museum, Johannesburg, 30 
May 1976. (Depite their historical interest, letters accompany­
ing photographs and documents Mrs. Kets sent to this Museum are 
kept as 'business letters' and are not part of the Africana Lib­
rary or the Africana Museum collection itself. I am indebted to 
Mrs. E. Ritchie for showing me the correspondence between the 
Museum and Mrs. Kets). 
272. 	Evidence of Rose Crawford op.cit., p.116. 
273. 	 Ibid. 
274. 	 Interview with Mrs. Rhoda Kets (nee Strichen), 8 April 1981. The 
SAGWU made great propaganda out of Poole being a manager and not 
a worker. See CDC Pamphlet: 'To all Trade Unions ••• ' December 
1935 op.cit. 
275. Evans 	signed himself as the "Honorary Secretarytl and Freestone as 
the "General Secretary". Freestone was an employee of the Union 
from 1 June 1935 at a salary of £20 per month. The Constitution 
made no provision for two secretaries. 
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276
elected. Crawford responded to the dissatisfaction of her 
fellow workers and "wrote out a letter of no confidence". 277 
Weinberg found out about Crawford's opposition to the Union offi­
cials and introduced her to Sachs. Sachs told Crawford of the 
illegality of all the actions of the officials and gained her 
co-operation in the efforts the SAGWU was making inside the Cape 
Un10n 0 s op t e ormat1on 0 an 1n ustr1a counC1 • raw or ' t t h f ' f . d . 1 'I 278 C f d 
vigorously challenged the actions of the officials at a union 
meeting on 20 November 1935 and she was one of those suspended 
279from Union membership prior to the requisitioned general meeting. 
Crawford never joined the SAGWU, but remained one of the 
chief internal organizers against the officials. She was again 
suspended, with a larger group of supporters, before the requisi­
tioned general meeting in January 1936. She was the principal 
signatory to the petition which (too late) asked the Department 
of Labour not to register the undemocratic amendments to the consti­
tution. In March, Hester and Joanna Cornelius stayed in her house. 
Crawford wrote a fighting letter to Sachs about new Cape efforts 
to defeat the SAGWU: 
Personally I would rather fight like hell, than crawl 
back to the Trades Hall and if it comes to the worst 
leave the job. But what about the rank and file ••• 
Comrade Weinberg is putting up a wonderful fight, but 
what can a handful of workers do when it is not only 
the boss you are fighting but the whole capitalistic 
' d h' 11 h . . 280state b h 1n 1m as we as t e tra1tor un1on.e 
Despite further references in this letter to "Mussolini Evans", 
only a few weeks later Crawford accepted an offer from Evans to 
fill the post of a paid organizer of the Cape Union! She recalled: 
Mr. Evans came to see me and spoke nicely to me and I 
276. 	See Affidavit of Rhoda Strichen (Smith v. Crawford and Others 
op.cit.). 
277. 	Evidence of Rose Crawford op.cit., p.116. 
278. 	 Ibid. 
279. 	Ex Parte Ernest Petersen and 5 Others op.cit. 
280. 	Letter from Crawford to Sachs, 8 March 1936 (GWUSA Archives). 
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agreed to become an organizer, after consulting the 
workers, as from the 1st May 1936. I have been faith­

281
ful towards the Cape Union ever since then.
 
282
Rhoda Kets switched allegiance at the same time. Officials 
of both the GWU-CP and the CWCMA gave evidence against Sachs and 
the Transvaal union to the commission of inquiry appointed by 
the Nationalist government in 1948 as part of its attack on the 
Transvaal Union. Crawford was cross-examined by Sachs about the 
second Cape campaign. She responded: 
Since the formation of the industrial council in 1935, 

we did improve our conditions. We had been dead but 

you woke us up, but after we had life again we did not 

. 	 f 283want your lnter erence. 
In the first phase of the SAGWU campaign, when it was trying to 
destroy the Cape Union, Crawford was a useful ally. Once she 
had defected and the campaign changed course, in an attempt to 
capture the Cape Union from the inside, the SAGWU made contact 
with David Lunn. As mentioned earlier (p.277) Lunn opposed the 
formation of a rival union in the Cape garment industry from the 
start. He had organized many workers in his own factory and began 
to work inside the Cape Union structure. He believed that the 
priority was to get a registered industrial council. This would 
involve stop order subscriptions and open the way to a "profes­
sional" rather than an "amateur" union. Workers would get the 
benefit of an immediate wage increase and could then be mobilized 
to depose the Evanses and Stuarts. 284 
281. 	Evidence of Rose Crawford op.cit., p.118. 
282. Her 	new membership card, No.4401, was dated 15 May 1936 (Africana 
Museum) • 
283. 	Minutes of Evidence op.cit., p.143. 
284. 	Interview with David Lunn, 4 January 1980. 
Eli Weinberg clashed with Lunn at a meeting "in the hall of the 
Lenin Club" on 22 May 1935. Weinberg reported: 
"Mr. Lunn told the workers, that they need not fear the Federa­
tion leaders. They would succeed to push them out, before the 
Industrial Council was set up and that then they could send rep­
resentatives of their own to the Council. I warned the workers 
of the lack of Democracy in the Bosses' Union and told them that 
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Lunn first attended Union meetings as a shop steward from 
African Clothing. The executive committee appointed him to be 
a Union representative on the 'industrial council' and he became 
its vice-chairman in July 1935. 285 He urged the executive committee 
and the shop stewards, in a joint meeting, not to accept the proposed 
agreement of the employers but to push for the full Wage Board 
proposals to be taken over by the industria~ council. His resolu­
286tion was defeated in a vote. Lunn also pressed Stuart and 
Evans to convene general meetings. Both continually refused on 
the pretext that there was no hall large enough to accommodate 
287
all the members. 
At this time, Lunn was a member of the Communist League of 
South Africa, an offshoot of the Trotskyist "Lenin Club" which 
had been formed in Cape Town in 1932. 288 The majority of the Lenin 
Club were shopkeepers, teachers and small businessmen. It arranged 
public meetings, education classes for workers,289 and published 
a newsletter called Workers' Voice. It held regular outdoor meet­
ings at lunch times outside the old Post Office at the bottom 
of Adderley Street. 
they 	would never succeed in breaking the influence of the em­
ployers in the Cape Garment Workers' Uniontt • (Letter to Sachs, 
24 May 1935 - GWUSA Archives, Cba 2.4.1). This prophecy 
proved only too true. 
285. 	 ICCI (Cape) Minutes: 24 JUly 1935 (Annexure K - Smith v. 
Crawford op.cit.). 
286. 	GWU-CP Minutes: 8 August 1935 - joint executive and shop 
stewards' meeting (Annexure F - Smith v. Crawford op.cit.). 
287. 	David Lunn, 'Statement', 1945 op.cit. 
288. Hear 	the tape-recorded interview of Charles van Gelderen (SOAS 
Library). See Southall (1980); Hirson (1982); Lenin Club 'Mani­
festo': 'Workers of South Africa, Awake!', 1934 (SAIRR Refer­
enceLibrarW. I conducted interviews with three former members 
of the Lenin Club, David Lunn, Herman van Gelderen and Eileen 
Ventris. Also see the remarkable letters of Clare Goodlatte 
(S.A. Library MSB618). 
289. 	A literacy class in Langa started off with Anti-Duhring! (Inter­
view). See Forward 29 November 1935 on the 'study circle' of 
garment workers supervised by the Lenin Club. Andrews accused 
the Lenin Club of hampering the activities of the SAGWU in its 
fight with the Federation because it diverted workers from attend­
ing important SAGWU meetings. 
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As an organization, the Lenin Club did not involve itself 
in organizing workers or forming trade unions, but a few of its 
members were active in unions and fell under its discipline. In 
October 1935, as the SAGWU was trying to build up a rival union 
to the GWU-CP, the Lenin Club advised an opposite course: 
The split must be healed. The Cape Garment Workers' 
Union must be regenerated by the entry of those mili­
tant Trade Unionists who are at present in the S.A. 
Garment Workers' Union. There is no other way. Even 
if the best elements in th~ Cape Union were to leave 
and join the S.A. Garment Workers' Union, most of the 
workers would be left behind at the mercy of Messrs. 
Stuart and Evans. THE MESS MUST BE CLEANED UP FROM 
WITHIN. 290 
As the GWU-CP was the registered and recognized garment workers' 
union, with a membership of thousands as against the mere hundreds 
of the SAGWU, 
••• the proper place for militant, class-conscious workers 
was in the union with a mass membership, and not in 
a separate union which would only tend to divide and 
confuse the broad masses of the workers. 291 
In January 1935, the Lenin Club changed its line on the garment 
workers' struggle. It was appalled by Evans and Freestone signing 
an industrial council agreement with wages lower than those advised 
by the Wage Board and also by "their policy of sheer hooliganism, 
292
of expulsion of militantslt • 
Workers' Voice stated: 
Obviously a Trade Union which employs policemen as thugs 
to eject its own members from meetings is no place for 
a class-conscious worker., Such a Union must be smashed 
and its leaders driven out of the labour movement! ••• 
290. Workers' Voice October 1935. (Original emphasis) 
291. Workers' 	Voice February 1936. This is a statement of the 
previous year's policy. 
292. 	 Ibid. 
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Another organization is necessary which the workers 
can enter and which will organize the struggle for the 
betterment of working class conditions ••• 
Our policy then, is that the present members of the 
C.G.W.U. should resign en bloc and enter the S.A.G.W.U. 293 
David Lunn was expelled from the Lenin Club and the Communist 
League, 
••• because he failed to conduct himself in the manner 
expected from a Bolshevik-Leninist in the Trade Union 
Movement. 294 
The Lenin Club executive explained: 
••• (W)e relied upon David Lunn to give the militants 
the lead in the struggle against the bureaucrats ••• 
Instead of leading the fight against Evans and Freestone, 
Lunn has lent tacit support to their policy of treachery 
and betrayal. 
At the general meeting he was on the platform whilst 
militant oppositionists were ejected from the Hall by 
police thugs. He uttered not one word of protest •••He 
raised no protest against the expulsions of leading 
m1"I"1tants, 1nc"1u 1ng wor d" kers 1n"h"1S own f ac t ory. 295 
Lunn had already compromised himself in the eyes of many workers on 
account of his collaboration with the Union officials. He wrote 
later: 
The masses of workers were dead against Stuart, Evans 
and Freestone because they were not members of the trade 
and (because) the workers looked upon them as bosses' 
men •••• 
Even I was treated with a certain amount of suspicion 
by the workers because of my association with Stuart, 
Evans and. Freestone. 296 
293. Workers' Voice February 1936. 
294. Ibid. 
295. Workers' Voice January 1936. 
296. 'Statement', 1945 op.cit., paragraphs 29,30. 
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But, to an extent, it was a choice between collaboration or ex­
pulsion. Lunn was not prepared, at the behest of the Lenin Club 
or anyone else, to abandon the advantages he had gained inside 
the Union structures by means of his acquiescence with some of 
the clique methods. He still felt that the Union could be captured 
from within. An additional reason for his rejection of the direc­
tive from the Lenin Club was that he refused to subordinate him­
self to Solly Sachs, as the Club's line in fact r~quired. _Lunn 
was suspicious of Sachs' past record in Cape Town as well as his 
. 	 297 present motl.ves. 
By April 1936, Poole had become the first agent of the ICCI 
(Cape). David Lunn was elected chairman of the Cape Union in 
his stead. He did not control the Union, as we shall see, but 
he occuped a position in which he could be of great use in the 
worker based challenge to the bureaucrats, being prepared by Wein­
berg and the SAGWU. 
The Lenin Club had no further influence on the garment workers' 
struggle. It had no base in the working class in Cape Town. 
It mattered little to whom it gave 'support'. But its policy 
in the garment industry, uncannily always the exact opposite of 
the SAGWU strategy, exposes one of the roots of Western Cape 
Trotskyism. 
11 Inside the Bosses' Union 
The ruling 8ro~p in the Cape Garment Workers' Union decisively 
won the first round of the battle against the rival union and 
its Transvaal backers. In April 1936 the industrial council agree­
ment was gazetted and the wages of many workers rose. The Depart­
ment of Labour registered the ICCI (Cape) and legalized the agree­
ment despite the fact that the Union's constitution had not been 
approved (either by the Department or by the members of the Union). 
The Department connived at the irregular and undemocratic actions 
of the ruling gYO~P with whom certain officials (in particular 
298Richard Beattie and Ivan Walker) had an understanding. 
297. 	 Interviews with David Lunn, February 1978; July 1978; January 1980. 
298. 	Forward (20 March 1936) reported that, in the appeal against 
the conviction of the three SAGWU leaders under the Industrial 
Conciliation Act, their lawyer, "Mr. Snitcher, said that from 
his investigations he believed a 'racket' existed in the garment 
industry between certain employers, certain trade union leaders 
and certain highly placed govenment officials". 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
339 

The new constitution, finally certified in June 1936, was 
remarkably undemocratic. Weinberg described it as being, 
••• nothing short of the constitution of any of the 

299
fascist corporate unions in Italy or Germany. 
Power was concentrated in the hands of the executive committee. 
This was elected annually by vote of the Union's shop stewards 
(called Delegates in this context). The executive appointed the 
general secretary and had the power to expel a Union member even 
if a delegates' meeting advised against this. No provision was 
made for general meetings of the Union members. The only means 
by which the membership could directly influence the executive 
was by ballot. A requisition for a ballot required the signatures 
of at least two hundred members. 300 
The aim of the SAGWU was to secure the election of its sup­
porters as shop stewards in the factories and then to use control 
of the delegates' meeting to capture the executive. As this was 
likely to take some time, the SAGWU also tried to put pressure 
on the existing executive committee to make the constitution a 
little more open to participation from members. The executive 
could, of course, amend the constitution without reference to 
the delegates or the membership. In April 1936, Sachs, Weinberg 
and Forsyth met with Ivan Walker, the Secretary for Labour, to 
discuss some form of truce in the Cape garment industry dispute. 
They agreed that the SAGWU and the Transvaal union would not take 
any action, legal or otherwise, to upset the existence of the 
ICCI (Cape) or the agreement. In return, the Labour Department 
undertook not to publish any further agreements unless it was satis­
fied the Union constitution had been complied with and workers 
had been consulted. Walker also promised to speed up the registra­
tion of any amendments to the constitution "which would aim at 
299. 	SAGWU Memorandum to the NEC of the TLC: 'The Position of the 
Clothing Industry in the Cape, with particular reference to the 
dictatorial methods adopted by certain officials of the Garment 
Workers' Union of the Cape Peninsula', n.d. c. January 1937, p.3. 
(signed by Weinberg - hereinafter Weinberg, 'The Position ••• ') 
(GWUSA Archives). 
300. 	 Ibid. In the face of dissident attacks during the 1940's this 
was raised to 400 signatures, not more than 100 of which were to 
come from anyone factory (GWU-CP Constitution 1952 - GWUSA 
Archives). 
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the extension of democratic rights of the members of the Union".301 
Walker broke the agreement in both its aspects. We have 
already seen how the Department pushed through the certification 
of the GWU-CP constitution in June, despite the fact that its 
advisers favoured the changes being confirmed by a general meeting 
302
of the Union. In October, an amendment to the industrial coun­
cil agreement was gazetted which set the wages of some grades 
of workers even below those of the old wage determination. 303 
The Department of Labour was no more sympathetic to opponents 
of Evans and company working inside the Union than it was to a 
rival union. 
Even in the face of these further setbacks, the effort to 
organize inside the Cape Union made notable progress. The SAGWU 
arranged a 'Conference of Activists' in August at which the need 
was stressed to train more activists "to assist in the fight for 
unity".304 SAGWU evening meetings included factory representatives 
and shop stewards of the Cape Union. 305 During the day, Weinberg 
and other activists held meetings at the factories. At the end 
of December 1936, Weinberg stated at a planning meeting which 
reviewed the progress of the campaign: 
... It would be possible before long to capture leader­
ship 	in the Union because the mass of the workers were 
301. 	Weinberg, 'The Position ••• ' op.cit. 
302. 	Walker was the superior of the Registrar of Trade Unions. The 
file ARBI054/306 strongly suggests Walker personally decided that 
the Department should risk the consequences of registering the 
constitution despite its internal deficiencies and the irregulari­
ties surrounding its drafting. On 15 June 1936 he wrote: "If the 
Union is prepared to accept full responsibility (sic) and the Re­
gistrar is able to say that the[draft amended Constitution] con­
forms to the law, it should be registered". (Handwritten note on 
memorandum to the Secretary for Labour 15 June 1936). The Regis­
trar was advised the constitution did not conform to the law (Memo­
randum to the Registrar, 24 June 1936, paragraph 8). Nevertheless, 
the constitution was certified as it stood. (See pp. 315/6, above). 
303. 	Weinberg, 'The Position ••• ' op.cit.; SAGWU Pamphlet: 'Another 
Wage Cut for Garment Workers' October 1936 (GWUSA Archives). 
304. 	SAGWU Minutes: 17 August 1936 (Conference of activists and fac­
tory representatives) (GWUSA Archives). 
305. 	Ibid.; SAGWU Minutes: 25 March 1937 (GWUSA Archives). 
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definitely in favour of the policy of the S.A.G.W.U. 306 
His remarks were supported by J.V. Mussell, the vice-chairman of 
the Cape Union who was also a member of the SAGWU. Mussell said: 
••• from his own observations be also thought that it 
would not be very long now before the Union would be 
captured. It all depended on whether the constitution 
would be amended. 307 
These amendments, put forward by Cape executive committee members 
who were opposed to the "reactionary leaders", would restore some 
power to the general meeting of members. Sachs was not so optimis­
tic. He, 
••• pointed out that even with all the work done so far ­
and he was not underestimating its importance - Evans 
was still the Union and did what he liked. He thought 
308this 	would be so for quite a time to come. 
The Stuart Machine extended a dominating control over the Cape Union 
whoever was on the executive committee and whoever was the chairman. 
David Lunn, chairman from 1936 to 1937, wrote later: 
••• during that period Evans made it abundantly clear 
that on all questions of importance, Stuart was boss. 
Stuart told us in my presence, on several occasions, 
that he had signed an agreement with the old committee, 
appointing him as secretary for two or three years, 
and that there was a clause in the agreement that he 
could appo1nt w oever e W1S e to act 1n 1S pace.. 	 h h' h d "h" 1 309 
At committee, general and delegate meetings, Evans al­
ways had thugs, mainly some Greyshirts and Lorry Drivers, 
led by a man called Simpson. He was the agent for the 
Lorry Drivers' Union. At least two delegates' meetings 
were broken up by these thugs, at the instigation of 
306. 	SAGWU Minutes: 30 December 1936 (joint meeting with represen­
tatives of the Garment Workers' Union, (Transvaal) - GWUSA 
Archives). 
307. 	Ibid. 
308. 	 Ibid. 
309. 	David Lunn, 'Statement', 1945 op.cit., paragraph 22. 
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Evans. 310 
On one occasion, some committee members and myself 
officially invited Evans, and asked him for the Minute 
Book and also to see what had transpired in the past 
as the Minutes were not properly kept and did not record 
what happened at meetings. The Minutes were written 
up not giving an account of what happened, but to suit 
Evans •••Our books and records all along were kept in 
Stuart's office. Stuart refused to allow me to go 
through the Minutes and even refused me permission to 
311
check up the balance sheets which I knew were not correct. 
Lunn had been co-operating with Weinberg and the SAGWU since about 
September 1936. 312 Early in November the Cape Union held a general 
meeting to discuss the proposal that the constitution be altered 
to allow for the election of officials and the executive committee 
at an annual general meeting open to all members. The meeting 
voted in' favour of this suggestion. But the bureaucrats responded 
by saying (correctly) that the general meeting had no power under 
the constitution and that the resolution was not binding on the 
executive. They followed this up by expelling Lunn and Mussell, 
the chairman and vice-chairman of the Union, as "they were associ­
ated with certain members of the S.A. Garment Workers' Union".313 
This time the controllers had overstepped the mark. Two 
days after the expulsions there was a shop stewards' meeting: 
Since the majority of the shop-stewards present insisted 
that they would not allow the meeting to be held without 
the presence of the chairman and vice-chairman, the 
310. 	David Lunn, 'Statement', 1945 op.cit., paragraph 35. Simpson, 
a member of the CFLU executive, was a witness in a defamation 
action brought by Poole against the printers of a SAGWU leaflet 
handed out at the November general meeting. Forward reported 
(12 June 1936), that Simpson " ••• admitted having struckE. Wein­
berg •••with his fist because Weinberg tried to enter the meet­
ing. He admitted also, the holding of another, which was atten­
ded by a number of Lorry Drivers, Bakers and a half-dozen police. 
Simpson said intfi~course of evidence, 'If I had hit Weinberg 
square in the face he would have gone to sleep' fl. 
311. 	David Lunn, 'Statement', 1945 op.cit., paragraph 36. 
312. 	SAGWU Minutes: 12 September 1936 (GWUSA Archives). 
313. Weinberg, 'The Position ••• ' op.cit. 
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officials insisted on sabotaging the meeting and 
it could not discuss any matters on the agenda. 314 
In addition, 
... a circular threatening the Executive Committee to 
cancel the existing stop-orders if the two members were 
not reinstated within a fortnight was signed by well 
over twelve hundred workers. 315 
The outburst of popular opposition to the officials exposed tensions 
within the controlling gTOUp. Poole, although the industrial coun­
cil agent, remained powerful within the Union. He wrote an angry 
letter to Stuart in which he said: 
We have power to turn Lunn out of the Union, but we 

have no power to keep him out if he wishes to force 

the issue. 

Under the Constitution an expelled member •••can ask 
for a ballot of the whole Union, and claim the ballot 
on the issue as he himself chooses to define it. From 
the general feeling throughout the Union I think he 
would come back with flying colours •••• 
(I)t is better to make our own terms and let him return, 
316
rather than he should return as a conqueror. 
Stuart had obviously thrown a tantrum at the way the Union was being 
disrupted. Poole continued: 
••• (Y)our statement, "Let the Union smash up" I cannot 
nor will I accept as a sane policy nor the right line 
to take. Harry Evans has dragged this Union together 
with superhuman effort and I undertake that it will 
continue. Neither you, nor I, nor the Federation nor 
the T.& L.C. nor any other individual has the right 
to say "Let the Union smash if we cannot have it our 
own way". I may tell you frankly that the Garment Wor­
314. 	Weinberg, 'The Position••• ' op.cit. 
315. 	Ibid. 
316. 	Letter from Poole to Stuart, 24 November 1936 (GWUSA Archives, 
Bcc 1.20.1). 
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kers' Union is not going to smash up for the sake of 

personalities. 317 

The expulsions of Lunn and Mussell were rescinded. The r~lers 
had to bow to the pressure of the membership, not unaided by a 
. d d . L ,. 318cour t JU gement or erlng unn s relnstatement. 
Another petition was presented to the Union for a ballot 
to compel the executive to amend the constitution in order that 
a new executive and new officials could be elected at a general 
members' meeting in January 1937. As Weinberg said: 
••• (T)he present Industrial Agreement operating in the 

Industry is expiring in April this year, and the workers 

can under no circumstances entrust the present committee 

with the task of negotiating a new agreement. It is 

quite likely that the officials of the Union will for 

this reason sabotage the requisition. 319 

Sure enough, no changes were made to the constitution. The reaction- , 
ary officials held onto their power ,and used it as before. But 
opposition was growing. Rose Crawford began to vote with the 
opposition on the executive. The executive meeting 
at which Poole presented a new draft agreement broke up in disorder 
without the agreement being approved. 320 Weinberg predicted: 
But that does not matter very much and the likelihood 
is that they will proceed and apply for registration 

321

of the agreement. 
I narcM , Lunn was lred f rom h' . b at Af· h'h 1937 f · lS JO rlcan CIot lng. 322 
He later alleged that this was part of a conspiracy between Poole, 
Evans and his employer, Simon Roytowski, to end his activities 
in the Union. 323 The SAGWU launched a campaign for his reinstate­
317. Letter from Poole to Stuart, 24 November 1936, ibid., 
318. Letter from Lunn to the Secretary, CFLU, 5 May 1937 (GWUSA Archives). 
319. Weinberg, 'The Position ••• ' op.cit. 
320. Letter from Weinberg to Sachs, 24 February 1937 (GWUSA Archives). 
321. Ibid. 
322. Guardian 12 March 1937 'Garment Workers Uneasy - Threat of Strike'. 
323. Letter from Lunn to the Secretary, CFLU, 5 May 1937 (GWUSA Archives). 
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ment which brought out all the grievances of the members against 
the Stuart Machine in the Union. Meetings were held at the fac­
tories and a long resolution was adopted. This condemned Lunn's 
dismissal as victimisation and demanded, 
••• the removal from the Executive Committee of all those 
officials who have deliberately refused to listen to 
the demands of workers and have acted detrimentally 
. t h . f t he U' 324agalns t e lnterests 0 nlon. 
The workers dissociated themselves from the industrial council 
negotiations because of irregularities in the election of delegates 
and demanded that the Wage Board recommendation be used as a basis 
of any new agreement. The resolution continued: 
We demand the immediate attention of the Executive Com­
mittee ••• to the requisition of members to change the 
constitution of the Union which was already handed in 
in November 1936 and has not been attended to since. 
We pledge ourselves to continue the fight and not to 
rest until we have gained quarterly general meetings, 
all control of union affairs by the general meeting 
of members and election of the officers and Executive 
Committee of the Union either by general ballot or by 
. f h 325a generaI meetlng 0 t e U'nlon. 
In response to this, "the bosses together with the officials of 
the C.G.W.U." organized a ballot at the factories to approve the 
new'agreement,.326 Tactically, this was a very shrewd move. 
If workers voted "No", the industry would revert to the low wages 
of the Determination No.42. If they voted, as they must, to ap­
prove the 'agreement', the officials could claim it as a vote 
of confidence. A SAGWU meeting pondered how the ballot could 
be stopped. Freestone had also issued a circular promoting the 
agreement which had not been authorised by the executive. Lunn 
challenged the officials for conducting the ballot without the 
324. Guardian 19 March 1937 'Garment Workers Again'. 
325. Ibid. 
326. SAGWU Minutes: 25 March 1937 CGWUSA Archives). 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
346 

approval of the executive. The officials then rigged Lunn's ex­
pulsion from the Union, 
••• in a most irregular manner by packing the Executive 
with people who had no vote, and then proceeding to 
vote for the expulsion despite the protests of more 
than half the legal Executive and the ruling of Mussell 
. h h' 327wh0 was ln t e c alr. 
Weinberg wrote to Sachs that the SAGWU had decided against upsetting 
the agreement (which could be easily done through the courts because 
f · 1" . . . ) 328 Th ld 111 he lrregu arltles ln ltS preparatlon • ere wou on yoat 

be a point in taking such a step if the garment workers were 

strongly enough organized to stop the employers reducing wages. 

Weinberg wrote, 

••• (We could) say "alright we are going to protect our 
interests by resorting to the mobilising of the workers 
for direct action and with some amount of pressure we 
might be able to compel the employers to grant us a 
new agreement with a flat rate of wages". But such 
(a) policy presupposed firstly control of the official 
union and secondly command of some funds. We had neither 
and it would have been adventurous to embark on a policy 
like that without the necessary preparation and prerequi­
sites •••• (W)ith the weakness of the [SAGWU] organization 
329
at the present moment the workers would have suffered.
In any event, the fight for control in the Union was entering 
another crucial stage. The Union executive committee was split 
5:5 	with Crawford still voting against the officials. The dele­
, . (h d ) l'dl . h 330 Thgates meetlng s op stewar s was so 1 y agalnst tern. e 
latter meeting voted to reinstate Lunn and protested strongly 
against the "high-handed action of the E.C.".331 But the constitu­
tion allowed the executive to override this advisory vote, which 
327. 	Letter from Weinberg to Sachs, 15 May 1937 (GWUSA Archives). 
328. 	 Ibid. 
329. 	 Ibid. 
330. 	 Ibid. 
331. 	Quoted in letter from Weinberg to Sachs, 9 June 1937 (GWUSA 
Archives). 
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it did by five votes to four, and Lunn was permanently expelled. 
He was unable to find employment in the clothing industry and 
had to leave Cape Town. 332 As Weinberg remarked, 
"they rule with force and not with reason ll • 
The SAGWU was expecting to make decisive'gains in the June elections 
for the shop stewards who (as the delegates' meeting) would elect 
a new executive. Weinberg wrote to Sachs: 
••• (W)e are already preparing our nominations and 
we hope to get this time a clear majority on the E.C. 333 
The SAGWU forces within the GWU-CP were growing. So confident 
was Weinberg of the strength of the opposition movement generated 
in the campaign that he willingly accepted the Transvaal union's 
decision to close its Cape Town office and cease its financial 
support for the SAGWU in July 1937. 334 
This action must have been totally incomprehensible to the 
rank and file garment workers who had thrilled to the speeches 
of Sachs to fight Stuart &Co. to the bitter end and not to leave 
Cape Town until a national union of garment workers had been formed. 
The results of ending the Transvaal union's material support for 
the SAGWU, after all Weinberg's hopeful reports, were probably 
equally surprising to Solly Sachs. 
12 The Illusion of National Unity 
The Transvaal union ceased to finance and direct the Cape Town 
campaign in July 1937 because Robert Stuart insisted upon it. 
The national trade union movement, so fiercely divided in 1935, 
had reached a position where unity between the North and the South 
seemed a real possibility. The CFLU, however, refused to commit 
itself to unity in any practical way as long as Solly Sachs' union 
was laying siege to its garment worker citadel. In order to "faci­
332. 	Interview with David Lunn. The CCI apparently warned all its 
members against employing him. Weinberg indicates that Lunn 
had alienated many of his supporters by the time of his expul­
sion, which may explain the lack of further protest. (See Wein­
berg to Sachs, 15 May 1937). 
333. 	Letter from Weinberg to Sachs, 9 June 1937. 
334. 	Letter from Sachs to Weinberg, 16 July 1937 (GWUSA Archives). 
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litate the creation of one National Trade Union Centre", the Trans­
vaal union withdrew from the Cape and "tried to come to an under­
standing with the Cape Garment Workers' Union by peaceful negotia­
' lon,,335t • 
The foundations for this attempt at victory through diplomacy 
had been laid since the SAGWU stopped its frontal attack on the 
Cape Union in mid-1936. Sachs gave support to those elements 
working inside the Cape Union who believed in national unity. 
He began to ply the Union officials with proposals for a national 
unity agreement. Even SAGWU supporters inside the Union were 
a long time in capturing full control, their growing strength could 
be used to push to Cape officials into some form of national co­
operation before then. This s.trategy appeared to payoff. In 
October 1936, the Cape Union cautiously agreed to attend a national 
conference of clothing trade unions. 336 It stipulated that no 
persons natt~ched to any unregistered union in the Cape Area should 
d" 337 S h d h' d" 338 H . . atten. ac s agree to t lS con ltlon. e was waltlng 
for the GWU-CP to commit itself to dates for the conference when 
the Transvaal union formally closed its Cape Town office in July. 
At this time there is every indication that Sachs and Weinberg 
believed that the influence of SAGWU members within the factories 
was great enough, 
••• to ensure a majority of our supporters on the Shop 
Stewards and Executive Committee of the Cape Garment 
Workers' Union. 339 
SAGWU members would, 
follow this up by putting Comrade Weinberg up as Secre­
tary, (or) alternately come to an understanding with 
Freestone and let Freestone remain Secretary with Comrade 
W ' b . 340eln erg as organlzer. 
Such an outcome would provide a firm base for reaching unity through 
335. 'R. Stuart versus E.S. Sachs', c.1945. paragraph 11 (GWUSA Archives). 
336. Letter from GWU-CP to Sachs, 12 October 1936 (GWUSA Archives). 
337. Ibid. 
338. Letter from Sachs to GWU-CP, 25 January 1937 (GWUSA Archives). 
339. GWUSA CEC Minutes: 9 July 1937 (GWUSA Archives, Baa 1). 
340. Ibid. 
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negotiation. Sachs advised the CEC of his union to dissolve the 
SAGWU. 341 
Sachs and Weinberg seriously miscalculated. The archives 
of the GWUSA do not contain specific information on the outcome 
of the Cape Union elections, but it is clear that the SAGWU suppor­
ters were not as successful as had been expected. The SAGWU was 
not dissolved, although it ceased to be a branch of the Transvaal 
. d .. f' f d 342 W' b . d'unlon an a reclplent 0 lts un s. eln erg contlnue ln 
office as the secretary although this was no longer a paid position. 
SAGWU activists continued to meet together and to organize inside 
the Cape Union. The CDC Annual Report for 1937/8 listed the SAGWU 
with a membership of 1 400. The efforts to secure democracy inside 
the GWU-CP and to further the aim of unity did not end simply 
because the SAGWU was no longer part of the Transvaal union. How­
ever both efforts ultimately failed. The SAGWU gradually declined 
until, in mid-1938, it was dissolved. 
Although the decline of the SAGWU dates from the Transvaal's 
withdrawal of support, this cannot be seen as the crucial factor 
that caused the campaign to fail. The SAGWU campaign had organized 
a substantial body of opposition to the Cape Union leadership 
amongst the garment workers of Cape Town. Support from these 
workers, not money from the Transvaal, was the principal force 
behind the progress of the SAGWU campaign. Certainly, the paid 
organizers and Transvaal advisers were essential in the first 
stages of organization, but only growth in the number of worker 
activists could ensure the success of the campaign. The Transvaal 
union had funded the SAGWU for two and a half years and had in­
vested the time and energies of its officials in the Cape campaign. 
If, after all this effort, the campaign could not sustain itself, 
341. 	GWUSA CEC Minutes: 9 July 1937 (GWUSA Archives, Baa 1). 
342. The 	Transvaal union was paying £30 a month to the SAGWU until 
July 1937. It also stepped in every now and then to pay 
off accumulated debts. It sent £550 for the I.L. Back strike 
alone. (See letters from Sachs to Weinberg, 16 July 1937; 
Weinberg to NEC TLC, 30 April 1936). At one stage, Weinberg 
claimed, the SAGWU was self-financing (Interview - see footnote 
87, above). Once it began the attack from within, its suppor­
ters would have paid subscriptions to the Cape union, thus 
making the Transvaal payments essential to maintain the office 
and paid organizers. 
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the reasons for failure lie beyond the withdrawal of Transvaal 
support. They are to be found in the conditions of class struggle 
in Cape Town - in the prevalence of the Stuart Machine in the 
garment industry, in the actions of the Department of Labour, 
and in the attitudes of the bosses. These forces were not weaken­
ed by the Transvaal union's abandonment of the SAGWU. 
But even this is too limited an interpretation of the col­
lapse of the SAGWU and the militant spirit which garment workers 
had shown during the campaign for a fighting trade unionism in 
Cape Town. Viewed from another perspective, the SAGWU was not 
given a chance to survive. The withdrawal of Transvaal support 
was sudden. The SAGWU had no alternative source of finance and 
had to scale down its activities immediately. But not only was 
the SAGWU deprived of assistance from the Transvaal union, the 
TLC found the SAGWU an embarassment in its efforts to negotiate 
a settlement with the CFLU. The CDC was hindered by the TLC from 
offering the fullest support to the SAGWU. The SAGWU was a sacri­
fice to the cause of unity. How did this come about? 
The retreat of the Transvaal garment workers' union from 
Cape Town was a tactical move on the part of the TLC. It was 
made in order to consolidate gains made at the expense of the 
CFLU on a much broader front. In the space of two and a half 
years the CDC had become a potent threat to the old guard in the 
Federation. Its presence had assisted power-shifts within Fede­
ration affiliates. Stuart's dominance in the Cape labour movement 
343had been challenged and was crumbling. 
The SAGWU had been a most important element in the revival of the 
CDC. It had been the fastest growing of the new unions and the 
most productive of propaganda against the Stuart machine. Weinberg, 
as the secretary of the CDC, used his base amongst the garment 
workers to promote national trade union unity as well as national 
unity for garment workers. 344 The SAGWU sent delegates to the 
Trade Union Unity Conference in Cape Town in February 1936. This 
involved 55 representatives from 14 Cape Town unions, including 
343. See Williams (1974). 
344. 	See 'CDC Report for the period 27 May 1936 to 14 April 1937' 
(GWUSA Archives). 
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six unions affiliated to the CFLU. (The leaders of the Federa­
tion, of course, did not attend).345 
By May 1938, the CDC included about 7 000 workers in ten 
unions, not counting CDC supporters allied to the SAGWU. Williams 
(1974, p.12) estimates that this equalled the effective member­
ship of the CFLU. These ten unions were in industries not orga­
nized by the CFLU. 346 There were 'old' unions such as the Engineers' 
and Iron Moulders', which were branches of national unions centrally 
affiliated to the TLC. The largest unions in the CDC were of rail­
way, harbour and dock workers. Small new unions had been estab­
lished among the sweet and chemical workers (in which Ray Alexander 
was active). The SAGWU was the only union that was a direct rival 
of a Federation affiliate. Howeve~ the presence of a Transvaal­
controlled body like the CDC in its home territory, was both hate­
ful and threatening to the isolationist leaders of the Federation. 
Not all the Federation leaders were as paranoid as Stuart 
about co-operation with the national union movement. The CFLU 
entered into a unity agreement with the TLC after a conference 
at Kimberley in March 1937. This established a National Joint 
Committee of six representatives from the two bodies. It was 
to meet quarterly and act as the mouthpiece of the trade union 
movement. (Williams, 1974, p.11). But the Federation remained 
dissatisfied with the existence of the CDC. In late 1937, the 
TLC proposed to disband the CDC on condition that its affiliated 
unions could join th  CFLU. The Federation was to accept represen­
tatives of six CDC unions as full members of its general council. 347 
The CDC itself and the workers it had organized in Cape Town 
had no say in this transaction. While the CDC saw the need for 
unity as well as any NEe member, it was unhappy about the absolute 
subordination of the CDC to the will of the NEC. In particular, 
345. 	 'Trade Union Unity Conference in Cape Town - Momentous Move 
in the Establishment of One National Trade Union Centre' 
n.d. (GWUSA Archives, Cba 2.4.1); SAGWU Minutes: 24 February 
1936. (GWUSA Archives). 
346. 	CDC Report for the period April 1937 to May 1938 (GWUSA Ar­
chives) (hereinafter 'CDC Report 1937/8'). 
347. 	Ibid. 
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it resented that "its right to organize workers (was) to be cur­
t .1 	 d" 348 NECJ b h h CDCa1 e. mem ers t en met with t e and stated that 
the Federation, 
••• had raised objections to co-operating with certain 
individuals of the Cape District Committee. It was 
also pointed out, that in order to come to some under­
standing with the Federation, it was essential to make 
concessions. On the other hand the Cape District Com­
mittee, whilst agreeing on the need for a "give and 
take" policy felt that it was unwise and impermissible 
to make concessions on matters of principle.349 
The CDC, 
•••still did not approve of the contents of the agree­
ment, but [it commented] it could evidently d  very 
1 . tItto preven . t s conf . 1rmat10n..1 t e 1 	 350 
Several CDC unions would not be directly represented on the Federa­
tion. The CDC commented that 
••• (this) is rather a severe penalty to pay for unity. 
The position tends rather to aggravate the bitterness 
and feeling of injustice. The Cape District Committee 
proposed that each Union be given one delegate on the 
Federation's General Council, but this proposal was 
351
not accepted. 
The absorption of the CDC by the CFLU was part of a power-sharing 
agreement between trade union 'politicians' who wanted to 'unite' 
the South African labour movement. It was not related to any 
intention of extending or consolidating the spirit of militancy 
among Cape Town workers which had emerged during the campaigns 
of the previous two years. It was not related to the previously 
348. 	CDC resolution of meeting on 10 November 1937, quoted in 
CDC Report 1937/8, op.cit. 
349. 	CDC Report 1937/8, op.cit. 
350. 	Ibid. 
351. 	 Ibid. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
353 

declared need to build a solid union movement in Cape Town. In 
fact the militant unionism supported by the TLC in Cape Town after 
1935, as is exemplified in the SAGWU campaigns, might appear to 
a cynical analyst, wise with hindsight, to have been a mere ploy 
to weaken Stuart's dominance over the Cape Town labour movement 
in order that 'unity' could be achieved. The reasons for the 
decline of the SAGWU must be located primarily in the conditions 
of class struggle existing in Cape Town and the clothing industry. 
But one can still maintain that the SAGWU was a sacrifice to 'unity'. 
Its existence was crucial in the campaign to undermine the power 
of the Stuart Machine in Cape Town. Yet in mid-1938 Weinberg 
was forced to wind up what remained of the SAGWU to set the seal 
on national unity in the labour movement. The Cape Union, in 
return, gave an undertaking that it, 
••• would collaborate with the garment workers' union 

in the Transvaal in a sort of federation of clothing 

workers. 352 

The disbanding of the CDC and the entry of its main constituents 
into the CFLU ultimately contributed to Stuart's resignation as 
secretary and to the absorption of the CFLU and most of the major 
Cape Unions by the TLC. However, this took another three years 
to materialize. 
The Transvaal garment workers' union had been persuaded ,to 
cut its constitutional and financial ties with the SAGWU to clear 
the way for national unity between the trade union movements of 
the North and the South. It agreed to this step because it believed 
that the campaign it had started in Cape Town would, anyway, shortly 
be victorious. Here it was mistaken. The union did not immediately 
resume the Cape Town campaign because this would jeopardize North­
South unity negotiations and because Sachs still had hopes that 
his peaceful persuasion would convince the Cape Union of the need 
for a national garment workers' union. Several former SAGWU ac­
tivists were members of the GWU-CP executive committee and could 
put pressure on the officials to enter negotiations with the Trans­
vaal union. But the disbanding of the SAGWU marked the defeat 
352. Interview with Eli Weinberg (see footnote 87, above). 
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of the campaign to establish a militant union for garment workers 
in Cape Town. 
Sachs had a draft constitution for a Co-ordinating Council 
of garment trade unions ready for discussion from early in 1937. 353 
The Cape Union officials avoided all attempts to arrange a meeting. 
In 1938 Sachs prepared a draft agreement, by which a National 
Council of Clothing Workers, including the Transvaal, Cape and 
Durban unions, would work towards forming a single union and form­
. . l' d . 1 'I 354 M bers f t he CU' , slng a natlona ln ustrla counCl. em 0 ape nlon 
executive committee in favour of unity pushed through a resolution 
to attend a national conference355 but again the officials succeeded 
. d 1 . th . 356ln e aylng e meetlng. 
In an attelnpt to put pressure on the Cape Union and Cape 
employers to consider unity seriously once more, the Transvaal 
union and the TCMA requested a new Wage Board inquiry. This was 
undertaken but to no purpose. The new Wage Board refused to coun­
tenance making a new determination to eliminate the wage differen­
tial between the Rand and the coast. It commented that: 
for more than a decade, wages on the Rand have been 
some 	 20 per cent higher than at the coast and during 
that 	period the industry has prospered and expanded 
· 1 . 357to a 	greater extent t han have ltS coastacompetltors. 
Sachs, convinced as ever of the importance of national unity, con­
tinued patiently to write letters to the Cape Union. Stuart replaced 
Freestone as secr~tary in 1939 but Sachs was undeterred. He wrote 
effusively to the executive: 
Ten thousand garment workers are now awaiting the de­
cision of the Cape Garment Workers. 
I sincerely hope that the Cape Garment Workers, and 
353. 	Letter from Sachs to the Secretary, GWU-CP, 25 January 1937 
(GWUSA Archives). 
354. 	Undated memorandum proposing the formation of such a body 
from 1 January 1939 (GWUSA Archives). 
355. 	Letter from Weinberg to Sachs, 16 August 1938 (GWUSA Archives). 
356. 	 'Report of the General Secretary on his visit to Durban, Port 
Elizabeth and Cape Town - November 1938' (GWUSA Archives). 
357. 	Wage Board Report, 21 February 1938 op.cit., paragraph 72. 
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that you, dear comrades, will not be long in making 

a decision which will result in a mighty army of gar­

ment workers being built up, which will go forward 

unitedly and determinedly, fighting for a happier and 

better life for all garment workers, and have a real 

. . th d . 	 h 1 358VOlce ln e tra e unlon movement as a woe. 
The long-awaited conference was finally convened in 1942!359 
Stuart had no intention of allowing a national union of garment 
workers to emerge under the leadership of the Transvaal. He con­
tinued to use the tactics - which served him so well in keeping 
the CFLU out of the national trade union movement over so many 
years - of paying lip service to unity but opposing all practical 
efforts to achieve it. 360 
Solly Sachs wrote to Rose Crawford in 1936, while she was 
assisting the SAGWU in Cape Town: 
There can be no unity with Bosses' pimps unless they 

give up their pimping - and then they can hardly be 

trusted. Therein lies the great importance of the 

361
struggle of the Cape Garment Workers. 
This is a fitting epitaph on the second Cape campaign. It is 
a lesson that the Transvaal Union never really learnt despite 
re-experiencing its truth in the subsequent Cape campaigns and 
unity efforts up to 1960. Today the leaders of the Garment Wor­
kers' Union of South Africa have little use for such insights. 
They have learnt a different lesson from their Cape counterparts 
- pimping pays. 
358. 	Letter from Sachs .to the Executive Committee, mJU-cP, 15 
February 1939 (GWUSA Archives). 
359. 	Minutes: 23, 24, 25 August 1942 (GWUSA Archives). 
360. 	In 1944 Sachs was still writing. His tone however had changed. 
He wrote to Stuart, "You have fooled us long enough in regard 
to national unity. You never had the slightest intention to 
build or help to build a national trade union of garment workers 
••••You wanted war and you shall have it, and this time when we 
come down to Cape Town to speak to our fellow workers we shall 
finish the job if we have to spend ten years doing it" ( 7 Sep­
tember 1944 - GWUSA Archives). 
361. 	Letter from Sachs to Crawford, 19 March 1936 (GWUSA Archives). 
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6.4: Comparative Table of Wages of Female Machinists, 1932-1937 
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23/9 25/­ 25/­
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28/6 30/­ 30/­
31/­ 32/6 32/6 
33/3 35/­ 35/­
38/­ 40/­ 40/­
42/9 45/­ 45/­
42/9 45/­ 45/­
47/6 50/­ 50/­
7i77b 50/­ 50/­
47/6 50/­ 55/­
-­
47/6 50/­ 55/­
,,< The Wage Board and the Transvaal industrial council agreements only set 
'flat' minimum wages. The minima appl ied to all men and women, whatever 
their specific jobs. By contrast, the Cape Town industrial council 
agreement had, by October 1936, twelve job categories, each with its own 
'wage path'. The wage of the female machinists is thus no longer as good 
an indicator of the wage level as before. For example, while machinists 
started at 18/- a week and earned at least 45/- after 36 months 
experience; packers started at 15/- and reached a 'top minimum' wage of 
32/6 after 24 months. Cleaners, markers, sorters, bobbin-girls and 
loose collar ironers started at 15/- and qual ified after 12 months to a 
wage of 25/-. Slopers and seam pressers started at 15/- and qual ified 
after 24 months to a wage of 30/-. Plain sewers and table hands started 
at 18/- and qual ified after 24 months to a wage of 35/-. Column10a shows 
the 'wage path' for packers. 
Sources: 	 Table 4.2 above; CWCMA Minutes: 19 July 1935 - M2/1; 

Government Gazette 16 Feb. 1934; 18 Mar. 1935; 21 May 1937. 
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CHAPTER VII 
A RUDE AWAKENING 
I started working in the industry some years before 

I joined the S.A. Garment Workers. Nobody from the 

Cape Union asked me to join the Cape Union. I did not 

know of its existence. At that time I earned the top 

wage - £2 per week. It was a very low wage. We \\'ere 

not really dissatisfied because we did not know any 

better. The workers were dormant. The Cape Union was 

also dormant. I thought the S.A. Garment Workers was 

to wake up the Cape Union. 

- Mrs. D. Julius, executive committee member GWU-CF, 1949. 1 
In retrospect, the second campaign of the Transvaal union in Cape 
Town was a decisive event in the history of South Africa's garment 
workers. Although the campaign did not attain its most ambitious 
objectives, it was not a complete failure and its consequences 
for the future of the Cape garment workers were wide-ranging and 
long-lasting. 
The basic aim of the Transvaal union in launching its campaign 
was to force the Cape clothing factories to raise wages. This 
would blunt the intensity of the competition in the garment industry 
between the low-wage Cape and the hig~er-wage Transvaal. The 
union could then win further improvements in the wages and conditions 
of Transvaal workers. In this basic aim the campaign succeeded. 
Agitation from the Transvaal union caused the Wage Board to investi­
gate the clothing industry. Sachs marshalled evidence for the 
Wage Board sittings which influenced the high wages it recommended. 
The organization of Cape garment workers in the SAGWU and in the 
GWU-CP forced the bosses to concede higher wages than would other­
wise have been the case. As a direct result of the campaign an 
industrial council was formed and an agreement enacted which raised 
Cape garment workers' wages substantially. The industrial council 
was able to police this agreement more effectively than the Depart­
ment of Labour enforced the old wage determinations. F'Jr the 
following twenty years, wages in the Transvaal garment industry, 
1. 	 Garment Workers' Union Commission of Inquiry: Min'Jtes of 
Evidence, p.69 (GWUSA Archives, Bca 4). 
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which had never risen above the levels set ten years previously, 
rose steadily. Although the wage differential between the Cape 
and Transvaal industries persisted, wages in the Cape also followed 
an upward trend. 2 The second Cape campaign served as a warning 
to the Cape employers of the consequences of lagging too far behind 
Transvaal wage levels. 
The campaign had its greatest and most direct effects on 
the workers and employers in the Cape clothing industry. It led 
to the re-creation of the Cape Union and an expanded unity of 
the manufacturers. The organizations of the workers and manufac­
turers were given purpose and permanence by the establishment 
of the industrial council. Industrial council agreements have 
regulated the wages and conditions of work in the Cape garment 
industry continuously from 1936 to the present. The undemocratic 
constitution of the Cape Union, which played its part in stopping 
numerous subsequent efforts to unseat the leadership, was approved 
by the Department of Labour as a result of the campaign. 
The ability of the Union leaders to secure higher wages and 
better conditions was limited by the way in which the industrial 
council and the Union itself had been formed. The Union owed 
its existence to the bosses. It relied on stop orders adminis­
tered (or imposed) by the bosses for its income. Its base of 
popular support amongst the workers was questionable. Many shop 
stewards were former SAGWU activists and any attempt to use orga­
nized worker power to put pressure on the bosses would serve to 
strengthen their influence. The organization of the workers in 
the factories could provide new impetus for a challenge to the 
leaders. From the start, the Union leaders tended to be remote 
from the membership in order to retain their control over the 
Union and their official positions. While the old Stuart Machine 
was crumbling in the Cape Labour movement under attacks from all 
sides, it was being cloned in the new Garment Workers' Union. 
But the employers did not exert direct control over the ac­
tions of the Union leaders and industrial council representatives. 
The Union leaders used strong words in the approaches they made 
to CWCMA3 and were frequently stubborn in refusing to agree to 
2. 	 See Appendix A, Graphs A.4 and A.5, below. 
3. 	 See, for example, letter from Freestone (general secretray of the 
GWU-CP) to "the employers' representatives on the Industrial Coun­
cil", 25 January 1937 (CCI Archives). 
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compromises suggested by the employers. This attitude was not 
a mere display to refute the charges that they were bosses' stooges, 
or a misinterpretation of the employers' earlier injunction to 
4be more militant. The Union leaders were not simply stooges. 
They had not fought so bitterly against higher wages and Solly 
Sachs primarily for the bosses but for themselves. They had to 
blend their powerful control over the Union with a measure of 
economic advancement for their members. The better the wages 
they negotiated, the safer were their jobs. So wages and hours 
were hotly debated in the industrial council meetings. The Union 
regularly made demands for improved conditions that horrified 
5the employers. 
The employers took time to adjust to the new conditions they 
faced under the industrial council system. They had been forced 
into establishing an industrial council in order to stop the Wage 
Board setting higher wages and also to stop Sachs from winning 
control over the Cape Garment Workers' Union. Their participation 
in an industrial council was for them the least of three evils. 
The CWCMA saw no need to institutionalize industrial conflict 
or enter a debate with their employees over the wages they paid 
them. Ideally, the function of the industrial council was to 
police the agreement and prevent unfair competition from sweatshops. 
They resented its interference in wage questions. This is illus­
trated in a CWCMA meeting in August:; 1939, called to discuss the 
Union's proposals for a new agreement to replace the one about 
to expire. A.A. Millar of Bertish (the new chairman of the CWCMA6), 
••• said that the demands made by the Union were pre­
posterous, and he was not satisfied with an Agreement 
being negotiated every year as insufficient time was 
allowed to enable the adjustments to be made and extra 
'costs absorbed. He thought that it would be more ad­
vantageous to have a Wage Determination which would 
continue for four or five years, and he would rather 
4. 	 See pp.297/8, above. 
5. 	 See, for example, CWCMA Minutes: 24 March 1938 (Annual General 
Meeting); 23 August 1939; 10 September 1940; 1 November 1944; 
15 March 1946 - M2. 
6. 	 Millar had succeeded William Middlemass, the original leader 
of Cape Town's clothing manufacturers, in 1937 (CWCMA Minutes: 
4 May 1937 - M2/1). 
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work under a Determination than under the present con­

ditions. He said that if the Agreement could not be 

extended for two years he was prepared to give three 

months' notice of his firm's resignation from the 

Council. 7 

Other employers supported Millar's sentiments but Edgar Jacobs 
pointed out that the Wage Board might raise wages up to Transvaal 
levels. He commented that, 
, ••• although the demands by the Union were preposterous 
in the eyes of members, they were not in excess of wages 
being paid in the, Transvaal. 8 
Eventually the manufacturers pressurized the Union into extending 
the existing agreement. The Union could not afford to let an 
agreement lapse before a new one was negotiated, as this would 
effectively remove a legally enforcible minimum wage. The 1932 
Wage Determination, with its depression wage-levels, would then 
apply. However the bosses were also not keen to return to such 
a low scale of wages as this would bring back intense competition 
from small and unscrupulous firms who paid the lowest wages pos­
sible. 
Disagreements, often severe disagreements, between the employ­
ers and the Union seem to be the rule rather than the exception 
in negotiations at least up to the early 1960's.9 The following 
four random examples from the minutes of the CWCMA indicate the 
serious light in which the employers regarded these challenges 
from the Union. In 1946, the CWCMA asked for a Wage Board investiga­
tion because Union demands for higher wages and shorter hours, 
•••were imposing an unnecessary economic strain on 

. d 10
t he ~n ustry. 
7. 	 CWCMA Minutes: 23 August 1939 - M2/1. 
8. 	 Ibid. 
9. 	 See, for example, CWCMA Minutes: 27 May 1946; 11 April 1947; 
4 August 1948; 30 March 1955; 19 March 1961 - M2/1. I have not 
consulted the minutes of the CWCMA after 1957. From 1936 to 
this date they minute only discussions amongst the employers. 
All joint employer-union meetings would be recorded in the In­
dustrial Council minutes to which I have been denied access. 
A thorough study of the ICCI (Cape) archives is needed to judge 
my hypotheses on the period after 1939. 
10. 	 CWCMA Minutes: 27 May 1946 - M2. 
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In 1949, Simon Roytowski reacted to Union pressure with the state­
ment that, 
If the Union gave any trouble the Industry could revert 
. . 11to a 	Wage Determlnatl0n. 
In 1955, the Union refused to compromise on its demands until 
there was a real danger that the industry would find itself regu­
lated by the 1932 Wage Determination. S.R. Back said, 
•••He felt that the present stand of the trade union 

12
did not reflect the true attitude of the workers. 
Again in 1961, negotiations ended in deadlock. 13 These random 
examples do not seem to accord with the actions of a "bosses' 
union". 
But these conflicts between the employers and the Union did 
not indicate a growing independence of mind on the part of the 
Union. The disagreements were subject to certain constraints, 
the effectiveness of which is seen in the fact that the industrial 
council has never collapsed (as it did in the Transvaal in 1932-33). 
The commonality of interest which the GWU-CP leaders shared with 
the CWCMA was made most obvious when the Transvaal union appeared 
on the scene to promote a nation-wide union of garment workers. 
The Union-boss alliance was essential to the defeat of the Trans­
vaal union's efforts to win the support of Cape workers for national 
unity. In 1945 and 1954-5 in particular, when the Transvaal union 
ran expensive organizing and publicity campaigns amongst Cape 
garment workers to promote the idea of a single union, the bosses, 
14the Union leaders and the police acted in consort. 
In addition, in the period after 1939, Union reliance on 
the employers acquired new dimensions. Firstly, the "closed shop" 
agreement became a weapon of the Union leaders in defeating new 
generations of dissidents. 15 Secondly, during the War the industrial 
11. 	 CWCMA Minutes: 5 September 1949 - M2. 
12. 	 CWCMA Minutes: 4 July 1955 - M2. 
13. 	 CWCMA Minutes: 29 March 1961 - M2. 
14. 	 See~icol (1977). 
15. 	 See, for example, Nicol (1977, p.92). In 1946, John Shadrach 
apparently lost his job as a result of the closed shop clause 
after his expulsion from the Union (Shadrach v. Garment Workers' 
Union of the Cape Peninsula, Cape Supreme Court Motions ~(464) 
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council began to establish benefit funds for the workers. Member­
ship of the funds was compulsory. Workers' contributions were 
deducted from their wages each week. Employers also contributed 
directly to the funds a weekly sum proportional to the size of 
their factories. First a sick fund was started and then an un­
employment fund. These were followed in 1954 by a provident fund. 
The industrial council-administered funds further limited the 
ability of the Union to sustain any confrontation with the employ­
ers. The funds relied heavily on employer contributions. If 
the industrial council collapsed workers would lose one of the 
few benefits of Union membership as well as the money paid by 
the employers into the fund (in effect a part of their wage). 
Today the GWU-CP has its strongest claim to existence in 
its role as a distributor and organizer of (small) benefits for 
16garment workers. The leaders still count on the support of 
the employers in defeating efforts of Union members to challenge 
their dynastic sway. (This was demonstrated a few years ago in 
the failure of an "Action Committee" to unseat them (Bloch, 1982; 
Maree, 1976). The Union has never called or supported a strike. 
Both the Union and the manufacturers often express their pride 
in their good relationship which has preserved 'industrial peace' 
in the Cape clothing industry over nearly fifty years. 
There is a striking continuity in the leadership style in 
the Garment Workers' Union between the period of our study and 
the present. The leaders are remote from their membership, are 
protected in office by a rigid and undemocratic constitution and 
are intolerant of dissent. They rely on the employers' aid in 
stifling opposition. They retain an aversion to any involvement 
in politics. But these continuities should not lead us to assume 
a lack of change in the manner in which the Union has maintained 
1946 - C.A.D.). In 1941 the CWCMA agreed that the closed 
shop clause would be applied as and when requested by the 
Union (CWCMA Minutes: 2 October 1941 - CCI Archives). In 
1946, Roytowski reminded a CWCMA meeting that "the manufac­
turers themselves had originally insisted on having this 
clause in the Agreement" to foil the organizing efforts of 
the Transvaal union (CWCMA Minutes: 22 April 1946 - CCI Archi­
ves). The closed shop's most important functions remained 
that of keeping up Union membership figures and stop order incom(~. 
16. 	 The Argus of 7 November 1983 reported that, " ••• the general sec­
retary of the Garment Workers' Union, Mr. L. Petersen, has said 
the union is 'proud' to be described as a benefit society". 
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....., 
the division and effective disorganization of garment workers. 
This central function of the Union has been mediated through the 
industrial council system. 
Few authors see the industrial council system in an historical 
perspective. Davies and Lever point to the bureaucratising effects 
of the Industrial Conciliation Act in the 1920's and modern commen­
tators, noticing bureaucracy and a lack of militancy in unions 
today simply invoke the general explanations put forward for that 
earlier period. The industrial council system tends to promote 
good negotiators rather than good organizers, conflict is removed 
from the factory floor to secret meetings, common interests between 
union officials and managers multiply across the negotiating table 
etc. All this points to a badly organized, apathetic union member­
ship and an entrenched leadership, remote from the workers. My 
contention is that the industrial council system can only be under­
stood historically and concretely. 
The industrial council system has never been a single system ­
it has different effects in different localities and industries, 
which are ruled by different conditions of class struggle. Over 
time the system has grown new tentacles as well as strengthening 
older ones. The industrial council system of today may perform 
the same function as that of 50 years ago but the way it achieves 
that function is different. One of the key inno'vations of the 
system has been the use of worker benefit funds to control unions. 
In the 1920's employers were not involved in any benefits a union 
might provide. Today employers are heavily involved and in addition 
may control pension funds which have no relationship to the indus­
trial council but which can be used to discourage workers from 
• Ok 17gOJ.ng on strJ. e. 
Employers did not appreciate the 'control function' of funds 
until after the Second World War. They first saw them as a sly 
manoeuvre on the part of the unions to increase their labour costs 
and consequently opposed funds bitterly. Unions had to fight 
hard for medical benefit funds, sick pay funds or provident funds 
17. 	 See Carole Cooper's article on the 1979 white mineworkers' 
strike in S.A. Labour Bulletin 5 (3) October 1979. The Cham­
ber of Mines used the threat o~depriving strikers of their 
benefits as a main weapon in this confrontation. 
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which included contributions from the employers and were adminis­
tered by the industrial council. Sometimes unions decided to 
forego wage rises in order to secure employer partnership in the 
funds. Once a fund was conceded after all the battles in the 
industrial council meetings, the union saw this as a victory. 
Unions were also unaware of how severely their independence of 
action could be compromised by a benefit fund. 
The establishment of a provident fund in the Cape garment 
industry illustrates some of these points. The Union first raised 
the demand for a provident fund in 1949. This was rejected by 
the CWCMA as, said the chairman, it was "a charitable institution" 
and "did not come within the scope of the Agreement".18 The Union 
pressed the demand for another three years. In 1950 the employers 
thought that a provident fund might help to stabilize the work­
19force but they still refused the request. By the end of 1951 
the chairman had changed his view. He commented that, 
••• the Association was, to an extent, committed to the 
establishment of a provident fund for the Industry, 
and if it did agree to such a fund, it would be of im­
measurable assistance when the question of a new Indus­
20trial Council Agreement had to be discussed.
R.M. Lee, then the labour affairs secretary to the CCI, advised that 
if the employers, 
••• contributed a lump sum to start the fund ••• and there­
by were able to ensure that the weekly contribution 
was kept reasonably low, it would place the employers 
in an advantageous position when the question of dis­
CUSSing a new Industrial Council Agreement with the 
Trade Union became due. 21 
The establishment of the fund was the only concession made to 
the Union when the Agreement came up for re-negotiation in 1952. 22 
18. CWCMA Minutes: 5 September 1949 - M2. 
19. CWCMA Minutes: 20 March 1950 - M2. 
20. CWCMA Minutes: 17 September 1951 - M2. 
2l. CWCMA Minutes: 23 November 1951 - M2. 
22. CWCMA Minutes: 
was inaugurated 
Board 1955-6). 
17 November 1952 - M2. 
on 5 May 1953 (CWCMA Fil
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A proper understanding of the role of benefit funds in boss­
union relations would have to be based on a thorough study of 
the records of the industrial council. This might also throw 
light on the real function of the Union in the Cape clothing in­
dustry after 1939. The Union constantly put pressure on the em­
ployers to improve wages and conditions. The seriousness with 
which the CWCMA viewed the Union's frequent rejection of compro­
mises in wage negotiations suggests that the Union was not backed 
purely by the power of words. The Union did not deepen its repre­
sentativeness amongst the workers in the 1940's or the 1950's 
and it is not clear where the apparent power of the Union was 
based. These observations underline the need for an historical 
study of the development of the industrial council system - it 
has never been a static system, it changes and adapts to every 
alteration in the conditions of class struggle • 
... 1 am content to let my record in the trade union 
movement speak for me and permit that record to form 
the basis on which I am to be judged. 
- Bob Stuart, 194523 
Focus on the Cape clothing industry's experience of the Wage Act 
(in chapters three and four) and on the two Cape campaigns (in 
chapters five and six) throws light on several of the hypotheses 
advanced in chapter two about the conditions of economic class 
struggle in Cape Town between 1925 and 1939. On two separate 
occasions the Cape clothing manufacturers engineered the organiza­
tion of their workers into a trade union in order to avoid inter­
ference by the Wage Board in their industry. The whole story 
is an indictment of the methods of Robert Stuart and his faction 
of the CFLU. The four chapters together illustrate the diffi­
culty of sustaining solid worker organization in Cape Town in 
the period of Stuart's dominance over the labour movement. The 
reasons for the weakness of worker organization and an explanation 
for the nature of the organization that did exist emerge clearly 
from the history of the two campaigns. 
23. 	 'A Reply to and an Exposure of the Distortions, Misstate­
ments and Methods of Solly Sachs', 1945 pamphlet (GWUSA 
Archives). 
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The basic aims of both campaigns was to raise wages in Cape 
clothing factories. In this, the first campaign failed and the 
second succeeded. But the broader aims of the Transvaal union's 
activities involved strategies for the organization of the Cape 
garment workers into a more militant union and the eventual for­
mation of a national garment workers' union incorporating the 
three existing registered unions in the Cape, the Transvaal and 
Natal. On both these counts the campaigns failed. The last two 
chapters have stressed the tactical errors made by Sachs - for 
example, pressing on with the 1931 campaign despite the severe 
economic depression, or prematurely withdrawing support from 
the SAGWU in 1937. But behind misjudgements such as these, stand 
elements which are fundamental to the defeat of both campaigns ­
the dominance of the Stuart Machine inside the GWU-CP and the 
CFLU, the alliance between the CCI and leading elements of the 
CFLU, the partiality of the Department of Labour to the Cape Union. 
and, finally, the harassment by the police. 
This thesis argues that the Stuart Machine and the boss-union 
alliance are based in the class struggle. Both are closely linked 
to one another in that they both drew strength from the industrial 
legislation of the 1920's •. This legislation, while it applied 
to the whole of South Africa. had effects in Cape Town which were 
the result of specific conditions of class struggle. 
The Stuart Machine controlled trade unions. Its key figure 
was, of course, Stuart himself, the father, the architect, the 
dictator of the unions which were revived or created in Cape Town 
in the wake of the Industrial Conciliation and Wage Acts. The 
temple of the Stuart Machine until the late 1930's was the Cape 
Federation of Labour Unions. Associated with Stuart were 
sta\warts such as Evans, Poole and Freestone who served as the 
secretaries, administrators and officials of unions. The Stuart 
Machine controlled the minute books, finances and records of the 
unions. It administered the union constitution, it wrote and 
received all correspondence, it kept close ties with the Depart­
ment of Labour - and with the employers. 
Each union had an executive committee which included workers 
in the industry concerned. These workers might even be elected 
by their workmates, but more often they were chosen by the Stuart 
Machine as representatives. The tendency was for Stuart or his 
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close associates to steer the union with the connivance and under­
standing of the executive if this was convenient or without it 
if it was not convenient. Official positions in Stuart's unions 
were often held by people not engaged in the industry but deemed 
suitable by reason of their experience in other unions. Between 
1928 and 1934 the GWU-CP appears not to have held executive meet­
ings (and certainly held no executive elections) yet the Union 
officials negotiated with the bosses in its name and prevented 
its de-registration by the Department of Labour. When a union 
executive was a real and not fictitious body and resisted follow­
ing the wishes of the Stuart Machine, the Machine was often able 
to counter the resistance by virtue of the controls it exercised 
. . d over the unlon.,s ad"mlnlstratlon. 24 I nd'lVl uaI s or even groups 
of individual executive members who opposed Stuart's designs could 
be expelled from the union. 25 If this did not being them to their 
senses, the employers could be approached to arrange their dis­
missal. 26 The Stuart Machine did not exist in all its characteris­
tics from the start. These were attributes it acquired slowly. 
Even then not all subterfuges were successful. In 1928 garment 
workers on the GWU-CP executive were able to call a meeting without 
Stuart's approval and pass a resolution criticising his actions 
in agreeing to a wage scale with the employers which was lower 
27than that proposed by the Wage Board. By the mid-1930's the 
Stuart Machine had gained sufficient strength and experience to 
prevent workers from expressing their opposition to a second, 
similar attempt to foist on them a low-wage ind'lstrial council 
agreement. 
The Stuart Machine offered its most loyal supporters employ­
ment as union officials or industrial council agents. It made 
its creator the leader of the Cape labour movement. Its conditions 
for survival as the dominant element in the CFLU were the goodwill 
of the employers, dictatorial control over the unions and preserv­
24. See, for example, p.341/2, above. 
25. As was Rose Crawford, for example. See p.333, above. 
26. As was David Lunn. See p.344, above. 
27. See p .177, above. 
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ing the isolation of Cape Town from the rest of the South African 
labour movement. Through the 1930's, the last two elements were 
challenged successfully. The Stuart Machine retreated into indi­
vidual_unions, of which the GWU-CP was the most important. 
The Stuart Machine arose out of the conditions of class 
struggle in Cape Town in the mid 1920's. It was able to control 
the unions spawned by the industrial legislation precisely because 
they were spawned by the industrial legislation and were not the 
product of working class struggles in Cape Town. 28 From the start 
few unions had any base amongst organized workers. The employers 
encouraged their workers to join unions after reaching an under­
standing with Stuart this his unions would be more reasonable 
than the Wage Board in wage negotiations. The industrial legisla­
tion provided the framework for this collusion. It gave Stuart 
the firm foothold for "trade unionism" which he had sought for 
since 1912 without success. The unions were destined to have 
a significant effect on the class struggle in Cape Town but they, 
in turn, were shaped by the existing (and changing) local condi­
tions of class struggle. 
These points are illustrated by an enquiry into the undemocratic 
character of Stuart's unions. The Stuart Machine's intolerance 
of worker opinion and its increasingly dictatorial nature were 
a product both of its short-sightedness and the backwardness of 
Cape Town industry. The Stuart Machine was greatly influenced 
by the earlier history of the CFLU. Most of the CFLU unions were 
craft unions. Stuart himself was a stone mason and his experience 
of trade unionism was of craft unionism. These craft unions were 
small, financially insecure and based on a small percentage of 
the workforce. They bargained with employers on the basis of 
the scarce skills of their members. They made use of the strike 
weapon only rarely and often more in desperation than in confidence 
of a victory. Strikes could be effective if only a few workers 
came out because of their skill and key positions in the labour 
process. This contrasts with the position of unskilled workers 
in industrial unions. Such workers had to rely for their power 
on strong organization and the ability this gave them to withhold 
28. See Chapter Two, above. 
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their labour and to prevent other workers from scabbing. 
29Chapter four suggested that the CFLU never really made 
the transition from the craft for-m of unionism to industrial union­
ism. Instead it applied the methods of craft unionism to the 
industrial unions they formed. It attempted always to solve dis­
putes by negotiation without having any regard for the unity or 
extent of organization of the workers. In the case of a craft 
union, unity was easier to achieve since there were relatively 
few workers and their skills gave them an additional power. An 
industrial union draws its strength only from the unity of its 
members. An industrial union, such as a garment workers' union, 
could only be successful in a challenge to the employers if it 
was strongly organized. The CFLU was never confronted with a 
need to adopt the strategies appropriate to industrial unionism. 
It saw no need to abandon the time-proven behaviour characteristic 
of craft unions. 
There were three reasons for the prevalence of this attitude. 
The basic reason relates to the backwardness of Cape industry 
in general. Most industry was small and competitive. It was 
oriented to consumer industries (such as food and clothing) and 
branches of industry that serviced existing enterprises and the 
transport sector. There was no significant process of deskilling 
in Cape Town industry, no great transition from manufacture to 
machinofacture. Craft unionists in Cape Town did not experience 
the challenge from semi-skilled operatives that broadened trade 
unionism in the industrialized countries from the last quarter 
of the nineteenth century. There never was a need to extend trade 
union membership to the less-skilled workers in Cape Town. 
Secondly, the backwardness of industry and competitive vulnera­
bility of the few factories that did exist ensured an original 
weakness in the structural position of the working class in Cape 
Town. There was no tradition of organization among workers that 
would enable them to question the mode of operation of the CFLU., 
The garment workers were the only substantial group of less skilled 
workers to be organized. Their unionization did not (as in the 
Transvaal) grow out of the threat of factory clothing production 
29. See p. 193. above. 
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to organized tailors but out of the desire of factory owners to 
avoid the Wage Board. 
Thirdly, the CFLU did not need to fashion strong industrial 
organization to confront the employers. The employers were happy 
to recognize unions. From the start they assisted unions to re­
cruit members and they made stop order facilities available to 
collect subscriptions. This attitude led to the creation of unions 
that were formally industrial unions but were not organized as 
such. 
The characteristics of craft unionism were naturally distorted 
in their extension to industrial unions. The constitutions of 
Stuart's unions were, to begin with, supremely democratic. They 
clearly show their origins in craft unionism. All important mat­
ters had to be decided at a general meeting of members. Until 
1936, for example, the GWU-CP constitution required such general 
meetings every month and allowed only 20 members to demand a 
special general meeting to discuss and decide on any issue. This 
system was totally unwieldy once more than 200 or so workers be­
longed to a union. The CFLU did not change constitutions, they 
merely ignored them. The Stuart Machine ran the unions. Because 
of the lack of real organizational structures in the unions, the 
Machine found it impossible to cope with any worker assertiveness. 
It responded by trying to kill it. The Stuart Machine operated 
as if it alone could secure benefits for the workers. The function 
of workers was to sign their stop orders and praise their negotia­
tors. It is not surprising that Stuart so often found workers 
ungrateful for his exertions. When the Stuart Machine was attacked 
as sell-outs or as undemocratic it responded with invective on 
the one hand and victimization on the other. It became still 
more dictatorial through the 1930's in response to the real orga­
nization of workers in unions set up by the Cape Districts' Commit­
tee of the TLC. Once this alternative style of trade unionism 
spread in Cape Town, the days of the Stuart Machine as the con­
troller of the CFLU were numbered. Even so it was not rooted 
out completely. It lived on in the Western Province and District 
Council of Trade Unions and in the GWU-CP. 
The mainstay of the Stuart Machine was its alliance with 
the Cape manufacturers. This alliance between the CFLU and the 
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CCI was the basis for the first real growth of the trade union 
movement in Cape Town. The CFLU had no need to adopt a form of 
unionism suited to confront the factory owners. An (unwritten) 
guarantee of non-confrontation was the reason for the new existence 
of the CFLU after 1925. Stuart effectively agreed to collaborate 
with the bosses in forming trade unions in order to resist attempts 
to raise wages in the Cape. 
The pressure to raise wages came from the state, not, in 
the first instance, from the Cape Town working class. The Pact 
government was concerned that low wages in industry were a cause 
of the 'poor white problem'. Cape Town was a low wage area com­
pared with the Transvaal on account of the backwardness of its 
industry and the organizational weakness of its working class. 
Its industry was bound to be affected by the new government policy. 
The CFLU shared the belief of the CCI that if wages in the Cape 
were raised, local factories would become uncompetitive. Work 
would go to the Transvaal where wages were already higher. Cape 
workers would lose their jobs, Cape manufacturers would be faced 
with extinction. The CFLU combined with the bosses to keep wages 
low and to keep jobs in Cape Town. As individuals CFLU officials 
gained an enormous amount from the alliance. For the first time 
they led financially viable trade unions and had regularly paying, 
high status employment as secretaries and union officials. 
Both the means of colluding and of avoiding the Wage Board 
were provided in the Industrial Conciliation Act. Unions were 
created, stop orders signed and agreements hastily negotiated. 
In the garment industry, the first attempt to avoid the Wage Board 
failed. This was not due to a failure of the alliance to find 
common ground. The alliance held firm even after garment workers 
rejected its ploys to keep their wages low. After the close col­
laboration between Stuart and the CWCMA between 1925 and 1928, 
it was natural for them to seek one another's aid in defeating 
the Transvaal's organizing efforts in 1930-1 and 1934-8. Stuart 
and Evans saw their chance of using the manufacturers' fear of 
Sachs to lever them into an industrial council agreement. As 
Stuart's hold over older CFLU unions weakened he saw a tempting 
prize in a new union of garment workers. This was the fastest 
growing industry in Cape Town and was shortly to become the largest 
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employer of labour. The alliance between the CFLU and the CWCMA 
ensured that this would be a trade union of industrial workers 
which used the methods of craft unionism but would neither be 
united to protect the workers' interests nor combined to injure 
. 30
those of the bosses. 
The manufacturers in the CCI entered the alliance with the 
CFLU as proper profit-maximizing capitalists intent on resisting 
all outside interference in their industries. They united and 
entered the alliance to defend and advance their class interests. 
An argument of this thesis, drawing on detailed accounts of the 
relationship between the CFLU and employers in the garment indus­
try, has been that Stuart and his associates embraced the alliance 
to defend and advance their personal interests. 
These statements are not to be taken as indicating a conspir­
acy theory of class struggle in Cape Town. The alliance was, 
in its composition and functioning, filled with contradictions. 
The actions of Stuart and his associates arose out of particular 
conditions of class struggle in Cape Town and out of particular 
beliefs about trade unionism, about racial discrimination and 
about Cape Town. Once formed, the alliance acquired a dynamic 
all of its own. The clothing manufacturers were as surprised 
in 1939 to find themselves bound into a yearly fuss of wage nego­
tiations as Stuart was to hear himself vilified at trade union 
meetings as a bosses' sellout. One cannot doubt the sincerity 
of his belief that he spent his life fighting for the bottom dog. 
On·e can understand the respect in which his name is still held 
amongst his colleagues in the GWU-CP. But Robert Stuart can never 
be held up as an exemplary workers' leader. 
The garment industry provides both the best example of the 
Stuart Machine and the boss-union alliance and the most extreme 
suggestion of ' its content. and importance. Future researchers 
on Cape Town labour history before World War II may well find 
it necessary to contest the claims made in this thesis about the 
importance of Robert Stuart and W.J. Laite; of the CFLU and the 
CCI in the class struggle in Cape Town. But there can be no doubt 
of their centrality in the history of the Cape garment workers. 
30. 	 "United to protect, but not combined to injure" was a common 
motto of early craft unions in England (Musson, 1972, p.54). 
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This thesis has placed stress on the differences, at many levels, 
between the class struggle in Cape Town and in the rest of South 
Africa. It has placed emphasis on how local history can only 
be understood in the context of local conditions of class struggle. 
This approach has been useful, particularly in the analysis of 
the operation of the industrial laws of the 1920's; for the mechan­
ism of the laws is most clearly seen in a regional study and in 
regional comparisons. An emphasis on the local dynamic of class 
struggle is also necessary to the interpretation of the forms 
taken by organization and conflict in Cape Town. But the history 
of class struggle in South Africa cannot only be a series of regional 
histories. 
The history of the Cape garment workers is tightly interwoven 
with that of garment workers in the Transvaal. The level of organi­
zation of garment workers in Cape Town, the success or failure 
of their struggles for higher wages, ultimately set limits on 
what was achievable by workers in the Transvaal. The lack of 
a nationally organized and united garment workers' union was an 
important factor which undermined garment worker organization 
and wages on the Witwatersrand in the 1950's. The campaigns of 
the Transvaal union in Cape Town were responsible for awakening 
the Cape Garment Workers' Union and for stimulating the alliance 
between the manufacturers' association and the Union officials. 
In other industries too, conditions in the Cape Town 'periphery' 
influenced struggles in the Transvaal 'centre' - this fact underlay 
the concerted and lengthy attempts to incorporate the Cape trade 
union movement with that of the north. But class struggles in 
all regions are linked at least by the relationship all have to 
the South African state. 
This raises the problem of how to conceptualise 'the class 
struggle' in South Africa when forms of organization are, and 
always have been, predominantly regional. In general, this problem 
is downplayed by the cartographers of class struggle in South 
Africa. National capital, national bourgeoisie, agricultural 
capital, merchant capital and manufacturing capital are uncompro­
misingly 'non-regional' concepts. Their use creates an (often 
misleading) impression of national applicability. Yet much of 
the analysis that uses these concepts has a strong regional bias ­
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
374 

to the Witwatersrand. For 'mining capital' is a regional con­
cept - if by default. The flaw in this analysis is not that it 
is regional but rather that assertions about the path of national 
class struggle are drawn too easily from regional struggles. 
There needs to be a greater consciousness of interlinkages between 
essentially regional struggles, rather than a promotion only of 
the 'main' battlefields of class struggle. 
The forging of effective national unity in political and 
economic struggle has always been seen as an essential requirement 
for change in South Africa. An organized national unity in action 
is exceptionally hard to achieve between regions having different 
forms of organization and subject to locally distinct rhythms 
of class struggle. An historical understanding of regional organi­
zation and struggles lays bare the differences between regions. 
Unity is not a South Africa tradition. It cannot be conjured 
into existence. It has to be planned and slowly constructed. 
Local history studies will not solve the problem, but they can 
open a constructive debate to identify the strongest bases for 
nation-wide co-operation and unity today. 
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Appendix A: 	 Wage disparities between the Cape Town and Witwaters­
rand clothing industries 1925-1939 
The difference in wages between the clothing industries in Cape 
Town and the Transvaal was the proximate cause of thirty years 
of conflict between the Garment Workers' Union of the Cape Penin­
sula and the Transvaal-based Garment Workers' Union of South 
Africa. This Appendix analyses the extent and effects of the 
wage gap from 1925 up to the end of the period covered by the 
thesis and evaluates the reasons raised at the time to explain 
the wage disparity. 
CONTENTS 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Estimating the extent of the wage 
The effects of the wage different
Reasons for the differential. 
Discussion. 
Blame it on the Board ~ a comment 
differential. 
ial. 
on Barker (1962). 
Estimating the extent of the wage differential 
••• for more than a decade wages (in the clothing indus­
try) on the Rand have been some 20 per cent higher than 
at the coast. 
- Wage Board 	Report, 1938 
This generalization is useful as an indication of the continuity 
and considerable extent of the wage differential between the Cape 
and Witwatersrand clothing industries. However it is impossible 
adequately to trace the true extent of the differential over the 
period 1925 to 1939. This is largely because of a lack of reliable 
or sufficiently detailed statistics but also because the structure 
of the industries in the two centres was not identical. The clas­
sification of jobs and learnership periods differed. Work that 
was done by higher paid workers in one centre might be done by 
lower paid workers in another. This was the case, for example, 
with pressing. This heavy work was done by men in all clothing 
factories, but the men in the Transvaal factories were all Africans, 
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whose wages, except between 1934 and 1936, were substantially 
1below those paid in the Cape. 
Average wages, for all workers engaged in the production 
of clothing in factories, were calculated by the Wage Board from 
2time to time. These statistics all indicated that average wages 
in the Transvaal were greater than those in the Cape. They cannot, 
however, even as averages, be taken as accurate figures because 
they were calculated only from returns submitted to the Wage Board 
and not from a systematic census of the whole industry. In addi­
tion it is possible that manufacturers gave incorrect information 
so as not to raise suspicions that they were not complying with 
the wage determinations or agreements. 
Table A.l: Average Wages of Cape and Transvaal Clothing Workers3 
Year Cape Town Witwatersrand Wage Gap Index 
(Cape = 100) 
1929a ;': £1.12. 8 £1.14.10 107 
1931 a;': £1.13 . 2 £1.17.8 114 
1936a* £1.13.11 £1 .19. 5 116 
b··· ...1938 .... £85,3 £100,6 118 
;': Weekly Earnings 
** Annual Earnings 
1. 	 The wages of African men in the Transvaal clothing industry 
were not regulated by industrial council agreements until 
the 1950's. No minimum wage was in force until 1932 when 
Wage Determination No.42, which ruled in Cape Town as well, 
was made applicable to African men (non-"employees" under 
the definition in the Industrial Conciliation Act) in the 
Transvaal clothing industry. Cape wages rose above the 
level set in Determination No.42 in 1936. The minimum basic 
wage of African male workers in the Transvaal was not raised 
until 1944 when a new wage determination (No.120) was made 
for this specific purpose. 
2. 	 The Industrial Census reports do not distinguish between 
wholesale factory production of clothing and retail bespoke 
tailoring. Class VI in the Census reports also includes 
laundries and dry cleaners. 
3. 	 Sources: a) Tables 6.3 and 6.4, above. 
b) Report 303 of the Board of Trade and Industries (1947). 
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A more continuous picture of the wage differential is obtained 
by tracing the minimum wages prescribed for female machinists 
in the two areas. In the period before 1939, these workers made 
up over half of the workforce in both Cape Town and on the Witwaters­
4
rand. The graph and table below are presented as an indicator 
of changes in the size of the wage differential and of its extent 
but they are not totally adequate for this task. They reflect 
the minimum wages of qualified female machinists. The wage struc­
ture in the clothing industry allowed for a long learnership period 
for all workers. The ratio of learners to qualified workers set 
in the agreements or determinations was not the same in the Cape 
and Transvaal. There are strong indications5 that it was common 
practice in the Cape to dismiss workers before they were entitled 
to the qualified wage and to replace them with beginners. The 
ratio provisions were constantly ignored. Many employers were 
able to pay wages below those set by law because of a lack of 
efficient enforcement. (Enforcement in the Transvaal was better 
than in Cape Town, but remained unsatisfactory until about 1936.) 
The effects of the wage differential 
The 'unfair' competition of the coastal towns with the 
Rand because of their lower wage structure, has been 
a source of perennial complaint by Transvaal (clothing) 
manufacturers since 1926. 
- Wage Board Report, 1956 (cited in Barker, 1962, p.395) 
The wage disparity between the Cape and Transvaal clothing indus­
tries had enormous effects in Cape Town. The wage disparity attract­
ed the attention of the Wage Board in 1926. It was the main reason 
4. 	 In March 1936, 61,4% of Transvaal garment workers were machin­
ists compared with 59,3% in Cape Town. 95% of these machinists 
were women. (Wage Board Report, 21 February 1938 - Tables II 
and IV.) In the Transvaal the minimum wage set for qualified 
women machinists was £2.10.0 a week while the average wage for 
machinists was £1.19.2. In Cape Town, the figures were £2 
(minimum) and £1.12.1 (average). The Transvaal average wage 
was thus 22% above the Cape average wage and the Transvaal mini­
mum qualified wage 25% above that of the Cape. The difference 
in minimum qualified wages appears to be a reasonable indicator 
of the difference in the average wages paid to qualified female 
machinists in the Cape and Transvaal. 
5. 	 See Chapter 4, above. 
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Table A.2: 	 Changes in the minimum starting and qualified wages 
of female machinists 1925-1939 (shillings) 
Govt. Date Regu lat ion 
WITWATERSRA~D CAPE TOWN 
WageLearner- Starting Qual ified Learner- Starting Qual i fied 
Notice 
Number 
ship 
period Wage Wage 
ship 
period Wage Wage 
Gap 
Index 
(months) (months) (Cape=100) 
1514 11 Sep 1925 Agreement 30 20/­ 50/­
2186 3 Dec 1926 Wage Det. 2 36 10/­ 35/­ 142 
939 8 Jun 1928 Wage Det. 15 36 15/­ 37/6 133 
- Jun 1929 Wage Det. 15 36 15/­ 40/­ 125 
1362 14 Oct 1932 Arb i trat ion 30 18/­ 45/­ 113 
174 16 Feb 1934 Agreement 30 19/­ 47/6 119 
528 18 Apr 1935 Agreement 36 ~O/- 50/­ 125 
457 3 Har 1936 Agreement 36 18/­ 45/­ 111 
787 21 Hay 1937 Agreement 36 20/­ 55/­ 122 
Graph A.l: Minimum qualified wages of female machinists 1925-1939 
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behind the efforts of the Wage Board to increase coastal wages. 
It was also the reason for the campaigns of worker organization 
in Cape Town directed and sponsored by the Transvaal garment wor­
kers' union. 
Conversely, the low wage competition from the Cape also affect­
ed the Transvaal clothing industry. The low coastal wages threaten­
ed the efforts of workers and factory owners to establish "good 
conditions of employment" on the Witwatersrand. 6 This is illustra­
ted most starkly in the period 1931 to 1932. The loss of govern~ 
ment contracts to Cape Town prompted the Transvaal employers to 
take desperate steps to cut wages. There were two general strikes 
in the industry before workers' wages in the Transvaal were cut 
by 10 per cent. The arbitrator in the dispute accepted the argu­
ment that the Transvaal factories were being undercut by competi­
tion from the coast because of the low levels of coastal wages. 
One can acknowledge the crucial role the wage differential 
had in shaping worker and employer organization and on stimulating 
changes in wage determinations and industrial agreements while 
still questioning the real effects of the wage differential on 
the location and growth of the industry. For although in general 
minimum and average wage levels were higher on the Witwatersrand, 
the industry there had a much faster pace of growth than that 
on the coast. As the Wage Board commented in 1938, while explain­
ing its refusal to set a uniform wage scale for the whole country 
based on the Transvaal standards: 
••• for more than a decade wages on the Rand have been 
some 20 per cent higher than at the coast and during 
that period the industry has prospered and expanded 
7to a greater extent than have its coastal competitors.
The number of workers in the Transvaal industry increased by 232% 
over the period 1929 to 1938 while in Cape Town employment increased 
by 186%.8 
But, a comparison of the growth of the Cape and Transvaal 
clothing industries over the period 1925 to 1938, hides an important 
6. Wage Board Report, 25 September 1927, paragraph 11. 
7. Wage Board Report, 21 February 1938. 
8. Calculated from Tables 6.3 and 6.4, above. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
380 

feature of the Transvaal's spectacular growth. This growth was 
most rapid after the Great Depression and the 1932 cut in wages. 
In the preceding four years the Transvaal lost contracts to Cape 
factories. Between 1929 and 1931 the Cape Town clothing industry 
outpaced that of the Transvaal in employment growth. The number 
of workers in Cape Town was 32 per cent greater in 1931 than in 
1929 while for the Witwatersrand the figure was 13 per cent. In 
the period after the depression, employment growth in the Trans­
vaal leapt ahead to be 135 per cent greater in 1936 than in 1931, 
as compared to 59 per cent in the case of Cape Town. 9 
In view of the enormous expansion of the Transvaal clothing 
industry after the depression and the fact that it surpassed the 
rate of growth in employment in the Cape Town industry, it is 
hard to sustain the perennial complaints of Transvaal manufacturers 
that they were in reality confronted with 'unfair' competition 
from the Cape after 1932 or 1933. Unfair competition, it must 
be noted, was partly removed by the successful efforts of the 
Transvaal garment workers' union to stimulate a rise in the wage 
level in Cape Town. But even if the 'unfair' element of Cape 
competition did disappear or was rendered irrelevant in the late 
1930's, the existence of lower wage levels in the Cape presented 
an obvious potential threat to the future prosperity of the Trans­
vaal industry. There was no wage regulating machinery or market 
force to guarantee that wage costs in the two areas would adjust 
to permit continued growth in both areas in the future. For 
twenty years after 1936, the fears of the Transvaal manufacturers 
and worker leaders that the lower wage levels in the Cape would 
decisively undermine the wage standards and expansion of clothing 
industry in the Transvaal proved groundless. These fears, however, 
had most important effects. They motivated a constant and, at 
times, obsessive effort of the Transvaal union to form a single 
nation-wide union of garment workers to fight for wage-uniformity 
based on the standards of the Transvaal. The fears of low-wage 
competition inspired numerous joint efforts of the Transvaal union 
and employers' association to form a national co-ordinating body 
9. 	 Between 1936 and 1938 the Transvaal industry showed a growth 
in employment of 24% compared with 20% for Cape Town. All 
percentages were calculated from Tables 6.3 and 6.4, above. 
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for the industry. Finally, in the mid-1950's, the fears were 
realised. The Transvaal industry began to shrink as firms went 
bankrupt or relocated in low-wage areas. The Transvaal union 
launched its last and most desperate campaign in Cape Town to 
organize Cape workers to demand parity with Transvaal wages. 
The campaign lasted for two years but failed utterly. In 1956 
wage levels in the Transvaal industry were cut drastically. New 
entrants to the industry, now mainly black women, received wages 
as low as those on the coast. Within five years the wage disparity 
between the Cape and Transvaal was all but eliminated. The dis­
appearance of the wage gap removed the cause of a thirty-year 
long, bitter conflict between the two largest garm~nt workers' 
unions in the country. 
3 Reasons for the differential 
Several reasons or justifications for the persistence of the wage 
disparity between the inland and coastal sections of the clothing 
industry were current in the period under discussion. These were 
of three basic types, none of which excludes the others. The 
first asserts that the Cape and Transvaal clothing factories pro­
duced for different parts of the market for clothing. They did 
not compete directly with one another and thus low wages in Cape 
Town did not interfere directly with the profitability of industry 
in the Transvaal or with the existence of higher wage levels. 
The second relates the wage disparity to the distance of Cape 
Town from the main markets of South Africa and the additional costs 
of transporting finished goods to their place of final sale. The 
third type of reason seeks an explanation for the wage disparity 
in differences in the labour markets between Cape Town and the 
Witwatersrand. 
3.1 Production for different parts of the market 
This explanation is unquestionably relevant to the shirt and 
pyjama branch of the clothing industry. Shirt and pyjama produc­
tion was only undertaken on any scale after 1925. Wages in this 
branch of the industry in Britain were specially low and local 
manufacturers could only compete once shirting was imported free 
of duty. It was formerly subject to the same customs duty as 
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10
made-up garments. The shirt and pyjama industry was concentrated 
in Cape Town. In 1935 the shirt industry in Johannesburg was 
described as "exceptionally small as compared with the Cape".ll 
In the same year the Transvaal Clothing Manufacturers' Association 
told the Customs Tariff Commission that, 
The disparity in wages is so great that it does not 
give us a chance to establish a shirt factory, so all 

12
that 	business goes. to the coast. 
The industry in Cape Town was forced to keep wages low by overseas 
competition, specially from the United States and Britain. 13 
The Cape shirt and pyjama manufacturers constantly stated that 
wages paid in the shirt industry in Britain were lower than in 
14South Africa. 
In the mid-1930's, when the Wage Board, encouraged by the 
clothing industry in the Transvaa~ indicated an intention of again 
raising wages in its determination for Cape Town, the shirt manu­
facturers decided to split away from the clothing industry and 
h Od 	 15 Tho ld0 0app y 1 f or t e1r own separate wage eterm1nat1on. 1S wou 
have lower wages and workers who had experience in other clothing 
factories would start at beginners' wages if they moved to shirt 
factories. 16 At a meeting of the CWCMA in 1935, Edgar Jacobs 
said that the wage structure and the regulations in the wage deter­
mination were framed on conditions in the ready-made clothing 
industry. 
[He] stated that shirt manufacturers' conditions were 
not the same as in the Clothing Industry. The competi­
tion to be met by the Clothing Industry was from the 
10. 	 Board of Trade and Industries Report 28b - The Duty on Shirt­
ing (Annexure 537 - 1925). 
11. 	 CWCMA Minutes: 26 March 1935 (Shirt Section) - M2/1. 
12. 	 Customs Tariff Commission: Minutes of Evidence, p.707. 
13. 	 CWCMA Minutes: 23 September 1937; 4 November 1938 - M2/1. 
14. 	 Customs Tariff Commission: Minutes of Evidence, pp.3494, 3497; 
CWCMA Minutes: 4 November 1938. 
15. 	 Some clothing factories produced shirts too, but the bulk of 
production came from specialized shirt factories such as the 
Monatic factory of Edgar Jacobs. 
16. 	 CWCMA Minutes: 9 April 1935 - M2/1. 
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Rand, whereas the fiercest competition in shirts came 
from overseas where there were not such restrictive 
wage rates nor ratios. In order to meet this competi­
tion the Shirt Industry had to have either greater pro­
17tection or a wage rate that would enable it to compete. 
Because the main pressure for wage increases in the Cape came 
from the Transvaal, the shirt manufacturers hoped that by distin­
guishing their branch of the industry as not competitive with 
the Transvaal, they might be able to avoid wage increases. The 
minutes of a "Shirt Section" meeting recorded: 
At present the Cape shirt manufacturing industry stood 
in danger of being subjected to excessive wage rates 
which had been framed with the prupose of combating 
sweating and other abuses of labour prevailing in the 
18Ready Made Clothing Industry. 
At this time the protective tariff for shirt manufacturers was 
slightly lower than for other clothing. 19 Shirt factories then 
employed about 2 900 out of some 4 700 workers in the Cape cloth­
. . d 20l.ng ln ustry. 
In other branches of clothing production there was competition 
between the Cape and the Transvaal but its intensity varied and 
it was not always direct, the Cape Town factories tending to produce 
higher quality goods. Competition was most intense during the 
1920's and the depression over the award of government contracts. 
In 1926-7, despite its higher wage standards, the Transvaal 
21
secured 89 per cent of government tendered contracts. "Most 
of this work," the Wage Board commented, "had previously been 
done in the Cape." The Board said this indicated the relative 
inefficiency of the Cape clothing industry. 22 But three years 
17. CWCMA Minutes: 15 April 1935 - M2/1. 
18. CWCMA Minutes: 26 March 1935 (Shirt Section) - M2/1. 
19. CWCMA Minutes: 9 April 1935 - M2/1. 
20. CWCMA Minutes: 15 April 1935 - M2/1. 
21. Wage Board Report, 25 September 1927, paragraph 39. 
22. Ibid. 
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later the trade union in the Transvaal complained that government 
contracts were being lost to the Cape. The union maintained, 
••• that the work was lost to Johannesburg and Pretoria 
firms because of undercutting by the Cape. 23 
By 1931 the Cape secured 25 government contracts, compared with 
the Transvaal's eleven and three awarded elsewhere. 24 This led 
to a crisis in the Transvaal clothing industry. The employers 
put pressure on the union to agree to a cut in wages. One inform­
ant stated that Solly Sachs' encouragement of the strike at Afri­
can Clothing in 1931 was an effort to sow discord in the Cape 
clothing industry and so sabotage the fulfilment of contracts 
given to Cape factories. 25 This effort (if it was so directed) 
failed competely. The garment workers' union in the Tr.ansvaal 
was drawn into an intense battle with the employers that culminated 
in the defeat of the union and a ten per cent cut in wages. 
Apart from government contract work (which assumed a special 
importance during the depression when much other production ceased), 
direct competitive clashes between the Cape Town and Witwatersrand 
clothing industries are not obvious. A substantial proportion 
of the output of Cape clothing factories went to supply country 
stores with "better class" clothing including wholesale bespoke 
suits. A CWCMA meeting noted that because of the variety of orders 
manufacturers had to fulfil when catering to "the higher class 
of customer (including merchants)" they needed to keep a large 
stock and range of high class material. 26 Transvaal firms, on 
the other hand, "catered for standard lines and were in the majority 
of cases interested in mass production" for the "tremendous market 
at their door". 27 In addition to the costs of keeping large stocks 
of expensive material, Cape manufacturers had to spend more than 
their counterparts in the Transvaal in promoting their wares. 
A 1931 Wage Board report recorded that Cape firms spent 7,6 per 
cent of their turnover on the salaries, commissions and expenses 
23. CaQe Times 20 December 1929. 
24. Wage Board Report, 23 October 1931. 
25. Interview with David Lunn. 
26. CWCMA Minutes: 12 October 1931 - M2/1. 
27. Ibid. 
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of travelling salesmen as compared with the 3,9 per cent of Trans­
· 28vaaI 	 f lrms. 
After the depression the Transvaal industry expanded its 
range of output. The TCMA told the Customs Tariff Commission 
in 1935 that until a few years previously they were making clothes 
"for natives and for native mine-workers" and were not making 
the "better class" of clothing. - But since then they had begun 
to produce mens' outer garments (but not shirts or pyjamas) that 
were "on the level ll with the best goods produced in South Africa. 29 
By the late 1930's, about two thirds of South African-manufactured 
ready-made suits and outer garments were produced on the tVitwaters­
30
rand. Transvaal manufacturers competed successfully on the 
local market in Cape Town. 31 One member of the CWCMA, 
••• was of the opinion that the Transvaal manufacturers 
'got away with' anything they made. It was a known 
fact that they did not pay the same careful attention 
to detail in the production of articles as was done at 
32the Cape. 
It is ironical that in the clothing industry the workers producing 
the lower class goods should get paid the higher wages. Cape 
manufacturers maintained that the Transvaal could pay higher wages 
because they got a higher "output per worker".33 This was made 
possible by there being no need to pay careful attention to detail 
in producing lower class goods. This argument is not necessarily 
valid. It is not clear whether the greater "output per worker" 
was related to volume or value. The Transvaal may have produced 
a greater number of garments per worker each day than the Cape, 
but the value added per worker was not therefore greater. The 
fact of a greater output per worker in .this sense cannot alone 
explain higher wages. The contention that the amount of value 
added by each worker every day was greater in the Transvaal might 
be inferred from a remark made at a CWCMA meeting which discussed 
28. 	 Wage Board Report, 23 October 1931 paragraph 4. 
29. 	 Customs Tariff Commission: Minutes of Evidence p.707. 
30. 	 Wage Board Report, 21 February 1938 p.39. 
31. 	 CWCMA Minutes: 23 September 1937. 
32. 	 Ibid. 
33. 	 Ibid. 
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the allegations that Cape manufacturers were employing sweated 
labour to undercut Transvaal manufacturers. 
Mr.Roytowski gave instances of 'efficiency drives' 

which he had witnessed in Transvaal factories where 

supervisors kept the girls working at top speed all 

day long and where an employee was discharged on the 

I " h "d" " f 1 34s 19 	test 1n 1cat1on 0 s owness. 
This statement might be the basis for an argument that the intensity 
of labour in the Transvaal was greater than in the Cape, that 
the rationalization of the labour process was more advanced and/or 
that the level of mechanization was greater. If anyone of these 
conditions held it might explain how the Transvaal could sustain 
its higher level of wages. It is extremely difficult to test 
this argument. Neither in Cape Town nor in Johannesburg was there 
a standard labour process or common level of mechanization. It 
is a characteristic of the clothing industry that advanced and 
backward methods of production can exist side by side and that 
"slave-driving" and "sweating" are common to tioth. 35 Comparison 
is further complicated by the fact that the output of the clothing 
factories was directed at different parts of the market and the 
labour process involved in the production of better class goods 
was different from that involved in producing longer runs of simple, 
lower class clothing. All the evidence surveyed for this thesis 
suggests that the "better" Cape manufacturers used the most effi­
cient and modern methods available for the type of production 
they were engaged in. 36 Joanna Cornelius would have contradicted 
Roytowski's remark above. In 1936 she worked in his factory. 
Later she wrote: 
The speeding-up at the African Clothing Manufacturers 

was much greater than in Johannesburg. One could not 

say a word there. The foreman was constantly watching 

the workers and I saw on many occasions workers being 

34. 	 CWCMA Minutes: 30 January 1935 - M2/1. 
35. 	 See. for example. Garment Workers' Union: Memorandum submitted 
to the Industrial Legislation Commission, September 1934, pp.19-20. 
36. 	 See Chapter 4, p.211. 
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offensively abused, slapped in the face and chased out 
" . 1 37of work f or t he most trlvla matters. 
In summary, 1) Low wages in Cape Town shirt factories did not 
adversely affect the Transvaal clothing industry as very few shirts 
were produced in the Transvaal. 2) The wage disparity in other 
branches of clothing manufacture did affect the Transvaal. Under­
cutting by the Cape deprived the Transvaal of government contracts 
and occasioned the need for wage reductions in the Transvaal during 
the depression. 3) The effects of the wage disparity were lessened 
to an extent by the Cape Town and Witwatersrand factories producing 
different classes of clothing for different parts of the market. 
This regional specialization became less marked after the depression. 
Its precise effects and its extent are difficult to estimate. 
3.2 Locational disadvantages of Cape Town 
A constantly expressed justification for the difference in wage 
rates between Transvaal and Cape Town clothing factories was that 
Cape manufacturers had to absorb heavy railage dues in order to 
t e on the Rand - t e . or c h" Tcompe h maln mar ket f 1ot lng. 38 ransvaa1 
manufacturers had to pay for the transport of raw materials from 
the coast but the railage on raw materials was lower than for 
finished goods. Also, 
••• there was the fact that railage dues from Durban 

to Johannesburg were very much less than those from 

Capetown to Johannesburg, while the extra freightage 

I ' 'bl 39b t e ween Cape Town and Durban was neg 19l e. 
Edgar Jacobs stated that, 
••• their main argument as to why the Cape was entitled 
to pay lower wages than the Transvaal was that the local 
manufacturers were situated a considerable distance away 
from the principle market of the Union. In his opinion 
it was therefore a reasonable claim that the Cape wages 
37. Statement of Joanna Cornelius n.d. (GWUSA Archives). 
38. CWCMA Minutes: 30 January 1935 - M2/1. 
39. C\vCMA Minutes: 26 March 1935 - M2/1. 
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should be at least 10% lower than those in operation 
in the North. 40 
In 1938 the CWCMA drafted a list of, 
••• reasons why it was considered fair and reasonable 
for the Cape to pay females 45/- per week as against 
55/- per week in the Tansvaal. 41 
The first point in this list was that, 
The Cape was situated about 1,000 miles away from the 
main market of the Union, and at least 50% of the goods 
manufactured in the Cape had to be sold on that market. 
The Cape manufacturers were at a decided disadvantage 
as their competitors' factories were situated right 
next door, as it were, to such a market. Such competi­
tors could give much quicker delivery.42 
A proper evaluation of the argument that the Cape deserved a 
10 or 20 per cent advantage in wage rates to compensate it for 
its locational disadvantages would be a mammoth undertaking. 
It would require a study of the distribution of clothing between 
the markets on the Rand and at the coast in the context of railway 
rates before World War II. However, one is inclined to dismiss 
the argument that locational disadvantages can explain a substan­
tial part of the wage differential in the light of Barker's com­
ments on the subject. Barker (1962, pp.ll0-118) discussed at 
length the influence of transport costs on the location of the 
South African clothing industry. He stated that, 
••• distribution transport costs do not constitute a 
very significant proportion of the total cost of cloth­
ing manufacture. 
In support of this he cited a Board of Trade and Industries report 
of 1945 that, 
'in the case of light valuable goods such as ciga­
rettes, shoes or clothing, the costs of movement 
40. CWCMA Minutes: 23 September 1937 - M2/1. 
41. CWCMA Minutes: 4 November 1938 - M2/1. 
42. Ibid. 
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from the centre of production to the centre of con­
sumptlon, may be a1most neg I'19l'ble. 43 

Barker (1962, p.lll) calculated that in 1946/7 the costs of trans­

porting finished garments were 0,55 per cent of sales' value 

for Western Cape factories as compared with 0,20 per cent for 

Transvaal factories. Although all Barker's comments related 

to a period after that investigated here and are not specifically 

directed at explaining the wage differential, they all tend to 

contradict the arguments advanced by the Cape manufacturers. 

Transport costs are unlikely to have been a valid justification 

for the wage differential. 

3.3 Regional labour markets 

Most explanations for the lower wages paid in the Cape garment 

industry amounted to assertions that they were based on conditions 

in the local labour market. Some of these explanations stressed 

differences between the labour markets of Cape Town and the Wit­

watersrand that were specific to the supply of clothing workers. 

Others saw the wage disparity in the clothing industry as just 

one instance of a general disparity in wages over the whole range 

of industry between the Cape and the Transvaal. It is not neces­

sarily useful to separate these two strands of argument, and 

no systematic attempt is made below. But it is necessary to 

see the wage disparity in the clothing industry in the wider 

context of wage differences between all Cape and Transvaal industry. 

A general wage gap between all the coastal towns and the 

Witwatersrand was acknowledged by the Wage Board in 1926. As 

Table A.3 indicates, this had existed for some years previously 

as well. IIIn view of the need for a speedy determination of 

", 	 h'e lndustrles.'1twas t h'en ,,44 t he Bwages ln t lnvestlgatlng, oard 
"decided to accept for the present" that a differentiation between 
the wage rates on the Witwatersrand and the coastal towns was 
, 'f' d 45JUStl le • 
43. 	 Board of Trade and Industries Report 285, 29 December 1946, 

p.20, cited in Barker (1962, p.lll). 

44. 	 Clothing, sweets, biscuits and confectionery. 
45. 	 'General Note on Matters Common to Recommendations in Respect 
of a Number of Industries', Social and Industrial Review (Special 
Edition), September 1926, p.27. 
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A whole book could be written on the conflicts within the 
labour movement between 1925 and 1939 caused by the wage differen­
tial between the Cape and the Transvaal. It was a major reason 
for the Transvaal unions trying to incorporate the CFLU in the 
SATUC and in the SATLC. One example of the problems that emerged 
around the wage question is provided by the furniture industry. 
A national industrial council was formed in the industry in the 
mid-1920's. It did not function well and soon collapsed, partly 
because the national union of furniture workers was unable to 
resolve internal differences and the Cape section of the union 
46
seceded. The reason for dissension was the wage gap in the 
furniture industry between the Cape and the Rand. 47 The branch 
of the union on the Rand wanted to negotiate an end to the wage 
disparity but could not reach agreement with the Cape branch 
on how this might be done. Bill Andrews accused the CFLU of 
co-operating with the employers to break the national industrial 
council and, 
•.• to perpetuate the low wage system so that the Cape 
industry can compete with the North. 48 
Although wage disparities were a feature in many industries, 
in each case they had individual as well as shared causes and 
followed different paths of change and development. 
3.3a The IfWage Sandwich" 
There was not a straightforward wage-gap between manufacturing 
industry in the Cape and the Transvaal. The labour markets in 
the two regions had different structures. The high wages of 
white and skilled workers in Witwatersrand factories were balanced 
against the wages of African unskilled workers which were extremely 
low - below those paid to unskilled workers in Cape Town. As 
Graph A.2 and Table A.3 indicate, the average wages of white 
and coloured workers in Cape Town were 'sandwiched' between much 
higher average wages for whites in the Transvaal and much lower 
average wages for Africans. There were relatively few African 
46. Cape Times 2 November 1929. 
47. Ibid.; Cape Times 25 December 1929. 
48. Cape Times 21 February 1930. 
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Graph A.2: The Witwatersrand-Cape Town IIWage Sandwich", 1917-1938 
(Manufacturing Industry) 
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workers in Cape Town. Their average wage, while below that of 
coloured workers in Cape Town, was above that of African workers 
on the Witwatersrand. Cape Town consistently stands out in the 
industrial censuses as paying higher wages to African workers 
on average than any other industrial area in South Africa. 
A 'wage sandwich' also describes an aspect of the difference 
between the clothing industries of the Witwatersrand and Cape 
Town. Average wages of Cape garment workers fell between the 
higher wages of the white garment workers on the Witwatersrand 
and the low wages of African male pressers in the industry on 
the Witwatersrand. African male workers made up 23 per cent 
of the workforce in the Transvaal clothing factories in the late 
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Table A.3: 	 Average Wage Comparison between the Witwatersrand and 
the Cape Peninsula 
Total Av. 
'EUROPEANS' AFRICANS ~ 'OTHER COLOURED'no. of wage
workers per Average %of % Average %of
Average I

of all year wage Number total Number total wage Number totalwaje
races (£) (£) (£ (£) 
1917/8 
Wi twatersrand 33 462 
 126 
 252 
 40
13 550 
 38 
 61
19 352 
 58 
 380 
 1 

Cape Peninsula 
 22 017 92 
 125 
 8 974 
 41 
 50 
 6
1 317 
 58 
 11 592 
 53 

Union 
 134 211 
 181
91 
 49 918 
 51 870
37 
 33 
 20 110
54
39 
 15 

1921/22 

Witwatersrand 
 147
53 991 
 (45) *322 20 780 
 38 
 (62)(33 211) 
Cape Peninsula 31 472 
 129 
 239 
 11 093 (73)*35 
 (20 379) {65} 
Union 170 951 
 -122 270 
 (48) *59 995 
 35 
 (1l0 956) (65) 
1924/25** 

Southern Transvaal 
 51 695 
 125 
 268 
 19 406 
 44
38 
 60
30 935 
 1 130 
 2
72 

Western Cape 27 625 
 113 
 199 
 9 626 
 3 814 
 14
35 
 53 
 76 
 13 966 
 51 

Union 
 152 747 
 226
107 
 53 450 
 41 
 44
66 503
35 
 71 
 23 427 
 15 

1926/27** 

Southern Transvaal 
 58 600 
 127 
 265 
 22 589 
 44 
 1 140
39 
 34 574 
 87 
 2
59 

Western Cape 31 615 
 120 
 202 
 11 412 
 14
36 
 4 494 
 15 486
57 
 83 
 49 

Union 
 170 412 
 111 
 61 412
227 
 42
36 
 44
74 615 
 78 
 25 083 15 

1932/33 ** 

2
1 266
87
36 153 
 55
235 28 310 
 43 
 43
124
73 420
Southern Transvaal 
43
12 
 13 175
44 
 3 501 
 77
118 
 13 477
30 428 
 53
179
Western Cape 
20 762
40 
 13 

1937/38** 

40 
 73
42 
 66 751
68 981
110 
 203
164 790
Union 
2
112+ 
 2 133
48 
 83 790 59 
 93
258 54 703
141 029 39
Southern Transvaal 
44
21 914
102+ 16
40 
 93
63 
 7 919
19 271
48 518 
 171
Western Cape 
86 
 11
100+ 47 
 33 113
142 447
45
227 
 117 237 
 38
305 454
Union 
f, Bracketed figures are for "Other Races", a total of african, indian and coloured workers. 
** 	 Statistics do not include government undertakings (eg. railway workshops) after 1924/25 ­
they cover "Private Industry" only. 
+ These averages were calculated by 	dividing total employment into total wages. 
Sources: Industrial Census reports: 	 191711918 UG17 - 1920, Tables 12,18 
1921/1922 UG14 - 1924, Tables 12,8,9 
1924/1925 UG41 - 1927, Tables lb,6,11 
1926/1927 UG51 - 1928, Tables lb,ll 
1932/1933 UG31 - 1935, Tables 2,7 
1937/1938 UG21 - 1941, Tables 3,4,10,15 
Note t~Q.t ... e",c(!ft -tov 19'11/'1.'1.) t~e aet:-4il colu~"'s 010 tlot inclu"'e e""flll~~eM.t. 
f l~Vrc.S fov 'I \'IJ. IQ"!J "' .... J ot~e1r p.. Si4t' 'S \. I-Iowevelf -t:~e t-obd colo...... a.!wlljS 
ill\(.lurAes ih cA ,0,.. 	 wblrkev$, 
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1920's, 18% in the early 1930's and between about 9 and 13 per 
cent through the rest of the decade. 49 Their wages were not 
set by the industrial council agreement and were not subject 
to any minimum until 1932 when Wage Determination 42 was made 
applicable in the Transvaal. In 1931 most African pressers were 
paid 30/- a week while factories in the Cape were bound by Wage 
Determination 15 to pay qualified pressers between £3 and £3.15.0 
a week. 50 The Wage Board went so far as to state, 
The higher wages paid to Europeans on the Rand in com­
parison with those paid elsewhere are only made possible 
by the absence of provision for pass bearing natives 
. h 	 51ln t 	 e agreement. 
Transvaal factories were assisted in their adjustment to the 
payment of the minimum wages set in Wage Determination 42 by 
the 10 per cent reduction in the wages of all white workers which 
also took effect in 1932. 
For four years, between 1932 and 1936, the minimum wages 
payable to pressers was the same in Cape Town and on the Witwaters­
rand. After 1936, when the Cape industry began to be regulated 
by an industrial council agreement, Cape pressers' wages again 
exceeded those in the Transvaal. 
The 'wage sandwich' can, at times, contribute to an explanation 
of how the 'high wage Transvaal' was able to compete with the 
'low wage Cape'. However, neither in the clothing industry, nor 
in industry in general were black workers' wages in the Transvaal 
low enough or the proportion of black workers in the Transvaal 
labour force high enough to remove the overall gap in average 
wages between the Cape and the Transvaal. The figures in the 
second column of Table A.3 show that once racially specified dif­
ferentials in each centre were submerged in the calculation of 
an overall average wage, the Cape still undercut the Transvaal. 
The same is true in the clothing industry, as is shown in Table A.l. 
49. 	 See Table 6.4, above. 
50. 	 Wage Board Report, 23 October 1931, paragraph 6. 
51. 	 Ibid. This judgement on the period before 1932 was reported 
in the Wage Board Report of 12 April 1935, paragraph 32. 
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3.3b Attitudes and actions of the Wage Board 

The competition presented by the coastal areas to the Witwaters­

rand and the effect this competition had on the standards of less­

skilled white workers in particular, were central problems which 

the Wage Board attempted to resolve. The Board was only responsible 

for unorganized industries. It noted in 1926 that, 

The rate of wages on the Witwatersrand and in Pretoria 

generally tends to be higher than elsewhere in the 

Union, partly because the employees are, as a rule, 

. d h . h 52better organlze t an ln ot er areas ••• 
In the case of the clothing industry the Board said: 
One principle in the line of policy which we intend 

to pursue, is to see that labour is not exploited in 

one district to keep down the standard in another. 53 

As Chapter 4, above, illustrates, the Board's constant attempt 
from 1926 to 1935 was gradually to raise coastal wages up to 
Transvaal levels. This attempt was set back by the Great Depres­
sion but is clearly expressed again in the 1935 Wage Board report 
and recommendations. The implementation of these recommendations 
was not approved by the Minister o  Labour, who disbanded the 
Board in 1935 and dismissed its long-standing chairman, Advocate 
F.A.W. Lucas. The new Wage Board issued a report on the garment 
industry which justified the existence of "two different sets 
of wages!! on the grounds that the Transvaal industry was prosper­
ing and that, 
•••whatever the cause, analysis of available information 
tends to confirm the assertion that the standard of 
industrial efficiency on the Rand is higher than it 
54is at the Cape. 
52. 	 'General Note •••• ' op.cit. 
53. 	 Wage Board Report, 25 September 1927, paragraph 36. 
54. 	 Wage Board Report, 21 February 1938, paragraph 70. The "avail­
able evidence" was largely a set of figures which showed the 
"average profit on turnover" to be 9,4 per cent on the Rand as 
against 5,4 per cent at the Coast. Lucas' Wage Board looked 
first at the need to improve and equalize workers' conditions. 
The Board of his successor, MacGregor, looked first at the need 
to improve and equalize profits! 
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Subsequently the Wage Board, although it conducted several exten­
sive investigations into the industry over the following twenty 
years, never proposed any new strategy to reduce or remove the 
wage disparity. After 1936 all centres of clothing production 
were ruled by regional industrial councils which in their operation 
responded to regional conditions of labour supply and reinforced 
regional differentiation of wage rates and wage structures. 
3.3c Lower standard of living = lower wage costs = unfair competition 
Their real argument should be that they had the right 

to pay lower wages at the Cape in view of the fact 

that it was a settled principle that the cost of living 

in the coastal areas was cheaper than in the Transvaal. 

- W.J. Laite, at a CWCMA Meeting in 193755 
The contention of the Transvaal clothing manufacturers' and garment 
workers' unions was that wage costs in Cape Town were lower than 
on the Witwatersrand in the period 1925 to 1939 and that Cape 
competition was therefore unfair. Both the employers' and the 
workers' leaders in the Transvaal pleaded with the Wage Board 
and the Minister of Laboyr to intervene to equalize wage costs. 
The Wage Board agreed that the lower wage competition was unfair 
and made efforts to raise coastal wages until it was stopped by 
the government in 1935. The refusal of the state to take decisive 
action in 1930 and in 1935 forced the Transvaal union to undertake 
its campaigns to organize the Cape garment workers. This Appendix 
has argued that at times wage costs were lower in the Cape than 
in the Transvaal but this was not an unchanging state of affairs 
and did not affect all branches of the clothing industry equally. 
The Transvaal's higher wage standards were however constantly 
threatened by the existence of lower wage rates at the coast. 
If the economic climate deteriorated, the Transvaal would be the 
first area to be affected. 
The Transvaal union and employers were certain about the 
reason for the lower wages in the Cape. They asserted that "coloured 
sweated labour,,56 was employed and that wage determinations were 
constantly flouted. The garment workers were too "poorly organized,,57 
55. CWCMA Minutes: 23 September 1937 - M2/1. 
56. CWCMA Minutes: 30 January 1935 - M2/1. 
57. Cape Times 16 December 1929. 
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to resist the forces which pushed them down to a lower standard 
of living. The Transvaal union (as well as the SATLC and the 
Wage Board) realised that the lack of effective clothing worker 
organization was related to a wider lack of militant worker organi­
58
zation in Cape Town generally. 
The Cape union and employers rejected the accusations of 
unfair competition. The CWCMA raised the issues of railway rates, 
higher distribution costs, the low wages of African pressers in 
the Transvaal and the pressure the Cape suffered from overseas 
competition. The Cape manufacturers never seriously advanced 
the argument that the "quality of 1abour,,59 in the Cape was inferior 
to that in the Transvaal and that lower wages therefore did not 
indicate lower wage costs. The Transvaal impression that Cape 
manufacturers relied on coloured sweated labour is false. Cape 
manufacturers employed an increasing proportion of white workers 
60between 1927 and 1935. . At the same time they agreed that coloured 
61
and white labour in Cape Town were equally efficient. (The 
preference for white labour seems to have be n related to a wish 
to be seen to implement the 'civilized labour policy' .62) 
The leaders of the GWU-CP consistently opposed the efforts 
of the Wage Board and the Transvaal union to raise wages in Cape 
Town ostensibly because the effect would be to transfer work from 
Cape Town to the Witwatersrand and garment workers in Cape Town 
would become unemployed. B.W. Poole stated at the CFLU conference 
in 1936 that the latest Transvaal attack on the Cape Union: 
••• was not made to help the Cape workers but to help 
themselves. They wanted to kill the trade in Cape Town 
and take it all to the Reef. 63 
Coloured leaders in Cape Town commonly argued that coloured workers 
58. 	 Some of the reasons for this situation are discussed in Chap­
ter 2, above. 
59. 	 CWCMA Minutes: 23 September 1937 - M2/1. 
60. 	 See Table 6.3, above. 
61. 	 See, for example, CWCMA Minutes: 23 September 1937 - M2/1; 
Leslie (1930, p.54). 
62. 	 See Chapter 4, p.214, above. 
63. 	 Cape Times 14 April 1936. 
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could only retain their employment in competition with whites 
by accepting lower wages and undercutting them. 64 The CFLU and 
the GWU-CP leaders applied the same type of argument to the rela­
tionship of Cape industry to Transvaal industry~ Bill Andrews 
satirized this doctrine. It amounted to saying: 
'Cape Workers! Work for starvation wages and you will 
have plenty of work and your bosses plenty of profit' .65 
But this argument was 'common sense' to a wide range of workers. 66 . 
It was the experience of many coloured workers, not only in the 
clothing industry, that the imposition of higher wages by the Wage 
Board had led to their replacement by whites. 67 The argument 
that raising Cape garment workers' wages up to Transvaal levels 
would displace the Cape industry appeared obvious. As an article 
in The Sun lamented in 1935, 
••• we are at present allowing a white Johannesburg in­
dustry to pursuade them to cut their own throats in 
the garment trade. 68 
This ideology informed the GWU-CP's efforts to hold back wage 
advances. The success of these efforts is itself part of the 
reason for the wage disparity between the Cape and Transvaal. 
The 'ideology of undercutting' strengthened the position of 
those who benefited from Cape 'autonomy' - primarily Bob Stuart 
and his coterie of union administrators. It is doubtful (although 
this is a moot point) that it had any positive effect for worker 
organization, employment or wage standards in Cape Town. The 
ideology was applied to oppose wage increases from 1925 to the 
late 1930's. This thesis has indicated that under the impact 
of the protective tariff and higher, Wage Board-decreed wages, 
the clothing industry continually rationalized its labour processes, 
invested in advanced machinery and discovered 'the economy of 
high wages'. It is likely that if wage increases had been greater, 
64. 	 Marais (1939, p.262); Gool (1945). 
65. 	 Forward 20 September 1935. 
66. 	 See the debates on coloured workers and trade unionism in The 
Sun 1935-1936. 
67. 	 See The Sun 4 October 1935. 
68. 	 The Sun 8 November 1935. 
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the industry would have been forced to discover at an earlier 

date the improvements in the organization and Qechanization of pro­

duction it in fact resorted to only later. 

4 Discussion 

There are strong indications that between the late 1920's and 

the early 1930's wage costs as well as wage levels were less in 

Cape Town than in Johannesburg. This attracted the first factories 

to specialize in shirt manufacture and allowed the Cape to underbid 

the Transvaal for contracts put up for tender by the government. 

The Transvaal was only able to compete successfully after the 

arbitrator reduced wages by ten per cent. If the Transvaal was 

the victim of 'unfair competition', three questions can be raised 

for discussion: 

1) Why was the 'unfair' element in competition not reduced by 

the migration of Cape garment workers to the Transvaal? 

2) Why did Transvaal firms not relocate their factories at the 

coast? 

3) Why did the Transvaal clothing industry employ mostly expensive 

white women and not draw on cheap black labour?, 

In tackling these questions, particularly the last two, it is 

useful to consider the issue of the wage disparity over a longer 

period than is covered by the thesis. 

4.1 Labour mobility 
Some garment workers who were trained in Cape Town did migrate 
to the Witwatersrand but this was not a major movement. It was 
not large enough to create a labour shortage in Cape Town and 
to force Cape wages to rise. The reasons for the lack of labour 
mobility in the clothing industry between the Witwatersrand and 
Cape Town are fairly obvious. The distance between the two centres 
is enormous. Most importantly, women garment workers generally 
remained tied to their families and husbands. The higher wage 
such a worker would receive in Johannesburg was not large enough 
to encourage family migration. The majority of Cape garment wor­
kers were coloured and until the late 1930's the Transvaal factor­
ies employed only whites and African men pressers (at wages lower 
than or equal to those paid in Cape Town). The 'racial question' 
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- ~hich included the difficulty which faced coloured families 
in finding housing in Johannesburg - was an additional factor 
which reduced labour mobility. 
4.2 Relocation 
In the 1950's wage costs in the Transvaal clothing industry rose 
so above those in other regions of South Africa that the indus­
try stopped growing and factories relocated their operations to 
the coastal areas or rural areas that were not subject to wage 
regulation (Barker, 1962, pp.603, 604). During the years 1925 
to 1939, undercutting from the coast was of real significance 
only periodically. The Wage Board, later assisted by the Transvaal 
union's organization campaigns, succeeded in raising Cape wages 
significantly between 1926 and 1928 and again in 1936. After 
1932 the Transvaal industry recovered swiftly once wages were 
cut by 10 per cent by an arbitration board. The disadvantages 
the Transvaal manufacturers suffered as a result of low wage compe­
tition from the coast were never sufficiently long lasting to 
make the production of clothing in the Transvaal economically 
unviable. Individual manufacturers certainly went bankrupt under 
the pressure of Cape competition. But the clothing industry is 
always highly competitive. Because of its low barriers to entry 
it has a high rate of enterprise failure. Notwithstanding Cape 
competition and the vicissitudes of the depression, the Transvaal 
industry did not collapse. even grew slightly. Its proximity 
to the market and its highly suitable labour force were the main 
supports of this growth. Even if economic forces had jeopardized 
the existence of the clothing industry in the Transvaal, few firms 
were large enough to have the resources to relocate as a 'going 
concern' • 
4.3 White labour, black labour 
Neither this thesis or appendix is directed at explaining the 
remarkable features of the clothing industry in the Transvaal ­
in particular its employment of white labour in low wage jobs 
(which in South Africa, and specially on the Witwatersrand, have 
always been the preserve of black workers) and its confinement 
of black employment in the industry until the late 1930's to the 
pressing of garments. However, these features of the Transvaal 
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industry reflect on the unusual growth path of the South African 
clothing industry. This has implications for our understanding 
of the Cape clothing industry. 
In Britain and the United States the clothing industry grew 
up in the nineteenth century on the sweatshop and outwork. 69 It 
made use of successive groups of the most exploitable workers, 
many of them immigrants, all of them poor and desperate for work. 
In the absence of laws to control sweating and outwork, competi­
tion made them the characteristics of clothing manufacture. The 
technology of the industry did not give a decisive advantage to 
factory production. The homeworker, assisted by family labour, 
could still compete. The clothing industry in South Africa largely 
escaped this phase of the development of clothing manufacturing. 
The extreme intensity of labour which allowed such low costs of 
clothing production in Britain and the United States was made 
possible by a social structure that was different from that in 
South Africa. The basic feature of this social structure was 
the existence of a mass of desperately poor, proletarianized wor­
kers. 
The existence of a growing competitive capitalism was a pre­
condition for forcing workers to accept the lowest wages. The 
clothing industry in Britain and the United States developed on 
the basis of such a competitive capitalism and the cities, the 
attitudes and the social system it had created. The existence 
of fully proletarianized workers - such as immigrants - is only 
one part of the requirements for the development of a low wage 
industry.70 The clothing industry in South Africa in the first 
decades of this century lacked both the labour resources and base 
of capitalist development. It could not find workers at wages 
low enough to compete with British imports on any but the smallest 
scale. As late as 1935, a Cape Town shirt manufacturer told the 
Customs Tariff Commission that "compared to South Africa, England 
is a low wage country". 
The clothing industry under competitive capitalism is essen­
tially an urban industry. It is attracted to cities and large 
69. 	 See Schmiechen (1974), and Chapter 1, above. 
70. 	 See Marx (1974, pp.848-50). Capitalist relations of production 
produce the lowest wages only if wider social conditions 
allow this. 
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towns not only by the market for output but by the particular 
type of labour' availaole in a city - proletarianized labour. 
In the Transvaal the attractive cheapness of black labour on the 
mines was not the product of 'simple' proletarianization - it 
relied on a complex intermingling of direct and indirect coercion. 
This extended from the rural areas where the workers had their 
homes to the mine compound and the rock face. To an extent, low 
wages were sustained by the access to the 1.and in the rural areas, 
which workers and their families retained under the migrant labour 
system. Only an industrial sector like mining, with its monopoly 
character, centralized labour recruiting system and its ability 
to use economies of scale, could operate such a system of labour 
procurement and control. 
Neither in the Transvaal, nor in the Cape was there a supply 
of workers who would accept wages low enough to compete with British 
industry on any scale on the open market. Where the clothing 
industry was able to grow - in an isolated and sporadic fashion 
71it was characterised by sweating and outwork. During World 
War I the disruption of clothing imports and the need for military 
uniforms gave the clothing industry in South Africa its first major 
opportunity. The manufacturers soon learnt to sweat their workers. 
The appalling conditions in certain Cape Town factories were said 
to be worse than in Britain. These lower class factories went 
under in the depression of 1920-1921 and with the revival of in­
tense competition from imports. 
The progress of the South African clothing industry after 
1925 was in large part due to the imposition of a protective tariff 
on imports which allowed the clothing factories to pay wages which 
South African workers would accept. This took place in the context 
of substantial, gradual improvements which were achieved largely 
though state intervention to check sweating after 1909. The growth 
of the South African clothing industry was crucially moulded by 
the 'civilized labour policy', the Wage Act and the Industrial 
Conciliation Act. South African clothing workers were badly paid, 
their conditions of work were unpleasant. They were subjected 
to long hours of work and strict discipline. But state regulation 
71. This is illustrated for Cape Town in Chapter 1, above. 
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prevented the all-pervading incidence of sweating and outwork 
that marked the development of the British and American clothing 
industries. South African manufacturers were forced to appre­
ciate the advantages of factory production and 'high' wages from 
the start. They were prevented by law from developing production 
on the basis of outwork and sweating which would have been profit­
able only with the use of the lowest paid, 'lowest class' workers. 
The forces of competition occasionally broke out of the system 
of control and showed the tendency of the industry to drift towards 
sweating and intense exploitation. For example the Wage Board 
in 193572 described the "terrible and appalling" conditions in 
factories "carried on by men of straw" which sprang up in Durban 
in 1934 after Wage Determination 42 was invalidated by the courts. 
Wages and prices fell drastically under the extreme competitive 
conditions and workers "received wages insufficient to provide 
even the barest necessities of life".73 The Board commented: 
The state of affairs which arose in Durban is com­

pletely conclusive of the inability of employees in 

this trade, under the existing economic system, to pro­

tect themselves against sweated labour conditions. 

Only by means of wage legislation or strong trade union 

o 0 0h °d h f h dO 74orgam..zatlon can t ey aVOl t e worst 0 suc con ltlons. 
Wages for white workers in the Transvaal were not higher than 
in the Cape simply because they were based on "European standards" 
(Barker, 1962, p.393). They were based on the lowest wages that 
the most suitable workers for factory production would accept. 
Willingness to accept a low wage is by no means the most important 
75
characteristic of an ideal clothing factory worker. If manufac­
turers had to train labour and provide machinery they needed time 
to reap the benefits of their investment. A worker had to stay 
in employment for six months or longer before he or she made a 
positive contribution to output. For a period, the most suitable 
clothing workers on the Witwatersrand were white, mainly Afrikaner, 
women. Legislation and government policy, as well as the strength 
72. Wage Board Report, 12 April 1935, paragraph 19. 
73. Ibid., paragraph 20. 
74. Ibid., paragraph 21. 
75. As the failure of many "border area" clothing factories testifies. 
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of their trade union, allowed them to make employment in clothing 
factories their preserve for about fifteen years. 
Graph A.3: The Real Value of the Minimum Starting Wages and Qualified 
Wages of 	Female Machinists in the Transvaal Clothing Industry 
761925-1983 (in 1975 Rands - £1 = R2) 
R35 

79 
YEAR 

76a. 	This graph represents changes in the mlnlmum wages of female ma­
chinists as reflected in industrial agreements at certain dates. 
All industrial agreements are included up to 1939. After 1939 
the graph gives an indication of the path followed by wage levels 
by recording the real value of the ruling wages at 5 yearly 
intervals from 1943 to 1983. Solid dots indicate the real value 
of wages reflected in an industrial agreement on the date of its 
application. Hollow dots indicate the deflated value of the 
wages set in a previous industrial agreement. Solid lines indi­
cate that there are no new wage rates effective between the 
dates indicated on the horizontal axis. Dotted lines indicate 
that there are intervening industrial agreements not recorded on 
the graph. 
b. 	The average annual retail price index for the Witwatersrand (con­
sumer price index) published in "Union Statistics for Fifty Years" 
and, from 1960, in the annual or quarterly volumes issued by the 
Department of Statistics, and rebased, where necessary, to 1975, 
was used to calculate the real value of wages. 
c. 	"Category B workers" are those who entered the industry after 1956. 
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It was on the basis of factory production that the South 
African clothing industry grew. Real wages rose in all areas 
77between 1925 and 1948 on account of labour shortages and espec­
ially favourable market conditions (Barker, 1962). But as South 
Africa's industrial base broadened and as urbanization speeded 
up, the clothing industry was able to draw on a new range of newly­
proletarianized workers. Following the traditions of the clothing 
industry, it began to use these workers, first coloured, then 
African women, to depress factory wages. The Transvaal garment 
workers' union resisted this process by organizing new workers 
into a separate branch of the union but ensuring that their wage 
scales were the same as for whites. The upward trend in real 
wages in the Transvaal ended in 1953. Undermined by competition 
from declining real wages at the coast and the willingness of 
African women to accept lower wages, Transvaal wage standards 
fell drastically. This is illustrated by Graph A.3, above. 
In Cape Town, after 1925, white and coloured workers were 
employed. The industry developed while employing increasingly 
a "better class of worker". Until the mid-1930's this meant, 
for many manufacturers, employing more white workers. Under the 
favourable conditions created by the War, wages in the Cape rose 
fast, to peak in 1948. From then until 1980 real wages slowly 
but steadily declined to levels below those set in the first indus­
trial council agreement in 1936. Since the late 1930's the industry 
has come to employ virtually only coloured labour, and has relied 
on the growing population in the Western Cape, which is increasingly 
an urbanized population, to keep wages low as the industry expanded. 
The Cape overtook the declining Transvaal as the leading area of 
employment in the clothing industry in the mid-1950's. Today 
its position is threatened by the growth of the industry in Natal. 
There, the industry took off in the 1930's on the basis of male 
Indian labour. Today African and Indian women are the vast majority 
of workers. 
The real value of the wages of Cape garment workers from 
1926 to 1983 is illustrated in Graph A.4, below. The minimum 
wages of qualified workers in three main categories are shown ­
those of male machinists, female machinists and lower grade female 
77. See Graph A.3, above; Graph A.4, below. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
405 

workers (such as packers). All show a similar pattern. The start­
ing wage of learners is the only wage to have risen in real terms 
since 1948. 
Graph A.4: Real Value of Minimum Starting Wages and Qualified Wages of 
Three Categories of Workers in the Cape Town Clothing Indus­
78try, 	1926-1983 (in 1975 Rands - £1 = R2) 
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M, F and P correspond to the wages of male machinists, female machin­
ists and female "packers". The starting wage is common to all these 
categories. 
78a. 	This graph plots the real value of wages ruling just after a change 
was made in the wage scales. This hides the extent to which infla­
tion (specially since the late 1960's) erodes the value of wages ­
particularly when changes in the agreements are less frequent. 
b. 	Every change in minimum wage levels under wage determinations, in­
dustrial council agreements and War Measure 43 of 1942 (as amended) 
is indicated. This involved consulting a Great Number of Government 
Gazettes, the dates of which it would be tedious to record here. 
c. 	The real value of wages was calculated using the retail price index 
(consumer price index) for Cape Town published in "Union Statistics 
for 50 Years" and the annual and quarterly volumes issued by the 
Department of Statistics, suitably rebased to 1975 when necessry. 
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The fall in wage rates in the Transvaal industry after 1956 
was calculated to bring the industry into line with the lower 
wages paid in the coastal areas. Long service workers continued 
to be paid wages in excess of coastal wages but the percentage 
gap between the two slowly narrowed. This is illustrated in Graph 
A.5 below which indicates the difference between the hourly rates 
of pay for qualified female machinists in Cape Town and the Transvaal. 
Graph A.5: 	 Comparison of Minimum Wages of Qualified Female Machinists 
between Cape Town and the Witwatersrand, 1926-198379 
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Blame it on the Board 
The only academic work to have considered the wage disparities in 
the clothing industry is that of H.A.F. Barker. Barker's doctoral 
thesis was published as a book under the sponsorship of the four 
clothing manufacturers' associations - 'The Economics of the Whole­
sale Clothing Industry of South Africa, 1907-1957' (Barker, 1962). 
He also contributed an article on the clothing industry to the 
79. 	 The graph is based on a comparison of hourly rates of pay 
between 1926 and 1939 and then at approximately five year 
intervals until 1983. 
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South African Journal of Economics (Barker, 1961). Barker does 
not consider the reasons for the wage disparity between the Cape 
Town and Transvaal industries as a distinct problem, nor does 
he consider the reasons for wage disparities specifically in the 
period 1925 to 1939. However the general points he raises do 
reflect on this period. 
In essence, Barker attributes the persistence of wage differen­
tials to the "absence of normal mobility of labour" in the clothing 
industry and the consequent existence of "virtually closed labour 
markets" in each of the main centres of production (Barker, 1961, 
p.251). Industrial council agreements reflect "the comparative 
bargaining powers of the parties involved" in each region (Barker, 
1962, p.401). This comparative power varies between regions, 
resulting in different wages. 
Barker is highly critical of this system. The products of 
the clothing industry have to compete on the same market; manufac­
turers face the same costs of machinery and raw materials, but 
wages are set by law at different levels in different centres. 
(T)he enforcement of wage-differentials by legal sanc­
tions is tantamount to a form of internal protection 
which discriminates between domestic producers on the 
basis of wages. 
Thus an economic regionalism is created, which breeds 
unrest, maladjustments and antagonisms, much as economic 
nationalism breeds international unrest and antagonisms 
on a larger scale. (Barker, 1961, p.252) 
Barker's outlook is highly coloured by the collapse of the Trans­
vaal clothing industry after 1953 which he experienced personally 
as the secretary of the CCMA and the TCMA and as the director 
of the National Clothing Federation of South Africa. This collapse 
was a direct result of the wage disparity and Barker felt obliged 
to find a scapegoat. He identifies the culprit as the Wage Board, 
whose activities in the 1920's and 1930's entrenched the regional 
differentiation of wages. Barker presents the Transvaal as having 
always been at a "disadvantage" compared with other centres of 
clothing production because of its higher wages (1961, p.251).80 
80. 	 The fact that "this inequality of wages ••• does not appear to 
have resulted in very appreciable disadvantage in wage costs 
until after the 1939-45 war" (Barker, 1962, p.605) is glossed 
over at this particular point. 
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The initial isolation by the Wage Board of the Transvaal 
clothing industry, merely because it had an industrial 
council in being, undoubtedly contributed to the propa­
gation of uneconomic wage disparities, which the subse­
quent formation of more industrial councils in the 
main coastal centres did nothing to remove. Indeed 
it is difficult to understand how the multiplication 
of such independent and virtually competing bodies can be 
expected to remedy a condition of unequal wage struc­
tures, in which the negotiating parties to each council 
have dissimilar interests. (1962, p.403) 
Barker's criticism of the effects of regional industrial councils 
on the welfare of the clothing industry as a whole is useful and 
substantiates his plea for the formation of a national industrial 
council and "a co-ordinated instead of haphazard wage structure" 
(1962, p.381). But Barker is deluded in seeing the original cause 
of the wage disparity in the acts and omissions of the Wage Board 
in the period from 1925 to 1939. This view is presented with 
some conviction and demands refutation. 
Barker argues that the Wage Board entrenched different wage 
standards between the Transvaal and the coast in its determinations 
between 1926 and 1932 so that in 1936, when "industrial councils 
began to function in the coastal centres", 
••• the industry had already expanded greatly and lower 
wage structures had become firmly established under 
the Wage Act in the Western and Eastern Cape and Natal. 
(1962, p.401) 
Barker criticises the Wage Board for not having recommended "a 
realistic nation-wide wage determination, with suitable differen­
tials based on actual wage costs" (1961, p.252). He suggests 
that such a determination would have been most easily absorbed 
before the outbreak of World War II, by which date "the regional 
disparities in the wages of female machinists (by far the largest 
category of garment workers) had not assumed unreasonable propor­
tions" (1962, p.128). He argues as follows: 
Considering the deterioration of the situation in retro­
spect, one must incline to the opinion that ••• the outcome 
indicates a failure to appreciate the ultimate issues 
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involved ••• (W)ith the Wage Board and the Minister as 
arbiters able to take a detached view, to decide purely 
on the merits of the case ••• , and to impose a decision 
without the necessity of securing full agreement among 
irreconcilables, it should have been possible for wage 
conditions to be ••• imposed gradually on a Union-wide 
basis ••• , without the entrenchment of unwarranted or 
inequitable regional disparities. (1962, p.401) 
Barker's arguments against the Wage Board are unjustifiable. 
The Wage Board was keenly aware of "the ultimate issues involved". 
Every Wage Board report from 1927 to 1935 argued strongly the 
need for a nation-wide determination of wages for the clothing 
industry and a determination which would, moreover, slowly raise 
the wage standards of the coastal areas until they were as favour­
able to workers as those on the Witwatersrand. Every Wage Board 
recommendation from 1926 up to 1935 was consistent with giving 
effect to this judgement. Barker was familiar with all these 
reports and recommendations, some of which he quotes. The Wage 
Board's refusal to be an instrument for encouraging a greater 
uniformity in wages dates from 1938. By then the Board was a 
different body in membership and in the function it was required 
. h 81to perf orm ln t e economy. 
The Minister of Labour refused to gazette the 1935 recommen­
dations of the Wage Board as a determination. There is no indication 
that he did not "appreciate the ultimate issues involved". He 
appreciated that a large rise in wages would eat into the profits 
of Cape clothing manufacturers and retard the expansion of this 
import-substituting, employment-creating manufacturing industry. 
He supported first the interests of capital against the demands 
of labour and only incidentally the interests of the Cape over 
those of the Transvaal. Barker's view of the state apparatuses 
as detached arbiters is incorrect. This thesis, by focussing 
on the role of the Wage Board and the Department of Labour in the 
Cape clothing industry, illustrates the class nature of the state. 
But it shows also that no 'correct' way for the state to serve 
its functions of organizing the dominant classes and disorganizing 
the dominated classes exists outside of the class struggle. 
81. See Chapter 4, p.220; and Chapter 6, p.306, above. 
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Appendix B: An Extract from Simons &Simons (1969, pp.449-S0) 
La Guma and Gomas were then actively engaged in form­
ing trade unions on a joint income of £4.10s. a month. 
Both assisted a group of garment workers who carne out 
on strike against a wage cut of lOs. on a weekly wage 
of £3.10s. or less. Bob Stuart, secretary of the local 
union, declared that the strike was unofficial, where­
upon La Guma appealed for financial help to the garment 
workers' union in Johannesburg. Bach intervened, with 
the result that the party in Johannesburg instructed 
La Guma to 'pursue an independent line' and refuse aid 
from any non-party union. He ignored the directive, 
and filed a counter-complaint against Bach who, he said, 
was 'tactless, bureaucratic and disruptive', the 'cause 
of past friction and potential disruption', and 'a 
serious menace to party welfare, prestige and progress'. 
Bach remained, while La Guma, the chief architect of 
the 'black republic' policy was cast out into the poli­
tical wilderness. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
I 
411 
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY 
I Archival Sources 
II Official Publications 
III Interviews 
IV Newspapers and Periodicals 
V Books, Articles and Theses 
Only material cited in references in the text or in the footnotes 
is included in the bibliography, with the exception of official 
statistics. All official statistics consulted are listed. Also 
have named all the people who kindly allowed me to interview 
them. Although few are directly quoted~ the interviews were in­
valuable in developing an understanding of the background to the 
events described in the thesis and in providing insights into 
the personalities of the protagonists. 
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I ARCHIVAL SOURCES 
1 Cape Chamber of Industries Archives 
The material in this collection is unsorted and unindexed. I 
have therefore had to develop my own reference system. The CCI 
was previously called the Cape Province Manufacturers' Association 
(1914-1922) and before that, the South African Manufacturers' 
Association (1909-1914). 
C Cape Chamber of Industries 
Cl Minutes 
Cl/l (Committee) Minutes 
Book 1 : 7 November 1904 (inaugural meeting) to 2 July 1908 
Book 2: 1 October 1908 to 20 November 1912 
Book 3: 11 December 1912 to 28 October 1915 
Book 4: 17 January 1916 to 21 August 1918 
Book 5: 23 August 1918 to 6 January 1920 
Cl/2 Executive Committee Minutes 
Book 1: 28 January 1920 to 28 February 1921 
C2 Annual Reports 
1917 onwards 
M Cape Clothing Manufacturers' Association 
Ml Clothing Section of the CCI (formed 1920) 
Minutes: Book 1: 26 April 1920 to 24 August 1925 
M2 Cape Wholesale Clothing and Shirt Manufacturers' Association 
(1925-1942 when name is changed to CCMA) 
M2/1 General Minutes: Book 1: 24 August 1925 to 13 January 1928 
Book 2: 2 February 1928 to 1 September 1931 
Book 3: 7 September 1931 to 18 June 1934 
Book 4: 11 June 1931 to 26 October 1931 
and 28 May 1934 to 28 April 1936 
Book 5: 26 June 1936 to 10 October 1939 
Book 6: 15 November 1939 to 8 February 1945 
M3 Cape Western Merchant Tailors' Association (formed 1926) 
M3/1 Minutes: Book 1: 15 March 1936 to 25 January 1929 
M3/2 Minutes of Conferences between Employers and Employees in 
the Tailoring Industry: Book 1: 15 June 1926 
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M4 	 Industrial Council for the Garment Manufacturing Industries 
(1927) Minutes: Book 1: 30 March 1927 and 5 April 1927. 
(This Council was not registered. The present Industrial 
Council for the Clothing Industry (Cape) was formed in 1935 
and registered in 1936.) 
Customs Tariff Commission 1935: Minutes of Evidence (17 Volumes, 
originally the property of H.J. Laite, a member of the Commission) 
2 Garment Workers' Union of South Africa (GWUSA) Archives 

This collection is housed in the Department of Historical and Liter­

ary Papers, The Library, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. 

Much of the material cited in the thesis was examined prior to 

its sorting and indexing. I have therefore been unable to indicate 

the exact location of many documents by reference to the inventory 

of the collection compiled by Marcelle Jacobson and Anna M. Cunningham: 

Records of the Garment Workers' Union (The Library, University of 

the Witwatersrand, 1980) 

Most of the documents referred to in footnotes as emanating from the 

GWUSA Archives may be found in the boxes indexed as: 

Bbe 1; Bce 1.20.1; Bcc 1; Bcd 1.1; Cba 1.1; Cba 2.4; Cba 2.5; 
Cca 2.5; Dab 1; Dac 2.1; Dac 2.7.1; Dac 2.8.1; Eab 2. 
Where documents were consulted after the compilation of the inventory, 
full details are given. 
3 Trade Union Council of South Africa (TUCSA) Archives 
This collection, which includes the archives of the Cape Federation 
of Labour Unions and the S.A. Trades and Labour Council, is housed 
in the Department of Historical and Literary Papers, The Library, 
University of the Witwatersrand. 
Again, most of the material cited in this thesis was examined 
before the inventory of the collection was published. In the 
case of the TUCSA collection, however, all the material had been 
sorted and is more easily locatable than in the c::'.se of the GWUSA 
Archives. The main sections referred to in the thesis are: 
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A; Cc 1; Da 4.1; Dc 2.12; Dc 7.3; Dc 8.17; Dc 8.26 
in Anna M. Cunningham Records of the Trade Union Council of South 
Africa: Part 1 1915-1954 (The Library, University of the Witwaters­
rand, 1979) 
4 Archives of the Secretary for Labour (S.A.B. ARB) 
This collection is part of the holdings of the Central Archives 
Depot (Sentrale Argief Bewaarplek - S.A.B.) at the Union Buildings; 
Pretoria. The papers of the Secretary for Labour are identified 
in the footnotes by the code ARB, followed by the file number. 
5 Records of the Cape Supreme Court (C.A.D.) 
The Cape Supreme Court records are part of the holdings of the Cape 
Archives Depot, Victoria Street, Cape Town. The following records 
are cited in the thesis 
Smith v. Crawford and Others Motions 12 (946) 1935 
Ex parte Ernest Petersen and Five Others Motions 22 (1083-93) 1935 
Garment Workers' Union and Others v. Smith Motions 1 (35) 1936 
Smith v. Crawford and Others, N.O. Motions (63) 1936 
Rex v. De Freitas, Fortuine &Weinberg Criminal Appeals I (79) 1936 
Shadrach v. Garment Workers' Union of the Cape Peninsula Motions 8 
(464) 1946 
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II OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS 

Reports of the Wage 	 Board (ordered chronologically by report date) 
30 September 1926: 	 'Clothing Industry' Annexure to the Votes 
and Proceedings of the House of Assembly 
No.55 of 1927 (hereafter Annexure 55 - 1927), 
published in The Social and Industrial Review 
Special Edition 30 September 1926 
30 November 1926: 	 'Interim Report on the Clothing Industry', 
Annexure 58 - 1927 
25 September 1927: 	 'Clothing Manufacturing Industry' Annexure 134 ­
1927-8, Social and Industrial Review Special 
Edition November 1927 
23 February 1928: 	 'Clothing Manufacturing Industry' Annexure 
398 - 1927-8 
23 February 1928: 	 'Bespoke Tailoring Industry for Certain Areas' 
Social and Industrial Review Special Edition 
22 June 1928 
February 1928 	 'Work of the Board for three years ended Feb­
ruary 1928' Annexure 112 - 1929, 2nd Sese 
7 March 1928 	 'Bespoke Tailoring Industry' Social and Indus­
trial Review Special Edition 22 June 1928 
10 October 1928 	 'Bespoke Tailoring Industry' Social and Indus­
trial Review Special Edition 8 December 1928 
20 July 1931 	 'Clothing Manufacturing Industry' Annexure 56 ­
1931-2 
23 October 1931 	 'Bespoke Tailoring and Clothing Manufacturing 
Industries' Annexure 82 - 1931-2 
25 November 1931 	 'Clothing Manufacturing Industry' Annexure 194­
1931-2 
31 December 1931 	 'Work of the Board for the period 1 March 1929 
to 31 December 1931' Annexure 108 - 1933 
18 March 1932 	 'Clothing Manufacturing Industry' Annexure 469 ­
1931-2 
12 April 1935 	 'Garment Making Trades' Annexur~ 99 - 1936 
21 February 1938 	 'Garment Making Trades' Annexure 190 - 1938 
I am indebted to the Library of Parliament for allowing me access to the 
unpublished reports of the Wage Board which are bound with the Annexures. 
Statistics 
Industrial Census Reports: 
For 1915/16 UG14 - 1918 
For 1916/17 UG51 - 1918 
For 1917/18 UG17 - 1920 
2 
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Industrial Census Reports: 
For 1918/19 UG28 - 1921 
For 1919/20 UG48 - 1921 
For 1920/21 UG40 - 1922 
For 1921/22 UG14 - 1924 
For 1922/23 UG41 - 1924 
For 1924/25 UG41 - 1927 
For 1929/30 UG33 - 1931 
For 1932/33 UG31- 1935 
For 1935/36 UG24 - 1938 
For 1936/37 UG39 - 1939 
For 1937/38 UG21 - 1941 
Cape of Good Hope: Census 1904 
Annual Statements of the Trade and Shipping of British South 
Africa 1899-1906 
Annual Statements of the Trade and Shipping of the Union of 
South Africa 1911-1939 

Union of South Africa: Official Year Book 

Union Statistics for Fifty Years 

South African Statistics 1968, 1982 

Monthly Bulletin of Statistics 1940-1946 

Quarterly Bulletin of Statistics - First Quarter 1983 

Other Official Publications 
Index to the Manuscript Annexures and Printed Papers of the House 
of Assembly 1910-1961 (Printed by Order of Mr. Speaker, 1963) 
A6-1906: Report of the Select Committee on the Factory Act. 
Cape of Good Hope. House of Assembly 
Cl-1906: Report of the Select Committee on the Conducting of 
Factories and the Fair Wage Clause. Cape of Good Hope. Legisla­
tive Council 
S.C.4-1917: Report of the Select Committee on the Regulation of 
Wages (Specified Trades) Bill 
UG14-1926: Report of the Economic and Wage Commission 
Reports of the Board of Trade and Industries (BTl): 
No.28a: 'Shirt, Collar and Pyjama Suit Manufacturing Indus­
try' Annexure 53 - 1925 
No.28b: 'Duty on Shirting' Annexure 537 - 1925 
No.107: 'Customs Tariff Amendments' Annexure 427 - 1930 
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No.3D3: 	 'The Clothing Industry' in Commerce & Industry Q 
9 May 1948 
Annual Reports of the Department of Labour 
For 1933 UG43 - 1934 
For 1934 UGll - 1936 
For 1935 UG4 - 1937 
For 1936 UG44- 1937 
For 1938 UG51 - 1939 
Government Gazettes 
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Mr S Reuben Back 
1983 Cape Town 
Mr E J Burford 
1979 London 
Mr Achmat Davids 
1978 Cape Town 
Mrs Cynthia Hartwell 
(nee Judelowitz) 
1979 London 
Mrs Lily Hertzberg 
(nee Abrahams) 
1979 London 
Mr Edgar Jacobs 
1978 Cape Town 
Mrs Rhoda Kets 
(nee Strichen) 
1981 Cape Town 
Ms Fanny Klenerman 
1979 Johannesburg 
Mr R Michael Lee 
1978 Cape Town 
Mr David L Lunn 
1978-1980 Cape Town 
and Johannesburg 
Mrs Pauline Naidu 
(nee Podbrey) 
1979 London 
Mr David Potash 
1980 Cape Town 
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Clothing factory owner/manager 

since the early 1930's (I.L. Back 

&Co). Past chairman of the CWCMA 

and past president of the CCI. 

Friend of Solly Sachs, former 

general secretary of NUDW and founder 

of the NUDW newspaper New Day. 

Social worker at The Muslim Assembly 

(Cape), the son of a family of tailors. 

Organizer of the Cape Town Branch of 

the Transvaal garment workers' union, 

1945. 

Voluntary worker for the NUDW in 

Cape Town during and after World War II. 

Founder of Monat &Co (Monatic shirts), 

1926 and of Towles-Edgar Jacobs Ltd 

(Tej) , 1946. Key member of the CWCMA, 

first chairman of ICCI (Cape) in 1935/6. 

Garment worker from 1928; activist 

member of the SAGWU, 1935-6; executive 

committee member and later paid orga~ 

nizer of GWU-CP. (Interviewed with 

Kevin Solomons) 

Proprietor of Vanguard Booksellers. 

Former Director of the Cape Chamber 

of Industries (c. 1950's and 1960's), 

former secretary of the Cape Clothing 

Manufacturers' Association. 

Worker at The African Clothing Factory 

1929 to 1937; chairman of the GWU-CP, 

1936 to 1937; first vice-chairman of 

ICCI (Cape) in 1935/6; associated with 

the Lenin Club. 

Trade union organizer in Cape Town 

during World War II and after; secre­

tary of the Cape Millinery Workers' 

Union and thus a fierce opponent of 

Robert Stuart. 

Jeweller, brother of J Potash, a mem­

ber of the CFLU executive committee 

in the 1930's. 
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Mr Fred Richfield 
1978 Cape Town 
Prof Guy Routh 
1979 Brighton 
Mr A Sadulla 
1978 Cape Town 
Dr Anna Scheepers 
1977 Johannesburg 
Mr Lionel Sussman 
1978 Cape Town 
Miss Eileen Ventris 
1979 Cape Town 
Mr Herman van Gelderen 
1981 Cape Town 
419 
Cape Town trade unionist associated 
with the CDC of the TLC in the 1930's. 
Former secretary of the ICCI (Trans­
vaal). 
Tailor and former member of the 
Journeymen Tailors' Association, 
1926-1928. 
Long-time and current president of 
the GWUSA (first elected in 1938); 
participant in campaigns against the 
leadership of the GWU-CP during World 
War II and particularly in 1954/55. 
Manager at Mona.t &Co from the 
early 1930's. 
Teacher in Wellington in the 1930's, 
associated with the Lenin Club. 
Printer since the 1930's, trade union­
ist, associated with the Lenin Club. 
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IV NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS 
The Bolshevik 

The Buyer 

The Cape Argus 

Cape Federation of Labour Unions: Official Organ 

The Cape Times 

Commerce & Industry 

Forward 

Garment Worker/Klerewerker 

The Guardian 

The Hammer 

The Social and Industrial Review 

South African Commerce and Manufacturers' Record 

This journal changed its name to Industrial South Africa in 
1918, to Industrial and Commercial South Africa in 1925, and 
later to South African Industry and Trade. 
The South African Journal of Industries 

The South African News 

The Sun 

Trade Union Bulletin 

Trades and Labour Journal of South Africa 

Umsebenzi/The South African Worker 

Workers' Voice 
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